Plane Down in Hudson River - NYC
Joined: Feb 2008
Posts: 39
Likes: 0
From: Jacksonville, Fl, US
N. T. S. B. Hearing Re U. S. Airways Ditching Accident In Hudson River
************************************************************
NTSB ADVISORY
************************************************************
National Transportation Safety Board
Washington, DC 20594
April 8, 2009
************************************************************
NTSB ANNOUNCES DATE OF PUBLIC HEARING ON US AIRWAYS DITCHING
ACCIDENT IN HUDSON RIVER
************************************************************
The National Transportation Safety Board will hold a public
hearing on June 9-10, 2009, as part of its ongoing
investigation into the ditching of a US Airways Airbus A-320
into the Hudson River in New York City in January. The
hearing will be held at the NTSB's Board Room and Conference
Center in Washington, D.C.
The purpose of the hearing will be to gather additional
factual information for the investigation. It will be
chaired by Member Robert M. Sumwalt who, along with Safety
Board investigators, will hear from those the Board calls to
testify on the following issues:
- Training of crew members on emergency procedures
- Certification requirements for the Airbus A-320
related to the structural integrity of the airframe
during ditching
- Bird ingestion certification standards for transport-
category turbofan engines
- New and developing technologies for detection of large
groups of birds and procedures to avoid conflicts with
birds in the general vicinity of airports
A list of the individuals expected to testify will be
released closer to the date of the hearing.
###
Media Contact: Peter Knudson
(202) 314-6100
[email protected]
************************************************************
NTSB ADVISORY
************************************************************
National Transportation Safety Board
Washington, DC 20594
April 8, 2009
************************************************************
NTSB ANNOUNCES DATE OF PUBLIC HEARING ON US AIRWAYS DITCHING
ACCIDENT IN HUDSON RIVER
************************************************************
The National Transportation Safety Board will hold a public
hearing on June 9-10, 2009, as part of its ongoing
investigation into the ditching of a US Airways Airbus A-320
into the Hudson River in New York City in January. The
hearing will be held at the NTSB's Board Room and Conference
Center in Washington, D.C.
The purpose of the hearing will be to gather additional
factual information for the investigation. It will be
chaired by Member Robert M. Sumwalt who, along with Safety
Board investigators, will hear from those the Board calls to
testify on the following issues:
- Training of crew members on emergency procedures
- Certification requirements for the Airbus A-320
related to the structural integrity of the airframe
during ditching
- Bird ingestion certification standards for transport-
category turbofan engines
- New and developing technologies for detection of large
groups of birds and procedures to avoid conflicts with
birds in the general vicinity of airports
A list of the individuals expected to testify will be
released closer to the date of the hearing.
###
Media Contact: Peter Knudson
(202) 314-6100
[email protected]
************************************************************
Joined: Feb 2000
Posts: 808
Likes: 0
From: Scotland
AIG photo ban
I'm intrigued by this - post 1728 refers - as I suspect the salvage operation could have been performed with far less collateral damage. The impression one gets is of a hurried job with inadequate gear; a conspiracy theorist, which I'm not, might venture that it's almost as if further damage was being deliberately inflicted to ensure as little as possible was recoverable.
Someone else, of course, might counter that photographic evidence of a shoddy salvage job wouldn't be great publicity for the insurers, the salvage company or the insurance industry in general.
Someone else, of course, might counter that photographic evidence of a shoddy salvage job wouldn't be great publicity for the insurers, the salvage company or the insurance industry in general.
Joined: Jan 2007
Posts: 729
Likes: 1
From: San Jose
Joined: Aug 2003
Posts: 3,833
Likes: 2
From: Sale, Australia
An interview with Sully from Sully?s Tale | Flight Today | Air & Space Magazine
Long before he won instant celebrity for his cool handling of the ditching of US Airways flight 1549 in the Hudson River on January 15, 2009, Chesley “Sully” Sullenberger had thought a lot about airline safety procedures. But when it came time to apply those lessons, he and his crew relied as much on instinct as on the playbook. Sullenberger spoke with Air & Space editor Linda Shiner on February 16, almost a month to the day after the dramatic events that earned him worldwide acclaim from fellow pilots and the public alike.
Air & Space: I heard you say in one of your interviews that it was comforting to you to hear the flight attendants, after you announced “Brace for impact,” also directing the passengers to brace and put their heads down. Why was that a source of comfort?
Sullenberger: I felt they were assisting me in that moment. Even though we were intensely focused and very busy, I remember thinking that as soon as I made the public address announcement in the cabin, within a second or two, I heard even through the hardened cockpit door the flight attendants in unison shouting their commands. “Heads down. Stay down.” And it was comforting to me to know that they were on the same page, that we were all acting in concert. It made me feel that my hope and my confidence in completing this plan was reasonable and that they knew what needed to be done and were doing their part.
Air & Space: Is it standard procedure for the captain to go back through the cabin after an emergency like yours?
Sullenberger: I felt that as more of a personal responsibility than a procedural responsibility—which it may be. But I had the time, the aircraft was stable, and I was not concerned that it would suddenly sink. And so I could leave absolutely no possibility of anyone being left behind. I made a thorough search, calling out, “Is anyone there?” to make sure the evacuation was complete, and it was.
Air & Space: You made the decision to ditch within one minute of losing power in the engines. Is that correct?
Sullenberger: You may know better than I. I have not seen an official timeline, or official data of any kind from the investigators. All I have seen is what’s been reported in the press—based upon the daily press briefings given by the NTSB [National Transportation Safety Board] during the initial phase. I knew it had to be done quickly.
Air & Space: Before you made that decision, you’d briefly considered returning to LaGuardia. You’d considered diverting to Teterboro [New Jersey]. Was there a discussion between you and your first officer about the distances you could glide or the amount of energy you might sacrifice if you had to head to either of those airports?
Sullenberger: I haven’t listened to the cockpit voice recorder yet. At some point before the NTSB public hearing in a few months, I will have to do that. Until then, I’m not sure. I would characterize the cockpit as being busy, businesslike, and our cooperation was done largely by observing the other and not communicating directly because of the extreme time pressure. [First officer] Jeff [Skiles] and I worked together seamlessly and very efficiently, very quickly, without directly verbalizing a lot of issues. We were observing the same things, we had the same perceptions, and it was clear to me that he was hearing what I was saying to Air Traffic Control on the radio. He was observing my actions, and I was observing his, and it was immediately obvious to me that his understanding of the situation was the same as mine, and that he was quickly and efficiently taking the steps to do his part.
Air & Space: What is the role of the first officer in that situation?
Sullenberger: This was not a typical case. Because of the extraordinarily difficult nature of the situation and because of the extreme time pressure, we both had to take on different roles than what typically would be done according to protocol. Most of the training that we get is for a situation where you have more time to deal with things. You have time to be more thoughtful, to analyze the situation. Typically what’s done these days is for the first officer to be the pilot flying and for the captain to be the pilot monitoring, analyzing and managing the situation. There wasn’t time for that.
I felt that even though Jeff was very experienced—he turns out to have had as much total flying experience as I do—and even though he’d been a captain before on another airplane at my airline and had been at the company 23 years, he was relatively new on this particular aircraft type [Airbus A320]. In fact, this was his first trip after having completed training on it. He’d been through the simulator and the ground school and had been on a four-day trip with an instructor, but this was his first trip to fly. So I decided early on that we were best served by me using my greater experience in the [A320] to fly the airplane.
Additionally, I felt like I had a clear view out the left-hand and forward windows of all the important landmarks that I needed to consider. They were on my side. They would be easier for me to see. And ultimately the choice of where we would go and what flight path we would take would be mine.
I also thought that since it had been almost a year since I had been through our annual pilot recurrent training, and Jeff had just completed it—he had just been in the simulator using all the emergency checklists—he was probably better suited to quickly knowing exactly which checklist would be most appropriate, and quickly finding it in this big mutlipage quick reference handbook that we carry in the cockpit. So I felt it was like the best of both worlds. I could use my experience, I could look out the window and make a decision about where we were going to go, while he was continuing his effort to restart the engines and hoping that we wouldn’t have to land some place other than a runway. He was valiantly trying until the last moment to get the engines started again.
Air & Space: Were you calculating the distance you could glide?
Sullenberger: It wasn’t so much calculating as it was being acutely aware, based upon our energy state and by visually assessing the situation, of what was and what was not possible. There are several ways I used my experience to do that. I knew the altitude and airspeed were relatively low, so our total energy available was not great. I also knew we were headed away from LaGuardia, and I knew that to return to LaGuardia I would have to take into account the distance and the altitude necessary to make the turn back.
In the case of Teterboro, I knew that was even farther away, even though we were headed in that direction. The short answer is, based on my experience and looking out the window, I could tell by the altitude and the descent rate that neither [airport] was a viable option. I also thought that I could not afford to choose wrongly. I could not afford to attempt to make it to a runway that in fact I could not make. Landing short, even by a little bit, can have catastrophic consequences not only for everybody on the airplane but for people on the ground.
Air & Space: What was your speed when you lost the engines?
Sullenberger: Again, I would hate to guess. I have not seen the data. It was less than 250 knots the entire time. And I think once the thrust loss occurred, our speed began to decay very rapidly because the nose was still up in a climb attitude, but without climb thrust on the airplane. It required a substantial but smooth push to get the nose down to attain and maintain our best lift-over-drag airspeed.
Air & Space: So that was your first move: to get the nose down.
Sullenberger: Yes.
Air & Space: When you’re in this situation are you just trying to make it go as far as you can?
Sullenberger: My initial focus was to fly at the proper speed while we were assessing the situation. We needed our best lift-over-drag airspeed while we were trying to decide where we could go. Once we had considered and ruled out both LaGuardia and Teterboro as unattainable, then we flew that same speed down to a lower altitude where we began to slow so that we could put out flaps for landing.
Air & Space: How did you slow down? Were you using control surfaces?
Sullenberger: No. We slowed by raising the nose. Our descent rate was more rapid than usual because we had essentially no thrust. So in order to maintain a safe flying speed, we had to have the nose far enough down that we could hold that speed as we descended. Of course that resulted in a higher-than-normal rate of descent.
Air & Space: Did you flash back on any of your experiences as a glider pilot? Did it feel natural to you?
Sullenberger: Actually not very much after the bird strike felt very natural, but the glide was comfortable. Once we had established our plan, once we knew our only viable option was to land in the river, we knew we could make the landing. But a lot of things yet had to go right.
I get asked that question about my gliding experience a lot, but that was so long ago, and those [gliders] are so different from a modern jet airliner, I think the transfer [of experience] was not large. There are more recent experiences I’ve had that played a greater role.
One of the big differences in flying heavy jets versus flying lighter, smaller aircraft is energy management—always knowing at any part of the flight what the most desirable flight path is, then trying to attain that in an elegant way with the minimum thrust, so that you never are too high or too low or too fast or too slow. I’ve always paid attention to that, and I think that more than anything else helped me.
I also participated as an Air Line Pilots Association safety volunteer on the NTSB teams that investigated two of the airline’s previous accidents: the San Luis Obispo PSA 1771 crash in 1987 and the later Los Angeles runway collision in the early nineties.
The way I describe this whole experience—and I haven’t had time to reflect on it sufficiently—is that everything I had done in my career had in some way been a preparation for that moment. There were probably some things that were more important than others or that applied more directly. But I felt like everything I’d done in some way contributed to the outcome—of course along with [the actions of] my first officer and the flight attendant crew, the cooperative behavior of the passengers during the evacuation, and the prompt and efficient response of the first responders in New York.
Air & Space: When the birds struck, the engines stopped operating, is that correct? They weren’t at idle power; they were at nothing?
Sullenberger: Again, I have not seen the data. They certainly were not capable of producing usable thrust.
Air & Space: In trying to relight the engines, could the computer have misread the situation and kept the engines from producing the thrust you needed to recover?
Sullenberger: I would not want to speculate on that, and that would be all I could do at this point. I have not seen the data from the recorders. As far as I’m concerned, it was clear to Jeff and myself that neither engine was producing thrust.
Air & Space: Had you trained for dead stick landings as an airline pilot?
Sullenberger: That’s never been part of our annual recurrent training. I do remember on a number of occasions attempting in the simulator under visual conditions—not a water landing, but an attempt to make a runway. We would be set up on a nearby heading where we could see the airport, and we knew that it was at a place and an altitude where it was possible to get to the runway. That was the one thing I remember practicing some years ago.
Air & Space: Does the Airbus operator’s manual have a procedure for ditching?
Sullenberger: Yes.
Air & Space: So your first officer would have found that procedure and had a checklist to go through for the ditching procedure?
Sullenberger: Not in this case. Time would not allow it. The higher priority procedure to follow was for the loss of both engines. The ditching would have been far secondary to that. Not only did we not have time to go through a ditching checklist, we didn’t have time to even finish the checklist for loss of thrust in both engines. That was a three-page checklist, and we didn’t even have time to finish the first page. That’s how time-compressed this was.
Air & Space: Did the airplane have a ditch button that would have sealed certain openings in the cabin?
Sullenberger: Yes, it’s called a ditching push button. And there was not time. We never got to the ditching push button on the checklist. It wouldn’t have mattered anyway. The vents that are normally open are small. And once the airplane touched the water, the contact opened holes in the bottom of the airplane much, much larger than all of the vents that this ditching push button was designed to close.
I cannot conceive of any ditching or water landing where it would help. Theoretically I understand why the engineers included it. It sounded like a good idea, but not in practice. We had a successful water landing, and even then, from seeing pictures of [the airplane] being removed from the river by a crane, there were much larger holes than the vents this button was designed to close.
Air & Space: Do you still love to fly?
Sullenberger: Oh, yeah. It’s been a passion since I was 5. I can remember at 5 years old knowing that I was going to fly airplanes. And I was just fortunate enough at every juncture to be able to get to the next goal. I’m not sure what I would have done had I not been able to fly. I never even considered anything else.
Air & Space: What's the best landing you've made?
Sullenberger: A time I'd flown into San Francisco, on an evening when air traffic wasn't particularly heavy and the air traffic controllers do not have to impose upon you a lot of constraints. It was a pretty night and I could see the airport from far away, and I tried to make as smooth and elegant a continuous descent as I could. You could barely feel the wheels touch.
Air & Space: Any advice for aspiring pilots?
Sullenberger: Well, not just for aviators, but for all of us. My view of the world is that people are best served when they find their passion early on, because we tend to be good at things we’re passionate about. I think we also need to find people whom we admire and try to emulate them
Air & Space: And who did you admire?
Sullenberger: My first flight instructor, L.T. Cook Jr., was a Civilian Pilot Training Program instructor during World War II, a real gentleman and a stick-and-rudder man. He was a cropduster and had his own grass strip in rural Texas. In 1967, I paid $6 an hour for the airplane and gas and $3 an hour for his time. Among the thousands of cards I received [after the ditching], I discovered one from his widow. She wrote, "L.T. wouldn't be surprised, but he certainly would be pleased and proud."
Long before he won instant celebrity for his cool handling of the ditching of US Airways flight 1549 in the Hudson River on January 15, 2009, Chesley “Sully” Sullenberger had thought a lot about airline safety procedures. But when it came time to apply those lessons, he and his crew relied as much on instinct as on the playbook. Sullenberger spoke with Air & Space editor Linda Shiner on February 16, almost a month to the day after the dramatic events that earned him worldwide acclaim from fellow pilots and the public alike.
Air & Space: I heard you say in one of your interviews that it was comforting to you to hear the flight attendants, after you announced “Brace for impact,” also directing the passengers to brace and put their heads down. Why was that a source of comfort?
Sullenberger: I felt they were assisting me in that moment. Even though we were intensely focused and very busy, I remember thinking that as soon as I made the public address announcement in the cabin, within a second or two, I heard even through the hardened cockpit door the flight attendants in unison shouting their commands. “Heads down. Stay down.” And it was comforting to me to know that they were on the same page, that we were all acting in concert. It made me feel that my hope and my confidence in completing this plan was reasonable and that they knew what needed to be done and were doing their part.
Air & Space: Is it standard procedure for the captain to go back through the cabin after an emergency like yours?
Sullenberger: I felt that as more of a personal responsibility than a procedural responsibility—which it may be. But I had the time, the aircraft was stable, and I was not concerned that it would suddenly sink. And so I could leave absolutely no possibility of anyone being left behind. I made a thorough search, calling out, “Is anyone there?” to make sure the evacuation was complete, and it was.
Air & Space: You made the decision to ditch within one minute of losing power in the engines. Is that correct?
Sullenberger: You may know better than I. I have not seen an official timeline, or official data of any kind from the investigators. All I have seen is what’s been reported in the press—based upon the daily press briefings given by the NTSB [National Transportation Safety Board] during the initial phase. I knew it had to be done quickly.
Air & Space: Before you made that decision, you’d briefly considered returning to LaGuardia. You’d considered diverting to Teterboro [New Jersey]. Was there a discussion between you and your first officer about the distances you could glide or the amount of energy you might sacrifice if you had to head to either of those airports?
Sullenberger: I haven’t listened to the cockpit voice recorder yet. At some point before the NTSB public hearing in a few months, I will have to do that. Until then, I’m not sure. I would characterize the cockpit as being busy, businesslike, and our cooperation was done largely by observing the other and not communicating directly because of the extreme time pressure. [First officer] Jeff [Skiles] and I worked together seamlessly and very efficiently, very quickly, without directly verbalizing a lot of issues. We were observing the same things, we had the same perceptions, and it was clear to me that he was hearing what I was saying to Air Traffic Control on the radio. He was observing my actions, and I was observing his, and it was immediately obvious to me that his understanding of the situation was the same as mine, and that he was quickly and efficiently taking the steps to do his part.
Air & Space: What is the role of the first officer in that situation?
Sullenberger: This was not a typical case. Because of the extraordinarily difficult nature of the situation and because of the extreme time pressure, we both had to take on different roles than what typically would be done according to protocol. Most of the training that we get is for a situation where you have more time to deal with things. You have time to be more thoughtful, to analyze the situation. Typically what’s done these days is for the first officer to be the pilot flying and for the captain to be the pilot monitoring, analyzing and managing the situation. There wasn’t time for that.
I felt that even though Jeff was very experienced—he turns out to have had as much total flying experience as I do—and even though he’d been a captain before on another airplane at my airline and had been at the company 23 years, he was relatively new on this particular aircraft type [Airbus A320]. In fact, this was his first trip after having completed training on it. He’d been through the simulator and the ground school and had been on a four-day trip with an instructor, but this was his first trip to fly. So I decided early on that we were best served by me using my greater experience in the [A320] to fly the airplane.
Additionally, I felt like I had a clear view out the left-hand and forward windows of all the important landmarks that I needed to consider. They were on my side. They would be easier for me to see. And ultimately the choice of where we would go and what flight path we would take would be mine.
I also thought that since it had been almost a year since I had been through our annual pilot recurrent training, and Jeff had just completed it—he had just been in the simulator using all the emergency checklists—he was probably better suited to quickly knowing exactly which checklist would be most appropriate, and quickly finding it in this big mutlipage quick reference handbook that we carry in the cockpit. So I felt it was like the best of both worlds. I could use my experience, I could look out the window and make a decision about where we were going to go, while he was continuing his effort to restart the engines and hoping that we wouldn’t have to land some place other than a runway. He was valiantly trying until the last moment to get the engines started again.
Air & Space: Were you calculating the distance you could glide?
Sullenberger: It wasn’t so much calculating as it was being acutely aware, based upon our energy state and by visually assessing the situation, of what was and what was not possible. There are several ways I used my experience to do that. I knew the altitude and airspeed were relatively low, so our total energy available was not great. I also knew we were headed away from LaGuardia, and I knew that to return to LaGuardia I would have to take into account the distance and the altitude necessary to make the turn back.
In the case of Teterboro, I knew that was even farther away, even though we were headed in that direction. The short answer is, based on my experience and looking out the window, I could tell by the altitude and the descent rate that neither [airport] was a viable option. I also thought that I could not afford to choose wrongly. I could not afford to attempt to make it to a runway that in fact I could not make. Landing short, even by a little bit, can have catastrophic consequences not only for everybody on the airplane but for people on the ground.
Air & Space: What was your speed when you lost the engines?
Sullenberger: Again, I would hate to guess. I have not seen the data. It was less than 250 knots the entire time. And I think once the thrust loss occurred, our speed began to decay very rapidly because the nose was still up in a climb attitude, but without climb thrust on the airplane. It required a substantial but smooth push to get the nose down to attain and maintain our best lift-over-drag airspeed.
Air & Space: So that was your first move: to get the nose down.
Sullenberger: Yes.
Air & Space: When you’re in this situation are you just trying to make it go as far as you can?
Sullenberger: My initial focus was to fly at the proper speed while we were assessing the situation. We needed our best lift-over-drag airspeed while we were trying to decide where we could go. Once we had considered and ruled out both LaGuardia and Teterboro as unattainable, then we flew that same speed down to a lower altitude where we began to slow so that we could put out flaps for landing.
Air & Space: How did you slow down? Were you using control surfaces?
Sullenberger: No. We slowed by raising the nose. Our descent rate was more rapid than usual because we had essentially no thrust. So in order to maintain a safe flying speed, we had to have the nose far enough down that we could hold that speed as we descended. Of course that resulted in a higher-than-normal rate of descent.
Air & Space: Did you flash back on any of your experiences as a glider pilot? Did it feel natural to you?
Sullenberger: Actually not very much after the bird strike felt very natural, but the glide was comfortable. Once we had established our plan, once we knew our only viable option was to land in the river, we knew we could make the landing. But a lot of things yet had to go right.
I get asked that question about my gliding experience a lot, but that was so long ago, and those [gliders] are so different from a modern jet airliner, I think the transfer [of experience] was not large. There are more recent experiences I’ve had that played a greater role.
One of the big differences in flying heavy jets versus flying lighter, smaller aircraft is energy management—always knowing at any part of the flight what the most desirable flight path is, then trying to attain that in an elegant way with the minimum thrust, so that you never are too high or too low or too fast or too slow. I’ve always paid attention to that, and I think that more than anything else helped me.
I also participated as an Air Line Pilots Association safety volunteer on the NTSB teams that investigated two of the airline’s previous accidents: the San Luis Obispo PSA 1771 crash in 1987 and the later Los Angeles runway collision in the early nineties.
The way I describe this whole experience—and I haven’t had time to reflect on it sufficiently—is that everything I had done in my career had in some way been a preparation for that moment. There were probably some things that were more important than others or that applied more directly. But I felt like everything I’d done in some way contributed to the outcome—of course along with [the actions of] my first officer and the flight attendant crew, the cooperative behavior of the passengers during the evacuation, and the prompt and efficient response of the first responders in New York.
Air & Space: When the birds struck, the engines stopped operating, is that correct? They weren’t at idle power; they were at nothing?
Sullenberger: Again, I have not seen the data. They certainly were not capable of producing usable thrust.
Air & Space: In trying to relight the engines, could the computer have misread the situation and kept the engines from producing the thrust you needed to recover?
Sullenberger: I would not want to speculate on that, and that would be all I could do at this point. I have not seen the data from the recorders. As far as I’m concerned, it was clear to Jeff and myself that neither engine was producing thrust.
Air & Space: Had you trained for dead stick landings as an airline pilot?
Sullenberger: That’s never been part of our annual recurrent training. I do remember on a number of occasions attempting in the simulator under visual conditions—not a water landing, but an attempt to make a runway. We would be set up on a nearby heading where we could see the airport, and we knew that it was at a place and an altitude where it was possible to get to the runway. That was the one thing I remember practicing some years ago.
Air & Space: Does the Airbus operator’s manual have a procedure for ditching?
Sullenberger: Yes.
Air & Space: So your first officer would have found that procedure and had a checklist to go through for the ditching procedure?
Sullenberger: Not in this case. Time would not allow it. The higher priority procedure to follow was for the loss of both engines. The ditching would have been far secondary to that. Not only did we not have time to go through a ditching checklist, we didn’t have time to even finish the checklist for loss of thrust in both engines. That was a three-page checklist, and we didn’t even have time to finish the first page. That’s how time-compressed this was.
Air & Space: Did the airplane have a ditch button that would have sealed certain openings in the cabin?
Sullenberger: Yes, it’s called a ditching push button. And there was not time. We never got to the ditching push button on the checklist. It wouldn’t have mattered anyway. The vents that are normally open are small. And once the airplane touched the water, the contact opened holes in the bottom of the airplane much, much larger than all of the vents that this ditching push button was designed to close.
I cannot conceive of any ditching or water landing where it would help. Theoretically I understand why the engineers included it. It sounded like a good idea, but not in practice. We had a successful water landing, and even then, from seeing pictures of [the airplane] being removed from the river by a crane, there were much larger holes than the vents this button was designed to close.
Air & Space: Do you still love to fly?
Sullenberger: Oh, yeah. It’s been a passion since I was 5. I can remember at 5 years old knowing that I was going to fly airplanes. And I was just fortunate enough at every juncture to be able to get to the next goal. I’m not sure what I would have done had I not been able to fly. I never even considered anything else.
Air & Space: What's the best landing you've made?
Sullenberger: A time I'd flown into San Francisco, on an evening when air traffic wasn't particularly heavy and the air traffic controllers do not have to impose upon you a lot of constraints. It was a pretty night and I could see the airport from far away, and I tried to make as smooth and elegant a continuous descent as I could. You could barely feel the wheels touch.
Air & Space: Any advice for aspiring pilots?
Sullenberger: Well, not just for aviators, but for all of us. My view of the world is that people are best served when they find their passion early on, because we tend to be good at things we’re passionate about. I think we also need to find people whom we admire and try to emulate them
Air & Space: And who did you admire?
Sullenberger: My first flight instructor, L.T. Cook Jr., was a Civilian Pilot Training Program instructor during World War II, a real gentleman and a stick-and-rudder man. He was a cropduster and had his own grass strip in rural Texas. In 1967, I paid $6 an hour for the airplane and gas and $3 an hour for his time. Among the thousands of cards I received [after the ditching], I discovered one from his widow. She wrote, "L.T. wouldn't be surprised, but he certainly would be pleased and proud."
Joined: May 2007
Posts: 88
Likes: 0
From: SE England
AIG photo ban
I'm intrigued by this - post 1728 refers - as I suspect the salvage operation could have been performed with far less collateral damage. The impression one gets is of a hurried job with inadequate gear; a conspiracy theorist, which I'm not, might venture that it's almost as if further damage was being deliberately inflicted to ensure as little as possible was recoverable.
Someone else, of course, might counter that photographic evidence of a shoddy salvage job wouldn't be great publicity for the insurers, the salvage company or the insurance industry in general.
I'm intrigued by this - post 1728 refers - as I suspect the salvage operation could have been performed with far less collateral damage. The impression one gets is of a hurried job with inadequate gear; a conspiracy theorist, which I'm not, might venture that it's almost as if further damage was being deliberately inflicted to ensure as little as possible was recoverable.
Someone else, of course, might counter that photographic evidence of a shoddy salvage job wouldn't be great publicity for the insurers, the salvage company or the insurance industry in general.
Joined: Mar 2002
Posts: 4,569
Likes: 1
From: Florida
I doubt that the suppression of photos has anything to do with technical coverups, etc. More likely to do with ownership and job specifications.
I suspect that future photo jobs will have more fine print in them.
Most investigative agencies like to have first access to the high quality pics
I suspect that future photo jobs will have more fine print in them.
Most investigative agencies like to have first access to the high quality pics
Joined: Apr 2009
Posts: 1
Likes: 0
From: Sonoma, CA, USA
Photo suppression
I'm a professional photographer, and have run into this type of corporate mentality before.
Here's an exchange I had with US Air regarding their attempted suppression of the aircraft recovery:
On Apr 21, 2009, at 1:35 PM, Customer Relations wrote:
Dear Mr. Campbell,
Thank you for contacting Customer Relations at US Airways. US Airways
has been fully cooperating with the investigation of Flight 1549 since
the event occurred. The aircraft hull which operated as Flight 1549 is
under the control of our insurance company and the NTSB. We are aware
that a photographer would like to publish or sell photographs of the
aircraft hull that may include our trademarks, service marks, etc., and
we are currently seeking information from the photographer to determine
if the photographs' release or sale would violate the intellectual
property rights of US Airways or otherwise interfere with the NTSB
investigation of this accident.
Sincerely,
Edie Curtin
US Airways Customer Relations
Corporate Office
US-09CAMPBELL-044P6
My reply:
Dear Edie:
The aircraft is out in the public domain; not in one of your hangars. You haven't got a leg to stand on, and you know it.
The images are all over the web, anyway.
Bob
Here's an exchange I had with US Air regarding their attempted suppression of the aircraft recovery:
On Apr 21, 2009, at 1:35 PM, Customer Relations wrote:
Dear Mr. Campbell,
Thank you for contacting Customer Relations at US Airways. US Airways
has been fully cooperating with the investigation of Flight 1549 since
the event occurred. The aircraft hull which operated as Flight 1549 is
under the control of our insurance company and the NTSB. We are aware
that a photographer would like to publish or sell photographs of the
aircraft hull that may include our trademarks, service marks, etc., and
we are currently seeking information from the photographer to determine
if the photographs' release or sale would violate the intellectual
property rights of US Airways or otherwise interfere with the NTSB
investigation of this accident.
Sincerely,
Edie Curtin
US Airways Customer Relations
Corporate Office
US-09CAMPBELL-044P6
My reply:
Dear Edie:
The aircraft is out in the public domain; not in one of your hangars. You haven't got a leg to stand on, and you know it.
The images are all over the web, anyway.
Bob
Joined: Feb 2000
Posts: 808
Likes: 0
From: Scotland
AIG photo ban
Desk Jockey, your post 1746
Quote
I think you need to explain that further. What extra damage was caused and how could the recovery have been better? How would that have aided the investigation?
Unquote
Certainly. I don't know what extra damage was caused, but I would expect a fair amount more than had the crane operators used broad webbing strops instead of steel, and had the aircraft been settled on the barge supported by rubber sausages.
It may be that by the time the aircraft was lifted out of the water, AIG and USAir had already agreed as to whose responsibility salvage would be and precisely how that would be carried out.
it may seem perfectly logical that an aircraft that's been ditched, submerged in brackish water for a few days and been bashed and yanked this way and that, is not going to represent much value to anyone. But insurance relies upon the insured acting at all times as if uninsured. Which means, amongst other things, don't make matters worse than they already are.
As for aiding the investigation - don't think my post suggested that!
Quote
I think you need to explain that further. What extra damage was caused and how could the recovery have been better? How would that have aided the investigation?
Unquote
Certainly. I don't know what extra damage was caused, but I would expect a fair amount more than had the crane operators used broad webbing strops instead of steel, and had the aircraft been settled on the barge supported by rubber sausages.
It may be that by the time the aircraft was lifted out of the water, AIG and USAir had already agreed as to whose responsibility salvage would be and precisely how that would be carried out.
it may seem perfectly logical that an aircraft that's been ditched, submerged in brackish water for a few days and been bashed and yanked this way and that, is not going to represent much value to anyone. But insurance relies upon the insured acting at all times as if uninsured. Which means, amongst other things, don't make matters worse than they already are.
As for aiding the investigation - don't think my post suggested that!
Joined: Feb 2005
Posts: 4,581
Likes: 0
From: flyover country USA
Re: post #1745
Thanks, Brian. A lot of us were "right there" with Sully while reading that outstanding story. Whether or not the word "Hero" applies, he and Jeff Skiles were using all their experience to make the best of the situation.
There comes a time you have to forget everything else, and just fly the damn airplane.
Thanks, Brian. A lot of us were "right there" with Sully while reading that outstanding story. Whether or not the word "Hero" applies, he and Jeff Skiles were using all their experience to make the best of the situation.
There comes a time you have to forget everything else, and just fly the damn airplane.
Joined: Jan 2006
Posts: 2,205
Likes: 0
From: US
re: post #1745
Folks were trumpeting CA Sullenberger's glider epxerience. He, in his own words, states that he doesn't think the flying experience transfers and it was a long time ago.
Every well planned descent is an idle power glide to a given point(ie, stablized approach criteria, etc).
In the right airspace, it's possible to get idle power descents over 120 n.m., and as high as 135 n.m. (+/-).
Having a slight dogleg to final allows the best profile -
Low on energy turn towards a closer in final.
High on energy, turn slightly away(using speedbrakes is cheating).
Folks were trumpeting CA Sullenberger's glider epxerience. He, in his own words, states that he doesn't think the flying experience transfers and it was a long time ago.
Every well planned descent is an idle power glide to a given point(ie, stablized approach criteria, etc).
In the right airspace, it's possible to get idle power descents over 120 n.m., and as high as 135 n.m. (+/-).
Having a slight dogleg to final allows the best profile -
Low on energy turn towards a closer in final.
High on energy, turn slightly away(using speedbrakes is cheating).
Joined: Aug 2005
Posts: 2,525
Likes: 0
From: fl
I think the sailplane experience of landing would give you confidence in a powered airplane that lost all power being able to land it. It probably didn't have a lot to do with his success in the Hudson but it couldn't hurt. He did a great job and all of his prior experience obviously helped.
Joined: Oct 2007
Posts: 6
Likes: 0
From: Canada
#2 engine?
Take a look at the photos, #2 engine appears to be in surprisingly good condition.
Pay attention to the nose cowl and fan blades, I have been invloved in the aftermath of several bird strikes from a maintenance perspective, quite common to replace nose cowls and fan blades, and this on engines that continued to run quite nicely.
I find it hard to believe that this engine had an encounter with Canada geese.
Pay attention to the nose cowl and fan blades, I have been invloved in the aftermath of several bird strikes from a maintenance perspective, quite common to replace nose cowls and fan blades, and this on engines that continued to run quite nicely.
I find it hard to believe that this engine had an encounter with Canada geese.
Joined: Mar 2002
Posts: 4,569
Likes: 1
From: Florida
Airfix1
We've been through this long ago in this thread i.e. barit1 etc. and myself.
Yes it is true that large birds mangle fan blades. However that is dependent on the bird entering the engine as a whole bird and not just broken up into small bits by the inlet cowl.
I expect that when the public hearing starts that additional data will come out clarifying what damage many pounds of the bird guts did cause behind the fan (I'm still hoping for a beer bet with barit1
I find it hard to believe that this engine had an encounter with Canada geese
Yes it is true that large birds mangle fan blades. However that is dependent on the bird entering the engine as a whole bird and not just broken up into small bits by the inlet cowl.
I expect that when the public hearing starts that additional data will come out clarifying what damage many pounds of the bird guts did cause behind the fan (I'm still hoping for a beer bet with barit1
Joined: Feb 2005
Posts: 4,581
Likes: 0
From: flyover country USA
You're on, dude.
A case of Christian Moerlein says the primary damage will be corncobbed HP compressors, rendering the beasts inoperable above some subidle cycle.
And no, I still have no inside dope. Just a lunchbunch of old-time hammer-and-tongs engineers with a century or two of field experience.
A case of Christian Moerlein says the primary damage will be corncobbed HP compressors, rendering the beasts inoperable above some subidle cycle.
And no, I still have no inside dope. Just a lunchbunch of old-time hammer-and-tongs engineers with a century or two of field experience.
Joined: Nov 2005
Posts: 472
Likes: 1
From: Potomac Heights
Article suggesting the A320 was more the hero than Sully
See this news article about longer piece written by aviation writer William Langewiesche suggesting that flight control laws written into A320 software were more responsible for the successful result than the pilot.
Vanity Fair: Did Sully Sullenberger Land in the Hudson? Or Did the Plane Land Itself? - The Middle Seat Terminal - WSJ
Do the pilots out there think that if Sully had kept his hands completely off the controls, the result would be the same?
Vanity Fair: Did Sully Sullenberger Land in the Hudson? Or Did the Plane Land Itself? - The Middle Seat Terminal - WSJ
Do the pilots out there think that if Sully had kept his hands completely off the controls, the result would be the same?
Guest
Posts: n/a
Whether the aircraft landed itself or was hand flown seems to me, as a PPL, to be missing the point.
What resulted in a happy outcome was first class decision making.
if the automatics can do a better job, then let them do it, it does not denigrate the skill of the PIC one iota, IMHO.
Listen to the ATC tapes, Sullenberger is decisive and clear - I take my hat off to his ability to analyse the situation and make the right calls.
What resulted in a happy outcome was first class decision making.
if the automatics can do a better job, then let them do it, it does not denigrate the skill of the PIC one iota, IMHO.
Listen to the ATC tapes, Sullenberger is decisive and clear - I take my hat off to his ability to analyse the situation and make the right calls.
Joined: Aug 2005
Posts: 2,525
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From: fl
Can you imagine that magic A320 computer slowing to best L/D and just setting up a sink rate until impact. Depending what power was being generated the sink rate would have probably been 1500 fpm or more. Sully was able to manage his energy and flaps to touch down with practically no sink rate allowing everyone to survive. He would have been just as successful in a Boeing 737 without all the magic.