Pilot handling skills under threat, says Airbus
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Airbus can be manualy flown. I swear everytime I push the sidestick, the nose goes down. Every time I pull, it goes up. Also, everytime I advance the thrust levers, N1 increases. It always decreases when I retard them.
What else do I need to fly an airplane?
What else do I need to fly an airplane?
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you may think you are hand flying the airbus...but
I am reminded of a FAA designated examiner who was asked to give an instrument check ride/instrument rating ride in a brand new Mooney
The mooney has a full time ''wing leveler'' and you have to press a button on the yoke to allow disengagement for a turn.
He called up the FAA and said: you can't give an instrument rating to a guy who takes a checkride with the autopilot on all the time.
The FAA said: give him the ticket.
But do you really think that guy is a good instrument pilot in any plane but a mooney?????
And this was some 30 years ago.
I am reminded of a FAA designated examiner who was asked to give an instrument check ride/instrument rating ride in a brand new Mooney
The mooney has a full time ''wing leveler'' and you have to press a button on the yoke to allow disengagement for a turn.
He called up the FAA and said: you can't give an instrument rating to a guy who takes a checkride with the autopilot on all the time.
The FAA said: give him the ticket.
But do you really think that guy is a good instrument pilot in any plane but a mooney?????
And this was some 30 years ago.
PTH;
LOL...a good friend with whom I enjoyed flying the A320 a great deal and who loves the B767, (who wouldn't?), always snapped on the autopilot soon after takeoff with the exclamation, "it'd be different if I were really flying it..."
I always enjoyed the back and forth with my buddy who loved Boeings, (as I do, and for the same reasons) because it was always good-natured and never driven by ideologies! So with a bit of fun in mind,...
The basis for the opinion is of course "fbw", ...that somehow who's flying has no "real" connection with the airplane's controls, can't "feel" the airplane because of auto-trim and doesn't know what the engines are doing because the thrust levers don't move, and, when one needed it most, "the software engineers took away the ability to get the most out of the airplane!"
But, with a bow in DC-ATE's direction, that's the case with every airliner since the DC8 which was the last real cable and pulley jet airliner. Since then it's been hydraulics, electrics and artificial load feel all the way down. Heck, the DC8 and B707 both had "non-moving" throttles and we never had a problem knowing what the engines were doing. One was constantly adjusting them however, as fuel was burnt and sometimes the throttle-stagger, was....um, staggering, (sorry...(I'm Canadian)).
So what's the big deal about non-moving thrust levers, hydraulically-powered, electrically-controlled flight controls?
I believe that, as with any airliner, a matter of understanding combined with habit is all that separates an enthusiastic response to the A320/A330 series from the sense that there is a veil between you and the airplane, (which is how I felt the first time I stepped into the cockpit..."where is everything?"...I asked myself).
Every airliner is a compromise, this airplane being no different; the compromises are exponential to the advancements in an industry unaccustomed to large, all-at-once changes, and Airbus took the industry to places it hadn't been except for military aircraft. Boeing followed suit with the B777 which is indeed fbw but with a few differences, (I know about by-passing the main flight control computers, but it's still fbw after the disconnect) and the brilliant B787, which I sincerely regret that I'll never fly, is entirely based upon carbon, one of the most stable elements in the universe, so it has to be a good'un, eh?
Anyway - in fun, PTH. I wish I still had the chance to hand-fly or even have the choice to engage an autopilot...
PJ2
you may think you are hand flying the airbus...but
I always enjoyed the back and forth with my buddy who loved Boeings, (as I do, and for the same reasons) because it was always good-natured and never driven by ideologies! So with a bit of fun in mind,...
The basis for the opinion is of course "fbw", ...that somehow who's flying has no "real" connection with the airplane's controls, can't "feel" the airplane because of auto-trim and doesn't know what the engines are doing because the thrust levers don't move, and, when one needed it most, "the software engineers took away the ability to get the most out of the airplane!"
But, with a bow in DC-ATE's direction, that's the case with every airliner since the DC8 which was the last real cable and pulley jet airliner. Since then it's been hydraulics, electrics and artificial load feel all the way down. Heck, the DC8 and B707 both had "non-moving" throttles and we never had a problem knowing what the engines were doing. One was constantly adjusting them however, as fuel was burnt and sometimes the throttle-stagger, was....um, staggering, (sorry...(I'm Canadian)).
So what's the big deal about non-moving thrust levers, hydraulically-powered, electrically-controlled flight controls?
I believe that, as with any airliner, a matter of understanding combined with habit is all that separates an enthusiastic response to the A320/A330 series from the sense that there is a veil between you and the airplane, (which is how I felt the first time I stepped into the cockpit..."where is everything?"...I asked myself).
Every airliner is a compromise, this airplane being no different; the compromises are exponential to the advancements in an industry unaccustomed to large, all-at-once changes, and Airbus took the industry to places it hadn't been except for military aircraft. Boeing followed suit with the B777 which is indeed fbw but with a few differences, (I know about by-passing the main flight control computers, but it's still fbw after the disconnect) and the brilliant B787, which I sincerely regret that I'll never fly, is entirely based upon carbon, one of the most stable elements in the universe, so it has to be a good'un, eh?
Anyway - in fun, PTH. I wish I still had the chance to hand-fly or even have the choice to engage an autopilot...
PJ2
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`PJ2
yes, all in fun.
but you forget the DC9...cables and pulleys too...considered the last, "PILOT'S Airliner". We didn't even have any sort of auththrottles and honestly, we really didn't need them.
one become one with the plane the more one is involved in the flying...we become the auto if you will.
and we are our own backup.
one learns to fly without auto and is ready
one learns to fly with auto and must also learn to fly manual...twice the effort if you ask me
yes, all in fun.
but you forget the DC9...cables and pulleys too...considered the last, "PILOT'S Airliner". We didn't even have any sort of auththrottles and honestly, we really didn't need them.
one become one with the plane the more one is involved in the flying...we become the auto if you will.
and we are our own backup.
one learns to fly without auto and is ready
one learns to fly with auto and must also learn to fly manual...twice the effort if you ask me
Psychophysiological entity
A few weeks later an invitation to tea and bikkies arrived from the chief pilot of the airline. A pleasant kindly chap he asked me to desist from hand flying unless necessary, because the first officers of his airline were not trained to monitor raw data navigation aid flying - only automatics.
Any pilot should be able to maintain height and course very accurately while flying c 250 kts. In the cruise is a different matter, there, passengers really feel the slight control inputs...and they don't like it. Below cruise speeds, well they need to put up with it, while the world's crews maintain basic skills. After all, it's in their interest that standards are kept to reasonable levels.
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I just came back to the Airbus after 6 years of flying the 757. I would amuse the F/Os by hand flying the short PHX to SAN and PHX to LAS legs (all below RVSM airspace due to ATC restrictions). 45 minute or so sectors and it helped to keep the skills sharp. I always hand fly approaches unless it is CAT II or worse, I live for cloudy days!
The Airbus is better to fly off the automation when you are doing short approaches or anytime you are asked to push the limit a little by ATC. The Airbus was designed to be flown in steady, stable patterns, something that does not always happen in real life.
Most of the F/Os I fly with turn on the autopilot at 500 feet and turn it off at 500 feet. They never get a feel for the aircraft and when it comes time to go into the sim they fly like sh#t. The Boeing guys were better at doing more hand flying, mainly I think because the 75 is such a great plane to fly. The Airbus guys are brainwashed into believing that the automation has to be on all the time. When I turn the autothrottles off and fly it like a real airplane it gives them the confidence to see that it is, after all, just another jet.
The Airbus is better to fly off the automation when you are doing short approaches or anytime you are asked to push the limit a little by ATC. The Airbus was designed to be flown in steady, stable patterns, something that does not always happen in real life.
Most of the F/Os I fly with turn on the autopilot at 500 feet and turn it off at 500 feet. They never get a feel for the aircraft and when it comes time to go into the sim they fly like sh#t. The Boeing guys were better at doing more hand flying, mainly I think because the 75 is such a great plane to fly. The Airbus guys are brainwashed into believing that the automation has to be on all the time. When I turn the autothrottles off and fly it like a real airplane it gives them the confidence to see that it is, after all, just another jet.
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and with regard to final approach and landing, we all do this (I hope) manually day in day out when conditions allow, which is 99% of the time. .... So what is the problem?
Mr New Management is so petrified of an incident, and so convinced that automatics are safer, that they will not let us hand fly. So the hand flying is rusty if it is ever needed, and no extra sim-time is allocated to brush up.
The problem is management.
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CAA study on automation and manual flying 2004
From
http://www.caa.co.uk/docs/33/2004_10.PDF
"Knowledge of Manual Flying vs Automatic Control
3.7.1 From the initial stages of flying training pilots develop skills to manually control the
flight path in a feed-forward type of behaviour. This means that when recognising an
error in the flight path performance the pilot makes a control input in anticipation of a
desired response – they think ahead in a pro-active manner. However, studies have
shown that pilots operating modern automation for flight path control do not have the
knowledge or understanding to predict the behaviour of the automation based on
detection of an error and selection of a control input. They cannot always predict the
behaviour or feedback cues of the systems modes; as a result it may be said that they
behave in a feedback or reactive manner - they are behind the aircraft.
3.7.2 As illustrated above there is a recognisable difference in the way humans (pilots)
handle certain types of knowledge. The basic skills associated with 'manually flying'
an aircraft are predominantly based on procedural knowledge i.e. how to achieve the
task. However, the use of automation to control the flight path of an aircraft is taught
as declarative knowledge. Pilots are required to manage systems based on a
knowledge that the autoflight system works in a particular fashion. So, the pilot is
faced with the same operational task of controlling the flight path but employs two
different strategies of cognitive behaviour depending upon whether the task is
manually or automatically executed. As discussed above the current requirements for
licence and type rating issue prescribe standards and experience in the procedural
knowledge of manual control of the flight path; however, there are no similar
requirements to ensure appropriate standards and experience for the procedural
knowledge of control of the flight path using automation.
December 2004
CAA Paper 2004/10 Flight Crew Reliance on Automation
Chapter 3 Page 7
3.7.3 It may be concluded that pilots lack the right type of knowledge to deal with control
of the flight path using automation in normal and non-normal situations. This may be
due to incorrect interpretation of existing requirements or lack of a comprehensive
training curriculum that encompasses all aspects of the published requirements. It
suggested that there should be a shift in emphasis in the way automation for flight
path control is taught and trained. Further research is required to identify the cause
and provide a solution."
http://www.caa.co.uk/docs/33/2004_10.PDF
"Knowledge of Manual Flying vs Automatic Control
3.7.1 From the initial stages of flying training pilots develop skills to manually control the
flight path in a feed-forward type of behaviour. This means that when recognising an
error in the flight path performance the pilot makes a control input in anticipation of a
desired response – they think ahead in a pro-active manner. However, studies have
shown that pilots operating modern automation for flight path control do not have the
knowledge or understanding to predict the behaviour of the automation based on
detection of an error and selection of a control input. They cannot always predict the
behaviour or feedback cues of the systems modes; as a result it may be said that they
behave in a feedback or reactive manner - they are behind the aircraft.
3.7.2 As illustrated above there is a recognisable difference in the way humans (pilots)
handle certain types of knowledge. The basic skills associated with 'manually flying'
an aircraft are predominantly based on procedural knowledge i.e. how to achieve the
task. However, the use of automation to control the flight path of an aircraft is taught
as declarative knowledge. Pilots are required to manage systems based on a
knowledge that the autoflight system works in a particular fashion. So, the pilot is
faced with the same operational task of controlling the flight path but employs two
different strategies of cognitive behaviour depending upon whether the task is
manually or automatically executed. As discussed above the current requirements for
licence and type rating issue prescribe standards and experience in the procedural
knowledge of manual control of the flight path; however, there are no similar
requirements to ensure appropriate standards and experience for the procedural
knowledge of control of the flight path using automation.
December 2004
CAA Paper 2004/10 Flight Crew Reliance on Automation
Chapter 3 Page 7
3.7.3 It may be concluded that pilots lack the right type of knowledge to deal with control
of the flight path using automation in normal and non-normal situations. This may be
due to incorrect interpretation of existing requirements or lack of a comprehensive
training curriculum that encompasses all aspects of the published requirements. It
suggested that there should be a shift in emphasis in the way automation for flight
path control is taught and trained. Further research is required to identify the cause
and provide a solution."
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Why are they surprised?
Does anyone remember in which subject of the ATPL manual flying techinque is studied?
.... None?
I remember Trevor Thom book, of course but I don't remember any institution telling me to study it or having to pass written tests on how to fly. The subject of how to fly does not exist as such. Isn't it amazing? Pilots learning depends on each instructor, good or bad, with correct or incorrect technique.
I had to argue many times with FIs that "power is for rate and pitch for speed" is a wrong law, many times. They thought I was crazy. It is on the books, but books that nobody has prescribed as necessary.
And in which subjet is automated flying technique studied ?
... None?
I don't even know of any book on that.
They should be glad that pilots know how to hand fly. Thanks to their flight instructors, only.
Does anyone remember in which subject of the ATPL manual flying techinque is studied?
.... None?
I remember Trevor Thom book, of course but I don't remember any institution telling me to study it or having to pass written tests on how to fly. The subject of how to fly does not exist as such. Isn't it amazing? Pilots learning depends on each instructor, good or bad, with correct or incorrect technique.
I had to argue many times with FIs that "power is for rate and pitch for speed" is a wrong law, many times. They thought I was crazy. It is on the books, but books that nobody has prescribed as necessary.
And in which subjet is automated flying technique studied ?
... None?
I don't even know of any book on that.
They should be glad that pilots know how to hand fly. Thanks to their flight instructors, only.
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Senate Moves To Change Flight Rules
From Avweb 17 Mar 2010:
Copilots for commercial flights carrying passengers would be required to have at least 800 hours of flight time under a measure passed by the Senate Tuesday. Current rules require only 250 hours. The 800 hours must include experience working in multiple-pilot environments and training in handling adverse weather and icing conditions. If the legislation becomes law, the FAA would have until the end of 2011 to issue new rules. The measure is just one part of the FAA reauthorization bill, which has been laden with dozens of controversial amendments, some of which have little or nothing to do with aviation, on its way through Congress. It's expected that the FAA will be given another 90-day funding extension on Thursday, moving the deadline back to June 30 for the reauthorization bill to pass.
Relatives of the victims of Colgan Air Flight 3407 have been actively lobbying Congress to include in the bill changes in the training standards for pilots on commercial passenger flights. The House version of the FAA reauthorization bill has already been passed, and it includes a 1,500-hour minimum requirement for right-seaters on commuter airlines. Whatever the Senate passes will have to be merged with the House bill by a House-Senate conference committee that will then vote on whatever compromises they reach. The long-awaited funding bill is expected to provide support for the development of NextGen.
Copilots for commercial flights carrying passengers would be required to have at least 800 hours of flight time under a measure passed by the Senate Tuesday. Current rules require only 250 hours. The 800 hours must include experience working in multiple-pilot environments and training in handling adverse weather and icing conditions. If the legislation becomes law, the FAA would have until the end of 2011 to issue new rules. The measure is just one part of the FAA reauthorization bill, which has been laden with dozens of controversial amendments, some of which have little or nothing to do with aviation, on its way through Congress. It's expected that the FAA will be given another 90-day funding extension on Thursday, moving the deadline back to June 30 for the reauthorization bill to pass.
Relatives of the victims of Colgan Air Flight 3407 have been actively lobbying Congress to include in the bill changes in the training standards for pilots on commercial passenger flights. The House version of the FAA reauthorization bill has already been passed, and it includes a 1,500-hour minimum requirement for right-seaters on commuter airlines. Whatever the Senate passes will have to be merged with the House bill by a House-Senate conference committee that will then vote on whatever compromises they reach. The long-awaited funding bill is expected to provide support for the development of NextGen.
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Thanks for info.
It is to be seen if this will bring more problems that it solves.
At first sight it sounds good, of course. But murphy law is unavoidable.
Every solution brings new problems.
In the USA, pilots can find ways to build time and get paid for it, or so it used to be years ago. If airline needs are supplied by these kind of pilots, the bill is a good one. Otherwise they have to allow for an alternate path to the RHS (not based on pay, pay and pay again, please!).
In Europe, if they did that there would be a lot of pilots spending a lot of money to build that time (good bussiness for FLA schools!) because general aviation there is a joke, almost non-existent. Still, if the "alternate path" that the americans should include in the bill, imho, was reasonable, then Europe could follow.
Let's see what happens
It is to be seen if this will bring more problems that it solves.
At first sight it sounds good, of course. But murphy law is unavoidable.
Every solution brings new problems.
In the USA, pilots can find ways to build time and get paid for it, or so it used to be years ago. If airline needs are supplied by these kind of pilots, the bill is a good one. Otherwise they have to allow for an alternate path to the RHS (not based on pay, pay and pay again, please!).
In Europe, if they did that there would be a lot of pilots spending a lot of money to build that time (good bussiness for FLA schools!) because general aviation there is a joke, almost non-existent. Still, if the "alternate path" that the americans should include in the bill, imho, was reasonable, then Europe could follow.
Let's see what happens
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Automation vs hand-flying - still a polarized debate
Amazing how "polarized" this sort of debate can still be. After 20 years flying, I then worked along 6.5 years - and had 6,500+ hrs logged as TC Instructor / TC Evaluator inside Level "D" FFS's in 3 distinct types of acft -, instructing & checking in a major (FAR 142 certified) Training Center in Asia (plus a few years as TRI/TRE with different operators), so my point of view is: although automation (obviously) came to stay, it is never too much to emphasize engineers should stick to their desks, same way we pilots should stick to our flight decks. "To each monkey its own branch", as we say in my country. We cannot teach them how to build acft and/or their systems (though some manufacturers wisely like to use pilots impressions in their projects, while others arrogantly see pilots as minor players or even as a "necessary evil", whose autonomy should be restrained, even inside the flight deck), nor should the engineers have the pretension to teach us how to do our jobs. Automation and its understanding / management is a vital part of modern flying, that goes without saying. However, I will never buy the idea of accepting complacency and/or "automation worshipping" / "automation-brain-wash" to take over the flight deck, be it inside a simulator, be it inside a real airplane, simply because it kills people. Automation fails exactly when it should not (it seldom does on VMC with clear-blue sky; more likely the Deep S
t happens approaching the ITCZ at night, as sadly happened to a widebody almost 01 yr ago, over the Atlantic, flying from GIG to CDG), specially on old & badly maintained acft, and then - if you are not ready to take over - then who's the acft's backup? Airbus Rule # 6 says: "When things don't go as expected - TAKE OVER". Very nice, in theory. My question is: how can you be ready to take over, if you never practice the takeover? Are you able to fly the automation, or - in a daily basis - the automation has been flying you??? I respectfully disagree with colleagues who think hand-flying can be practiced in the simulator recurrent only. It can, for the sake of exercising non-normals and being signed-off, but - no matter how high the fidelity index of a given simulator is - it is never the same as the real aircraft. "The box" is "the box", the only "master" inside it is the guy sitting on the I.O.S. (and I talk out of personal experience, as I am used to be in the I.O.S. as much as in the pilot's seats). So, while never advocating hand-flying within congested airspace and/or during high workload phases, it is my opinion hand-flying should indeed be practiced, at some point of the line routine. Any acft can be flown manually (Airbus' Rule # 1: "The aircraft can be flown like any other aircraft", though I believe that little blue card has been made when my kind of Airbus was the standard, not the current ones
). I had the opportunity to train a large group of young pilots in Asia, and that has been an extremely rich experience, for many reasons. 1st, the cultural differences (as I am from South America and most of my students/trainees were asians), 2nd because I had a completely different formation than the one they had. I started flying on Piper J3's, Piper Cub's and other basic tail-draggers (later on flew as a crop-duster, then corporate acft before reaching my 1st airline job in the mid-'80s), while those guys had never flown any basics. Most of them were either trained by the local armed forces or underwent their initial training in highly-equipped glass-cockpit acft on the local flight academy. So - as these people basic acft is a much better aircraft, their basic training should necessarily be different. It was common to have a student turning into an upset condition upon loosing an FD, or else two guys with heads-down on a visual short final approach (one flying through the approach by instruments only, even though runway had been in sight after a while, the other still making "drawings" & calculations on the FMC keyboard). The name of that disease is "automation-worshipping". So we must "use the proper level automation for the task" (Airbus' rule # 7), but we do not blindly rely on it, because it is dangerous & unrational. My question to the trainee was always: "Mr X, what's the purpose of the automation?" Answer: "To reduce workload, Captain"...my 2nd question: "Good. And why are you using automation to increase your workload, instead???"
Another personal word about simulator training: simulators should not be the "horror chambers" that may cause nightmares in many pilots. Instead they should be like a "laboratory" with a motion, where each of us can practice what we cannot in the real acft. Obviously, however - and mostly due to economic-financial reasons -, most airlines do not allow it. Given the way many operators provide recurrent training, nowadays, in the format of "box-ticking-policy" sessions, it does not seem likely to me that there would be much room for "free-plays". The C.A. Authority demands an absurd amount of maneuvers & non-normals to be performed in a 4-hour session which, in many cases, has to serve both as a training & checking (OPC/LPC etc). That neither trains nor checks anyone. That is frustrating, it is a massacre perpetrated every 6-months agains pilots, just for the sake of complying with the regulations, checking boxes, filling-up paperwork and nicely signing & stamping logbooks, and then everyone goes back into line-flying (one side pretending the syllabus has been tought, the other pretending the syllabus has been learnt), and life goes on. It is a fact many pilots (if not the vast majority) feel very uncomfortable, once they complete their recurrents.
Nice & Safe flights to everyone, keep yr hand-flying skills honed!!!
Well put A310. But I am afraid things will never change from what we are seeing now. Your Asian experience is not new - it happens all the time. The fact is many pilots are so brain-washed into automatics that they are now afraid to let go of their mother's (automatics) hand. They count on that one in a thousand chance of ever losing control of the aircraft as the rationale for thinking it will never happen to them.
Yes, very well and clearly stated, A310.
I recall very well these issues being predicted, mainly by pilots and pilots' associations when the A320 was introduced in the late 80's, early 90's.
Such observations were no surprise to pilots, but airline bean counters, perhaps dealing with the effects of de-regulation and other economic crises, slowly became intoxicated with the cost-savings of the new, two-man cockpits, and holding on to the notion, engendered by the manufacturer, that automation would "fly the airplane" and reduce training and qualification needs. I think that very few if any pilots ever thought this or believed it.
This serious failing of fundamental understanding of aviation not only reduced the number of pilots in the cockpit, (and now some are talking about "one-man cockpits!?"), but over the following two decades would reduce training footprints and enable hiring "less - experienced pilots." The response to such obvious trends which were seen and commented upon back then has been glacial.
These chickens are now coming home to roost. The Flight Safety Foundation is speaking out clearly on the issue. While primarily intended to focus on systems failures and handling, the comment from the Flight Safety Foundation is precisely what this thread is about.
While I think that supporting the automation innovations designed mainly by Airbus is legitimate I think first, that a clear marketing strategy was to leave the impression that the airplane was going to be easy to fly for anyone, that the automated cockpit would be safer than steam-types and that cockpit commonality would reduce qualification and training costs. This has perhaps been true but what was not taken into account was the nature of the airline industry (vice the nature of aviation itself).
Pilots used to know that appropriate use of automation as a supplement to aircraft handling, supported with thorough training, was always the understanding had of such advances, first seen in the B-767, (which was initially to be a three-man cockpit). Through no fault of their own, we are seeing the beginnings of a generation raised on "FS in a comfortable if not naive environment", who don't know what they don't know about aviation.
Automation is not, and has never been the problem; the expectation that automation can replace thinking has been the mistake all along.
In other words, this is neither an Airbus nor a Boeing problem alone. It is a structural problem within the airline transportation system itself which probably went too far in early assumptions regarding automation and the reasons used for cost-reductions.
In more than one way it is the same portentous outcome that we are seeing in response to SMS especially in the US where some airlines have taken advantage of reduced oversight under the program. SMS is not intended as the de-regulation/self-monitoring of flight safety but that is what it became; it was naive and money-driven to think otherwise. On this, I think both the US and finally the Canadian regulator have hearkened to the problem and are acting.
Here is the FSF article:
I recall very well these issues being predicted, mainly by pilots and pilots' associations when the A320 was introduced in the late 80's, early 90's.
Such observations were no surprise to pilots, but airline bean counters, perhaps dealing with the effects of de-regulation and other economic crises, slowly became intoxicated with the cost-savings of the new, two-man cockpits, and holding on to the notion, engendered by the manufacturer, that automation would "fly the airplane" and reduce training and qualification needs. I think that very few if any pilots ever thought this or believed it.
This serious failing of fundamental understanding of aviation not only reduced the number of pilots in the cockpit, (and now some are talking about "one-man cockpits!?"), but over the following two decades would reduce training footprints and enable hiring "less - experienced pilots." The response to such obvious trends which were seen and commented upon back then has been glacial.
These chickens are now coming home to roost. The Flight Safety Foundation is speaking out clearly on the issue. While primarily intended to focus on systems failures and handling, the comment from the Flight Safety Foundation is precisely what this thread is about.
While I think that supporting the automation innovations designed mainly by Airbus is legitimate I think first, that a clear marketing strategy was to leave the impression that the airplane was going to be easy to fly for anyone, that the automated cockpit would be safer than steam-types and that cockpit commonality would reduce qualification and training costs. This has perhaps been true but what was not taken into account was the nature of the airline industry (vice the nature of aviation itself).
Pilots used to know that appropriate use of automation as a supplement to aircraft handling, supported with thorough training, was always the understanding had of such advances, first seen in the B-767, (which was initially to be a three-man cockpit). Through no fault of their own, we are seeing the beginnings of a generation raised on "FS in a comfortable if not naive environment", who don't know what they don't know about aviation.
Automation is not, and has never been the problem; the expectation that automation can replace thinking has been the mistake all along.
In other words, this is neither an Airbus nor a Boeing problem alone. It is a structural problem within the airline transportation system itself which probably went too far in early assumptions regarding automation and the reasons used for cost-reductions.
In more than one way it is the same portentous outcome that we are seeing in response to SMS especially in the US where some airlines have taken advantage of reduced oversight under the program. SMS is not intended as the de-regulation/self-monitoring of flight safety but that is what it became; it was naive and money-driven to think otherwise. On this, I think both the US and finally the Canadian regulator have hearkened to the problem and are acting.
Here is the FSF article:
Reaction to systems failure faces scrutiny
THE way pilots respond to the failure of computer-controlled systems on advanced aircraft is likely to be the next big area to come under scrutiny by safety authorities, a leading US expert believes.
Flight Safety Foundation global chief executive Bill Voss said there was increasing concern about the interface between pilots and aircraft automation, as well as how this should be incorporated into aviation training.
Mr Voss said during a visit to Sydney that he had seen a preliminary analysis of Line Operation Safety Audit (LOSA) reports designed to gauge the prevalence of problems with automation and how well they were managed.
"And the answer keeps coming out to extremely prevalent and very badly managed," he said.
"It's actually a significant threat."
Questions about automation in planes received increased attention after the crash of an Air France Airbus A330 over the Atlantic Ocean last year.
Australians also saw a graphic example of what could go wrong when an Emirates crew in Melbourne mistyped the Airbus A340's take-off weight and struggled to get airborne after a tail-strike.
Investigators have still to reveal what caused an air data inertial reference unit to malfunction and send a Qantas A330 to go on a wild ride through West Australian skies in 2008. Mr Voss also cited a radar altimeter failure to which a crew failed to react prior to a Turkish Airlines crash at Amsterdam; a 2007 TAM A320 runway overrun in Brazil's Sao Paolo where one engine deployed thrust reversers while the other accelerated; and a crash the same year of an Adamair 737 off Indonesia.
"Even if you go back to fairly primitive aircraft like the Adamair accident, they were changing their modes in the weather and actually blanked out their flight display," he said. The internationally renowned air safety expert said there was a common thread through many of the accidents and it was time to train for a new type of emergency that looked at the failure modes in highly automated aircraft. This included talking explicitly about how automation fails, how pilots should cope with it and if they had the "gut skill" to get through the failures.
"These systems are amazing -- they will usually recover themselves, but you've got maybe 30 seconds where you've got to gut through things like the pitot tube (part of the air speed measuring devices) failures we've seen," he said. "That's all it takes -- attitude and power for about a minute and you're out the other side of the problem. But if you don't, you die."
He said pilots needed snappy new phrases for automation failures that were similar to "dead foot, dead engine" slogans that helped them identify which engine had quit.
"The (US Federal Aviation Administration) is probably going to push it and you're seeing some speeches from (FAA administrator) Randy Babbitt, who's very tuned into this stuff," he said.
Reaction to systems failure faces scrutiny | The Australian
THE way pilots respond to the failure of computer-controlled systems on advanced aircraft is likely to be the next big area to come under scrutiny by safety authorities, a leading US expert believes.
Flight Safety Foundation global chief executive Bill Voss said there was increasing concern about the interface between pilots and aircraft automation, as well as how this should be incorporated into aviation training.
Mr Voss said during a visit to Sydney that he had seen a preliminary analysis of Line Operation Safety Audit (LOSA) reports designed to gauge the prevalence of problems with automation and how well they were managed.
"And the answer keeps coming out to extremely prevalent and very badly managed," he said.
"It's actually a significant threat."
Questions about automation in planes received increased attention after the crash of an Air France Airbus A330 over the Atlantic Ocean last year.
Australians also saw a graphic example of what could go wrong when an Emirates crew in Melbourne mistyped the Airbus A340's take-off weight and struggled to get airborne after a tail-strike.
Investigators have still to reveal what caused an air data inertial reference unit to malfunction and send a Qantas A330 to go on a wild ride through West Australian skies in 2008. Mr Voss also cited a radar altimeter failure to which a crew failed to react prior to a Turkish Airlines crash at Amsterdam; a 2007 TAM A320 runway overrun in Brazil's Sao Paolo where one engine deployed thrust reversers while the other accelerated; and a crash the same year of an Adamair 737 off Indonesia.
"Even if you go back to fairly primitive aircraft like the Adamair accident, they were changing their modes in the weather and actually blanked out their flight display," he said. The internationally renowned air safety expert said there was a common thread through many of the accidents and it was time to train for a new type of emergency that looked at the failure modes in highly automated aircraft. This included talking explicitly about how automation fails, how pilots should cope with it and if they had the "gut skill" to get through the failures.
"These systems are amazing -- they will usually recover themselves, but you've got maybe 30 seconds where you've got to gut through things like the pitot tube (part of the air speed measuring devices) failures we've seen," he said. "That's all it takes -- attitude and power for about a minute and you're out the other side of the problem. But if you don't, you die."
He said pilots needed snappy new phrases for automation failures that were similar to "dead foot, dead engine" slogans that helped them identify which engine had quit.
"The (US Federal Aviation Administration) is probably going to push it and you're seeing some speeches from (FAA administrator) Randy Babbitt, who's very tuned into this stuff," he said.
Reaction to systems failure faces scrutiny | The Australian
Last edited by PJ2; 27th Mar 2010 at 15:44.
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Do you think, in Aviation, we're going through a metamorphosis today similar to what occurred when steam gave way to sail with sea transport?
I don't think there'd be one person reading this thread who wouldn't be willing to bet a year's salary that back then, old captains brought up on sail sat around in harbour bars decrying the lack of skills/knowledge etc of the new breed of 'stink boat' sailor.
It's a fact. Things change, and sometimes irrevocvably.
However, for Aviation, I don't think the sail to steam analogy holds too much water (sorry if some see that as a dreadful pun to some). Where a 'new breed' ship's officer on one of them thar new-fangled coal burners would have lost the ability and the knowledge to rig a jury sail (that's if the new-fangled steamer had a mast that would take one!), at worst, he might have - eventually - drifted onto a shoal if he lost his engines, and in many cases, he should have had quite some time to summon some help before actually hitting those rocks.
In Aviation, it really is different. We're not steaming at 12 knots, we're doing 480 knots, or at best, maybe 120K, and those 'rocks' (or at 480 knots, something equally as hard), are ALWAYS just minutes, sometime only seconds, away.
I've seen quite a few posts here from people decrying the (us!) Old Farts and our predictions of gloom and doom with the loss - and lack of maintenance - of hand flying skills. At the risk of sounding like one of those old sailing captains in a seaside tavern 150 years ago, I think I'll close by repeating PJ2's (I think) very wise comment from his post above, with my own emphasis added.
Edited to add: "...and thanks to patently silly airline SOPs demanding the use of the highest level of automation available at all times on the line, this new generation will never be given the chance to develop vital skills and to learn that - maybe on just one awful day in their otherwise uneventful careers - those skills really can be the difference between life or death."
I don't think there'd be one person reading this thread who wouldn't be willing to bet a year's salary that back then, old captains brought up on sail sat around in harbour bars decrying the lack of skills/knowledge etc of the new breed of 'stink boat' sailor.
It's a fact. Things change, and sometimes irrevocvably.
However, for Aviation, I don't think the sail to steam analogy holds too much water (sorry if some see that as a dreadful pun to some). Where a 'new breed' ship's officer on one of them thar new-fangled coal burners would have lost the ability and the knowledge to rig a jury sail (that's if the new-fangled steamer had a mast that would take one!), at worst, he might have - eventually - drifted onto a shoal if he lost his engines, and in many cases, he should have had quite some time to summon some help before actually hitting those rocks.
In Aviation, it really is different. We're not steaming at 12 knots, we're doing 480 knots, or at best, maybe 120K, and those 'rocks' (or at 480 knots, something equally as hard), are ALWAYS just minutes, sometime only seconds, away.
I've seen quite a few posts here from people decrying the (us!) Old Farts and our predictions of gloom and doom with the loss - and lack of maintenance - of hand flying skills. At the risk of sounding like one of those old sailing captains in a seaside tavern 150 years ago, I think I'll close by repeating PJ2's (I think) very wise comment from his post above, with my own emphasis added.
Through no fault of their own, we are seeing the beginnings of a generation raised on "FS in a comfortable if not naive environment", who don't know what they don't know about aviation.
Last edited by Wiley; 28th Mar 2010 at 03:49.
Wiley;
Yes, I think we are metamorphizing but I don't think it is such changes which result in accidents.
I think separating technique (know-how) from intelligence, (knowing) is one way to answer your question.
By know-how I mean the way an enterprise is carried out. By oar, by sail, by propeller by stream of turbine-driven water, with bulbous-nosed hulls to catamaran designs.
By "intelligence" I don't mean high brain power, I mean comprehension through experience.
The ocean requires experienced knowledge of how hulls, propulsion, long tracts of water and large weather systems, tides, fresh and salt water all interact.
The "character of physical law" as Feynman put it, doesn't change so failure means failure to take into account physical law.
Success, even uninterrupted, long success with fancy powerpoints trying to convince others that the right thing is being done, is still descriptive, not predictive.
We can imagine something similar for airplanes. The stuff of "how", changes, as we obviously understand. The stuff of "what", doesn't change.
Most of us are familiar with the old saying attributed to Captain Lamplugh:
"Aviation in itself is not inherently dangerous. But to an even greater degree than the sea, it is terribly unforgiving of any carelessness, incapacity or neglect."
I think a far, far better view, again by Richard Feynman may add something to the conversation. He stated the following in his contribution to the investigation into the Challenger accident:
"For a successful technology, reality must take precedence over public relations, for Nature cannot be fooled."
Automation uses natural laws but is wholly unanticipatory. Like all algorithms, software and computers are totally blind and can be wrong billions of times per second. So far, the only intervention is the "tuned-receivers" in the cockpit seats who know the real difference between know-how and knowing.
I doubt if a single airline manager can say the same thing, not because I think less of them but because they are so narrowly focussed on staying alive in this industry that they can't stop to really manage and instead can only see the cost equations until nature catches up.
But none of this filosophickal stuff makes money, right?
PJ2
Yes, I think we are metamorphizing but I don't think it is such changes which result in accidents.
I think separating technique (know-how) from intelligence, (knowing) is one way to answer your question.
By know-how I mean the way an enterprise is carried out. By oar, by sail, by propeller by stream of turbine-driven water, with bulbous-nosed hulls to catamaran designs.
By "intelligence" I don't mean high brain power, I mean comprehension through experience.
The ocean requires experienced knowledge of how hulls, propulsion, long tracts of water and large weather systems, tides, fresh and salt water all interact.
The "character of physical law" as Feynman put it, doesn't change so failure means failure to take into account physical law.
Success, even uninterrupted, long success with fancy powerpoints trying to convince others that the right thing is being done, is still descriptive, not predictive.
We can imagine something similar for airplanes. The stuff of "how", changes, as we obviously understand. The stuff of "what", doesn't change.
Most of us are familiar with the old saying attributed to Captain Lamplugh:
"Aviation in itself is not inherently dangerous. But to an even greater degree than the sea, it is terribly unforgiving of any carelessness, incapacity or neglect."
I think a far, far better view, again by Richard Feynman may add something to the conversation. He stated the following in his contribution to the investigation into the Challenger accident:
"For a successful technology, reality must take precedence over public relations, for Nature cannot be fooled."
Automation uses natural laws but is wholly unanticipatory. Like all algorithms, software and computers are totally blind and can be wrong billions of times per second. So far, the only intervention is the "tuned-receivers" in the cockpit seats who know the real difference between know-how and knowing.
I doubt if a single airline manager can say the same thing, not because I think less of them but because they are so narrowly focussed on staying alive in this industry that they can't stop to really manage and instead can only see the cost equations until nature catches up.
But none of this filosophickal stuff makes money, right?
PJ2