Qantas A380 uncontained #2 engine failure
Join Date: Jan 2007
Location: Liverpool
Posts: 34
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
Gretchenfrage, I'm Not a pilot, but I expect neither are you if given you believe the list of supposed damages to the aircraft, you also believe it used all of the Runway (same post you are basing your sound decision to get down ASAP on), if you were in the left hand seat, it would almost certainly have gone off the end of the runway.
Now can us uninformed, idiot SLF please stay off the thread and leave it to the people who know what they are talking about?
Please ignore, I'm as bad as him, didn't notice there was a page of posts already.
Now can us uninformed, idiot SLF please stay off the thread and leave it to the people who know what they are talking about?
Please ignore, I'm as bad as him, didn't notice there was a page of posts already.
Join Date: Dec 2003
Location: Australia
Posts: 9
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
The A380 Jettison System does not jettison fuel from the feed tanks.
The 4 feed tanks have a capacity of 89,460kg and hence with a ZFW greater than 301,500kg the aircraft will be over MLW of 391,000kg even with fuel jettison.
The A380 has demonstrated Autoland up to MTOW of 569,000kg and also has CAT II capability with 1 E/O on each side and CAT III with 1 E/O.
I understand that with the multiple failures the landing calculation after fuel jettison showed a margin of approximately 100m and that was exactly what was left.
Given that situation a rushed return could well have lead to an overrun situation with an emergency evacuation which would have lead to injuries.
The 4 feed tanks have a capacity of 89,460kg and hence with a ZFW greater than 301,500kg the aircraft will be over MLW of 391,000kg even with fuel jettison.
The A380 has demonstrated Autoland up to MTOW of 569,000kg and also has CAT II capability with 1 E/O on each side and CAT III with 1 E/O.
I understand that with the multiple failures the landing calculation after fuel jettison showed a margin of approximately 100m and that was exactly what was left.
Given that situation a rushed return could well have lead to an overrun situation with an emergency evacuation which would have lead to injuries.
Join Date: Dec 2007
Location: Cornwall-on-Hudson, New York
Posts: 875
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
"Interesting article. The story is getting murkier ...Qantas A380 Investigation Goes Beyond Engines | AVIATION WEEK"
Nothing here we haven't read in this thread, if you care to go back at least 30 pages.
Well OF COURSE the investigation goes beyond engines. There was a wing, a hydraulic system, a variety of flight controls and other systems involved. That head could have been written a week ago (which in fact it probably was).
Nothing here we haven't read in this thread, if you care to go back at least 30 pages.
Well OF COURSE the investigation goes beyond engines. There was a wing, a hydraulic system, a variety of flight controls and other systems involved. That head could have been written a week ago (which in fact it probably was).
Join Date: Feb 2010
Location: Norden
Posts: 138
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
Originally Posted by no-hoper
The severed wiring loom is located inside the tank.
Look again. The picture is taken from inside the tank, see hole in the 'ceiling', the wiring is outside, in the leading edge.
I had another look HN39,the view is aft and the wiring is only low voltage.
Pls look at the nuts.Inside the tank are no nuts like these and:
everything is sealed inside.
The severed wiring loom is located inside the tank.
Look again. The picture is taken from inside the tank, see hole in the 'ceiling', the wiring is outside, in the leading edge.
I had another look HN39,the view is aft and the wiring is only low voltage.
Pls look at the nuts.Inside the tank are no nuts like these and:
everything is sealed inside.
Join Date: Jul 2007
Location: in the classroom of life
Age: 55
Posts: 6,864
Likes: 0
Received 1 Like
on
1 Post
iskyfly
Ohh yes we do........
The 7.30 Report - ABC
Go to the "More problems Plague Qantas" segment and watch at 47secs. Now that is not the fuel jettison nozzle surely!
Ohh yes we do........
The 7.30 Report - ABC
Go to the "More problems Plague Qantas" segment and watch at 47secs. Now that is not the fuel jettison nozzle surely!
Join Date: May 2005
Location: middle of nowhere
Posts: 312
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
I understand the beating of my argument, it is certainly out of line of the general teaching how to handle a serious failure. I admit having chosen a more juicy wording for my case and this might trigger some anger.
Let me however stand in for my arguments:
Facts, as reported:
The aircraft suffered a uncontained engine dismanteling with heavy debris slicing up essential parts.
The hole in the wing was reportedly getting bigger in flight.
The debris shattered some essential systems.
Dumping is only partially possible.
Conclusion (atleast to me): The damage was time critical, the handling (up to 2 hours) did not represent such an assessment.
As to the landing distance:
I agree that was critical, even after the two hours. The small margin indicates that even after dumping an overrun was still possible.
I simply weigh the risk of falling out of the sky with a heavily injured aircraft against the risk of running over a runway with all the rescue forces ready.
Remember SR111? They were confronted with a similar risk management: Handle the overweight (and failure) to land on Halifax's 2.4km without overrun, or to consider the threat to fall out of the sky so big, that a controlled overrun might be more survivable. The captain did the correct thing as is geneally tought, meaning to handle the failure and performance according to procedures and tables. - He lost the plane in the reversal manoever while dumping.
Consider this before you shoot back again.
My argument is that we no longer weigh some TIME CRITICAL failures heavily enough. There are failures and incidents that might require more than ECAM and SOPS. In all AOMs there is a remark that the captain has to consider deviating at any moment as to ensure safe flight. Now why would such a remark be there, apart from covering the a$$es of the company and regulators? It is also there for such cases.
I simply pretend (yes it's a theory and not necesseraly the right one) that in this particular failure the collateral damage and threat might have warranted a rapid landing as to land with a still airworthy airframe, than to possibly lose it before the calculated maximum landing weight is atteined.
(You might read my contribution considering the philosophical meaning of my handler. It means Gretchen's question in Goethes Faust, - too lenthy to explain, but it is about a tough question and tough choice. This fascinates me and goes right down to this thread)
Let me however stand in for my arguments:
Facts, as reported:
The aircraft suffered a uncontained engine dismanteling with heavy debris slicing up essential parts.
The hole in the wing was reportedly getting bigger in flight.
The debris shattered some essential systems.
Dumping is only partially possible.
Conclusion (atleast to me): The damage was time critical, the handling (up to 2 hours) did not represent such an assessment.
As to the landing distance:
I agree that was critical, even after the two hours. The small margin indicates that even after dumping an overrun was still possible.
I simply weigh the risk of falling out of the sky with a heavily injured aircraft against the risk of running over a runway with all the rescue forces ready.
Remember SR111? They were confronted with a similar risk management: Handle the overweight (and failure) to land on Halifax's 2.4km without overrun, or to consider the threat to fall out of the sky so big, that a controlled overrun might be more survivable. The captain did the correct thing as is geneally tought, meaning to handle the failure and performance according to procedures and tables. - He lost the plane in the reversal manoever while dumping.
Consider this before you shoot back again.
My argument is that we no longer weigh some TIME CRITICAL failures heavily enough. There are failures and incidents that might require more than ECAM and SOPS. In all AOMs there is a remark that the captain has to consider deviating at any moment as to ensure safe flight. Now why would such a remark be there, apart from covering the a$$es of the company and regulators? It is also there for such cases.
I simply pretend (yes it's a theory and not necesseraly the right one) that in this particular failure the collateral damage and threat might have warranted a rapid landing as to land with a still airworthy airframe, than to possibly lose it before the calculated maximum landing weight is atteined.
(You might read my contribution considering the philosophical meaning of my handler. It means Gretchen's question in Goethes Faust, - too lenthy to explain, but it is about a tough question and tough choice. This fascinates me and goes right down to this thread)
Last edited by Gretchenfrage; 16th Nov 2010 at 04:55.
Join Date: May 2008
Location: USA
Posts: 44
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
Can I ask a newbie question about the inability to shut down the No1 engine? It seems to a mere engineer like me that even if control of the fuel shut-off valves was lost (I take it that they are of a bi-stable design thus requiring an active "open" signal and an active "close" signal) why was it not possible to cut off power to the fuel pumps thus killing the flow to the engine from there? The plane was on the ground so killing fuel flow, even to all engines, shouldn't be an issue.
Thanks.
Thanks.
Land ASAP????
Would consider that Richard & Co made a rational decision on time criticality, in the face of the evidence that the aircraft continued to fly, notwithstanding unattributed comments of hole getting larger. (By what mechanism? what size of "growth", who was the observer, what is their observational validity.... etc)
The aircraft was expected to and did use up available LDA, following the jettisoning of fuel. At no time was the aircraft holding in a location where an expedient landing could not have been conducted if the condition deteriorated further.
After an extended period of time, I don't consider your position on landing immediately to have any more validity on this event than the Captain's decisions on the day, in fact given that you are proposing a landing knowing you are going to exceed LDA deliberately with damage onboard, INCLUDING FUEL LEAKS, and you are prepared to guarantee having an overrun and potential ignition sources, I would have thought that such a rash position would be nearly negligent in this particular instance. DOn;t get me wrong, there are numerous occasions where an immediate landing, or an out landing is a rational decision, such as fire in the cabin, cockpit etc... but the Captain and crew on this day assessed correctly that there was no urgency that overrode their prudent actions.
Had they landed immediately, overrun and had fatalities from an ensuing fire, (rough probability of 25-30% in this case..., certain overrun, #1 unable to be shutdown, fuel leak etc...) then your position would have been... what?
Decision making under uncertainty is what we do, and they did, just fine.
The aircraft was expected to and did use up available LDA, following the jettisoning of fuel. At no time was the aircraft holding in a location where an expedient landing could not have been conducted if the condition deteriorated further.
After an extended period of time, I don't consider your position on landing immediately to have any more validity on this event than the Captain's decisions on the day, in fact given that you are proposing a landing knowing you are going to exceed LDA deliberately with damage onboard, INCLUDING FUEL LEAKS, and you are prepared to guarantee having an overrun and potential ignition sources, I would have thought that such a rash position would be nearly negligent in this particular instance. DOn;t get me wrong, there are numerous occasions where an immediate landing, or an out landing is a rational decision, such as fire in the cabin, cockpit etc... but the Captain and crew on this day assessed correctly that there was no urgency that overrode their prudent actions.
Had they landed immediately, overrun and had fatalities from an ensuing fire, (rough probability of 25-30% in this case..., certain overrun, #1 unable to be shutdown, fuel leak etc...) then your position would have been... what?
Decision making under uncertainty is what we do, and they did, just fine.
Join Date: Dec 2003
Location: Australia
Posts: 9
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
Quote
"I simply pretend (yes it's a theory and not necesseraly the right one) that in this particular failure the collateral damage and threat might have warranted a rapid landing as to land with a still airworthy airframe, than to possibly lose it before the calculated maximum landing weight is atteined."
Sorry but I don't believe that is the situation at all. As I previously explained at a normal ZFW even with normal jettision available you will be some 40,000kg or more over MLW. So you would have to spend a lot longer flying around to get down to MLW.
There is NO Airbus limitation for an Overweight landing in the A380. The procedure is to return and land Overweight.
I would suggest the time taken was to configure the Aircraft and Crew for a very non-normal landing situation and what could have changed a major incident into a major accident on landing.
"I simply pretend (yes it's a theory and not necesseraly the right one) that in this particular failure the collateral damage and threat might have warranted a rapid landing as to land with a still airworthy airframe, than to possibly lose it before the calculated maximum landing weight is atteined."
Sorry but I don't believe that is the situation at all. As I previously explained at a normal ZFW even with normal jettision available you will be some 40,000kg or more over MLW. So you would have to spend a lot longer flying around to get down to MLW.
There is NO Airbus limitation for an Overweight landing in the A380. The procedure is to return and land Overweight.
I would suggest the time taken was to configure the Aircraft and Crew for a very non-normal landing situation and what could have changed a major incident into a major accident on landing.
Join Date: Apr 2002
Location: Sydney
Posts: 152
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
Hindsight is wonderful, lots of armchair pilots saying what they would do. You have to look at what information is available to the crew at the time. I don't believe that there would be a single professional pilot who following an engine failure, regardless of the level of the failure would assume that the spar was damaged. You're in a 4 engine a/c, the aircraft is flying normally. You work through all faults, setup a/c for approach to the best available runway and land. Those who fly airbus know that with 50 odd ECAMS' this will take a while to work through, hence the delay in flying the approach. A stated previously getting below MLW isn't critical. If the crew knew what the state of the a/c actually was, they may have expedited the approach. Given the info that was available to them the crew did an outstanding job.
Join Date: May 2005
Location: middle of nowhere
Posts: 312
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
MrWoodby
If you reread correctly my first contributions: Exactly my point. The only difference is the assumption that, yes or no, they might have come to such a conclusion during the emergency already.
Most of you say no, I say some might have, but we basically mean the same.
If the crew knew what the state of the a/c actually was, they may have expedited the approach. Given the info that was available to them the crew did an outstanding job.
Most of you say no, I say some might have, but we basically mean the same.
Join Date: Jul 2007
Location: in the classroom of life
Age: 55
Posts: 6,864
Likes: 0
Received 1 Like
on
1 Post
Lucky Airbus used that yellow rope to keep the wing together 
Thats is really amazing. Did they find any engine bits inside the wing or had they all punched through?
Thats is really amazing. Did they find any engine bits inside the wing or had they all punched through?
Join Date: Apr 2002
Location: Sydney
Posts: 152
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
Gretchenfage, to rush an approach, for an extremely unlikely spar damage (read, no one would ever consider it a real possibility prior to this incident) has far more risk involved than the conservative approach.
Join Date: May 2005
Location: middle of nowhere
Posts: 312
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
If you go for a spar damage, agreed, but that was not what I directed at. With such a hole punched in the wing you could ask yourself where the rest of that missile might have punched other holes. Tank? (eventual fire). Outer engine? (eventual further thrust loss or fire/smoke). Cabin? (looming decompression).
Apparently the fire fighting capability of the outer engine was compromised, its control on ground anyway. The hydraulics were gone to a great extent (controlability of the a/c).
I do not pretend that a speedy approach would be the only right decision. And it would have been one very easy to crticise later if only one pax would hit his head. But it still gives me the creeps to know whith what status they flew around for two hours.
I rest my case now because in fact the monday morning quarterback thing is all too applicable, I admit.
A pity though that different oppinions and maybe some avocatus diavoli stuff get shot down up so dilligently here.
Apparently the fire fighting capability of the outer engine was compromised, its control on ground anyway. The hydraulics were gone to a great extent (controlability of the a/c).
I do not pretend that a speedy approach would be the only right decision. And it would have been one very easy to crticise later if only one pax would hit his head. But it still gives me the creeps to know whith what status they flew around for two hours.
I rest my case now because in fact the monday morning quarterback thing is all too applicable, I admit.
A pity though that different oppinions and maybe some avocatus diavoli stuff get shot down up so dilligently here.
Join Date: Sep 2010
Location: Double Oak, Texas
Age: 71
Posts: 180
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
G rage..
Shot down so diligently as you shoot down the skill/decisions of 5 professional aviators (whose lives depend upon their actions); alas they had no ability to contact you for advice on how to proceed with such an easy decision tree during their brief combat mission??
Bah, what did those clowns flying the beast know, pity G.rage wasn't available that day. Then the world could have seen some real Top Gun piloting!
A pity though that different oppinions and maybe some avocatus diavoli stuff get shot down up so dilligently here.
Bah, what did those clowns flying the beast know, pity G.rage wasn't available that day. Then the world could have seen some real Top Gun piloting!
Wing damage
I agree with HN39's post #979. I believe the picture 'Section of Front Spar' is taken from within the wingbox (and therefore the tank) looking at the inside face of the front spar and forward through the hole into the leading edge D nose area. The damaged top skin can be seen above and the nuts are those attaching the top flange of the spar to the main skin.
SafferNZ's other picture seems to be taken looking through the exit hole in the top skin down into the wingbox. The fuel pipe inside the tank has been fractured in an 'upwards' direction, i.e. towards the camera POV. The yellow cord appears to indicate the trajectory of the engine part passing through the wing.
SafferNZ's other picture seems to be taken looking through the exit hole in the top skin down into the wingbox. The fuel pipe inside the tank has been fractured in an 'upwards' direction, i.e. towards the camera POV. The yellow cord appears to indicate the trajectory of the engine part passing through the wing.
Join Date: Mar 2008
Location: Texas, USA
Posts: 9
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
What I thought was interesting was the probing of the links between the Trent 1000 and 900. Although RR says this problem is confined to the 900 it doesn't ring true given the similarities betwen the events. There is also the while issue of how much RR knew about this beforehand. 
why was it not possible to cut off power to the fuel pumps thus killing the flow to the engine from there?