Originally Posted by protecthehornet
the air florida crash is a prime example of saving the engines and losing the plane.
someone even made a TV movie of the week about that crash...and in it, the grizzled old American Airlines pilot of a 727 said: IF WE GET IN TROUBLE BEND THE THROTTLES AROUND THE STOP.
(you would have to see the movie)
and of course the young, less than gifted air florida pilot didn't do jack.
IF anything comes out of this thread, I hope new pilots will know what to do when the plane ain't flying right...especially near the ground!
I truly wish that folks would cease with the criticisms of the Air Florida crew regarding the tragic January 1982 crash at Washington, DC. without a better understanding of the facts. Please understand, I'm not trying to be argumentative - although my passion could easily be read that way. However, there obviously seems to be a continuing gross misunderstanding of the facts regarding that particular accident … let me, once again, try to set the record straight.
I have said many times, the power setting used by the B-737 crew
had nothing – uh, that is NOTHING – to do with the crash. Airplanes fly on airspeed – not power settings. Additionally, this was most assuredly NOT a situation where there was a decision that resulted in “
saving the engines and losing the airplane.” There are a couple of points specific to this particular issue:
1) There was no outward decision made to keep the throttles where they were – or to “not advance” the throttles. The engine indications (primarily EPR indications – as was the routine and primary engine production indication at that time) were that the engines were producing the planned thrust.
2) Because of the location of the engines (under the wing) adding thrust would have exacerbated the pitch problem both pilots were engrossed in resolving. (please, continue to read)
It is true that because of this accident, there have been some additional discussions regarding the use of engine power on a turbojet powered airplane - to wit … when in doubt – push them forward. However, I
still hear the periodic comment about “
we don’t want to over-boost the engines.” It’s taken a good part of the last 28 years to put the “urban legend” about “over-boosting” a jet engine to bed. Over-speeding … yes. Over-temping … sure. But over-boosting? Come on. Additionally, for years after this particular accident, there were many in the industry (and some who had considerable credentials) who steadfastly argued that adding power (e.g., “shove ‘em to the firewall”) would not gain any appreciable thrust. Again, through the last 28 years, there is generally now an opinion that, at the bare minimum, pushing all the throttles forward, while they may or may not produce any additional thrust, at least all the engines would be producing maximum thrust – and (save an engine failure of some sort) likely doing so in a symmetrical manner. However, that particular remedy would not have prevented the Air Florida crash, regardless of when it was applied.
As for the “young, less than gifted air florida pilot” … it might surprise many who simply do not know that the pilot flying (the first officer) WAS, in fact, a rather gifted young aviator … who had recently completed a tour of active duty with the Air Force at Minot AFB, North Dakota, where he was an F-15 pilot (and if memory serves, an instructor pilot) attached to the Air Defense Command Squadron at that location.
As far is this young pilot’s not doing “jack” is concerned … there simply wasn’t much “jack” that could be done. Not that the two pilots weren’t trying. They certainly were. You can read the CVR transcript where the Captain was intoning that “we only want 500 feet,” “barely climb,” “forward,” “come on, forward.” The airplane had uncontrollably pitched up, well beyond the angle of attack (AoA) required to generate the stall warning stick shaker. In fact, the pitch attitude was estimated to have been 24 degrees. The airplane was buffeting substantially in an aerodynamic stall while at an airspeed that was well above the stall speed for an airplane at that gross weight and configuration (i.e., V2 was computed to be 144 knots – the airplane reached approximately 149 knots, slowed to approximately 135 knots, and then accelerated to between 142 and 145 knots until impact). The rotation from the 3-point, on-ground condition to the stall buffet was a scant 2 seconds. That means, where the pilot had indicated he was “going to takeoff the nose gear and just let the airplane fly off” (surely a much less aggressive takeoff than the normal 3-degrees per second rotation rate), the airplane actually rotated at 4 times that rate – 12 degrees per second – from zero to 24 degrees in 2 seconds! Surprise! … and now you have less than 20 seconds to figure it out before you crash! The airplane staggered the approximately 4000 feet from the runway to the 14th street bridge. Probably not climbing to an altitude of greater than 50 – 60 feet; with its nose 24 degrees up and an airspeed at or above V2 the entire time. The crew could
NOT get the nose down. Should they have pushed the throttles forward? What happens to a B-737 when you push forward on the throttles? Right ... the nose pitches UP.
No. This was
not a situation where someone (the crew) decided to “save the engines and lost the airplane.” This was
not a situation where the crew simply sat there … not doing “jack.” I won't go into the gory details here - because discussing them takes a lot of space - space that perhaps the readers of this thread may not be interested in using to take the discussion in a new direction.