BA 747 Crew commended

[L337]

I have read the report thank you, and I did see that it used reduced power. And I see no evidence that they increased power once airborne.

However if you look at my post, I am suggesting that even had they firewalled it... as "JNB is hot and high. They were very close to MAX ToW and there would have been little or no extra left."

The report states:

The Maximum Certified Mass for the aircraft is 396 890 kg and the
Take-off Weight for the aircraft at the time was 365 000 kg. The
aircraft was thus 31 893 kg below the Maximum Certified Mass
during take off

However what it does not say is what the performance limiting weight was. It was probably below 396,890kg. The ATIS wind was light and variable so odds are that they used a tailwind in the take off performance calculation. If they did then they will have been very close to the performance limit.

I take your point, but having flown the 744 for a while and flown the exact departure at JNB in similar conditions, they will have had little extra performance available.

As a PS: The engines on the 744-436 can be safely firewalled. They have a fancy computer between the thrust levers and the engine and if you push the TLs fully forward the computer will give you maximum available power whatever phase of the flight.

[ExSp33db1rd]

that the crew firewalled the engines.

Long time ago now of course, but I don't recall the word " firewall " being an option, if take-off with reduced thrust i.e. Graduated Power was being applied, and more power needed, I recall the command " Go Around Power " being the appropriate call ? G .A. Power being a calculated figure, not just a B***s Out reaction. ( but then we had a Flt. Eng. !! )

Only nit-picking of course, in Extremis I guess the phrase " what the h**l " as the Thrust Levers are in fact firewalled is the way to go !!

Good show chaps.

Didn't we get a green LE flaps extended light added to the forward panel of the Classic 747 following an early accident out of Nairobi, when Lufthansa took off without the L.E. flaps extended ?

If that light wasn't illuminated, then the F/Eng. could interrogate his panel display to ascertain which sections weren't down, and an attempt to lower them manually could be made.

Not suggesting that any crew would have time to do that in a situation like this, but if a L.E. extended light had suddenly extinguished, then it might have given the crew a clue as to what was happening.

Haven't the faintest idea of the display / indications on the - 400, although an EICAS display is mentioned, along with the statement .....

There was no independent indication available to the crew that the applicable group of LE flaps had been retracted by the aircraft system

Is this another example of " progress " ?

[RVR800]

Good teamwork

>the first officer - whose aerobatic experience

Enough said

[Yobbo]

The Boeing B747 classic flight crew training manual states there is extra power available from the P&W and GE but says there is very little from the Roller when "firewalled". I wonder if this also applies to the 400 powered Roller a/c?

[OD100]

"...
isn't 'dual maintenance illegal., not ETOPS?..."

The 74 is a four engine jet.

[Lonewolf_50]

@ tyro:
From the link Airclues provided us:

Engines 2 + 3 gave spurious thrust reverser unlocked indications at rotate leading to an automatic slat retraction with associated loss of lift.

The thrust reverse sub-system (and its relation to the movement of spoilers) is what appears to be in play, which is why I asked the question I did.
See also this post: http://www.pprune.org/rumours-news/3...ml#post4925602
and this: http://www.pprune.org/rumours-news/3...ml#post4927933
and this: http://www.pprune.org/rumours-news/3...ml#post4927367
and this: http://www.pprune.org/rumours-news/3...ml#post5052472
and this: http://www.pprune.org/rumours-news/3...ml#post5385782

@ taildragger, Airclues, ExSP33db1rd, Airbubba, DozeyWannabe

Thank you for the education.
EDIT: "thrust reverse function" is probably more correct that "thrust reverse sub system" and in any case, more thanks for the education to all and sundry, and the Tip o' the Stetson to the crew.

[Castle Don]

Lauda Air

Not to nit pick...but the Lauda Air crash wasn't caused by the engine ripping from the wing (I think that's what someone inferred)

It was the plume of turbulent air over the wing (caused by the deployed reverser) that led to the high speed upset and subsequent in-flight breakup.

Just clarifying

[protectthehornet]

L337

I too noticed the lack of specific reference to performance weight. But the wording indicated that some 31,000KG was from max allowable for that day...

and just to remind others of interesting takeoff problems, there was a TWA L1011 that got false stall warning out of KJFK and the copilot gave up flying and handed it to the captain who landed...and the plane burst into flames, but everyone got out.

always fly the plane!!!!

We also had a C5 Galaxy, USAF, with a thrust reverser deployed warning or actual, return for landing at Dover AFB...and they managed to get too slow on approach and bam...survivable crash...plane cracked in two.

Moral..always fly the friggin thing

[Basil]

Used to have a FE who was a bit meticulous about translating cowl rigging in the closed position.
Perhaps he had a point

[Tmbstory]

The B747 Crew Commended

Well done to the Crew concerned and I enclose a quote from a previous post that I made in PPRune.

" A crew is expected to perform to the best of their ability when a problem occurs, either known or unknown. In the unknown case the crew have to attempt to control the aircraft flight path, so that they have time to solve the problem "

Once again well done and enjoy a beer or two or three!

Tmb

[B-HKD]

Well done to the crew

4.1.2 The aircraft manufacturer Boeing Aircraft Company on 08 June 2009
issued an Alert Service Bulletin (ASB) no. 747-78A2181 titled, Exhaust -
Thrust Reverser Control System – Automatic Leading Edge Flap
Retraction System Wiring Change, in order to change the signal to the
FCU.

Implementation of this change allowed for the Group ‘A’ LE flaps to auto-
retract only when the thrust reversers are commanded by lifting the
reverse thrust handle. The change given in this ASB was to be
implemented within 90 days after the issue date.

The ASB also stated that the FAA will possibly release an AD related to
this service bulletin. The AD will make the compliance tasks given in this
service bulletin mandatory.

[Icare9]

I can only say "Fabulous job" to the flight deck crew.
Extraordinary situation coped with, thanks to training and developed skills.

If this crew is typical of BA, then sort out the strike issues pronto.

This is AT LEAST the second occasion when flight deck crew have avoided a major catastrophe. That why they are the British flag carrier and are worth their pay.

Cabin crew - well, the guys up front are ensuring you still have jobs (and lives).
Sort it, please, without any more strikes.

I'd also suggest that any "armchair pilots" carry on their "discussion" in the BA Airline thread, not post bl@@@dy stupid opinions, theories etc here. Keep your mental problems hidden from our viewing.

[Airbubba]

Long time ago now of course, but I don't recall the word " firewall " being an option, if take-off with reduced thrust i.e. Graduated Power was being applied, and more power needed, I recall the command " Go Around Power " being the appropriate call ? G .A. Power being a calculated figure, not just a B***s Out reaction. ( but then we had a Flt. Eng. !! )

On Rolls RB211 engines you can push the throttles (or thrust levers or whatever they are called in these enlightened times) to the stop and the engine will not exceed limitations as long as the EEC, ELC, TMC, and whatever other boxes are working.

And, even with the older motors, if you're about to crash, I think an exceedance would be a secondary consideration. Air Florida 90 at DCA may have had a better outcome if they had pushed the throttles all the way up when they realized that the takeoff performance was less than normal.

[protectthehornet]

airbubba...right on!

the air florida crash is a prime example of saving the engines and losing the plane.

someone even made a TV movie of the week about that crash...and in it, the grizzled old American Airlines pilot of a 727 said: IF WE GET IN TROUBLE BEND THE THROTTLES AROUND THE STOP.
(you would have to see the movie)
and of course the young, less than gifted air florida pilot didn't do jack.

IF anything comes out of this thread, I hope new pilots will know what to do when the plane ain't flying right...especially near the ground!

[lomapaseo]

And, even with the older motors, if you're about to crash, I think an exceedance would be a secondary consideration. Air Florida 90 at DCA may have had a better outcome if they had pushed the throttles all the way up when they realized that the takeoff performance was less than normal.

Just to add some more balance to this discussion :

With these computer controlled engines (FADECs etc.) commanded exceedances have been taken out of the pilots domain. The pilot can of course command computerized functions like TOGA etc. and still firewall the throttles until they bend (sic), but the engines will obey the logic designed in their computers.

Thus I wouldn't rely very much on machoism in descision making today

[DozyWannabe]

MWR - I suspect that with the acceleration the thinking time required to call for RTO would have meant they'd have been on or past V1 by the time the call was made and the action started.

PTH - As someone pointed out, the Spanair Madrid accident shows that even in a simpler aircraft (an MD-80), sometimes things can be misdiagnosed or not diagnosed in time - with tragic results

[AirRabbit]

Originally Posted by protecthehornet

the air florida crash is a prime example of saving the engines and losing the plane.

someone even made a TV movie of the week about that crash...and in it, the grizzled old American Airlines pilot of a 727 said: IF WE GET IN TROUBLE BEND THE THROTTLES AROUND THE STOP.
(you would have to see the movie)
and of course the young, less than gifted air florida pilot didn't do jack.

IF anything comes out of this thread, I hope new pilots will know what to do when the plane ain't flying right...especially near the ground!

I truly wish that folks would cease with the criticisms of the Air Florida crew regarding the tragic January 1982 crash at Washington, DC. without a better understanding of the facts. Please understand, I'm not trying to be argumentative - although my passion could easily be read that way. However, there obviously seems to be a continuing gross misunderstanding of the facts regarding that particular accident … let me, once again, try to set the record straight.

I have said many times, the power setting used by the B-737 crew had nothing – uh, that is NOTHING – to do with the crash. Airplanes fly on airspeed – not power settings. Additionally, this was most assuredly NOT a situation where there was a decision that resulted in “saving the engines and losing the airplane.” There are a couple of points specific to this particular issue:

1) There was no outward decision made to keep the throttles where they were – or to “not advance” the throttles. The engine indications (primarily EPR indications – as was the routine and primary engine production indication at that time) were that the engines were producing the planned thrust.
2) Because of the location of the engines (under the wing) adding thrust would have exacerbated the pitch problem both pilots were engrossed in resolving. (please, continue to read)

It is true that because of this accident, there have been some additional discussions regarding the use of engine power on a turbojet powered airplane - to wit … when in doubt – push them forward. However, I still hear the periodic comment about “ we don’t want to over-boost the engines.” It’s taken a good part of the last 28 years to put the “urban legend” about “over-boosting” a jet engine to bed. Over-speeding … yes. Over-temping … sure. But over-boosting? Come on. Additionally, for years after this particular accident, there were many in the industry (and some who had considerable credentials) who steadfastly argued that adding power (e.g., “shove ‘em to the firewall”) would not gain any appreciable thrust. Again, through the last 28 years, there is generally now an opinion that, at the bare minimum, pushing all the throttles forward, while they may or may not produce any additional thrust, at least all the engines would be producing maximum thrust – and (save an engine failure of some sort) likely doing so in a symmetrical manner. However, that particular remedy would not have prevented the Air Florida crash, regardless of when it was applied.

As for the “young, less than gifted air florida pilot” … it might surprise many who simply do not know that the pilot flying (the first officer) WAS, in fact, a rather gifted young aviator … who had recently completed a tour of active duty with the Air Force at Minot AFB, North Dakota, where he was an F-15 pilot (and if memory serves, an instructor pilot) attached to the Air Defense Command Squadron at that location.

As far is this young pilot’s not doing “jack” is concerned … there simply wasn’t much “jack” that could be done. Not that the two pilots weren’t trying. They certainly were. You can read the CVR transcript where the Captain was intoning that “we only want 500 feet,” “barely climb,” “forward,” “come on, forward.” The airplane had uncontrollably pitched up, well beyond the angle of attack (AoA) required to generate the stall warning stick shaker. In fact, the pitch attitude was estimated to have been 24 degrees. The airplane was buffeting substantially in an aerodynamic stall while at an airspeed that was well above the stall speed for an airplane at that gross weight and configuration (i.e., V2 was computed to be 144 knots – the airplane reached approximately 149 knots, slowed to approximately 135 knots, and then accelerated to between 142 and 145 knots until impact). The rotation from the 3-point, on-ground condition to the stall buffet was a scant 2 seconds. That means, where the pilot had indicated he was “going to takeoff the nose gear and just let the airplane fly off” (surely a much less aggressive takeoff than the normal 3-degrees per second rotation rate), the airplane actually rotated at 4 times that rate – 12 degrees per second – from zero to 24 degrees in 2 seconds! Surprise! … and now you have less than 20 seconds to figure it out before you crash! The airplane staggered the approximately 4000 feet from the runway to the 14th street bridge. Probably not climbing to an altitude of greater than 50 – 60 feet; with its nose 24 degrees up and an airspeed at or above V2 the entire time. The crew could NOT get the nose down. Should they have pushed the throttles forward? What happens to a B-737 when you push forward on the throttles? Right ... the nose pitches UP.

No. This was not a situation where someone (the crew) decided to “save the engines and lost the airplane.” This was not a situation where the crew simply sat there … not doing “jack.” I won't go into the gory details here - because discussing them takes a lot of space - space that perhaps the readers of this thread may not be interested in using to take the discussion in a new direction.

[Airbubba]

Again, through the last 28 years, there is generally now an opinion that, at the bare minimum, pushing all the throttles forward, while they may or may not produce any additional thrust, at least all the engines would be producing maximum thrust – and (save an engine failure of some sort) likely doing so in a symmetrical manner. However, that particular remedy would not have prevented the Air Florida crash, regardless of when it was applied.

Well, they only had about 1.70 actual EPR set instead of 2.04, there was plenty of power left in those JT8D's. Remember, you can MEL the EPR gauges and go with N1 for power setting on this engine. As the NTSB comments on page 81 of its report:

The aircraft could not sustain flight because of the combined effects of airframe snow or ice contamination which degraded lift and increased
drag and the lower than normal thrust set by reference to the erroneous EPR indications. Either condition alone should not have prevented continued flight.

[Checkboard]

Originally Posted by AirRabbit

I truly wish that folks would cease with the criticisms of the Air Florida crew regarding the tragic January 1982 crash at Washington, DC. without a better understanding of the facts.

Indeed.

Originally Posted by AirRabbit

Had Capt. Hoot not been one to play around with trying to deploy trailing edge flaps (by pulling circuit breakers and repositioning the flap handle)

It was a theory in the subsequent investigation, but has been vigorously disputed over the years. Perhaps an "alleged" or two might be seen as following your own advice?

As to the Air Florida - take-off power was never set, as the P2 sensors were iced up, giving an erroneous EPR reading. The FO made several comments about the engine indications at the start of the take-off roll, if I recall correctly.

[punkalouver]

Originally Posted by AirRabbit

No. This was not a situation where someone (the crew) decided to “save the engines and lost the airplane.” This was not a situation where the crew simply sat there … not doing “jack.” I won't go into the gory details here - because discussing them takes a lot of space - space that perhaps the readers of this thread may not be interested in using to take the discussion in a new direction.

I should think that if the Air Florida guys had not taken off with a bunch of wet snow on the wings, they would not have had their pitch-up. If they had bothered to turn the engine anti-ice on, they would have had their proper power setting for takeoff and there would not have been a need to add a bunch of thrust just to get to takeoff thrust. Somehow, I think they would have been in a better position if a normal thrust setting was used for takeoff. Doing a powerback from the gate on a heavy snow day in a 737 seems to be a strange decision as well.