Crash at ZRH
ex-Tanker
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Rivet,
As always - no speculation - but here you have interested professionals on a rumour board - rather like asking a thirsty camel not to drink water.
A few clues could add up here:
1) RW28 VOR approach was never found difficult by Swissair pilots because - they never flew the STOL version and - they only flew it when the crosswind (or occasionally tailwind) for 14/16 was out of limits, so they had a relativly LOW groundspeed. The new German/Swiss agreement demands this approach even if there is no headwind, however.
2) A STOL approach requires high ROD which requires Low Thrust,
3) Severe icing conditions are usually at the limits of engine/airframe deicing equipment and require High Thrust,
4) After a steep descent in STOL configuration it is neccessary to put on a lot of thrust to arrest the descent, requiring an instant thrust response.
Now we don't know whether the flight was performing a STOL approach or how bad the icing was but I throw these factors into the pot for what they are worth.
As always - no speculation - but here you have interested professionals on a rumour board - rather like asking a thirsty camel not to drink water.
A few clues could add up here:
1) RW28 VOR approach was never found difficult by Swissair pilots because - they never flew the STOL version and - they only flew it when the crosswind (or occasionally tailwind) for 14/16 was out of limits, so they had a relativly LOW groundspeed. The new German/Swiss agreement demands this approach even if there is no headwind, however.
2) A STOL approach requires high ROD which requires Low Thrust,
3) Severe icing conditions are usually at the limits of engine/airframe deicing equipment and require High Thrust,
4) After a steep descent in STOL configuration it is neccessary to put on a lot of thrust to arrest the descent, requiring an instant thrust response.
Now we don't know whether the flight was performing a STOL approach or how bad the icing was but I throw these factors into the pot for what they are worth.
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I haven't seen any pics. in which the speed breaks where deployed in any way, however I often see the Avro usually deploying them fairly early. Perhaps a "Jumbolino" driver can shed some light on the proc.
My sympathy and condolences to all. RIP.
My sympathy and condolences to all. RIP.
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Few,
The STOL procedure is on request only and is, since RWY 28 has become the primary landing runway after 22:00, no longer being requested. There also was a lid as per the amount of STOL ops. on 28 - 12 per day if I remember correctly.
The STOL procedure is on request only and is, since RWY 28 has become the primary landing runway after 22:00, no longer being requested. There also was a lid as per the amount of STOL ops. on 28 - 12 per day if I remember correctly.
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During an autopilot coupled autoland approach the air brake is deployed before reaching 500 ft AGL.
During a standard approach the airbrake is deployed at around 100 ft.
During any phase of the descend the airbrake can be used at any speed. The Avro is fitted with an automatic airbrake retraction system in case of go-around or levelling off, this system is activated by means of switches on the thrust levers.
In landing configuration a level off flight needs plenty of power, the airbrake would, even if selected to deploy, retract instantly, the power required is enough to also give adequate air supply to the wings for de-icing, a setting of approximately 75%, assuming a landing weight of less than 32 to. Around 50% is enough for the wings to receive adequate air for de-icing.
Too many speculations at this stage, let´s wait and see....the boxes are in Woodford.
Pure coincidence, just 5 weeks ago I did exactly this scenario in the simulator, low vis, low clouds, severe icing, RWY28.
For sure an approach which askes for high attention and close adherence to profiles.
RIP
[ 26 November 2001: Message edited by: FL310 ]
During a standard approach the airbrake is deployed at around 100 ft.
During any phase of the descend the airbrake can be used at any speed. The Avro is fitted with an automatic airbrake retraction system in case of go-around or levelling off, this system is activated by means of switches on the thrust levers.
In landing configuration a level off flight needs plenty of power, the airbrake would, even if selected to deploy, retract instantly, the power required is enough to also give adequate air supply to the wings for de-icing, a setting of approximately 75%, assuming a landing weight of less than 32 to. Around 50% is enough for the wings to receive adequate air for de-icing.
Too many speculations at this stage, let´s wait and see....the boxes are in Woodford.
Pure coincidence, just 5 weeks ago I did exactly this scenario in the simulator, low vis, low clouds, severe icing, RWY28.
For sure an approach which askes for high attention and close adherence to profiles.
RIP
[ 26 November 2001: Message edited by: FL310 ]
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ChrisKSDF said
Initially beginning to look very much like this RJ100 tangled with freezing rain (aka rain-ice) during the protracted time spent at low-level on that drawn-out approach (temp zero and dewpoint zero from the ATIS more or less confirms that). Allegedly ATC always motor them around via some lengthy track-miles even before they get to commence that 28 VOR final approach. They would have accumulated a lot of ice very quickly in the rain and snow conditions. In fact they would have quickly become a flying ice-block. Those ex Chinook helo engines aren't renowned for coping well with heavy icing conditions (although they are anti-iced, that bleed-air fed system could be overcome at lower power settings on the approach). But more to the point, not many aircraft can cope aerodynamically, for any period, with freezing rain/snow - because it tends to hit and stick in areas on the wings, tail and fuselage that just aren't able to be de-iced. It is accumulative. That build-up can rapidly erode the aircraft's aerodynamics (lotsa drag, increased weight and a greatly increased stall speed). The pilots may not have realised just how much their stall speed had increased. When the laminar flows are disrupted by the non-laminar formation of rime ice accretions and ice-ridges (just aft of the de-iced leading edge areas) and ice excrescences (caused by melted ice flowing back and re-freezing further aft) then the stall IAS can zoom up and the stall warning can then be as little as a few knots. In part that is because the horizontal tail surfaces (elevator and horizontal stabilizer) are also affected. It is normally the vibration over the tail that warns you about pre-stall airflow breakaway occurring prematurely (speedwise) on the wing - but with a high-up T-tail, I'm not sure that that would be the case. When the freezing level is very close to the ground (or lowest safe altitude in IMC) you cannot escape rain-ice (by descending into warmer air) - so the only answer is in diverting, preferably before you get caught up in this deteriorating condition.
It's possible that they might have stalled it when levelling early at MDA for the drive into the MAP or even on an attempted missed approach (i.e. during flap retraction). That's exactly when that heavy coating of draggy rain-ice and greatly increased stall speed is most likely to catch you out. T-tail deep-stall might have been part of it. They obviously hit quite flat so that either means stalled or ran outa power. If they'd simultaneously had engine problems I'd not be surprised. These RJ-100's have the LF-507 engines (which allegedly don't suffer from roll-back, but that's not to say that they would behave impeccably in heavy rain-ice. Spent a bit of time in freezing rain and I know just how fast things can turn to worms, if you don't get out of it pronto. The problem is that, being night-time, they wouldn't have been monitoring the wings visually, nor necessarily noticed the ice build-ups on the windshields. Someone mentioned that the dive-brake was about 80% deployed. They likely did that so that they could carry more power for better wing de-ice. However in freezing rain (that just hits and sticks), that's not going to assist at all.
If they'd been able to slot straight into an ILS there'd have likely been no problem. I blame the bureaucrats and their compulsory 28 approach - totally idiotic in those weather conditions. In fact, I'd go so far as to call it criminal stupidity.
My whole point was that asking a pilot to perform a VOR/DME approach in conditions very near VFR isn't exactly "irresponsible" or dangerous.
It's possible that they might have stalled it when levelling early at MDA for the drive into the MAP or even on an attempted missed approach (i.e. during flap retraction). That's exactly when that heavy coating of draggy rain-ice and greatly increased stall speed is most likely to catch you out. T-tail deep-stall might have been part of it. They obviously hit quite flat so that either means stalled or ran outa power. If they'd simultaneously had engine problems I'd not be surprised. These RJ-100's have the LF-507 engines (which allegedly don't suffer from roll-back, but that's not to say that they would behave impeccably in heavy rain-ice. Spent a bit of time in freezing rain and I know just how fast things can turn to worms, if you don't get out of it pronto. The problem is that, being night-time, they wouldn't have been monitoring the wings visually, nor necessarily noticed the ice build-ups on the windshields. Someone mentioned that the dive-brake was about 80% deployed. They likely did that so that they could carry more power for better wing de-ice. However in freezing rain (that just hits and sticks), that's not going to assist at all.
If they'd been able to slot straight into an ILS there'd have likely been no problem. I blame the bureaucrats and their compulsory 28 approach - totally idiotic in those weather conditions. In fact, I'd go so far as to call it criminal stupidity.
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There has never been an airframe certified for flight into freezing rain or drizzle. Once you get in it, you're a test pilot. Happened in Roselawn, Indiana in 1994 - an Eagle ATR-72.
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We just have had a minute of silence here at our company, because the president of our business unit and the finance boss together were on board of this flight, among those, who did not survive this crash. And how often I myself used this flight to ZRH. My and my colleagues condolences to all who also lost loved ones an colleagues. Another bad day for aviation.
The airbrakes on a 146/RJ are inclined to creep open after a few minutes on the ground. So with the hydraulic lines severed I'm not surprised to read this here.
As has been said many times before all this speculation only serves to feed a media frenzy. Crossairs name of Jumbolino seemed to cause confusion aplenty to the BBC on Saturday and Sunday..looking for a 747?
May they all R.I.P.
As has been said many times before all this speculation only serves to feed a media frenzy. Crossairs name of Jumbolino seemed to cause confusion aplenty to the BBC on Saturday and Sunday..looking for a 747?
May they all R.I.P.
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The speed brake will open on impact, only held together with a small teflon locking mechanism,when no hydroulic power. So airbrake could have been in any position. The impact looks a bit nose down as the front is crushed from radome backwards, but the tail looks in good condition. Still, the impact looks quite flat though.
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Dagger Dirk:
My thoughts exactly. I rather suspect the investigation will reveal something akin to what you suggest. A fresh crew performing a routine task in a homebase environment is not "pilot error" material (whatever THAT means), and I suggest we owe it to the memories of those lost, not to speculate randomly as to their performance.
Hooking Fell:
Using this dreadful accident to pedal your slovenly pro-Swissair/anti-Crossair agenda is appalling even by your standard. You're a disgrace to the profession.
God Bless all involved and effected.
My thoughts exactly. I rather suspect the investigation will reveal something akin to what you suggest. A fresh crew performing a routine task in a homebase environment is not "pilot error" material (whatever THAT means), and I suggest we owe it to the memories of those lost, not to speculate randomly as to their performance.
Hooking Fell:
Using this dreadful accident to pedal your slovenly pro-Swissair/anti-Crossair agenda is appalling even by your standard. You're a disgrace to the profession.
God Bless all involved and effected.
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From LX Management
[ 26 November 2001: Message edited by: Dr Know ]
Dear Colleagues,
The tragic event of last night, has caused us all deep sorrow and grief.
The loss and injury of our dear colleagues and their passengers, is a
heavy burden for us all to bear. At this time, the cause of the
accident is not known, but a thorough investigation has been launched.
I would like to pass on to you personally the facts that we have on hand
at this time.
The Flight
LX3597 was the regular scheduled flight from TXL to ZRH. It departed
TXL on time at 1940 UTC.
The crew was originally planned to operate ZRH-BRU-ZRH, before the
ZRH-TXL-ZRH rotation, but the BRU flight was changed to a S20. There
were 2 pilots, 3 cabin crew members and 28 passengers on board.
Technical
The aircraft HB-IXM had no major technical deficiencies reported before
the flight. There was a minor remark about the APU, that it required
two start attempts on a previous flight. In addition, the cockpit
temperature control system was reported to be inoperative in AUTO mode.
All scheduled maintenance checks and inspections had been performed in
accordance with the approved maintenance plan. No reports had been
received about navigation, communication or warning system faults. As
an immediate response, however, the navigation data base for the ZRH RWY
28 VOR/DME approach was checked for way point accuracy. Additional
precautionary inspections will also be performed on the GPWS, Stall
Warning System, Radio Altimeters, Altitude Alerting System, Pitot Static
System, Barometric Altimeters, Standby Altimeter, and FGC 1 & 2. These
checks will be completed by Monday morning, the 26th of November.
Airport Information
The navigation and lighting facilities were reported to be functioning
normally at the time of the accident.
Weather Conditions
The accident occurred at approximately 2106 UTC. METAR for 2050 UTC was
16002 3500 -SN FEW006 BKN015 OVC022 00°/00° Q1024 TEMPO 5000. METAR for
2120 UTC was 13002 4000 -SN FEW006 BKN015 OVC022 01°/00° Q1023 NOSIG.
Emergency Response
The Emergency Control Center (ECC) was opened by Thomas Brandt
immediately after the accident. The response procedures include the
care of the crew and passengers, their families and friends. The
support of the entire Crossair team is also of critical importance over
the coming days and weeks as we adjust to our loss. The ECC is staffed
by specialists from all areas of our company, assisted by other external
professionals.
Communication with our Passengers and the Public
It is of vital importance that we communicate in an open and factual way
with the members of the public. You should only use the information that
is written on the fact sheets that will be available at your check-in
base and no personal opinions. We will pass you additional information
as it becomes available.
Flight Operations
Even though the investigation is in its initial phase, there are no
technical or navigational issues that have been immediately identified
to cast doubt on the integrity of the ARJ operations. It must be
acknowledged, however, that maintaining our professional standards,
after the shock of an accident, requires an increased level of alertness
and care on the flight deck. Even though our thoughts and prayers are
with our colleagues and their families at this time, we must all ensure
that our focus is directed to safe flight operations. We are convinced
that together we can maintain our flight network in a normal manner.
There will be flight operations and fleet representatives at each base
to support you with direct communication during this difficult time.
Philipp Hildebrand
Fleet Chief ARJ
Fredi Luginbühl
Vice President Fleet and Cockpit Personnel
The tragic event of last night, has caused us all deep sorrow and grief.
The loss and injury of our dear colleagues and their passengers, is a
heavy burden for us all to bear. At this time, the cause of the
accident is not known, but a thorough investigation has been launched.
I would like to pass on to you personally the facts that we have on hand
at this time.
The Flight
LX3597 was the regular scheduled flight from TXL to ZRH. It departed
TXL on time at 1940 UTC.
The crew was originally planned to operate ZRH-BRU-ZRH, before the
ZRH-TXL-ZRH rotation, but the BRU flight was changed to a S20. There
were 2 pilots, 3 cabin crew members and 28 passengers on board.
Technical
The aircraft HB-IXM had no major technical deficiencies reported before
the flight. There was a minor remark about the APU, that it required
two start attempts on a previous flight. In addition, the cockpit
temperature control system was reported to be inoperative in AUTO mode.
All scheduled maintenance checks and inspections had been performed in
accordance with the approved maintenance plan. No reports had been
received about navigation, communication or warning system faults. As
an immediate response, however, the navigation data base for the ZRH RWY
28 VOR/DME approach was checked for way point accuracy. Additional
precautionary inspections will also be performed on the GPWS, Stall
Warning System, Radio Altimeters, Altitude Alerting System, Pitot Static
System, Barometric Altimeters, Standby Altimeter, and FGC 1 & 2. These
checks will be completed by Monday morning, the 26th of November.
Airport Information
The navigation and lighting facilities were reported to be functioning
normally at the time of the accident.
Weather Conditions
The accident occurred at approximately 2106 UTC. METAR for 2050 UTC was
16002 3500 -SN FEW006 BKN015 OVC022 00°/00° Q1024 TEMPO 5000. METAR for
2120 UTC was 13002 4000 -SN FEW006 BKN015 OVC022 01°/00° Q1023 NOSIG.
Emergency Response
The Emergency Control Center (ECC) was opened by Thomas Brandt
immediately after the accident. The response procedures include the
care of the crew and passengers, their families and friends. The
support of the entire Crossair team is also of critical importance over
the coming days and weeks as we adjust to our loss. The ECC is staffed
by specialists from all areas of our company, assisted by other external
professionals.
Communication with our Passengers and the Public
It is of vital importance that we communicate in an open and factual way
with the members of the public. You should only use the information that
is written on the fact sheets that will be available at your check-in
base and no personal opinions. We will pass you additional information
as it becomes available.
Flight Operations
Even though the investigation is in its initial phase, there are no
technical or navigational issues that have been immediately identified
to cast doubt on the integrity of the ARJ operations. It must be
acknowledged, however, that maintaining our professional standards,
after the shock of an accident, requires an increased level of alertness
and care on the flight deck. Even though our thoughts and prayers are
with our colleagues and their families at this time, we must all ensure
that our focus is directed to safe flight operations. We are convinced
that together we can maintain our flight network in a normal manner.
There will be flight operations and fleet representatives at each base
to support you with direct communication during this difficult time.
Philipp Hildebrand
Fleet Chief ARJ
Fredi Luginbühl
Vice President Fleet and Cockpit Personnel
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backtrack,
You can send your sympathy to Crossair at
[email protected]
[ 26 November 2001: Message edited by: spagiola ]
You can send your sympathy to Crossair at
[email protected]
[ 26 November 2001: Message edited by: spagiola ]