Continental TurboProp crash inbound for Buffalo
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there were numerous 737 pilots at the time (myself included) who were convinced, knowing the crew, that tail ice was the primary cause of that accident.
NOT.The probably don't even
know how a Turboprop looks like let stand how it performs.This aircraft will probably outperform a lot of RJ's on specific routes. This is where it was designed for. It has to adhere to the same standards during certifying as any other commercial airplane.
Everybody is bull
ing about SAS dumping the Dash-8 400 but 2 months later they bought multiple brand new ones. After a sweet deal with Bombardier. This company doesn't do that if they think this aircraft is dangerous in icing conditions. They fly with them in icing more than anybody in the world. Except maybe some Canadian company's.
For the icing sake!
Dear DC-ATE:
UAL 553 was B737-200 that crashed in 100Nm visibility with temp 53°F and it took a long while to get to the bottom of the things but nowadays crash is clearly attributed to faulty rudder servo block. No one knowledgeable could ever consider icing to be a factor or blame the crew.
EDIT: DC-ATE, my apologies. I got numbers mixed up and actually I was refering to UAL 585. My bad.
Dear PPRuNe Sherlocks:
Just because accident happened in icing conditions it does not mean that icing contributed to it at all. Go google post hoc, ergo propter hoc. Wait for further NTSB briefs and reports.
Dear PPRuNe Anti-Q brigade:
Your existence has been noticed with some annoyance. I don't support the notion of "professional pilots only" forum, as suspect there are many jet jockeys among you and this move would probably achieve nothing.
UAL 553 was B737-200 that crashed in 100Nm visibility with temp 53°F and it took a long while to get to the bottom of the things but nowadays crash is clearly attributed to faulty rudder servo block. No one knowledgeable could ever consider icing to be a factor or blame the crew.
EDIT: DC-ATE, my apologies. I got numbers mixed up and actually I was refering to UAL 585. My bad.
Dear PPRuNe Sherlocks:
Just because accident happened in icing conditions it does not mean that icing contributed to it at all. Go google post hoc, ergo propter hoc. Wait for further NTSB briefs and reports.
Dear PPRuNe Anti-Q brigade:
Your existence has been noticed with some annoyance. I don't support the notion of "professional pilots only" forum, as suspect there are many jet jockeys among you and this move would probably achieve nothing.
Last edited by Clandestino; 16th Feb 2009 at 16:41. Reason: Lapsus cerebri
I don't agree with those who advocate grounding the DHC-8. Wideroe (of Norway) have been operating variants of the type in harsh wintery conditions for 16 years without problem. They introduced the 400 to their fleet in 2002. Plenty of 400s flying in Canada in their equally harsh Winters too.
Perhaps it's not so much the aircraft but the training of the crew which might prove to be a significant factor.
Perhaps it's not so much the aircraft but the training of the crew which might prove to be a significant factor.
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A look at what we know...
Deano,
I can see your frustration with SLF but we are not all that bad - a little knowledge is dangerous - I have refrained from posting here till I have something pertinent to say that is not scaremongering.
All,
As for grounding the fleet I too think that is a kneejerk reaction coming from the ill informed - this incident needs to be put in perspective of the many thousands of other Q400 flights through ice that are performed without incident. I am sure the NTSB are doing their best to understand exactly what happened in this situation and will advise of resolution actions/precautions if required.
From an observation point of view it would appear some are jumping on the bandwagon of speculating around facts as and when they are issued by the NTSB, without actually streaming those facts together to see what the bigger picture may be.
From all I have read/seen/heard we have a number of different items to take into consideration when speculating what could/did happen. We cannot just focus on the ice or the autopilot, we need to remember the aircraft came down on its belly and not in the direction expected for a landing at the destination.
I am no expert, I dont even hold a ppl but from reading postings from those that are pilots on type, and watching the research material from NASA it leads me to believe there is more to this incident than just ice and tail stall. It seems to me that the ice was a distraction for sure but there were other influences that caused the change in direction, loss of altitude and affected performance/recoverability of the aircraft.
Questions I have are for what other reason than aircraft stability would the PIC withdraw flaps after deployment - TOGA I have seen briefly mentioned earlier in the thread but I would expect there to be a call on CVR for that.
It was mentioned earlier in the thread also that tail stall and then wing stall could have compounded together to result in this incident - but does this theory sit in with the change in course of the aircraft ?
Do we yet know if the A/P was switched off due to stick pusher/shaker or manually. Likewise do we know if the Stall Reference speed change was selected when icing was observed (if not could the plane stall well before the stick shaker/pusher was activated).
I know Microburst is commonly associated with thunderstorms but could such a phenomenom have been present in the weather conditions that could cause the sudden loss of altitude experienced - would such an event explain the reported low airspeed?
Apologies if I trod on anyones toes - I just think the detail provided has blinded a few from the bigger picture.
I can see your frustration with SLF but we are not all that bad - a little knowledge is dangerous - I have refrained from posting here till I have something pertinent to say that is not scaremongering.
All,
As for grounding the fleet I too think that is a kneejerk reaction coming from the ill informed - this incident needs to be put in perspective of the many thousands of other Q400 flights through ice that are performed without incident. I am sure the NTSB are doing their best to understand exactly what happened in this situation and will advise of resolution actions/precautions if required.
From an observation point of view it would appear some are jumping on the bandwagon of speculating around facts as and when they are issued by the NTSB, without actually streaming those facts together to see what the bigger picture may be.
From all I have read/seen/heard we have a number of different items to take into consideration when speculating what could/did happen. We cannot just focus on the ice or the autopilot, we need to remember the aircraft came down on its belly and not in the direction expected for a landing at the destination.
I am no expert, I dont even hold a ppl but from reading postings from those that are pilots on type, and watching the research material from NASA it leads me to believe there is more to this incident than just ice and tail stall. It seems to me that the ice was a distraction for sure but there were other influences that caused the change in direction, loss of altitude and affected performance/recoverability of the aircraft.
Questions I have are for what other reason than aircraft stability would the PIC withdraw flaps after deployment - TOGA I have seen briefly mentioned earlier in the thread but I would expect there to be a call on CVR for that.
It was mentioned earlier in the thread also that tail stall and then wing stall could have compounded together to result in this incident - but does this theory sit in with the change in course of the aircraft ?
Do we yet know if the A/P was switched off due to stick pusher/shaker or manually. Likewise do we know if the Stall Reference speed change was selected when icing was observed (if not could the plane stall well before the stick shaker/pusher was activated).
I know Microburst is commonly associated with thunderstorms but could such a phenomenom have been present in the weather conditions that could cause the sudden loss of altitude experienced - would such an event explain the reported low airspeed?
Apologies if I trod on anyones toes - I just think the detail provided has blinded a few from the bigger picture.
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When I study accidents, I always try to take away lessons learned. There are a lot of things in accident findings that I can't change, but I can mitigate. So for this accident, I take away the following, based on the information released so far.
It's safer to assume that Anti-ice/deicing systems can be overwhelmed (this is my personal opinion) - This aircraft flew through icing conditions for 50-60 minutes, with anti-ice/deice on. Who knows what ice may (or may not) have accumulated beyond the boots on the wings and stabilizer. It's safer in my opinion to assume that some ice has accumulated on the wings and stabilizer beyond the boots, especially when flying for long periods in icing conditions. With this assumption in mind:
It's safer to assume that Anti-ice/deicing systems can be overwhelmed (this is my personal opinion) - This aircraft flew through icing conditions for 50-60 minutes, with anti-ice/deice on. Who knows what ice may (or may not) have accumulated beyond the boots on the wings and stabilizer. It's safer in my opinion to assume that some ice has accumulated on the wings and stabilizer beyond the boots, especially when flying for long periods in icing conditions. With this assumption in mind:
- Watch your airspeeds at all times in icing.
- On approach, get off the autopilot early (if you're allowed to fly the AP) while you have the altitude to do something, in the rare case you experience an upset. I also wouldn't assume that your AP can properly handle an icing upset. You (and I) don't really know whether it can or not.
- After autopilot disconnect, check your trims and forces, to determine if you have any aerodynamic issues caused by ice. The knowledge you gain can be very useful.
- Make configurations changes SLOWLY, and be prepared to recover from an upset, and give yourself room to recover. Remember that flap changes are THE most problematic of the configuration changes in icing conditions. To illustrate, in general aviation, flap changes are not normally recommended AT ALL, but instead you choose a long runway and land an iced aircraft without flaps, because of the danger of a flap induced upset.
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infrequentflyer789 wrote:
787 doesn't use bleed air for anything - because there isn't any. The Trent 1000 is a bleedless engine.
Must admit I did a double take when I was first told that, but it is correct.
What the precise design reasons are for it I don't know, but clearly someone thought it was a benefit. Plenty of people doubt it will have any effect on fuel economy, so maybe the alternative electrical systems are hoped to be easier / cheaper to build & maintain.
787 doesn't use bleed air for anything - because there isn't any. The Trent 1000 is a bleedless engine.
Must admit I did a double take when I was first told that, but it is correct.
What the precise design reasons are for it I don't know, but clearly someone thought it was a benefit. Plenty of people doubt it will have any effect on fuel economy, so maybe the alternative electrical systems are hoped to be easier / cheaper to build & maintain.
Boeing does contend that it will be a more efficient process and therefore yield greater fuel economy:
The 787 utilizes an electro-thermal ice protection scheme, in which several heating blankets are bonded to the interior of the protected slat leading edges. The heating blankets may then be energized simultaneously for anti-icing protection or sequentially for deicing protection to heat the wing leading edge. This method is significantly more efficient than the traditional system because no excess energy is exhausted. As a result, the required ice protection power usage is approximately half that of pneumatic systems. Moreover, because there are no-bleed air exhaust holes, airplane drag and community noise are improved relative to the traditional pneumatic ice protection system.
http://www.boeing.com/commercial/aer...7_article2.pdf
http://www.boeing.com/commercial/aer...7_article2.pdf
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'D-OCHO'
Please read what I wrote. I did not say anything aboout "knowing" how to fly a turbo-prop in icing conditions.
'jstflyin' wrote that....."...ice alone is not a problem for the Q400 in the same way it is not a problem for a B737."
I merely added that....."Ice can be a problem for ANY aircraft." Then sited an accident.
And, I DO know what a Turboprop looks like. I've been aboard a few both up front and in the back. I only did this stuff for thirty years.
'Clandestino'
I think you might have the wrong accident in mind. UAL 553 at MDW was in December while they were making a nonprecision instrument approach to RWY 31L. The accident happened at 1428L and the wx at 1433L was: 500' var and 1 mile vis. Temp at 1400L was 26F.
Please read what I wrote. I did not say anything aboout "knowing" how to fly a turbo-prop in icing conditions.
'jstflyin' wrote that....."...ice alone is not a problem for the Q400 in the same way it is not a problem for a B737."
I merely added that....."Ice can be a problem for ANY aircraft." Then sited an accident.
And, I DO know what a Turboprop looks like. I've been aboard a few both up front and in the back. I only did this stuff for thirty years.
'Clandestino'
I think you might have the wrong accident in mind. UAL 553 at MDW was in December while they were making a nonprecision instrument approach to RWY 31L. The accident happened at 1428L and the wx at 1433L was: 500' var and 1 mile vis. Temp at 1400L was 26F.
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Kerosene Kraut wrote: "Inexperienced? They had more than 2K and 3K flt hours hadn't they?"
It really depends on the makeup of that TT... if many hundreds of hours were spent instructing from the right seat of a Cessna on sunny weekend days, then those hours were of little help during those critical moments.
This aircraft appears to have crashed due to an abrupt loss of control. It appears to have entered a flat spin. The task in understanding the causes of this accident involves understanding what factors led to this abrupt loss of control followed by severe unusual attitudes.
It really depends on the makeup of that TT... if many hundreds of hours were spent instructing from the right seat of a Cessna on sunny weekend days, then those hours were of little help during those critical moments.
This aircraft appears to have crashed due to an abrupt loss of control. It appears to have entered a flat spin. The task in understanding the causes of this accident involves understanding what factors led to this abrupt loss of control followed by severe unusual attitudes.
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Here's a question for the "ground the fleet" brigade:
IF (please not the word IF), the accident turns out to have nothing or little to do with the a/c and it's sytems, and instead the main causal factor is one to do with either of the pilots, what action do you espouse then? Ground all 'inexperienced' pilots? Ban them from pax operations and built up areas? Only allow them to fly in clear blue skies?
Sounds a bit stupid and patronising, doesn't it.
IF (please not the word IF), the accident turns out to have nothing or little to do with the a/c and it's sytems, and instead the main causal factor is one to do with either of the pilots, what action do you espouse then? Ground all 'inexperienced' pilots? Ban them from pax operations and built up areas? Only allow them to fly in clear blue skies?
Sounds a bit stupid and patronising, doesn't it.
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in passing interest
folks, did you all know that the 737 doesn't de/anti ice its tail? that's right...it just goes flying along even with a bunch of ice on it.
would it not be tragic to find that ice bridging does happen on the Q400 and that following the idea of turning on the boots before they are picking up ice is bad?
I wonder whose leg this flight was?
would it not be tragic to find that ice bridging does happen on the Q400 and that following the idea of turning on the boots before they are picking up ice is bad?
I wonder whose leg this flight was?
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Protectthehornet
What's that got to do with it!?
Robert
How do you come to that conclusion? Just because it has been said that it impacted in a flat attitude doesn't imply it was in a flat spin.
I wonder whose leg this flight was?
Robert
It appears to have entered a flat spin
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chesty morgan
wanting to know whose leg it was shouldn't offend you. it should be an easy statement of fact.
that the f/o was on the radio might indicate it was the captain's leg.
if you don't think it makes a difference, the tone for CRM is vital to a copilot telling a captain something is wrong.
I would not describe either pilot as ''high time'' or VERY experienced. I would say that both pilots had more time than required by regs for an ATP certificate.
it is interesting to me that a pilot who is 47 years old doesn't have too much time. I wonder if he switched careers later in life.
I would want to know what prescription meds these pilots may have been on.
From early reports on the CVR, the pilots were aware of the icing...they used a high level of precaution in turning on the deice boots shortly after takeoff. No one reported severe icing, so we can infer that the deice equipment was keeping up with the demand.
I did see a report indicating that the plus 20 knot vref switch had been engaged.
Has any Q400 driver experienced icing up of control cables ???
And robwert 975...instructor time is very good for being ready to catch a loss of control. The time that I don't think is very good is IO time...PIC time logged watching the autopilot fly the plane.
PIC had 200 in type, SIC 700 or so in type...how much real hand flying time did they have? 20 hours, 70 hours? That's not much for acrobatic recovery.
that the f/o was on the radio might indicate it was the captain's leg.
if you don't think it makes a difference, the tone for CRM is vital to a copilot telling a captain something is wrong.
I would not describe either pilot as ''high time'' or VERY experienced. I would say that both pilots had more time than required by regs for an ATP certificate.
it is interesting to me that a pilot who is 47 years old doesn't have too much time. I wonder if he switched careers later in life.
I would want to know what prescription meds these pilots may have been on.
From early reports on the CVR, the pilots were aware of the icing...they used a high level of precaution in turning on the deice boots shortly after takeoff. No one reported severe icing, so we can infer that the deice equipment was keeping up with the demand.
I did see a report indicating that the plus 20 knot vref switch had been engaged.
Has any Q400 driver experienced icing up of control cables ???
And robwert 975...instructor time is very good for being ready to catch a loss of control. The time that I don't think is very good is IO time...PIC time logged watching the autopilot fly the plane.
PIC had 200 in type, SIC 700 or so in type...how much real hand flying time did they have? 20 hours, 70 hours? That's not much for acrobatic recovery.
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I wonder whose leg this flight was?
I was reading a newspaper article labeling the crew as "young and inexperienced". I will leave the inexperienced comment up for debate, but young??? the Captain was 47 years old! That's pretty old in my books!
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protectthehornet -
Your point being.....?
folks, did you all know that the 737 doesn't de/anti ice its tail? that's right...it just goes flying along even with a bunch of ice on it
If the pilot was alert to the possibility a tail stall, could he have misidentified a wing stall and yanked back on the stick? (The stick pusher and shaker sound a lot like the symptoms of a tail stall from the NASA video, but I'm sure that part's just me going too far with my layman's fantasy.)
Gender Faculty Specialist
For your interest (And I'm not suggesting severe ice).
Our Ops manual states that on first detection of ice select the airframe protection to FAST.
Action on encountering severe ice:
Autopilot disconnect immediately.
Condition Levers MAX
Power Levers as required
MINIMUM airspeed - 190kts
Exit icing conditions
Avoid aggresive manoevering
It then goes on to say that if it can't be established that severe icing is no longer a factor then do not re-engage the autopilot.
Our Ops manual states that on first detection of ice select the airframe protection to FAST.
Action on encountering severe ice:
Autopilot disconnect immediately.
Condition Levers MAX
Power Levers as required
MINIMUM airspeed - 190kts
Exit icing conditions
Avoid aggresive manoevering
It then goes on to say that if it can't be established that severe icing is no longer a factor then do not re-engage the autopilot.
Duration of Icing and 31 Degree Pitch Up
This aircraft flew through icing conditions for 50-60 minutes, with anti-ice/deice on. Who knows what ice may (or may not) have accumulated beyond the boots on the wings and stabilizer.
Perhaps the investigators will fly a Q-400 behind a tanker to replicate the icing conditions -- then land the a/c with 0 flaps, measure the changed wing profiles and replicated those changed wing profiles in a wind tunnel with flap activation.
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Protectthehornet
I'm not offended I'm just surprised why you think it's important.
I think you've also answered your own question.
Your point about CRM being vital I agree with although telling the Captain that something is wrong doesn't depend on who is flying the aircraft.
wanting to know whose leg it was shouldn't offend you. it should be an easy statement of fact.
that the f/o was on the radio might indicate it was the captain's leg.
if you don't think it makes a difference, the tone for CRM is vital to a copilot telling a captain something is wrong.
that the f/o was on the radio might indicate it was the captain's leg.
if you don't think it makes a difference, the tone for CRM is vital to a copilot telling a captain something is wrong.
I think you've also answered your own question.
Your point about CRM being vital I agree with although telling the Captain that something is wrong doesn't depend on who is flying the aircraft.