FAA Puts American Airlines Under Close Scrutiny

[md-100]

Sun, 03 Jan '10

Three Incidents In December Leads To Increased Oversight

Aero-News Network: The Aviation and Aerospace World's Daily/Real-Time News and Information Service

After having three landing incidents in quick succession, American Airlines (AAL) is now under investigation by the FAA. Pilot training, fatigue, and weather-related landing procedures are all likely to receive an in-depth review in addition to increased FAA inspections.

"In situations where there may be several incidents involving a single carrier over a short period of time, FAA inspectors increase their oversight, which we're doing now, and conduct a review of those events to determine whether they might be indicative of a larger issue," FAA spokesman Lynn Lunsford said in a statement released Friday.

AAL's string of incidents started when an MD-80 landed erratically at CLT on Dec 13, leaving the runway and then striking the right wingtip. As ANN reported, there were no injuries though pilot fatigue was being investigated.

On December 22, AAL flight 331 overran the runway at KIN in Jamaica during heavy rains. The fuselage of the B737 broke into three pieces with reports that many of the 148 passengers were injured.

Another AAL MD-80 struck a wingtip while landing at AUS on Dec 24. No injuries were reported.

AAL spokesman Tim Wagner told The Wall Street Journal that the three incidents will be investigated separately. "We take each event as an individual event" he said.

As for the result of the FAA's investigation, Lunsford noted that "the FAA communicates its findings to the air carrier and assists in the development of the appropriate corrective action."

[golfyankeesierra]

Well, they were already under scrutiny by 411A; wonder which is worse...

[411A]

It's about time the FAA looked closely at AA flight ops.
Lets look at the latest accident at KIN.
Landed very long, wet runway (very recent TS), tailwind...and went smartly off the end

AA was very lucky folks did not die in this very serious accident.
AA has the largest hull loss record of any US trunk carrier, however...if you look back at their accident/incident record, each end every one of these incidents/accidents was directly rooted in pilot inability, or very poor thought process.
Couple these incidents/accidents at AA together with the massive fine the FAA imposed on AA in the recent past for maintenance violations, leads me to believe that AA needs continual detailed oversight until these problems are corrected.

[aa73]

Every major US airline has had a rash of accidents attributed to pilot error at some point of time. AA's just happens to be these last 10 years. Unfortunate, yes: but it will be corrected. I remember in the early 90s, USAir had the highest hull loss record of all US airlines. It was eventually corrected as well. AA will be no different.

[sludge]

This is the FAA justifying its existence. High profile, lots of ink, see how busy and concerned we are? Send more tax dollars.

[WindSheer]

One would guess this is occurring due to commercial pressures??

PPL pilots in the UK face excess diversionary charges, which can sometimes lead to fatal 'press on' decisions being made.

I fear this is very much a similar case now in the commercial sector, with Captains facing an extreme grilling down if they have diverted during 50/50 conditions.
Things need to change industry wide....not just within AA!!

[411A]

Changes are a comin' at major airlines, you can be sure, in the USA.
One recent example, Southwest at RNO.
The airplane diverted to OAK due to a reported brief heavy snowfall and high winds on approach...and several pax were wondering why.
RNO is (or can be) a very challanging airport in the wintertime, and I suspect that Southwest learned their lesson well at Midway, when they slid off the end into a passing auto, and killed a child.
The FAA is clamping down, and I hope it continues.

[Ocampo]

I fear this is very much a similar case now in the commercial sector, with Captains facing an extreme grilling down if they have diverted during 50/50 conditions.

It's not just now...remember AA at Little Rock some years ago? In my opinion, the pressure is always there; we have to learn to fly with it. But then again, some so-called airlines do not "encourage" pilots to make the correct decision (of deviating) because you might get a call to visit the Chief of Pilots Office...

[bearfoil]

Then again, Mesa is having trouble with take-offs.

[protectthehornet]

I don't always agree with 411A...but I recognize that he is an experienced pilot.

American has rarely impressed me with piloting skills. Some exceptions might be pilots acquired through mergers like Air cal or TWA or such. American has claimed that Lindbergh was one of their own...through a very big stretch of the imagination.

I know at least one pilot hired At American who lied in his log book...oh well.

I've seen something that can only be called over confidence...thinking that something can be ''salvaged'' but the skills are rusty or lacking.

With new planes, higher automation, it seems to me that hand flying skills are gone. straight down a runway, pull up...autopilot on...hand fly about 2 mins.

automation to the outer marker and hand fly to the runway...2 or 3 minutes.

So, on a 5 hour flight, you get 5 minutes of real flying. Maybe 20 hand flying hours a year for a 1000 hour year. Think about that.

Dragging wing tips, overshooting a runway...this all sounds like an old pro who has lost his touch on the stick.

There is a difference between these AA crashes and the USAIR stuff in the 90's.

All of the AA stuff is happening in the same part of flying/phase of flight...landing.

All of the USAIR stuff was pretty unique accidents...aborted takeoff after V1 at LGA...rudder trim out of wack or is it whack?

cleared to land at LAX with another plane on the runway at night...obvious ATC error.

Microburst/windshear at CLT ( I was there watching the smoke come up)...atc involved with that one too, though the pilots were flaky on this too.

And the rudder deal at PIT...'nuff said on that one.

I hadn't heard about southwest diverting from Reno to Oakland...I know both places like the back of my hand...odd stuff.

[aa73]

Protectthehornet... all airlines go through rashes of minor stuff like wingtip scrapes, over-rotations/over-flares, etc. The determining factors are whether they make the news or not. I have plenty of friends at all airlines, and trust me when I say that AA is NOT unique to these incidents. If I showed you all the stuff my SWA buds send me, you'd be astonished. They never make the news, that's why you don't hear about it.

We could go back and forth on pilot error stuff. Truth is, all airlines go through it. DAL had two very high profile pilot error accidents before they changed. So did UAL... So did CAL. My point is that, while not defending AA's recent mishaps, they all happen to all airlines. The AA pilot group is as professional as any other out there, including the training. It's just the luck of the draw, which is an unfortunate fact given the thousands of flights flown every day with no incidents.

[protectthehornet]

aa73

its fine...I understand...but remember please that the american boys aren't MORE professional than anyone else...as, yes...more NO.


and southwest has gotten away with murder...better PR firms!

[backseatjock]

Nicely said WindSheer and agree with comments in full.

[411A]

Alaska MD80, jackscrew

This one was directly a pilot problem.
Why, you may ask, when the stab jackscrew failed?
It completely failed after the crew attempted many maneuvers, both flaps up and flaps down, to check handling.

Instead of....diverting to LAX or LGB when the problem was first noticed, with minimal configuration changes.
This screwing around with the airplane instead of diverting in quick time defied all common sense logic, thereby contributing directly to the accident.

[TIMA9X]

As a daily reader of PPRuNe for years now I felt it necessary to comment regarding this thread in defense of AA.

Agree with the following

by aa73: Every major US airline has had a rash of accidents attributed to pilot error at some point of time. AA's just happens to be these last 10 years. Unfortunate, yes: but it will be corrected. I remember in the early 90s, USAir had the highest hull loss record of all US airlines.

In America the 5 major airlines are huge compared to many other parts of the world, it's economy of scale that come into play here, compare the number of rotations in the USA and here lies the answer. AA have had a bad run of late but the AA Kingston, Jamaica 737 off runway crash is still not conclusive, and to be fair to all pilots on this forum, it is my view we should wait for the official reports.

The Dallas Morning News also reported that the runway at Norman Manley International Airport in Kingston, Jamaica was not grooved like many runways in the US, making it easier for water pool on the runway and increase the likelihood of hydroplaning. The main runway (12/30) is 8900 feet (2713 meters) long, with an instrument landing system available (ILS) only on runway 12. Because of the weather conditions at the time of the landing (rainstorm), and the lack of an ILS option on runway 30, it is likely that the crew had no choice but to land using the ILS equipped runway which meant either landing with a tail wind or landing at an alternate airport.

It is possible that commercial pressures may apply in this case.

I agree with WindSheer

I fear this is very much a similar case now in the commercial sector, with Captains facing an extreme grilling down if they have diverted during 50/50 conditions.
Things need to change industry wide....not just within AA!!

Having said that, 411A also has some very valid points, and I always respect his point of view, re the Alaska MD80, jackscrew disaster. But I must point out that it was not long ago that the FAA had also focused heavily on Southwest and United maintenance procedures.

I am not American but I do respect the American pilots and their crews, they may do things slightly differently to say Europe but at the end of the day all the American airlines manage to get to through most 24 hour periods without incident.

[fdr]

"The Critics are Tough in this Crowd!...."

This one was directly a pilot problem.
Why, you may ask, when the stab jackscrew failed?
It completely failed after the crew attempted many maneuvers, both flaps up and flaps down, to check handling.

-411A circa dark ages

So, since we warm fuzzied the aerospace scene with CRM etc, we set up the process for activity beyond the checklist. While there are times tht this is appropriate, there are as many or more when that is not the case.

I do not argue that 411's doesn't have some point on this one, I just suspect it is a case of "shootin' the messenger". Is it not of interest that the system set this program up, through the auspices of AC120-51 (orig, A thru E), JAA-OPS TGL No5 & 6 etc. The line between correct action and correct inaction is blurred, as the basic premise of CRM is to give better outcomes, which often is misrepresented as being the perfect outcome. As a lowly 22,000 pilot and air safety investigator off and on for the last 30 years, and a past CRM facilitator, I find myself rather reserved in the benefits of teaching perfect outcomes in a dynamic environment. (well, when I taught...). As a pilot, I think that an adeqate solution that removes my airborne problem to a ground management problem is usually a good thing, satisficing my requirements of minimal disruption to my operation, minimum interference by external intrusions and hopefully least risk to me, which is what I get paid for by the passenger.

I have watched too many relatively competent crews loose SA while running evermore complicted scenarios of their own making, (both in simulations, and in investigations after whacky outcomes occur in 12" to 1' scale, HiDef etc), to be overly enamoured with our current philosophy in opertions and training.

Operationally, the driver (which is professionally where we have allowed ouselves to be re-categoried as... thanks AI...) is torn between the basic tasks as written, and the desires of the passenger (percieved) and the companies overt and subjective demands. Out of all that, he/she is damned if he does (AS261), and damned if he doesn't (SR111).

It is far easier to be perfect after reading the crash comics.

I recall a small vignette from a prior life; where in beginning of the '80's, flying with tin hat on, I had a jammed elevator system in flight. Oddly the cause was immediately obvious and the emergency checklist was considered to be catastrophically detrimental to the actual problem (shifting hyd boost on > off)... jury rigged a solution, and landed. The subsequent investigation found I had acted correctly in light of my diagnosis being correct, "but the NNCL (NATOPS) had not been actioned as written". A week later the writer of the comments (an experimental TP...) had a similar jam of his ailerons, and followed the same actions I had for the same reasons. No comments made on his report.... Easy to have the solution on the ground, and after the reports published.

Crew disregarding an approved procedure is a matter of some gravity, yet, notwithstanding the vignette above, external agencies such as Maintenance and Ops Control suggesting the crew don't action a fire checklist, MEL etc, is hardly sound risk management, but crosses the line to being interference in the operation. If the PIC is compelled by his knowledge to act in some way, then he will take responsibility for that at all times without question. The dispatcher or maintainer don't. And by law, nor does the FAA ATC controller. After a crew have actioned the NNCL and the situation has not improved will always call for careful and thoughtful consideration of the relative risks involved, classic decision making under conditions of uncertainty.

As far as Alaskan goes, I think the greatest learning point missed was the fabrication of records, and the absolutely disgraceful treatment of the insider who blew the whistle to the FAA and was pilloried for his efforts at attempting to preserve life, while of course little substantive action was taken by the regulator to do same. . As is often the case, the company fails to see that their behavior when it goes feral due to commercial factors makes them the enemy of both the pasenger and the company itself, whereas the whistle blower is perceived to be the threat.

All depends on your point of view.

411A, I think the issue of operation risk management is far more complex than it appears on the surface, and that simplistic observations are often just that, simplistic.

happy new year.

Warm Springs

[bubbers44]

So the NTSB didn't understand he was doing a cat 2 approach and had to manually land?????? If it was an MD80, I have lost autopilot and autothrottle below 300 ft on a cat 1 and recovered and landed with no go around with the same airline. MD80's are full of surprises. Hopefully we don't replace them with the A320 as rumored. Then we have worse problems. At least the MD80 will do exactly what you want, even if it's wrong.

[beardy]

bubbers44,

1st line of the report:

Both pilots indicated that they had set up the navigation systems and briefed to fly an ILS Category III instrument approach to an autoland to runway 36C

Last line of the report:

Factors contributing to the incident were: The Captain's decision to execute a Category III autoland approach on a runway without rollout guidance contrary to company Flight Manual guidance, the Captain's decision to deviate from the Category III approach and continue it manually contrary to the company Operating Manual, and the First Officer's failure to call for a go-around when the approach became unstable.

So I guess that NTSB were correct in assuming he wasn't executing a Cat2 approach.

Hopefully we don't replace them with the A320 as rumored. Then we have worse problems.

What an odd statement. I assume that the second sentence should include the conditional 'would.' I am not sure what condition of the A320 itself would lead to worse problems than the operational indiscipline highlighted in this report.

[bubbers44]

I'm still trying to find the accident report because it seems they could have at 1400 rvr done a cat 2 approach. Maybe briefing a cat 3 approach by AAL procedures would require a rebrief for cat 2 but the FAA doesn't require it. 1200 rvr is the normal cat 2 minimums. I think I could do a 10 second rebrief on changing to a cat 2 approach and I don't think any pilot would initiate a cat 3 with no required roll out visibility.

[beardy]

Notwithstanding a sloppy report, briefing and executing a Cat 3 approach to a non Cat3 runway (no auto rollout) and not briefing and not executing a go-around when patently unstable shows a less than rigorous attitude to procedures and safety.

Both NTSB and the crew refer to outer marker, the Post Incident ILS readings make clear that there is no outer marker. NTSB refer to AP disconnect at less than 300', the Captain says 'at' 300.' NTSB refer to the aircraft being 'fully configured' leaving the reader to assume what that configuration is.