Southwest Airlines jet catches fire after landing in Houston
Nothing has changed -- "reconsideration" is NEVER possible (claiming they lack resources to correct blatant errs); and their managers never face any review-checkride, or any investigative "professional-standards" committee.
If the expert opinion is that critical contributors were overlooked than at the least a petition for rexamination need be made. If that is not disposed in a professional manner than there is room for further collective action.
So please get back to us after a pertition for reconsideration has been made and rejected without foundation and maybe we can do something about it.
Meanwhile thanks for the heads up
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Dispatching with anti-skid u/s is a serious matter which requires much thought before accepting the airplane and thorough briefings.
If restrictions could not be complied with, "careful thought" dictated that I didn't launch the flight and get an aircraft swap, or take other action if it was in the air at the time of the anti-skid failure. I can recall one specific situation where HOU's 04/22 was closed for construction, SE winds were out of tailwind limits for 30L, and with the aircraft now too heavy for 12R, I diverted them to IAH. Another time I had a similar situation with a flight inbound to BUR, and sent him to LAX. After a swap there, the aircraft stayed LAX-OAK (on the long runways of each) for the rest of the day and was fixed overnight.
Whether SWA's internal prohibition on an anti-skid being deferred continues, or is perhaps rescinded (now the NTSB has issued their final report) remains to be seen.
On one hand, if the Company wants to stay conservative despite MMEL permisiveness, that's perfectly fine, and it's certainly their call to make.
On the other hand, should the internal restriction be rescinded, that's fine too, and it can be reasonably be argued that if dispatching an aircraft with an inop anti-skid was supposedly so inherently unsafe then FAA would have already forced Boeing to delete MEL item 32-2 from the MMEL as well as all airline MELs. Ditto for other transport category aircraft.
Just my humble personal opinion here (and nobody else's), but the fact that inop anti-skids have occasionally cropped-up in the last 60 or so years since jet-powered aircraft* like the 707, 727, 737, and DC-9 family, and perhaps other types were deployed and that they have been routinely and safely deferred (and operational restrictions complied with as a part of that MEL deferral process), that suggests to me that there's no real systemic issue involved here, only an issue associated with a specific flight.
I'll live with whichever way it ends up going. Like I said, anti-skids don't fail all that often, and when one does, we'll deal with it, just like we deal with any other out-of-service event.
(*The recip and turbo prop aircraft of the 1950s and early may well have also had anti-skid systems, but that was before my time)
Last edited by SeniorDispatcher; 14th Jan 2011 at 13:20. Reason: Deleted MD-80 reference
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one more thing...it was just a brake fire...with CFR present...and while I don't have access to the videos (old computer, cheap pilot), why use the slides when air portable stairs might be better used? unless the plane was burned beyond recognition, sometimes waiting makes sense...of course we had this argument for the jet blue a tire in sacramento. (parking brake set for landing!)
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Reconsideration -- only good for BEA or AAIB submissions
Lampo's comment on the 13th, re' NTSB rule 845.41(a):
Have you submitted any Petition in the past few years? Any worthy response?
Hauter wrote back two years ago on one Petition (a decades- ago AAR still awaiting correction) -- he honestly admitted that there would be little chance of any action, "lack of resources". Over the past few years (check some of my posts) the Board has failed to make correction (even after admitting the errs and stating that correction would be done): But the Staff/Board seems eager to aim their P.C. at the human operator -- case closed, avoid any mention of deferred-Mx as contributing factor, or revealing an MMEL-problem area.
Nothing has changed regarding NTSB- errs & their lack of "reconsideration"--
C.O. Miller offered this critique way back in the early 1980's
"... at the least a petition for rexamination need be made. If that is not disposed in a professional manner than there is room for further collective action...."
No. There is no recourse. Have you submitted any Petition in the past few years? Any worthy response?
Hauter wrote back two years ago on one Petition (a decades- ago AAR still awaiting correction) -- he honestly admitted that there would be little chance of any action, "lack of resources". Over the past few years (check some of my posts) the Board has failed to make correction (even after admitting the errs and stating that correction would be done): But the Staff/Board seems eager to aim their P.C. at the human operator -- case closed, avoid any mention of deferred-Mx as contributing factor, or revealing an MMEL-problem area.
Nothing has changed regarding NTSB- errs & their lack of "reconsideration"--
C.O. Miller offered this critique way back in the early 1980's
"The deteriorating scope, depth and accuracy of the NTSB/FAA aircraft investigations is approaching the level of a national embarrassment. Instead of being a leader in this field, the United States government seems to be unwilling to provide the resources, leadership or motivation necessary to improve investigative techniques and procedures. . . ."
"There is reason to believe that because of the excessive workload, the inadequacy of investigations, or the questionable nature of some board members' qualifications, some views of parties associated with a particular case are not communicated or understood by the Board's members. Petitions for reconsideration of the determination of cause or, more importantly, for changes in the report to present a fuller presentation or discussion of the facts, appear to be treated summarily without the objectivity which normally characterize the Board's actions. It is rare for the Board to present in its report the contrary views of competent parties unless one of the members elects to write a minority opinion supporting such a view. Such dissents are infrequent."
Excerpts from "Aviation Accident investigation: Functional and Legal Perspectives," an article by Mr. C.O. Miller, past Director of the Bureau of Aviation Safety of the NTSB; Journal of Air Law and Commerce (Dallas, Tx.: SMU School of Law), Winter 1981, Vol 46, #2.
"There is reason to believe that because of the excessive workload, the inadequacy of investigations, or the questionable nature of some board members' qualifications, some views of parties associated with a particular case are not communicated or understood by the Board's members. Petitions for reconsideration of the determination of cause or, more importantly, for changes in the report to present a fuller presentation or discussion of the facts, appear to be treated summarily without the objectivity which normally characterize the Board's actions. It is rare for the Board to present in its report the contrary views of competent parties unless one of the members elects to write a minority opinion supporting such a view. Such dissents are infrequent."
Excerpts from "Aviation Accident investigation: Functional and Legal Perspectives," an article by Mr. C.O. Miller, past Director of the Bureau of Aviation Safety of the NTSB; Journal of Air Law and Commerce (Dallas, Tx.: SMU School of Law), Winter 1981, Vol 46, #2.
Last edited by IGh; 14th Jan 2011 at 05:03.
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NarrowBody ANTI-SKID exceptions (MEL-items)
SeniorD, on the 13th, kindly explained his recollection of history on MEL-Antiskid inop':
Flight Standards Information System (FSIMS)
[INTERESTING point that PJ2 mentioned about A330-instrumentation with the sensor at the Brake Valve, to prevent crew from inciting "skid" [I've not seen that option on TBC nor DAC line aircraft].
Senior D -- for SWA employees, this case raises a PRIVACY issue: The NTSB ceased including NAMES in their "final" reports: Until about 1993, the NTSB's final AAR included an Appendix usually titled "Personnel Information", which printed the names of various pilots, FA, others involved. Recently, the Board has posted its "DOCKET" on the web for their investigations -- so now again anyone can easily find the NAMES of pilots, dispatchers, F/A's. Seems the management pilots attempted to have their names redacted -- but SWA dispatcher "P.S.", and the pilots, & FAs NAMES are again easily available in the newly available "docket" on the web.
"... if dispatching an aircraft with an inop anti-skid ... so inherently unsafe then FAA would have already forced Boeing to delete MEL item ... inop anti-skids ... in the last 60 ... years ... 707, 727, 737, and DC-9/MD-80 family ... routinely and safely deferred ..."
Hmmm -- that option hasn't been the case for some years. For example, look at the DAC-transition from DC9 through their MD8 family, the MMEL does NOT offer the permissible-exception to the heavier models:FAA's DC-9 MMEL ... 32- 4. ... Anti-Skid System ... (Series 10, 20, 30, 40, 50)
(O) May be inoperative provided:
a) Operations are conducted in accordance with performance data of the AFM ...
Note that the MMEL only offers the deferral option for the "little" DC9 series 10 thru 50 [NOT offered for the heavier DC9-80 models]. That is what caught my attention in this B737 MMEL -- still offering the deferral for Anti-Skid Inop'. That MEL-option seems wrong for later B73 models. [Edit: the MMEL Policy letter #113 (Dec2002) "MMEL Relief for Anti-Skid Inoperative" offers history, with the B737 under the pre-Amendment 92 customs:(O) May be inoperative provided:
a) Operations are conducted in accordance with performance data of the AFM ...
Flight Standards Information System (FSIMS)
[INTERESTING point that PJ2 mentioned about A330-instrumentation with the sensor at the Brake Valve, to prevent crew from inciting "skid" [I've not seen that option on TBC nor DAC line aircraft].
Senior D -- for SWA employees, this case raises a PRIVACY issue: The NTSB ceased including NAMES in their "final" reports: Until about 1993, the NTSB's final AAR included an Appendix usually titled "Personnel Information", which printed the names of various pilots, FA, others involved. Recently, the Board has posted its "DOCKET" on the web for their investigations -- so now again anyone can easily find the NAMES of pilots, dispatchers, F/A's. Seems the management pilots attempted to have their names redacted -- but SWA dispatcher "P.S.", and the pilots, & FAs NAMES are again easily available in the newly available "docket" on the web.
Last edited by IGh; 19th Jan 2011 at 03:07.
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Hmmm -- that option hasn't been the case for some years. For example, look at the DAC-transition from DC9 through their MD8 family, the MMEL does NOT offer the permissible-exception to the heavier models:
FAA's DC-9 MMEL ... 32- 4. ... Anti-Skid System ... (Series 10, 20, 30, 40, 50)
(O) May be inoperative provided:
a) Operations are conducted in accordance with performance data of the AFM ...
Note that the MMEL only offers the deferral option for the "little" DC9 series 10 thru 50 [NOT offered for the heavier DC9-80 models]. That is what caught my attention in this B737 MMEL -- still offering the deferral for Anti-Skid Inop'. That MEL-option seems wrong for later B73 models.
FAA's DC-9 MMEL ... 32- 4. ... Anti-Skid System ... (Series 10, 20, 30, 40, 50)
(O) May be inoperative provided:
a) Operations are conducted in accordance with performance data of the AFM ...
Note that the MMEL only offers the deferral option for the "little" DC9 series 10 thru 50 [NOT offered for the heavier DC9-80 models]. That is what caught my attention in this B737 MMEL -- still offering the deferral for Anti-Skid Inop'. That MEL-option seems wrong for later B73 models.
Lampo's comment on the 13th, re' NTSB rule 845.41(a):
"... at the least a petition for rexamination need be made. If that is not disposed in a professional manner than there is room for further collective action...."
No. There is no recourse.
Well there are other ways to get at this if the NTSB rejects what we were to collectively want.
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Common element= touchdown + SpinUp PHASE
Insight into the common-element in each of those three landing mishaps, offered by "VFD" message #74 on 13Jan:
When I first read VFD's observation (re' too early application of Brakes), it made no sense, because it seemed crazy that any pilot would ever want to ride-the-Brakes during the touchdown-SpinUp phase (too early in the landing roll-out). [Only a few decades ago, such Braking-behavior meant a plume of smoke following pilots into the parking-spot (hot-brakes), with the local Crash-Fire-Rescue vehicle on standby nearby. So we avoided use of brakes.]
Anyway, based upon VFD's comment about too-EARLY Braking, I went back to reconsider those three similar B737 occurrences:YES, as suggested in VFD's observation: Each of those three mishaps (multiple tire-failures/fire), included BRAKING (Tire Failures) at, or soon after, TOUCHDOWN.
The idea that any pilot -- even with a perfect Anti-Skid System -- would elect to initiate Braking so early, had seemed out-of-the-question. Maybe today's pilots, flying modern aircraft with massive Brake Energy capability, can routinely begin braking soon after TOUCHDOWN, as a regular habit [& routinely do it without encountering Hot Brakes, smoke, &CFR]. Just a few decades ago, pilots waited until slowed below 80Kts before thinking about Brakes. So, lacking Anti-skid protections, it seemed unreasonable to imagine any pilot initiating Braking at TOUCHDOWN. [This assumes pilot input to Brake Pedal; but pilot's Brake-Pedal FORCE / displacement was not recorded on the FDR. Might be possible that the the Pilot had input ZERO Pedal FORCE, investigators don't know that pilot's Brake "Pedal Force" input.]
"... The key ... allowing time for ... spin up before ... brakes with inop-antiskid.... due to inop-antiskid ... additional couple seconds for ... spin-up ... spin up issue ... not tied to the MEL ..."
Earlier, over years, there had been repeat cases of TIRE FAILURE during landing, after inflight loss of the associated Electrical Bus (loss of electrical power to the AntiSkid System).
When I first read VFD's observation (re' too early application of Brakes), it made no sense, because it seemed crazy that any pilot would ever want to ride-the-Brakes during the touchdown-SpinUp phase (too early in the landing roll-out). [Only a few decades ago, such Braking-behavior meant a plume of smoke following pilots into the parking-spot (hot-brakes), with the local Crash-Fire-Rescue vehicle on standby nearby. So we avoided use of brakes.]
Anyway, based upon VFD's comment about too-EARLY Braking, I went back to reconsider those three similar B737 occurrences:YES, as suggested in VFD's observation: Each of those three mishaps (multiple tire-failures/fire), included BRAKING (Tire Failures) at, or soon after, TOUCHDOWN.
The idea that any pilot -- even with a perfect Anti-Skid System -- would elect to initiate Braking so early, had seemed out-of-the-question. Maybe today's pilots, flying modern aircraft with massive Brake Energy capability, can routinely begin braking soon after TOUCHDOWN, as a regular habit [& routinely do it without encountering Hot Brakes, smoke, &CFR]. Just a few decades ago, pilots waited until slowed below 80Kts before thinking about Brakes. So, lacking Anti-skid protections, it seemed unreasonable to imagine any pilot initiating Braking at TOUCHDOWN. [This assumes pilot input to Brake Pedal; but pilot's Brake-Pedal FORCE / displacement was not recorded on the FDR. Might be possible that the the Pilot had input ZERO Pedal FORCE, investigators don't know that pilot's Brake "Pedal Force" input.]
Last edited by IGh; 18th Jan 2011 at 17:31.
