Pilot handling skills under threat, says Airbus
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My A320 type rating was done under this "FORCE" course.
The first few sims were simply about hand flying, in fact they were done before any major ground school/CBT just the basics about control laws etc. to get you going.
At the time I enjoyed it, but had just come off the end of a 40 hour MCC / Jet Handling Course on the Airbus so I was probably about as current on hand flying as I will be at any point in my career.
At the time, I thought it was a good idea, however those type rating hours seem like an absolute age ago now and like many others would love the opportunity to hand fly more on the line.
The first few sims were simply about hand flying, in fact they were done before any major ground school/CBT just the basics about control laws etc. to get you going.
At the time I enjoyed it, but had just come off the end of a 40 hour MCC / Jet Handling Course on the Airbus so I was probably about as current on hand flying as I will be at any point in my career.
At the time, I thought it was a good idea, however those type rating hours seem like an absolute age ago now and like many others would love the opportunity to hand fly more on the line.
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A company in Middle East apply to their SOP that pilot have to be stabilized by 1000 ft AGL in VMC & IMC
Also in the middle of Europe......
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At A certain bankrupt Belgian National Airline, the line-training went as follows:
First flights: NO flight-director and only basic useage of automatics allowed during the flight. Autopilot and F/D only during cruise.
Only after the new pilot showed enough proficiency to fly safely and smoothly without the automatics, knowing the aircrafts behaviour did the training progress to the next step: the correct use of the autoflight modes.
Was it easy? NO Was it ultimately safer, YES
It made sure that EVERYBODY was proficient in hand-flying the aircraft should things go wrong, and EVERYBODY was comfortable in operating and flying the aircraft in all modes. Stick-and-Rudder proficiency was an evident result.
Mind you, this obviously also requires a very good basic schooling during initial ATPL training, and with that I don't mean creating SOP slaves.
This is how it should be done also today.
First flights: NO flight-director and only basic useage of automatics allowed during the flight. Autopilot and F/D only during cruise.
Only after the new pilot showed enough proficiency to fly safely and smoothly without the automatics, knowing the aircrafts behaviour did the training progress to the next step: the correct use of the autoflight modes.
Was it easy? NO Was it ultimately safer, YES
It made sure that EVERYBODY was proficient in hand-flying the aircraft should things go wrong, and EVERYBODY was comfortable in operating and flying the aircraft in all modes. Stick-and-Rudder proficiency was an evident result.
Mind you, this obviously also requires a very good basic schooling during initial ATPL training, and with that I don't mean creating SOP slaves.
This is how it should be done also today.
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A company in Middle East apply to their SOP that pilot have to be stabilized by 1000 ft AGL in VMC & IMC
I can understand the rather excessive minimum stabilisation height in the Middle East due to heat shimmy and updraughts from sand-dunes
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Many people talk about keeping their skills tuned by hand flying. Often what they mean is follow the F.D. on departure and climb with a constant power setting. Likewise on descent in VNAV/LNAV at idle power just follow the F.D. I question whether this is keeping hand-flying skills well oiled.
I hate the "good old days' expression. but they were. In a B732, with only 1 DME, and often that was not on the field; if you spooled up before 1500' you'd messed it up. This was from TOD of 35000' with little wind info. It was a self planned DME v ALT descent. Into the Greek islands it was Mark 1 eyeball visuals, varying from No.1 in traffic at 5000' and severe clear 20nm out, to overhead at FL100 and cleared to land; expedite to allow departures.
I've flown for various airlines since then, and on much bigger a/c. Visuals were still necessary in many island destinations, both Europe & Caribbean. Since then, with more & more radar's and ILS's the requirement has been reduced, even if there is only thin traffic. Indeed, many airlines seem to discourage visuals. In recent years, I've flown during the rapid expansion of short-haul airlines, where most of the F/O's are low hour cadets and the promotion to captain is mind bogglingly rapid. When conditions were suitable, and traffic allowed, and to expedite our arrival, I asked if they wished to fly a visual pattern. Sometimes the eager response was hestiant, but YES please. There then ensued an holy mess and much coaching. Once we'd managed to get it somewhere near the correct glidepath at 1000' it all went well. They were now in familiar territory. Afterwards they admitted they had so little practice. Yet. in 3 years they could be comig up for command. Some airlines even have no night landings without PAPI's, VASIS or G/S. Years ago the CAA required night base training, a nd no VASIS approaches. Now, it seems even night circuits is no longer a base training requirement. The first time a cadet lands a night is on the line. Amazing. Whatever is going on is not good. If pilots are not considered capable of night landing on a fully lit Rwy without G/P indicators I wonder if they should on board. If a pilot in severe clear and field in sight at 40nm can not make a low drag approach to the slot at 1000' I wonder if they really are a capable of being a captain. One day all the fancy bits of kit will not be available and hand eye coordination will be needed. Is it trained and practiced enough? I doubt it, but when it is needed the final insurance policy (pilots) might not be as comprehensive as everyone thought. More 3rd party than all risk.
I hate the "good old days' expression. but they were. In a B732, with only 1 DME, and often that was not on the field; if you spooled up before 1500' you'd messed it up. This was from TOD of 35000' with little wind info. It was a self planned DME v ALT descent. Into the Greek islands it was Mark 1 eyeball visuals, varying from No.1 in traffic at 5000' and severe clear 20nm out, to overhead at FL100 and cleared to land; expedite to allow departures.
I've flown for various airlines since then, and on much bigger a/c. Visuals were still necessary in many island destinations, both Europe & Caribbean. Since then, with more & more radar's and ILS's the requirement has been reduced, even if there is only thin traffic. Indeed, many airlines seem to discourage visuals. In recent years, I've flown during the rapid expansion of short-haul airlines, where most of the F/O's are low hour cadets and the promotion to captain is mind bogglingly rapid. When conditions were suitable, and traffic allowed, and to expedite our arrival, I asked if they wished to fly a visual pattern. Sometimes the eager response was hestiant, but YES please. There then ensued an holy mess and much coaching. Once we'd managed to get it somewhere near the correct glidepath at 1000' it all went well. They were now in familiar territory. Afterwards they admitted they had so little practice. Yet. in 3 years they could be comig up for command. Some airlines even have no night landings without PAPI's, VASIS or G/S. Years ago the CAA required night base training, a nd no VASIS approaches. Now, it seems even night circuits is no longer a base training requirement. The first time a cadet lands a night is on the line. Amazing. Whatever is going on is not good. If pilots are not considered capable of night landing on a fully lit Rwy without G/P indicators I wonder if they should on board. If a pilot in severe clear and field in sight at 40nm can not make a low drag approach to the slot at 1000' I wonder if they really are a capable of being a captain. One day all the fancy bits of kit will not be available and hand eye coordination will be needed. Is it trained and practiced enough? I doubt it, but when it is needed the final insurance policy (pilots) might not be as comprehensive as everyone thought. More 3rd party than all risk.
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The only IMC above 40,000 is the top of a CB and can't see anyone doing that really.
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I think you put your finger on that one.
For example: I know that I'm one of the most 'Autos off' pilots on our fleet. But I usually keep the FD on. This is because, if we get a GA the FD will not come on if you have already switched it off. So you're looking at a raw data GA with four stages of flap to get in!
I had a situation about a year ago when (due a genny fail) we had no FD or autos (climbing out of Frankfurt).
Even though I'm a very hand flying type, I found the lack of FD , coupled with our troubles, to be quite a lot to deal with.
I think you put your finger on that one.
For example: I know that I'm one of the most 'Autos off' pilots on our fleet. But I usually keep the FD on. This is because, if we get a GA the FD will not come on if you have already switched it off. So you're looking at a raw data GA with four stages of flap to get in!
I had a situation about a year ago when (due a genny fail) we had no FD or autos (climbing out of Frankfurt).
Even though I'm a very hand flying type, I found the lack of FD , coupled with our troubles, to be quite a lot to deal with.
Although I am keenly aware of what the thread is about, piloting skills are relative.
Let me expand on what is meant by this.
A good friend was describing an approach in the south Pacific where the "strip" was carved out of a hillside - 11m wide, 400m long with an 18% grade. If one didn't add power after touchdown, one didn't get to the end and wasn't able to do the next takeoff downhill. All that is seen in the flare is blue sky. Charts (where available) for these airports have "over-run instructions" on which way to turn in case of the overrun so as not to hit the school, the hospital or go over the cliff.
While my own skills were atuned to the 320/330/340 types in both hand-flying and autoflight, I'd be dead in a week on the coast of BC in the winter or in some south Pacific islands as described above without easing into it and practising. Same goes for most of us I suspect.
Suffice it to say that in large transport flying, if one can change control regimes from fully automated flight to fully manual flight (raw data, no f/d's, autothrust off) and back again at any time, under any circumstances without the passengers once noticing, one probably has sufficient skills to cover off almost all situations.
We are not expected to have test pilot skills nor are we expected to out-guess the designers of the aircraft be they Boeing or Airbus. Beyond the QRH we are not expected to troubleshoot an abnormality. We are expected to operate by the book and where the book is silent or the safety of flight is threatened, to use airmanship and the authority of the pilot-in-command to make the best decision(s) possible.
Though we are solely responsible for our flight, we are no longer "on our own" in the cockpit and thus may expect the broad support of scheduling, dispatch, maintenance, ATC, weather forecasters and the regulators, and that they will do their jobs just as we do. The current fatal accident rate mirrors the success of this approach but as we know, "nothing fails like success" and a level of vigilance mixed with a bit of crankiness is always needed when commercial priorities begin to creep beyond safety priorities.
Let me expand on what is meant by this.
A good friend was describing an approach in the south Pacific where the "strip" was carved out of a hillside - 11m wide, 400m long with an 18% grade. If one didn't add power after touchdown, one didn't get to the end and wasn't able to do the next takeoff downhill. All that is seen in the flare is blue sky. Charts (where available) for these airports have "over-run instructions" on which way to turn in case of the overrun so as not to hit the school, the hospital or go over the cliff.
While my own skills were atuned to the 320/330/340 types in both hand-flying and autoflight, I'd be dead in a week on the coast of BC in the winter or in some south Pacific islands as described above without easing into it and practising. Same goes for most of us I suspect.
Suffice it to say that in large transport flying, if one can change control regimes from fully automated flight to fully manual flight (raw data, no f/d's, autothrust off) and back again at any time, under any circumstances without the passengers once noticing, one probably has sufficient skills to cover off almost all situations.
We are not expected to have test pilot skills nor are we expected to out-guess the designers of the aircraft be they Boeing or Airbus. Beyond the QRH we are not expected to troubleshoot an abnormality. We are expected to operate by the book and where the book is silent or the safety of flight is threatened, to use airmanship and the authority of the pilot-in-command to make the best decision(s) possible.
Though we are solely responsible for our flight, we are no longer "on our own" in the cockpit and thus may expect the broad support of scheduling, dispatch, maintenance, ATC, weather forecasters and the regulators, and that they will do their jobs just as we do. The current fatal accident rate mirrors the success of this approach but as we know, "nothing fails like success" and a level of vigilance mixed with a bit of crankiness is always needed when commercial priorities begin to creep beyond safety priorities.
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RAT 5,
My experience with the 737 Classic is that even with the FDs on, one shouldn't just follow them blindly. The FDs are sometimes slow adjusting to speed fluctuations and wot not so even with the FDs one must see past such guidance to the actual situation on the primary instruments. Just following FDs, if the 737 is anything to go by, will mean dipping below VREF+x moving off GS/LLZ guidance (how ever slightly) from time to time as well as making adjustments too severe, which would could not be regarded as the best thing to do just to keep the FDs centred.
Maybe the Airbus is pretty good in that regard?
Many people talk about keeping their skills tuned by hand flying. Often what they mean is follow the F.D.
Maybe the Airbus is pretty good in that regard?
Maybe the Airbus is pretty good in that regard?
Your advice is good. The FD's do lag and sometimes order contrary directions to what you are trying to do in the next 15 to 30 seconds. I think "looking behind" or "looking through" the FD symbols while seeing them "peripherally" on the PFD/Horizon display abut keeping a close eye on the raw data, (speed/speed trend, VSI, pitch/roll) to be sure you're achieving what you set out to do, is best. Blindly following FD's is not good airmanship in my view. They're only driven by a computer and require intelligent interpretation just like any computer output.
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The FDs are sometimes slow adjusting to speed fluctuations
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Very good thread. It can clearly be seen that there is great feeling on this.
Another life working for a far eastern airline B747:
Company SOP at that time, autopilot must always be engaged above ten thousand feet.
Captains always used autoland because a "Red Flag" (little bit too high or low on final approach or a little bit too much or too little power on same occasion) on the FOQA would mean a "day off " spent in chief pilot office making a self criticism and promise to "never do it again".
Volunteer for manual and flight director off approach on simulator check? You must be joking!
Another life working for a far eastern airline B747:
Company SOP at that time, autopilot must always be engaged above ten thousand feet.
Captains always used autoland because a "Red Flag" (little bit too high or low on final approach or a little bit too much or too little power on same occasion) on the FOQA would mean a "day off " spent in chief pilot office making a self criticism and promise to "never do it again".
Volunteer for manual and flight director off approach on simulator check? You must be joking!
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To all correspondants about F.D.'s I concur whole-heartedly. I've always tried to teach to 'look through' the F.D's and maintain a raw data scan. Only then can you see what the F.D. is telling you and understand why. Sadly, there were other insructors who hammered the students to "follow the F.D". So they did, solely. Unfortunately I think that philosophy has prevailed. Trying to explain to students, and other instructors that the F.D can drop you in some very deep holes showed that they did not understand fully how it worked. If wrongly used (B737) V/S can fly you into the ground; on the classics it can stall you, as can ALT HLD. The F.D will be perfectly centred. I even see SFI's teaching cadets about the FPV on the NG. That too can stall you without a basic scan. It will only be the performance istruments in the basic scan that wil alert you to the impending problem. On B757/B767 generation a/c it was a command requirement to fly a tiny SBY instrument approach. Is that still the case, and would most be able to do so? On the new NG a/c., even with total A.C., failure there will be a no F.D. PFD. Nice big fat and juicy TV screen. There is still a tiny SBY ADI/ASI. Could most pilots fly that? If not, why's it there? However, we don't all fly that technology. On NG LNAV GPS a/c I find students do not look at 'the needles'. They assume the magenta line will always be correct. Such was the case when I converted a senior training pilot from B738 - B733. On an NDB approach he hadn't a clue where the inbound CRS was. He didn't realise there was map shift on a non-GPS a/c. He flew the magenta line in HDG SEL (SOP for the classic), but was not on the inbound track by 0.6 nm. No scan of the basics.
There was even a case years ago of a crew on a very short UK flight, B733, who could not engage LNAV or VNAV or A/T on departure. They returned. It didn't occur to them to inform ATC and fly raw data VOR's. There have been a few well documented crashes on contollable flying a/c where the instruments were giving spurious readings. They did not show what was expected from the control inputs. However, with some careful analysis and 'back to basics' airmanship the situation was survivable. Is that not what our pax expect from us; to be able to manange such a scenario?
I remember, perhaps Jackie Stewart, who won a Grandprix without a clutch for half the race. He managed the revs and what gears to use. Basics. (bring back manula gearboxes). I remember stories of mariners who lost nav systems and reverted to sextants and D.R. Should we allow the old magic black arts to disppear in our profession? There are many places in the world still without radar coverage. If the nav boxes shoutdown you are on your own, and ofen on minimum fuel these days. If the EADI freezes in a erronious attitude should we not be able to detect something is wrong and survive it? Or do we go down the route of 'the chances of it happening are so one in so many millions that it will just be a 'bad-hair' day'. Lets put on more backup systems, and have SOP's that keep us so far away from the boundaries that we don't even know where they are.
I've flown B767 into Calvi with a visual downwind amongst the mountains onto the northly Rwy. The same applied to Corfu at night onto the southerly; likewise Salzburg onto the northerly. It was a big a/c. Nothing macho, cowboy or special about it. It was the norm and expected from our crews. The a/c had the capabilities, so too did the crews. I wonder nowadays?
Are we old farts becoming like the 'Space Cowboys' (Clint, Tommy Lee & James G) hand flying the Space Shuttle with all systems off, or are we out of touch with the future and the real requirements? I'm sure the debate will run & run and go round in circles and disappear where the sun don't shine, but it's fun the shoot the breeze about it. Sadly, most of the F/O's I fly with want to be able to do the things we talk about; they just don't get the chance or the training. One day they might have to, and then...................
There was even a case years ago of a crew on a very short UK flight, B733, who could not engage LNAV or VNAV or A/T on departure. They returned. It didn't occur to them to inform ATC and fly raw data VOR's. There have been a few well documented crashes on contollable flying a/c where the instruments were giving spurious readings. They did not show what was expected from the control inputs. However, with some careful analysis and 'back to basics' airmanship the situation was survivable. Is that not what our pax expect from us; to be able to manange such a scenario?
I remember, perhaps Jackie Stewart, who won a Grandprix without a clutch for half the race. He managed the revs and what gears to use. Basics. (bring back manula gearboxes). I remember stories of mariners who lost nav systems and reverted to sextants and D.R. Should we allow the old magic black arts to disppear in our profession? There are many places in the world still without radar coverage. If the nav boxes shoutdown you are on your own, and ofen on minimum fuel these days. If the EADI freezes in a erronious attitude should we not be able to detect something is wrong and survive it? Or do we go down the route of 'the chances of it happening are so one in so many millions that it will just be a 'bad-hair' day'. Lets put on more backup systems, and have SOP's that keep us so far away from the boundaries that we don't even know where they are.
I've flown B767 into Calvi with a visual downwind amongst the mountains onto the northly Rwy. The same applied to Corfu at night onto the southerly; likewise Salzburg onto the northerly. It was a big a/c. Nothing macho, cowboy or special about it. It was the norm and expected from our crews. The a/c had the capabilities, so too did the crews. I wonder nowadays?
Are we old farts becoming like the 'Space Cowboys' (Clint, Tommy Lee & James G) hand flying the Space Shuttle with all systems off, or are we out of touch with the future and the real requirements? I'm sure the debate will run & run and go round in circles and disappear where the sun don't shine, but it's fun the shoot the breeze about it. Sadly, most of the F/O's I fly with want to be able to do the things we talk about; they just don't get the chance or the training. One day they might have to, and then...................
Roger Coppid;
Yes, all these events and more would be in an airline's FOQA/FDA/FDM (as the term might be) Program.
These are serious events which, if seen in trends, are precursors to an accident. The intent of a flight data monitoring program is to learn about these events and take preventative measures before an accident occurs.
But FOQA data must be used intelligently and with great integrity and comprehension to deliver on its promise of enhanced flight safety.
I have learned that senior management of a large airline has stated to its flight data people that the long landings being reported on the B777 are the result of its "big wing". Such a view is, in my opinion, an enabling one, excusing long landings, for whatever conceivable reason.
One supposes that the corollary to that view is, (because the wing is what it is), there is therefore nothing to be done and landings over 3000 to 4000ft down the runway are somehow acceptable (normalizing the deviance). The other excuse offered is, the runways that B777's typically use are "long".
Such a response (or denial) to the flight data places the organization at undue risk and subsequent liabilities because the "accident was in the data" before it occurred. The QANTAS overrun at Bangkok years ago is one example. The organization changed as a result of the accident and has championed flight data analysis as a primary preventative safety tool; in my opinion, QANTAS is a fine example of a learning organization which has been able to balance economics with safety.
Flight data monitoring programs will tell the airline if there are stick-shaker events which go unreported, hard landings, over-banking, (> 35deg), overspeeds and how the automation performs in comparison with manual flight.
Critically, the data derived from the QARs must be believed, (that is not always the case), kept confidential but never used to police or punish pilots. Ninety-nine percent of flight safety is about "what", not "who".
A "distributed archive" program was begun in the US some time ago, where de-identified flight data was made available to various airlines under a desire to share data to enhance safety. The idea was to see if carriers were experiencing the same issues. I don't know the present status of the program but such an approach, (very difficult to implement - those involve did a huge amount of work over a long time) goes directly to your question about industry experience.
FOQA programs are expensive to start and maintain, and the argument from the beancounters is always, "what does it produce that justifies the cost?" I have actually been told that the flight safety department was a "profit center" under some corporate business models. Such an approach reveals a high degree of ignorance first about aviation and second about how flight safety work is done. Some think that wearing reflective vests on the ramp is "doing flight safety" while others that I know have a full comprehension of the safety tools available to them, know their worth and are willing to invest the time and resources.
As always, the CEO leads and his or her "knights", (managers) will ride out and do and say exactly what the CEO wants. So if the CEO is ignorant about how to do aviation safety, the organization will likely be ignorant. All safety people have had experience pushing rope at one time or another. Some organizations learn by honest assessment of their strengths and weaknesses, others take their long-term success for granted, ostensibly waiting until an accident to teach them.
is there iny info out there about the comparison between incidents such as deep/short/hard landings, stick-shakes, over-speeds, over-banking, bank angle on landing both with or without the use of automation.
These are serious events which, if seen in trends, are precursors to an accident. The intent of a flight data monitoring program is to learn about these events and take preventative measures before an accident occurs.
But FOQA data must be used intelligently and with great integrity and comprehension to deliver on its promise of enhanced flight safety.
I have learned that senior management of a large airline has stated to its flight data people that the long landings being reported on the B777 are the result of its "big wing". Such a view is, in my opinion, an enabling one, excusing long landings, for whatever conceivable reason.
One supposes that the corollary to that view is, (because the wing is what it is), there is therefore nothing to be done and landings over 3000 to 4000ft down the runway are somehow acceptable (normalizing the deviance). The other excuse offered is, the runways that B777's typically use are "long".
Such a response (or denial) to the flight data places the organization at undue risk and subsequent liabilities because the "accident was in the data" before it occurred. The QANTAS overrun at Bangkok years ago is one example. The organization changed as a result of the accident and has championed flight data analysis as a primary preventative safety tool; in my opinion, QANTAS is a fine example of a learning organization which has been able to balance economics with safety.
Flight data monitoring programs will tell the airline if there are stick-shaker events which go unreported, hard landings, over-banking, (> 35deg), overspeeds and how the automation performs in comparison with manual flight.
Critically, the data derived from the QARs must be believed, (that is not always the case), kept confidential but never used to police or punish pilots. Ninety-nine percent of flight safety is about "what", not "who".
A "distributed archive" program was begun in the US some time ago, where de-identified flight data was made available to various airlines under a desire to share data to enhance safety. The idea was to see if carriers were experiencing the same issues. I don't know the present status of the program but such an approach, (very difficult to implement - those involve did a huge amount of work over a long time) goes directly to your question about industry experience.
FOQA programs are expensive to start and maintain, and the argument from the beancounters is always, "what does it produce that justifies the cost?" I have actually been told that the flight safety department was a "profit center" under some corporate business models. Such an approach reveals a high degree of ignorance first about aviation and second about how flight safety work is done. Some think that wearing reflective vests on the ramp is "doing flight safety" while others that I know have a full comprehension of the safety tools available to them, know their worth and are willing to invest the time and resources.
As always, the CEO leads and his or her "knights", (managers) will ride out and do and say exactly what the CEO wants. So if the CEO is ignorant about how to do aviation safety, the organization will likely be ignorant. All safety people have had experience pushing rope at one time or another. Some organizations learn by honest assessment of their strengths and weaknesses, others take their long-term success for granted, ostensibly waiting until an accident to teach them.
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Eons ago, myself and another candidate were undertaking day two of "Command simulator". It was NOT required by the authorities but rather a Company "ism", which I believe exists to this day.
Upon my initial takeoff my partner,acting as F/O, died at the "gear-up" call. Thereafter I performed a no radar ADF to minimums,engine fail in the GA, tight vectors for the single engine ILS in the opposite direction on the parallel runway to landing in a 20 kt. crosswind.
Other than that the flight was routine. Hands ,feet and cerebral cortex working in unison. I was never sharper again than the day they let me strap a DC-9 to my ass. A completely wonderful aircraft.
Upon my initial takeoff my partner,acting as F/O, died at the "gear-up" call. Thereafter I performed a no radar ADF to minimums,engine fail in the GA, tight vectors for the single engine ILS in the opposite direction on the parallel runway to landing in a 20 kt. crosswind.
Other than that the flight was routine. Hands ,feet and cerebral cortex working in unison. I was never sharper again than the day they let me strap a DC-9 to my ass. A completely wonderful aircraft.
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and how the automation performs in comparison with manual flight.