Airbus prepares safety warnings following A321 incident

[arearadar]

airbus anomalies

I remember some years ago, a colleague recalls a situation in the hold at Ockham. An aircraft bust it`s level, he instructed BA-XXX to turn left immediately (Not the offending a/c) and then observed on radar that it was in fact turning right. He then instructed BA to turn left,left immediately. BA-XXX said I AM TURNING LEFT!!!!! The pilot took control of the situation, turned left and resolved a nasty situation.

Additionally, a friend of mine, having been left without an aeroplane with the demise of Concord, was on an A320 command course. I asked him how he found it and his reply was `What the xxxxxxx hell is it going to do next.

Dave

[ECAM_Actions]

I know the stats don't currently support it, but it will be interesting to see if the level of computerization that there is on any modern Airbus results in more accidents overall than more mechanical types.

Various bodies burying their heads in the sand aside, how many crashes of an Airbus have been unexplained, either in whole or in part, compared to any other type that crashed? Would be an interesting statistic to look into.

ECAM Actions.

[arearadar]

sciolistes

I think there were quite a few of those messages from the QF A380 too !

Dave

[Locked door]

Can I please ask all contributors to this thread read the AAIB report? It's not quite as dramatic as this thread makes out.

Found here :- http://www.aaib.gov.uk/cms_resources...0%20G-MEDJ.pdf

As another contributor asks, how many 737's have rolled into oblivion?

LD

[ECAM_Actions]

>> It's not quite as dramatic as this thread makes out.

Locked door: I politely disagree. Loss of control of the aircraft (due to an electrical fault no less) is second only to the aircraft actually crashing IMHO.

The crew were extremely lucky they were able to re-gain control, eventually.

That said, I do agree that the A380 was a different incident (accident?) altogether, and can't be compared to this one.

ECAM Actions.

[ELAC]

I politely disagree. Loss of control of the aircraft (due to an electrical fault no less) is second only to the aircraft actually crashing IMHO.

The crew were extremely lucky they were able to re-gain control, eventually.

ECAM Actions,

Locked Door is right. These loose and overly sensationalistic descriptions create false impressions of what occurred that aren't supported when you read the actual incident report.

Your response is a perfect example. Nowhere is it stated that the crew lost control of the aircraft or believed they had lost control of the aircraft. They certainly encountered difficulties with control, but those difficulties were not so severe that the captain felt a need to declare a Mayday and at its worst the bank angle was only 10 degrees. So, no "loss of control second only to the aircraft crashing" and no "re-gain control, eventually."

A likely guess is that the judders experienced were a function of the incremental movement of the rudder trim with each of the multiple FAC resets. The left wing low condition then coming about from the trim position as a result of the sum of those movements. Nobody's going to suggest that either condition should occur or is acceptable, but while disconcerting neither posed a serious problem to maintaining aircraft control.

While the reflex reaction is to bang the drum about those darned electronic airplanes, it is worth noting as some others already have, that many steam driven types have suffered far more severe unexpected control problems with far more deadly consequences. So, perhaps we should keep the scale of the event in perspective.

Personally, I'm more curious about how a GEN #1 fault could provoke a loss of both CM1 & CM2 primary instrument displays.

Regards,

ELAC

[lomapaseo]

I politely disagree. Loss of control of the aircraft (due to an electrical fault no less) is second only to the aircraft actually crashing IMHO.

The crew were extremely lucky they were able to re-gain control, eventually.

Its quite possible that there are semantics here.

Could I ask what control was lost and how long and just how was a safe landing eventually made?

It's quite possible that only some functions were lost while others were only temporary in nature and that the crew was able to use back up control finctions to land safely. Thus no luck was involved just adherence to knowledge and training

[protectthehornet]

regarding the 737 rollover...at least there is a procedure for dealing with it in a mechanical fashion.

one can also use assymetric thrust to deal with it...relatively easy

so, is the airbus procedure, start writing NEW CODE and enter it into the computer?

I don't care for the 737, but I flew it.

I hate the Airbus and didn't fly it, even though I would have earned more money.

what a POS!

[CONF iture]

The commander contemplated transmitting a MAYDAY, but considered that his priorities were to retain control of the aircraft and identify the problem.

That makes sense. Is it also what was thought on AF447 flight deck ... ?

That event reminds the Martinair 767 over NY ... the issue was a battery not properly installed, if I remember correctly.

[iceman50]

Protectthehornet

I hate the Airbus and didn't fly it, even though I would have earned more money.

what a POS!

Typical ridiculous comment from a well balanced individual who does not wear blinkers!

[fox niner]

Came out a week ago, when everyone's attention was on the, er, 'ashes' in Australia

Almost turned into a different sort of ash in a matter of minutes.

[Mushroom_2]

Could I ask what control was lost and how long and just how was a safe landing eventually made?

You could always try reading the report. Link supplied in a post above.

[TheWanderer]

From the AAIB accident report, page 3:

The flight crew reported that the aircraft did not seem to respond as expected to their control inputs and shuddered and jolted repeatedly

That could be interpreted as a kind of loss of control, if the aircraft does not respond to control inputs as expected, couldn't it?

[Data Guy]

Remembering AA 587

Remembering AA 587 control problems
That NTSB Report aside, there were 15 SDR reports not seen there of uncommanded rudder/yaw, hard-overs, ‘kicks and ‘jolts’. Some samples follow >
Before loss of AA Flt 587
6/27/96 >SDR #, AWXA9960293, America West A-320
11/15/98 >SDR # AWXA9800221, America West A-320
2/12/99 > SDR # 99UAL900100, United A319
6/27/00 > SDR # AALA20001276, American A300
12/22/00 > SDR # 00FDEA0093, Fed Ex A300
9/19/01 > SDR # 2001UALA02074, United A320

After loss of AA Flt 587
1/17/02 > SDR # AALA20020060, American A300
6/3/03 > SDR # AALA20030633, American A300
8/13/03 > SDR # CA03081900, Part 129 A310.
8/21/03 > SDR # AALA20030886, American A300
1/6/04 > SDR # AALA20040029, American A300
11/12/04 > SDR # AWXA200401278, America West A320
3/22/06 > SDR # F3LA200600010, Frontier A319
5/13/07 > SDR # NWAA07186325251, Northwest A320
8/2/09 > SDR # UALA2009080302310, United A320

And during this same period of time, and not included here were nine ASRS reports; #s 347914, 451388, 470552, 484141, 536451, 540100, 644939, 734999 and 790707.

To access the full texts for these Service Difficulty Reports, go to FAA Link >
FAA :: SDR Reporting [Service Difficulty Report Query Page] and just enter SDR control number.

To access the full texts for these Aviation Safety Reporting System reports go to search Link > ASRS - Aviation Safety Reporting System and enter the report number

Lastly, also a good read > “Over Controlling the Rudder Still Possible After 2001 Crash” By David Evans Aug 10, 2010. Story Link > Over Controlling the Rudder Still Possible After 2001 Crash|Aviation Safety Journal

--------------------

[QA1]

Easa Ad 2006 0280

I would be very surprised if this incident was not caused by the condition described in EASA AD 2006 0280. i.e. Burnt pin(s) in the #1 generator feeder engine disconnect plug.

[Janu]

Airbus said yesterday that they are not going to release a "safety warning" but are working on new advice to pilots informing them about the possible electrical fault and how to deal with it. Airbus pledges to continue working closely with the AAIB.

[Beeline]

The AD Explains flickering cabin lights, very common problem that has never caused this level of failure. The main cause of concern is how computers recieving feeds from different buses were knocked out simultaneously. DMCs/FACs.

I lost all power on a ground run once, very scary being in the pitch black with the engines running, even the standby failed, apu not avail. Never followedup the fix.

[wileydog3]

regarding the 737 rollover...at least there is a procedure for dealing with it in a mechanical fashion.

one can also use assymetric thrust to deal with it...relatively easy

so, is the airbus procedure, start writing NEW CODE and enter it into the computer?

I don't care for the 737, but I flew it.

I hate the Airbus and didn't fly it, even though I would have earned more money.

what a POS!]

And if there was a rudder hardover below 1500ft on takeoff, the procedure of unloading the airplane and accelerating worked well IN THE SIM. But fortunately no one had to actually try it in the air. It was anything but 'relatively easy' when one considers how many times many if not most pilots had to repeat the exercise. And 427 and the crash at Colorado Springs proved that combined with startle factor, low altitude, etc, it was not 'relatively easy' for even an experienced crew to resolve in time.

As for the 'what a POS', you do yourself a disservice by posting such comments, -hornet.

It appears however once again we are going to lapse into the Boeing/Airbus version of the American game "Ford/Chevy" and not focus on the real issues. Complex systems fail in complex and often unanticipated ways. Offered as sheer sarcasm, maybe we should go back to open cockpits, fixed gear, biplanes with cables to the flt controls so we can avoid all those complexities.

[J.O.]

It's interesting that (to my knowledge) Airbus has never stated in any flight crew documentation that reports from the cabin of flickering lights are a common indicator of a problem in the electrical network, usually being either a bad IDG or a bad GCU. Experienced engineers know that this is one of the first things to troubleshoot when such reports are made by the cabin crew.

[DC-ATE]

wileydog3 -
It appears however once again we are going to lapse into the Boeing/Airbus version of the American game "Ford/Chevy" and not focus on the real issues. Complex systems fail in complex and often unanticipated ways. Offered as sheer sarcasm, maybe we should go back to open cockpits, fixed gear, biplanes with cables to the flt controls so we can avoid all those complexities.

Ah.....but you forget DOUGLAS and LOCKHEED [the Cadillacs].
And.....you'll have to admit that if we never got into these "complex" systems, we would NOT be having these problems.

I gotta go with the -protectthehornet- as well.