Pay-to-fly wannabee damages Thomas Cook Airbus
Couldonlyaffordafiver
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BA put 200 hour guys on 777's last year - are we suggesting that BA (widely regarded as having one of the best ongoing training systems in the business) is making a huge mistake?
In the past, 200 hour "cadets" were recruited onto the 757/767 fleet (although this was stopped in 2003, I think). The only way for 200 hour guys to join BA currently is onto the Airbus fleet and until recently, the 737.
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My Experiences
I'll speak up as a former cadet jumping from 300 hours SEP/MEP time to a Boeing 737. From reading the AAIB article and parts of this thread, I can possibly relate to the general topic of this conversation (except, thankfully, the bending of an aeroplane in Greece - however this can happen to any poor sod, so my sympathies are with the FO in question).
Having just completed my first 6 months on line, I can still remember my TRQ training on the 737 fairly well. First of all I would remark that from day one an average to above average level of general flying competency is assumed. The TR is no place to review the 'Effects of Controls - Lesson One, 'Basic Instrument Flying' or the 'Constant Aspect Technique.' SFIs and TRIs assume a level of competency and may believe that this has been regarded as being satisfactory from the initial assessment. My particular airline also asked for copies of training records during my interview/sim assessment. I only assume that a record of '2 attempts to pass the CPL and 3 attempts to pass the IR' would have created some degree of concern. However I would also imagine that general flying competency would also have been observed in the sim. As it seems to have been during this guy's initial assessment. The fact that he was offered a second attempt in a different type by a less impartial assessor smacks of commercial pressures. I was a SSTR cadet, however I am more than certain that a below par sim assessment would have resulted in my application being binned.
Going back to my point about a certain level of flying competency being assumed, I will put it into the context of my TRQ. The training programme was extremely time pressured and therefore fast paced. During my course, training was conducted by 5 different SFIs & TRIs. A lesson plan was created for each simulator exercise, with specific training sorties to be carried out. As 'time was of the essence,' a lot of repositioning and positioning of the simulator was carried out. Possibly only one landing after some repositioning was all that time allowed at the end of the exercise. We would then be debriefed and assessed on performance in that exercise, i.e. loss of a hydraulic system, EFATO or loss of pressurisation. If performace was satisfactory we would move onto the next exercise. The SFI or TRI would leave their remarks and the whole process would recommence. Items such as take-offs and landings would become items of less focus as more comprehensive simulator exercises involving the aircraft's systems and failure recognition occured.
In my experience, as indeed it seems in this chaps case, problems with a cadet's landing technique and general aircraft handling as a whole were usually revealed towards the later stages of the course when S/E exercises, raw data flying and indeed preliminary sim based circuit training were covered. This was all still before the LST and way before anyone certified the cadet for aircraft base training. From the time of my TRQ I would say that if someone faced a hurdle, it would generally be here. As far as I believe, it was few and far between, however it would have always have been met with an SFI or TRI recommending the cadet for further training. That being said, a second bout of training in a particular area may have been passed to a satisfactory standard, allowing the person to progress to the aircraft. Only here, again with similarities to the AAIB report, would the problem again become evident. The person in question would be sent back to the sim and then be asked to retake the base check if regarded to be at an acceptable standard. As I am led to believe, a second below par attempt in the aircraft would result in the cadet being scrubbed.
So maybe certain things were overlooked or indeed certain things were assumed well before this poor guy got near the A320. In my opinion he became a victim of a poor standard of training from the very first day that he put his hands on the controls of an aeroplane. I was once told by an extremely experienced and qualified instructor/examiner who had flown, assessed and trained on a plethora of aircraft types that the first 10 to 20 hours of a pilot's training is often critical to their development as an aviator. 'Poor initial training will leave them ****** for life.' Maybe this is part of the case, I don't know?
Having just completed my first 6 months on line, I can still remember my TRQ training on the 737 fairly well. First of all I would remark that from day one an average to above average level of general flying competency is assumed. The TR is no place to review the 'Effects of Controls - Lesson One, 'Basic Instrument Flying' or the 'Constant Aspect Technique.' SFIs and TRIs assume a level of competency and may believe that this has been regarded as being satisfactory from the initial assessment. My particular airline also asked for copies of training records during my interview/sim assessment. I only assume that a record of '2 attempts to pass the CPL and 3 attempts to pass the IR' would have created some degree of concern. However I would also imagine that general flying competency would also have been observed in the sim. As it seems to have been during this guy's initial assessment. The fact that he was offered a second attempt in a different type by a less impartial assessor smacks of commercial pressures. I was a SSTR cadet, however I am more than certain that a below par sim assessment would have resulted in my application being binned.
Going back to my point about a certain level of flying competency being assumed, I will put it into the context of my TRQ. The training programme was extremely time pressured and therefore fast paced. During my course, training was conducted by 5 different SFIs & TRIs. A lesson plan was created for each simulator exercise, with specific training sorties to be carried out. As 'time was of the essence,' a lot of repositioning and positioning of the simulator was carried out. Possibly only one landing after some repositioning was all that time allowed at the end of the exercise. We would then be debriefed and assessed on performance in that exercise, i.e. loss of a hydraulic system, EFATO or loss of pressurisation. If performace was satisfactory we would move onto the next exercise. The SFI or TRI would leave their remarks and the whole process would recommence. Items such as take-offs and landings would become items of less focus as more comprehensive simulator exercises involving the aircraft's systems and failure recognition occured.
In my experience, as indeed it seems in this chaps case, problems with a cadet's landing technique and general aircraft handling as a whole were usually revealed towards the later stages of the course when S/E exercises, raw data flying and indeed preliminary sim based circuit training were covered. This was all still before the LST and way before anyone certified the cadet for aircraft base training. From the time of my TRQ I would say that if someone faced a hurdle, it would generally be here. As far as I believe, it was few and far between, however it would have always have been met with an SFI or TRI recommending the cadet for further training. That being said, a second bout of training in a particular area may have been passed to a satisfactory standard, allowing the person to progress to the aircraft. Only here, again with similarities to the AAIB report, would the problem again become evident. The person in question would be sent back to the sim and then be asked to retake the base check if regarded to be at an acceptable standard. As I am led to believe, a second below par attempt in the aircraft would result in the cadet being scrubbed.
So maybe certain things were overlooked or indeed certain things were assumed well before this poor guy got near the A320. In my opinion he became a victim of a poor standard of training from the very first day that he put his hands on the controls of an aeroplane. I was once told by an extremely experienced and qualified instructor/examiner who had flown, assessed and trained on a plethora of aircraft types that the first 10 to 20 hours of a pilot's training is often critical to their development as an aviator. 'Poor initial training will leave them ****** for life.' Maybe this is part of the case, I don't know?
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Experienced people do bend aircraft, the problem in this case is that the warning signs for this exact incident were there from day one and they weren't acted upon.
This is a failing of a training/checking system rather than an simply a human error by the handling pilot. Which is far more concerning. Everyone makes mistakes, what isn't acceptable is that the systems aren't rigorous enough to catch potential problems before they happen.
This is a failing of a training/checking system rather than an simply a human error by the handling pilot. Which is far more concerning. Everyone makes mistakes, what isn't acceptable is that the systems aren't rigorous enough to catch potential problems before they happen.
However sometimes things are overlooked.
Auburn Calloway had been fired several places, including Flying Tigers, before he was offered a job at FedEx. He later became infamous for his bloody attempt to hijack and crash FedEx flight 705 in 1994.
Robyn S. had a history of busted checkrides including a "609" ride with the feds before she was hired by FedEx:
A review of the first officer's employment, flight, and training records revealed
that two of her DHC-8 captain proficiency checkrides (on April 7 and 13, 1994, while she was employed by Mesaba Airlines) were unsatisfactory. According to Mesaba Airlines, the check airman who conducted both proficiency checkrides indicated that the unsatisfactory results were because of “generally poor airmanship.” As a result of the first officer's unsatisfactory performance during the April 13 checkride, the FAA inspector who observed that checkride required her to be reexamined for her ATP certificate by an FAA check airman under the provisions of 49 CFR, Chapter 447, Section 44609
(currently codified as Section 44709).14 On May 15, 1994, the first officer satisfactorily completed the reexamination.
According to FedEx training records, the first officer completed DC-10 flight engineer training on April 17, 1996. She began MD-11 first officer transition training on August 31, 1998, and received her MD-11 type rating on October 22, 1998. The records also indicated that, on October 26, 1999, the first officer failed her MD-11 proficiency checkride; deficiencies were noted in the areas of engine-out takeoff, nonprecision
approach, and engine fire/failure/restart. The records further indicated that, after additional training, she satisfactorily completed a proficiency checkride on October 29, 1999. The records also indicated that, on October 17, 2001, the first officer failed another MD-11 proficiency checkride; deficiencies were noted in the areas of powerplant failure, nonprecision approach, missed approach procedures, one/two engine-out landing, and command judgment. The records further indicated that, after additional training, she satisfactorily completed a proficiency checkride on October 19, 2001.
that two of her DHC-8 captain proficiency checkrides (on April 7 and 13, 1994, while she was employed by Mesaba Airlines) were unsatisfactory. According to Mesaba Airlines, the check airman who conducted both proficiency checkrides indicated that the unsatisfactory results were because of “generally poor airmanship.” As a result of the first officer's unsatisfactory performance during the April 13 checkride, the FAA inspector who observed that checkride required her to be reexamined for her ATP certificate by an FAA check airman under the provisions of 49 CFR, Chapter 447, Section 44609
(currently codified as Section 44709).14 On May 15, 1994, the first officer satisfactorily completed the reexamination.
According to FedEx training records, the first officer completed DC-10 flight engineer training on April 17, 1996. She began MD-11 first officer transition training on August 31, 1998, and received her MD-11 type rating on October 22, 1998. The records also indicated that, on October 26, 1999, the first officer failed her MD-11 proficiency checkride; deficiencies were noted in the areas of engine-out takeoff, nonprecision
approach, and engine fire/failure/restart. The records further indicated that, after additional training, she satisfactorily completed a proficiency checkride on October 29, 1999. The records also indicated that, on October 17, 2001, the first officer failed another MD-11 proficiency checkride; deficiencies were noted in the areas of powerplant failure, nonprecision approach, missed approach procedures, one/two engine-out landing, and command judgment. The records further indicated that, after additional training, she satisfactorily completed a proficiency checkride on October 19, 2001.
Unfortunately, she was the FO getting a line check in one of the recent FedEx Memphis MD crashes (or if you prefer, hard landings with runway excusions and fire).
In response to this crash the NTSB recommended a remedial training program be set up to mitigate the risks with such pilots:
Require all 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 121 air carrier operators to
establish programs for flight crewmembers who have demonstrated
performance deficiencies or experienced failures in the training
environment that would require a review of their whole performance
history at the company and administer additional oversight and training to
ensure that performance deficiencies are addressed and corrected.
establish programs for flight crewmembers who have demonstrated
performance deficiencies or experienced failures in the training
environment that would require a review of their whole performance
history at the company and administer additional oversight and training to
ensure that performance deficiencies are addressed and corrected.
Last edited by Airbubba; 18th Dec 2008 at 21:37.
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In the case of the co-pilot on G-DHJZ, the course provided him with the opportunity to carry out a number of landings in the A320 simulator, but without any type specific formal training to do so. It is possible that this, at least, led to his rehearsing actions of his own choosing in circumstances where formal learning of the correct technique was desirable.
Also, 2nd attempt (first series) passes in your CPL/IR means jack****. Many instructors experienced with seeing crap students get there first time and good students 2nd/3rd time around know that passing first time has only 50% to do with skill, it is also by and large a bloody lottery. So lets stop peddling this myth.
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In America we have cadets flying less people in regional jets to gain experience before carrying 100 plus people in bigger jets. No less easy to fly , but a risk to fewer people. Cadets have to learn somehow and gain time somewhere.
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I feel that people are losing sight of the main problem here.
The lack of a structured, organised and regulated training structure supplying pilots to airlines. In the days of yore airlines trained their own pilots. This allowed consistent checking throughout the course to enable an accurate assessment of a pilots ability to be made. If the pace was not suitable then the pilot was dropped.
The out sourcing of these facilities made it cheaper, however, as an airline controlled the purse strings of the training companies through the contracts, quality could be monitored.
The breakdown of 'in house training' coupled with the ability of pilots, with the backing of FTO's, to purchase line training is, in my opinion, dangerous in some degree.
What happened here is not the fault of the FO and in some respects it is not the fault of the TC. The lack of a consistent brief on the training record of the FO in question is probably a root cause of this problem. I am a great believer in the fact that just about anyone can fly. Given enough time, money and practice then just about anyone can get airborne. The airline and military place a monetary and time training restriction on ab-initio pilots to 'weed' out those who just aren't suitable for the operation or pace of training. That was sadly lacking in this case. The TC hadn't been briefed on the FO's previous failings hence was not properly in position to expect a problem. The FO is paying and therefore won't volunteer potentially bad information. The links in the flight safety chain hook together beautifully.
There are many, many pilots who can handle, with 250 hours, flying as an FO with an experienced training Captain in the left hand seat. They have been monitored to ensure that they have the capacity to deal with landing large commercial airliners. Where was the monitoring in this case?
More to the point, the pax don't know that training is taking place!
The lack of a structured, organised and regulated training structure supplying pilots to airlines. In the days of yore airlines trained their own pilots. This allowed consistent checking throughout the course to enable an accurate assessment of a pilots ability to be made. If the pace was not suitable then the pilot was dropped.
The out sourcing of these facilities made it cheaper, however, as an airline controlled the purse strings of the training companies through the contracts, quality could be monitored.
The breakdown of 'in house training' coupled with the ability of pilots, with the backing of FTO's, to purchase line training is, in my opinion, dangerous in some degree.
What happened here is not the fault of the FO and in some respects it is not the fault of the TC. The lack of a consistent brief on the training record of the FO in question is probably a root cause of this problem. I am a great believer in the fact that just about anyone can fly. Given enough time, money and practice then just about anyone can get airborne. The airline and military place a monetary and time training restriction on ab-initio pilots to 'weed' out those who just aren't suitable for the operation or pace of training. That was sadly lacking in this case. The TC hadn't been briefed on the FO's previous failings hence was not properly in position to expect a problem. The FO is paying and therefore won't volunteer potentially bad information. The links in the flight safety chain hook together beautifully.
There are many, many pilots who can handle, with 250 hours, flying as an FO with an experienced training Captain in the left hand seat. They have been monitored to ensure that they have the capacity to deal with landing large commercial airliners. Where was the monitoring in this case?
More to the point, the pax don't know that training is taking place!
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Just as a matter of interest,
To complete his type rating he would have needed to complete 6 competent take-offs and landings before getting the A320 on his licence.
Does anybody know whose aircraft and TRI/TRE those were completed with and, surely, if he was signed off as competent at that stage then that is where the 'loophole' may lay?
To complete his type rating he would have needed to complete 6 competent take-offs and landings before getting the A320 on his licence.
Does anybody know whose aircraft and TRI/TRE those were completed with and, surely, if he was signed off as competent at that stage then that is where the 'loophole' may lay?
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Originally Posted by Superpilot
Also, 2nd attempt (first series) passes in your CPL/IR means jack****. Many instructors experienced with seeing crap students get there first time and good students 2nd/3rd time around know that passing first time has only 50% to do with skill, it is also by and large a bloody lottery. So lets stop peddling this myth.
Mungo - it might apply more to the IR than the CPL, but I think Superpilot has a point. I've certainly seen a number of very average pilots pass the CPL and IR first-time by flying close to 100% of their ability, having a nice easy departure, quiet airways and helpful ATC. I've also seen some very good pilots fail or partial because they've flown well but had nasty weather, busy circuit traffic or insane ATC instructions, which has induced them to make an uncharacteristic and costly mistake. 
Moving swiftly on...
Phileas Fogg - I believe he managed those 6 competent landings on his TR. I think it's mentioned in the AAIB report. What's that very unkind saying: Every dog has his day?
In all seriousness, if you made a note of all my landings I suspect there are strings of 6 lovely touch-downs in there amongst the occasional 'arrival'...
Moving swiftly on...
Phileas Fogg - I believe he managed those 6 competent landings on his TR. I think it's mentioned in the AAIB report. What's that very unkind saying: Every dog has his day?
In all seriousness, if you made a note of all my landings I suspect there are strings of 6 lovely touch-downs in there amongst the occasional 'arrival'...
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Notwithstanding all the above (including my own ) contributions, I sure hope to hell the poor sod doesn't read PPRuNe too often. . . . . . . and if you do, don't worry mate we're all crap, we just became more adept at concealing it 
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I certainly agree with MikeHotel152, for every 6 good landings, there is always 1 awful one. Someone told me that angels reside beneath the landing gear boggies and they decide your fate. Landing may often be regarded as a bit of a black art, but it is true that after the TR, someone of 'cadet' status must demonstrate 'at least' 6 satisfactory landings in the actual aircraft. In this chap's case I believe he was asked to return to the sim after initial base training, after then he was signed off after a second attempt.
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Mikehotel (and others),
But six landings in quick succession, bang, bang, bang! Sure, in any job, we can all have an 'off' day but it seems that as soon as the guy started on line there were question marks being raised regarding his landings.
So, perhaps, someone must have stood in as his alias and did the landings for him during his base training or there were other factors and not just his abilty to land the aircraft.
But six landings in quick succession, bang, bang, bang! Sure, in any job, we can all have an 'off' day but it seems that as soon as the guy started on line there were question marks being raised regarding his landings.
So, perhaps, someone must have stood in as his alias and did the landings for him during his base training or there were other factors and not just his abilty to land the aircraft.
Mistrust in Management
Foggy
So, perhaps, someone must have stood in as his alias and did the landings for him during his base training
Just a guess based on the fact that all TC's are human - they want the trainee to do well - if a TC sees an overall 'good' operation they are reluctant to write up a 'poor' landing on the only time they have flown with the student.
That is why it is a good idea to have one TC for the student for several sectors - doesn't always happen in my experience.
So the system is not perfect like so many other systems we encounter. Generally it works OK though.
Regards
Exeng
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Originally Posted by Dani
but as an experienced instructor you see a hard landing coming.
The AAIB set up a little experiment to see if an experienced Training Captain can intervene. From page 10 of the AAIB report, link given above.
In the first of these ‘unusual’ approaches, a manual approach was flown with autothrust, but the ‘trainee’ ceased to make sidestick inputs at 50 ft RA. The TRE(A) was unable to intervene in time and the aircraft struck the runway without a flare. In other ‘unusual’ approaches, the TRE(A) was again unable to intervene, or intervened too late, to prevent a hard landing.
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Originally Posted by ITCZ
The AAIB set up a little experiment to see if an experienced Training Captain can intervene. From page 10 of the AAIB report, link given above.
In the first of these ‘unusual’ approaches, a manual approach was flown with autothrust, but the ‘trainee’ ceased to make sidestick inputs at 50 ft RA. The TRE(A) was unable to intervene in time and the aircraft struck the runway without a flare. In other ‘unusual’ approaches, the TRE(A) was again unable to intervene, or intervened too late, to prevent a hard landing.
In the first of these ‘unusual’ approaches, a manual approach was flown with autothrust, but the ‘trainee’ ceased to make sidestick inputs at 50 ft RA. The TRE(A) was unable to intervene in time and the aircraft struck the runway without a flare. In other ‘unusual’ approaches, the TRE(A) was again unable to intervene, or intervened too late, to prevent a hard landing.
The commander stated that, in his opinion, the task of monitoring a trainee in the Airbus aircraft was “certainly not as intuitive” as in the Boeing aircraft, as he was unable to sense any control inputs made by the co-pilot.
If Airlines want to follow that path, at least they should seriously consider providing their captains with the more logical tool : Fully visible and coupled control columns !
Originally Posted by lederhosen
The report should be required reading for training captains
ECON cruise, LR cruise...
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As a (thank God now former) captain with a low FaRes airline, I can attest to cadets not being taught how to land. As long as they have a nice 3-degree GS to the TDZ, they're ok in as much that you can get away with not flaring.
But how the hell do you suppose a pilot that cannot even maintain a stabilised visual approach will have the visual accuity to pick up a high ROD during landing? It's not taught, because it costs money and is strictly not necessary. The captain is paid to be last line of defence, and that's it.
Most cadets learn the finer points over time, but have had go-arounds from the flare and later, and not a single one was initiated by the FO in question. More sim practice in when to throw a landing away would prolly be worth the dough. Don't teach them how to land, but teach them how to recognise when the water is getting too deep.
But how the hell do you suppose a pilot that cannot even maintain a stabilised visual approach will have the visual accuity to pick up a high ROD during landing? It's not taught, because it costs money and is strictly not necessary. The captain is paid to be last line of defence, and that's it.
Most cadets learn the finer points over time, but have had go-arounds from the flare and later, and not a single one was initiated by the FO in question. More sim practice in when to throw a landing away would prolly be worth the dough. Don't teach them how to land, but teach them how to recognise when the water is getting too deep.
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I find the above post to be a very sensiblie recommendation. The postee is right, these things are not taught,but should be taught in my opinion. The first time I did any type of visual manouver in the 737, besides the base check, was on line with 180 odd punters in the back. It is a different kettle of fish than simply flying a nice flight director assisted ILS approach on a 3 degree path. Don't get me wrong, in terms of the actual perspective, a visual approach is a visual approach, regardless of aircraft type. However the aeroplanes inertia and energy makes everything that little bit more 'exciting' should I say. We are all given a 500' AAL landing gate criteria to abide by, however in some cases this could become a target to actually get stabilised by instead of a point that you would normally be stabilised by. Everything could be a bit of a rush up to this stage for the unparacticed pilot. I reckon a few sim exercises practicing this scenario would indeed make situations like this potentialy less dramatic. I'm not saying they always are, they just can be. Especially with someone new to type or with limited experience.
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Comment on the JOC course etc
As usual the comments posted are mostly from ignorance of the facts and not having undergone this particular course with this particular provider to the airline. The course has run successfully since 2006 and over 28 cadet pilots from differing backgrounds have completed it as well as proceeding directly to the Type Rating and gone on to successful careers.
Is the JOC course worth it? Ask the low hour cadets who were successful in completing the 320 Type Rating without problems and the airline which received them! Feedback was entirely excellent. All are now in full time A320 employment Quod Erat Demonstrandum!
It is true that unfortunately money is a pre requisite these days (even for BA cadets eventually!), but the selection procedure is extremely rigorous conducted jointly both by the airline and the training organisation. The JOC itself is yet another risk management stage and not all the cadets are successful in proceeding to type rating, demonstrating the level of quality control and the fact that unlike some other organisations, a line is drawn in the sand that money cannot cross!
The JOC course instructors are also A320/A330 SFI/TRI/TRE and have considerable industry expertise, including recent A320 Aircraft Base Trainers who have conducted dozens of aircraft base training sessions with cadet pilots. (the AAIB report seems to have missed this point entirely!)
No training is without risk, it just needs managing carefully...........
Unfortunately no selection system is entirely foolproof, and there were probably sufficient indicators along the way to cause concern, however most reputable training organisations and airlines really do try and do the right thing for the candidate and bend over backwards to try and bring about successful conversion by putting in place remedial training as required. The debate therefore rests as to when enough is enough.
One of things that has changed over the last few decades is the number of crew members on the flight deck.
In the "olden days" there was a Captain, First Officer, Flight Engineer, Flight Navigator and a "Second Officer".
When I joined BOAC as a cadet pilot in 1970 on the B 707 much of my early time on the flight deck (having completed the conversion) was spent in the jump seat observing and sitting in pilot's seats when either the Captain or First Officer took a "rest" (we could even have our meal down the back in First Class - how times have, sadly, changed).
Although this time spent observing could, at times, feel a bit unproductive, in fact it wasn't - much was learned by observing the operation and seeing how other (much more experienced) pilots flew the aircraft.
We also started with a restricted take off and landing card - initially one could only land by day in good weather conditions (minimal crosswind etc) and then as time progressed one had more and more of the restrictions removed (but only after further suitable training).
Whilst one wouldn't want to see a return to the "olden days" the pendulum now seems to have swung the other way. Admittedly modern simulators and training syllabi are much improved but they are light years away from actual operation on the line with all the intangibles and randomness which can occur on a normal line flight.
As I said before there are really no short cuts. I have every sympathy for the newly trained pilots, many of whom go straight from a general aviation a/c to the RHS of a modern jet operating in busy airspace and often into some challenging aerodromes.
In the "olden days" there was a Captain, First Officer, Flight Engineer, Flight Navigator and a "Second Officer".
When I joined BOAC as a cadet pilot in 1970 on the B 707 much of my early time on the flight deck (having completed the conversion) was spent in the jump seat observing and sitting in pilot's seats when either the Captain or First Officer took a "rest" (we could even have our meal down the back in First Class - how times have, sadly, changed).
Although this time spent observing could, at times, feel a bit unproductive, in fact it wasn't - much was learned by observing the operation and seeing how other (much more experienced) pilots flew the aircraft.
We also started with a restricted take off and landing card - initially one could only land by day in good weather conditions (minimal crosswind etc) and then as time progressed one had more and more of the restrictions removed (but only after further suitable training).
Whilst one wouldn't want to see a return to the "olden days" the pendulum now seems to have swung the other way. Admittedly modern simulators and training syllabi are much improved but they are light years away from actual operation on the line with all the intangibles and randomness which can occur on a normal line flight.
As I said before there are really no short cuts. I have every sympathy for the newly trained pilots, many of whom go straight from a general aviation a/c to the RHS of a modern jet operating in busy airspace and often into some challenging aerodromes.