UPS Aircraft Down In Dubai
Join Date: Jan 2003
Location: Manchester
Age: 45
Posts: 615
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
All this talk of lithium-ion batteries made me do a little digging into whether they are actually DG or not. Unfortunately I don't have a DGR book or Technical Instruction manual with me, so most of this is off my head and corroborated off the net, so forgive any errors.
As of 2009, Li-Ion batteries under 100Wh could be carried without a DG cert as excepted quantities (under 10Kg). Those over 160Wh need a DG cert under UN3480 Class 9 (RMD).
So for the excepted quantities class, you could have hundreds of Kgs in an overpack, and it would never appear on a NOTOC, and maybe under a shrinkwrapped pallet where you could not possibly see it. Scary.
As of 2009, Li-Ion batteries under 100Wh could be carried without a DG cert as excepted quantities (under 10Kg). Those over 160Wh need a DG cert under UN3480 Class 9 (RMD).
So for the excepted quantities class, you could have hundreds of Kgs in an overpack, and it would never appear on a NOTOC, and maybe under a shrinkwrapped pallet where you could not possibly see it. Scary.
Join Date: Mar 2009
Location: Phoenix, AZ USA
Age: 66
Posts: 0
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
This is one of the few scenarios I can see where "full automation" has a place. Some type of "single button" or even voice activation that can be triggered in the event of some type of impending incapacitation of the flight crew.
Basically the "hail Mary" option for the flight crew when it's all going south and no realistic option exists.
Basically the "hail Mary" option for the flight crew when it's all going south and no realistic option exists.
Join Date: Mar 2004
Location: Somewhere Over America
Posts: 192
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
Instead of ejection seats, hacking out 2" bullet proof windows with the crash ax, parachutes and other gee wiz Buck Rogers ideas how about keeping this crap off the plane in the first place. Anyone caught disobeying the rules would be band from shipping by air for life.
If it truly has to go by air then the shipper pays for an off duty firefighter to stand watch over the pallet with a full complement of fire apparatus appropriate to the DG being shipped. Manning ratio is one firefighter per pallet.
If it truly has to go by air then the shipper pays for an off duty firefighter to stand watch over the pallet with a full complement of fire apparatus appropriate to the DG being shipped. Manning ratio is one firefighter per pallet.
More Crew = Safety
Expdrd33, if having more crew is safer how do you explain todays safety rate against the "good ole" days?
Carrying around a FD crew of 5 would do wonders for airlines economics and prices, which in turn will reduce the jobs available.
We will have to see what the investigation says but it is clear that batteries are everywhere and can be dangerous. Is there a practical way to scan packaged cargo for batteries?
20driver
Carrying around a FD crew of 5 would do wonders for airlines economics and prices, which in turn will reduce the jobs available.
We will have to see what the investigation says but it is clear that batteries are everywhere and can be dangerous. Is there a practical way to scan packaged cargo for batteries?
20driver
Batteries are everywhere; indeed they are and your aircraft is fitted with them. Fortunately, they rarely go wrong.
I had the aircraft battery (NiCad) blow up on me over northern Kenya at night (Aden to Nairobi) in one of Mrs Windsor's Argosys. It started off with a smell. F/E went downstairs (the battery was in a cupboard on the left of the forward fuselage INSIDE the pressure hull). Naturally, he took the asbestos gloves with him to investigate. He came back upstairs and told me that he had found the battery "rather hot" and had disconnected both terminals and so we should have no further problems until after landing.
About 20 minutes later there was a bit of a "whump" as the battery blew. Luckily, everything was contained within the cupboard.
We then had to do an emergency descent (not very far in an Argosy) and then get rid of the fumes.
It transpired that NiCads can indeed start to overheat so a thermal strip was introduced between the first couple of cells and that was supposed to melt. Sadly, it did not and so the temperature kept increasing and eventually a catalytic reaction took over.
The funny part was that a bunch of the passengers downstairs were on their way to a gospel meeting in Nairobi. From the flightdeck we could clearly hear renditions such as "Land of Hope and Glory" and "Abide With Me".
I can also remember one of Fred Laker's DC-10s doing an unseemly dive into Winnipeg on the way from LGW to LAX with serious electrical problems which proved to be the battery.
Just like car owners, we take our batteries for granted.
I had the aircraft battery (NiCad) blow up on me over northern Kenya at night (Aden to Nairobi) in one of Mrs Windsor's Argosys. It started off with a smell. F/E went downstairs (the battery was in a cupboard on the left of the forward fuselage INSIDE the pressure hull). Naturally, he took the asbestos gloves with him to investigate. He came back upstairs and told me that he had found the battery "rather hot" and had disconnected both terminals and so we should have no further problems until after landing.
About 20 minutes later there was a bit of a "whump" as the battery blew. Luckily, everything was contained within the cupboard.
We then had to do an emergency descent (not very far in an Argosy) and then get rid of the fumes.
It transpired that NiCads can indeed start to overheat so a thermal strip was introduced between the first couple of cells and that was supposed to melt. Sadly, it did not and so the temperature kept increasing and eventually a catalytic reaction took over.
The funny part was that a bunch of the passengers downstairs were on their way to a gospel meeting in Nairobi. From the flightdeck we could clearly hear renditions such as "Land of Hope and Glory" and "Abide With Me".
I can also remember one of Fred Laker's DC-10s doing an unseemly dive into Winnipeg on the way from LGW to LAX with serious electrical problems which proved to be the battery.
Just like car owners, we take our batteries for granted.
Join Date: Oct 2007
Location: KLAX
Posts: 287
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
US Congressman now reacting to UPS Flight 6 . . From Air Cargo News 09/08/10
-The investigators are now looking into whether there were any lithium-ion batteries onboard, which have already raised safety concerns about their inclusion on flights.
“The frequency of events, including the difficulty in extinguishing lithium-battery fire, warrants taking strong action,” said Jerry Costello, chairman of the US’ House of Representatives’ aviation subcommittee -
-The investigators are now looking into whether there were any lithium-ion batteries onboard, which have already raised safety concerns about their inclusion on flights.
“The frequency of events, including the difficulty in extinguishing lithium-battery fire, warrants taking strong action,” said Jerry Costello, chairman of the US’ House of Representatives’ aviation subcommittee -
Join Date: May 2002
Location: dubai
Posts: 942
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
Economics
When I am confronted by the question, "How much is this all going to cost?" I like to remind the money boys the old and true saying. "If you think safety is expensive, try having an accident." This accident, like all others is going to cost some people a lot of money indeed.
An accident could be the trigger, or the final straw, that puts a company under.
When I am confronted by the question, "How much is this all going to cost?" I like to remind the money boys the old and true saying. "If you think safety is expensive, try having an accident." This accident, like all others is going to cost some people a lot of money indeed.
An accident could be the trigger, or the final straw, that puts a company under.
Join Date: Jun 2009
Location: Bangkok,Thailand
Posts: 106
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
Yes there will always be a debate about cost of extra crew. But I think on all large aircraft, there should be a safety engineer/officer. Let the pilots fly the plane. Let this person address all the other issues.
Yes there will always be a debate about cost of extra crew. But I think on all large aircraft, there should be a safety engineer/officer. Let the pilots fly the plane. Let this person address all the other issues.
Join Date: Jan 2008
Location: Atlanta, GA, USA
Posts: 349
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
Battery fire - nasty stuff
YouTube - Tests on lithium battery fire
Lithium Battery Fire Could Burn Through a Cargo Hold | Air Safety Week | Find Articles at BNET
One can only imagine the catastrophe possible with a bulk shipment of lithium batteries!
-drl
YouTube - Tests on lithium battery fire
Lithium Battery Fire Could Burn Through a Cargo Hold | Air Safety Week | Find Articles at BNET
One can only imagine the catastrophe possible with a bulk shipment of lithium batteries!
-drl
Last edited by deSitter; 8th Sep 2010 at 21:03.
Join Date: Oct 2007
Location: KLAX
Posts: 287
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
Heres another on lithium batterys lifted from another forum. . .
YouTube - CR123A Lithium Battery Fire
Go ahead . .try this at home.
YouTube - CR123A Lithium Battery Fire
Go ahead . .try this at home.
Join Date: Nov 2009
Location: Near Puget Sound
Age: 86
Posts: 88
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
You know, I've always wondered if having an FE on SR-111 might have made a difference. As I said earlier, they were about as well positioned as possible for an immediate diversion over the North Atlantic. However, the workload on two pilots would have been unreal. Let's see, one flies the airplane, the other coordinates with ATC, the other fights the fire, . . . . well you get the idea.
Assuming we could say for sure that a FE would have been the difference between Halifax and the water, I wonder how much the industry has saved by doing away with the FE.
Goldfish
Assuming we could say for sure that a FE would have been the difference between Halifax and the water, I wonder how much the industry has saved by doing away with the FE.
Goldfish
Join Date: Jun 2009
Location: Tunisia
Age: 71
Posts: 146
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
doubleu-anker,
I'm not trying to argue with you, but perhaps an accident is cheaper. How much insurance money is collected on a yearly basis against how much is paid in premiums? Then of course premiums are raised to recover what has been paid out. It's a win/win for them and no need for the insurance industry to lobby for comprehensive safety improvements.
However, the fed's have known for years through several complete and partial losses the dangers of lithium batteries.
The real danger to aviation safety worldwide in my view is the incompetence of the regulating authorities who just can't seem to show any balls on a wide range of issues from fatigue to DG's.
We always crewed (MD-11) with loadmasters and while he may not have saved the day, I certainly felt better having eyes and a firefighter in the jumpseat. Said authorities, who were and still are sleeping with the manufacturers, sh@t in OUR messkit when they did away with the FE.
I'm not trying to argue with you, but perhaps an accident is cheaper. How much insurance money is collected on a yearly basis against how much is paid in premiums? Then of course premiums are raised to recover what has been paid out. It's a win/win for them and no need for the insurance industry to lobby for comprehensive safety improvements.
However, the fed's have known for years through several complete and partial losses the dangers of lithium batteries.
The real danger to aviation safety worldwide in my view is the incompetence of the regulating authorities who just can't seem to show any balls on a wide range of issues from fatigue to DG's.
We always crewed (MD-11) with loadmasters and while he may not have saved the day, I certainly felt better having eyes and a firefighter in the jumpseat. Said authorities, who were and still are sleeping with the manufacturers, sh@t in OUR messkit when they did away with the FE.
Join Date: Jun 2009
Location: Bangkok,Thailand
Posts: 106
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
In the year 2010, it appears that some of the operating philosophy is to let the robot fly the plane, and let the two pilots address all the other issues, which includes flying when the robot can't. (OK, I shall catch a small ration for that ... fair enough). That would still leave the crew in this case with apparently not the right tools to address a fire, other than "land as soon as you can" as a response.
Trash du Blanc
Join Date: Mar 2001
Location: KBHM
Posts: 1,185
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
It would be interesting to look at the relative manning requirements of the maritime industry.
Let's say a ship was the same length - 225 feet - and carried roughly the same tonnage of cargo. How many crew would be required to be aboard? Would they be required to be trained in onboard firefighting?
Let's say a ship was the same length - 225 feet - and carried roughly the same tonnage of cargo. How many crew would be required to be aboard? Would they be required to be trained in onboard firefighting?
Expdrd33, if having more crew is safer how do you explain todays safety rate against the "good ole" days?
Quote.. There are Lies, Damned Lies, and Statistics ( Anon ) depends who holds the purse strings.
Cynic ? who me ?
Many past accidents in The Good Old Days occured regardless of the number of crew involved, but were related to the cr*p equipment, engines, navaids, weather reporting and comms. that they had to use, and had those same 5 man crews been flying a modern 777 in todays' conditions, then their accidents might not have happened ? Maybe.
Another pair of eyes / hands 'should' help, but then Mr. Murphy is always with us, and I can recall one accident when the presence of a Senior Check Captain in the jump seat, off duty, interspersed his comments into the actions of the other 3 crew members, even tho' he acted with the best intentions, but that affected the reading of the checklist with subsequent disastrous results.
Not really relevant to the subject accident, but I attended one Sim. training session when we were asked the first action in getting a fire warning ? Won't bore you with the various answers, all deemed to be wrong. Nothing, was the desired reply. Sit on your hands and think before you touch anything. I guess that was a precursor of the Capt and Dog philosophy that is now being suggested as the way to operate single pilot heavy jets ?
Last edited by ExSp33db1rd; 9th Sep 2010 at 05:10.
@goldfish85
As you can well imagine, SR111 was discussed widely within the company at the time. If a FE might have helped, I don't know, possibly or maybe not. The situation was extremely tricky and misleading to the crew.
From where I sit and from what I did hear and read about this one from people who had direct access to the investigation, it became so dramatic because of a very unique sequence of events. I am going from memory here, long time, but what was discussed and what seemed to me the most logical chain of events was of a nature that was a "gotcha" from every angle one looked at it.
When they first smelled and later saw the smoke and took the decision to divert, they had no way of knowing the location and the mechanics of what went on. Initially, nothing big happened, and even worse, the smoke disappeared or lessened considerably, giving them the idea they had time to prepare the cabin, dump fuel and all that.
However, what went on behind this bulkhead was a trap truely set. The fire melted a cap fitted over an AC duct not used on the pax version of the MD11. Once the cap was gone, the duct sucked the smoke away from the flight deck. That is when the smoke disappeared. When they then went into the checklists and switched off the cabin bus, the fans which provided the suction stopped working and within very few moments, the fire started to move forward and attack the vital systems. A very short time later, they basically had nothing left and crashed.
Of course, the question arose what if they had not disactivated the cabin bus? Might it have bought them the time to go down and land? Very likely if they had gone straight into Halifax or even cricled. But, and that is the crux, they had NO WAY of knowing this and did the absolutely logical thing by depowering the cabin bus, as per checklist. They were right in their assumption that this fire was electrical, so powering down unessential equipment is perfectly sound and what they were trained to do. As to the duct, nobody knew or thought about it's effect once the silicon cap was gone and probably there would not have been an effect, had the fire only been slightly different. And obviously, nobody knows what would have happened if they had continued flying with the fans still on, probably the fire might have eventually burnt through the fuselage aft of the flight deck.
So what really killed them was the sequence of events of smoke on, smoke disappears, giving them the illusion of time available to prepare for landing, following their checklists and with that unknowingly aggravating the situation to beyond control. Nightmare for everyone of us who ever might have to sort out such a situation.
Had they gone by the principle of "he who hesitates survives" on the checklists and at the same time gotten it on the ground overweight and PDQ, they might have made it, or not. BUT had they done so and the fire had been slightly different in nature, this might have been the recipe for disaster right there.
So the posters here who say evaluating a fire is not done got more than one point. I rekcon all of us would rather take the "blame" of an unnecessary diversion due to a faulty indication or cremated crewmeal than to ever ever get into a situation like the crew of Swissair 111 or UPS 6.
As you can well imagine, SR111 was discussed widely within the company at the time. If a FE might have helped, I don't know, possibly or maybe not. The situation was extremely tricky and misleading to the crew.
From where I sit and from what I did hear and read about this one from people who had direct access to the investigation, it became so dramatic because of a very unique sequence of events. I am going from memory here, long time, but what was discussed and what seemed to me the most logical chain of events was of a nature that was a "gotcha" from every angle one looked at it.
When they first smelled and later saw the smoke and took the decision to divert, they had no way of knowing the location and the mechanics of what went on. Initially, nothing big happened, and even worse, the smoke disappeared or lessened considerably, giving them the idea they had time to prepare the cabin, dump fuel and all that.
However, what went on behind this bulkhead was a trap truely set. The fire melted a cap fitted over an AC duct not used on the pax version of the MD11. Once the cap was gone, the duct sucked the smoke away from the flight deck. That is when the smoke disappeared. When they then went into the checklists and switched off the cabin bus, the fans which provided the suction stopped working and within very few moments, the fire started to move forward and attack the vital systems. A very short time later, they basically had nothing left and crashed.
Of course, the question arose what if they had not disactivated the cabin bus? Might it have bought them the time to go down and land? Very likely if they had gone straight into Halifax or even cricled. But, and that is the crux, they had NO WAY of knowing this and did the absolutely logical thing by depowering the cabin bus, as per checklist. They were right in their assumption that this fire was electrical, so powering down unessential equipment is perfectly sound and what they were trained to do. As to the duct, nobody knew or thought about it's effect once the silicon cap was gone and probably there would not have been an effect, had the fire only been slightly different. And obviously, nobody knows what would have happened if they had continued flying with the fans still on, probably the fire might have eventually burnt through the fuselage aft of the flight deck.
So what really killed them was the sequence of events of smoke on, smoke disappears, giving them the illusion of time available to prepare for landing, following their checklists and with that unknowingly aggravating the situation to beyond control. Nightmare for everyone of us who ever might have to sort out such a situation.
Had they gone by the principle of "he who hesitates survives" on the checklists and at the same time gotten it on the ground overweight and PDQ, they might have made it, or not. BUT had they done so and the fire had been slightly different in nature, this might have been the recipe for disaster right there.
So the posters here who say evaluating a fire is not done got more than one point. I rekcon all of us would rather take the "blame" of an unnecessary diversion due to a faulty indication or cremated crewmeal than to ever ever get into a situation like the crew of Swissair 111 or UPS 6.
Huck,
Hard to say exactly,but a ship has what's called a safety crew meaning not the minimum crew to navigate the ship from A to B, but to operate it safely and being able to cater for emergencies.
Every sailor needs to pass a certified safety course learning first aid, fire fighting and other safety procedures. On every ship I've been on we had safety drills every Saturday after lunch. Fire drills and life boat drills alternate weeks. Comparing a ship to an airplane is of course not fair, we had all the fi-fi equipment you could wish for. In the engine room and cargo tanks we could inject inert gases, we had huge sea water fire pumps and extinguishers all over the place. I've had three serious on-board fires in my career, all extinguished.
Per
It would be interesting to look at the relative manning requirements of the maritime industry.
Let's say a ship was the same length - 225 feet - and carried roughly the same tonnage of cargo. How many crew would be required to be aboard? Would they be required to be trained in onboard firefighting?
Let's say a ship was the same length - 225 feet - and carried roughly the same tonnage of cargo. How many crew would be required to be aboard? Would they be required to be trained in onboard firefighting?
Every sailor needs to pass a certified safety course learning first aid, fire fighting and other safety procedures. On every ship I've been on we had safety drills every Saturday after lunch. Fire drills and life boat drills alternate weeks. Comparing a ship to an airplane is of course not fair, we had all the fi-fi equipment you could wish for. In the engine room and cargo tanks we could inject inert gases, we had huge sea water fire pumps and extinguishers all over the place. I've had three serious on-board fires in my career, all extinguished.
Per
Join Date: Sep 2001
Location: 38N
Posts: 356
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
Bean-Counting solution for solving problem of forward viz in fire situation
Here's a napkin analysis for actually addressing this problem :
the numbers are approximate, but maybe not unreasonable vs actual:
(assumes various commercial products now available, including those discussed at the beginning of this thread)
Cockpit Smoke-Obscuration protection for the Entire Global Commercial Jet fleet:
Approximate number of turbine Air-Transport aircraft in use around the world : 10,000
Approximate est cost for installation/use life of inflatable smoke-through visibility package for panel and forward view windows :
New installations (in quantity) & 5 yrs support : US$ 25,000 /ac
Sustaining cost for existing installations - addnl 5-yr : US$ 12,000 /ac
So:
Cost for the first 5 years (50,000 aircraft-years) = $250 Million
Cost for each successive 5 years (50,000 aircraft-years) = $120 Million
10-yr cost for solving this problem for the entire global fleet = $370 Million
Nominal cost est for ONE aircraft lost - Passenger -Freight a/c median case = $400 Million
The numbers, even if you find a way to double the cost, are very persuasive. Surely some of those financial geniuses that can sell the same city block 5 or ten times over at half a billion $ a throw can help solve this well-bounded but very important problem? Sell bonds? Ticket Tax? Carriers pay? Crews pay out-of-pocket?? Which will it be?
Solvable problem - time to act appropriately.
the numbers are approximate, but maybe not unreasonable vs actual:
(assumes various commercial products now available, including those discussed at the beginning of this thread)
Cockpit Smoke-Obscuration protection for the Entire Global Commercial Jet fleet:
Approximate number of turbine Air-Transport aircraft in use around the world : 10,000
Approximate est cost for installation/use life of inflatable smoke-through visibility package for panel and forward view windows :
New installations (in quantity) & 5 yrs support : US$ 25,000 /ac
Sustaining cost for existing installations - addnl 5-yr : US$ 12,000 /ac
So:
Cost for the first 5 years (50,000 aircraft-years) = $250 Million
Cost for each successive 5 years (50,000 aircraft-years) = $120 Million
10-yr cost for solving this problem for the entire global fleet = $370 Million
Nominal cost est for ONE aircraft lost - Passenger -Freight a/c median case = $400 Million
The numbers, even if you find a way to double the cost, are very persuasive. Surely some of those financial geniuses that can sell the same city block 5 or ten times over at half a billion $ a throw can help solve this well-bounded but very important problem? Sell bonds? Ticket Tax? Carriers pay? Crews pay out-of-pocket?? Which will it be?
Solvable problem - time to act appropriately.