AA 757 departed runway at ORD - no injuries

[aa73]

Chris Scott - no cheap shots from me at a foreign manufacturer. But you will continue to get heat from a lot of us AA folks simply due to the fact that the NTSB investigation NEVER was able to determine whether the f/o manipulated the rudder the way he did. And our training program never had us resorting to rudder only during a wake encounter. Unusual attitudes, yes - ailerons supplemented with rudder. But not just a wake encounter. And due to the history of the Airbus' rudder/tail problems, it is very suspect.

[Pugilistic Animus]

chris scott...I have had the pleasure of flying 2 british built planes, one japanese built plane and numerous US built planes. All were very,very strong planes. And the rudder didn' t come off.

Sevenstrokeroll---again, NO AIRPLANE!!!!! is certified for sudden complete control reversal--NONE..none whatsoever

[sevenstrokeroll]

animus

and what if the rudder came apart first causing the wild movement instead of the blame being placed on the dead copilot?

[Pugilistic Animus]

SSR,

It doesn't matter the cause of the oscillations only the effects---even if a magical djini did it---and I don't blame the pilots if it were really SOP at AA then I blame the training--- I've always thought the co-pilot was unfairly blamed as he was following procedure

PA

[KC135777]

AA had an MD80 that was literally rolling over, due to wake vortices, on initial takeoff in DFW. High AOA portion of takeoff. FULL aileron was NOT effective in stopping/countering imminent unusual attitude at low altitude.

ONLY by applying opposite rudder, in this relatively low airspeed, high AOA scenario, was the aircraft saved.

When the airleron's not working for you- the rudder will/can save your ass.

This was the basis for AA's AAMP training.

I too, believe what was recorded on AA587's FDR was NOT caused by the feet of FO Sten Molin.

KC135777

[metrodriver]

Why in the chicago 757 incident did the engines not shut down using the fire handles? In most aircraft pulling the handles will shut of fuel and hydraulics going to the engine, with a cable operated mechanism. How does this work on the 757?

The AA Little Rock accident: I was flying around that monster storm at the time of the accident. It was the worst storm I have ever seen from an aircraft with constant lightning (you could read a paper) shooting everywhere. This one deserved at least 20 miles distance. Nobody had any business being anywhere close to this storm. So untill this day I'm still wondering: what the hell were they thinking?????

[bugg smasher]

Long day, wanna get home, fatigued to the bone, ugly weather everywhere, support not to be seen. Delays measure now in multiples of hours, passengers in full revolt, FA’s swamped, overloaded and needy. If you don’t make this landing, the rest of yer month goes south, won’t make the guarantee, probably have to make it up with another three-day trip somewhere in the off days. So much for your five-year olds’ school play. And God help you if you break the airplane, lotsa trees die for that paperwork.

The MBA touts who now write the rules we all live, die, and make our mortgage payments by, well, something has gone terribly wrong here. You want safety? Talk to the six-figured idiot-savants who control the money and write the plan, funny how they always come out spanking clean, and barring that, at least several millions in recompense to crawl back into the miserable holes they impossibly came from.

Not that I’m bitter or anything, it’s just that I really love my job, flying commercial jets is a very romantic occupation, the women on my crew would be lining up at my hotel room door, if they weren’t so damned dog-tired from flying eighteen hours a day.

I also hear some pilots fly turboprops in Tahiti, and life is tropical and good, in a Pina Colada kinda way. Would anyone happen to have a line on that employment?

[IGh]

AA 587 did have PEDAL POSITION recorded

Some misinformation was posted earlier.


Posted by “AA73”, slot #95, dated 29Oct, re’ AA587 12Nov01:

“... there is no hard evidence that the rudder reversal was caused by the f/o. all the dfdr records is rudder movement, NOT rudder pedal movement....”

Posted by “KC135777” in slot #105, date 29Oct:

“... what was recorded on AA587's FDR was NOT caused by the feet of FO ...”

Hmmmm, No Pedal Position recorded????
That item (Pedal Position) was surprise for everyone: the sensors for Pedal Position had been retrofitted prior to that mishap; from AAR-04/04, pgs 3-6 [the Pedal Position is plotted on page 6]

“...Between 0915:36 and 0915:41,the FDR recorded movement of the control column, control wheel, and rudder pedals. Specifically ... the rudder pedals movedfrom about 0.1 inch left (the starting point for the pedals) to about 0.1 inch right and 0.2 inch left ... According to the FDR, the airplane’s bank angle moved from 23ş to 25ş left wing down at 0915:51.5, the control wheel moved to 64ş right at 0915:51.5, and the rudder pedals moved to 1.7 inches right at 0915:51.9.... According to the FDR, the rudder pedals moved
from 1.7 inches right
to 1.7 inches left,
1.7 inches right, 2.0 inches right,
2.4 inches left, and
1.3 inches right
between 0915:52 and 0915:58.5....”

3.2 Probable Cause
... Safety Board determines ... probable cause of this accident was the in-flight separation of the vertical stabilizer as a result of the loads beyond ultimate design that were created by the first officer’s unnecessary and excessive rudder pedal inputs. Contributing to these rudder pedal inputs were characteristics of the Airbus A300-600 rudder system design and elements of the American Airlines Advanced Aircraft Maneuvering Program.

[Clandestino]

are you saying the american airlines crew that died weren't experienced?

I'm not saying that and I have never said that, but as Collin Powell recently observed: "Experience is helpful but it is decisions that count". The last captain of PH-BUF was very experienced. So were the captains of TC-GEN, YU-ANA, N651AA and HB-IXM. It is a pity that no one will ever be able to benefit from their experience. It seems that crew involved in KORD runway excursion were very experienced but that didn't prevent them from draining their battery inflight.

I'm glad your private pilot course taught you all about this stuff.

But why didn't the FAA approved course teach these American pilots about this?

Sir, you are still evading the answer! For the third time: do you know what divergent oscillation is? I'm not asking you to explain it, a simple "yea" or "nay" would suffice. Perhaps it wasn't emphasised during your trainning but I'm certain it gets mentioned in my 2003. edition of FAA Pilot's aviation knowledge handbook. Also it is part of JAA ATPL syllabus. Why some people fail to heed a good advice is beyond me.

bubbers 44 is right about the rudder problems...thanks for posting it.

What rudder problems? He was writing about fin being repaired before the aeroplane being delivered to AA. It is completely irellevant as NTSB analysis found that fin failed during extreme sideslip, at load that heftily exceeded the ultimate design load. Ergo it took more than its fair share of punishment before parting with the aeroplane. And since you've mentioned the Air Transat incident, had the rudder of N14503 came apart before the fin failed, chances are that we wouldn't have an accident to discuss.

also the F28...that crash is interesting because another F28 in canada crashed due to similiar circumstances and the information was not passed on properly.

What information? That it is unwise to take off with upper wing surface contaminated with ice? If you had read the full NTSB report on LaGuardia accident, you would have known that this fact was known from at least 1930ies and it was made part of a lot of aeronautical regulations. And yet we've had that infamous Iberia thread here.

glad that I don't fly the 'bus

Well, then there's a piece of Airbus trivia for you: A320's speedbrakes retract automatically upon aplication of TOGA power.

AA had an MD80 that was literally rolling over, due to wake vortices, on initial takeoff in DFW. High AOA portion of takeoff. FULL aileron was NOT effective in stopping/countering imminent unusual attitude at low altitude.

What I'd like to know is how did they manage to get themselves into such a violent wake vortex in the first place. Is the report available? Or at least an ILAFFT story?

And our training program never had us resorting to rudder only during a wake encounter. Unusual attitudes, yes - ailerons supplemented with rudder.

It is tragic that someone needed the broken fin to realize that the rudder is not primary roll control surface. But it is beyond tragic that some pilots still don't accept the fact that this procedure has proven itself to be lethaly wrong. Especially so on swept wing twins with wing mounted engines.

the NTSB investigation NEVER was able to determine

So we have come to the point at last! NTSB comes out with probable cause and recomendations on how to avoid similar occurences in the future and here we have PPRuNers that know better than NTSB's experts but don't tell us what their superior analysis came out with. All we get are oblique hints unsupported by the known facts. For my part, I'll be glad if they're actually not rated to fly anything that isn't powered by Microsoft.

[sevenstrokeroll]

clandestino

YES

OK, so how come it wasn't in the PHAK books before the crash?

Collin POWELL is not an expert in aviation. Do you recall his presentation to the UN with the artists conception of portable BIO Weapons Labs? OOPS.

Collin POwell's endorsement of obama...ah yes, Obama was in diapers during the Cuban Missile Crisis. McCain was in a navy attack plane. Experience doesn'T matter....I guess duty honor and country don't matter either.

Why not publish the dissenting opinion of the NTSB board member?

I take it you learned to fly this century and not the last one.


heeding advice after the fact...makes good sense...last time I checked 2003 was after the crash.

as to icing...the point was planes without leading edge devices are more prone to problems than those with leading edge devices. the crash in canada and its resulting information was not passed on to US operators of another funky european plane.

rudder not primary roll control...really...gee Orville taught that to me. have you ever been locked into a wingtip wake vortex? can you name any jet transport that crashed in wake turbulence?


sorry boys and girls for leaving the idea of the 757 ORD. i don't like american airlines, but I won't have the clueless lead us down the wrong localizer.

[Clandestino]

Collin Powell is not an aviation safety expert indeed. Nevermind his character&deeds, my opinion is that his statement:

Experience is helpful but it is decisions that count.

...is very true for life in general and aviation safety in particular. It was only fair of me to credit the author properly.

OK, so how come it wasn't in the PHAK books before the crash?

I'm unable to verify that tere were even PHAK books before 2003. edition. However warnings about dynamic unstabillity and pilot induced oscillations can be found in any aerodynamics handbook worthy of its name, even decades before AA587. As Marlene Dietrich commented about the matter that has no connection with flying, but I find it relevant nevertheless:

Those who wanted to know, knew.

as to icing...the point was planes without leading edge devices are more prone to problems than those with leading edge devices. the crash in canada and its resulting information was not passed on to US operators of another funky european plane.

So is your point that we can be more carreless with wing ice if our aeroplane is slats equipped? Also it seems that I have to spell it out: I don't like oblique hints! If you think that Dryden accident had some sinister connections with Roselawn, way don't you say it out loud?

have you ever been locked into a wingtip wake vortex

I'm fiery supporter of avoidance-is-easier-than-recovery theory. That's why I always warn ATC I need 2mins separation behind 757 when cleared to line up behind one at LHR and LGW. I have never encountered wake below 4000AGL and certanly have never been locked into one.

I take it you learned to fly this century and not the last one.

Irelevant. Newton's and Bernoulli's laws haven't been amended since the first issue or had they area of aplicability changed. Those who learnt to fly 100 years ago and those who made their first solo yesterday had to obey the same laws to stay airborne. Anyway, you've got even the millenium wrong.

[Swedish Steve]

Why in the chicago 757 incident did the engines not shut down using the fire handles? In most aircraft pulling the handles will shut of fuel and hydraulics going to the engine, with a cable operated mechanism. How does this work on the 757?

All RB211 from the first -22B on the Tristar to the latest Trent have electrically operated HP and LP fuel shut off valves and spar valves. The spar valves are powered by the battery for safety, I suppose the case where the crew will knowingly deplete the battery, but still have main DC bus power was not envisaged in the design case.
The B777 even has special spar valve batteries to cater for this case, so perhaps they though of it?

[timbob]

IGh...just curious what amount of rudder displacement occured with those pedal movements..I don't know the airbus, but that amount of pedal displacement at relatively low speed doesn't sound like a tremendous amount..granted the rapid, cyclical inputs are puzzling...have only observed one pedal left-right or right-left rapid input and that is engine failure drills in the simulator after V1 when the wrong rudder is applied just prior to rotation..then its oops...other way and hold the pedal displacement..never to and fro. Timbob.

[Shore Guy]

Hopefully back to thread here....

Has AA come out with any changes to QRH procedures yet? When they do, would someone please post.

[IGh]

APC and Rudder Response

TB, in slot #113, posed a question about the special characteristic of that -600 model

"... what amount of rudder displacement occurred with those pedal movements ...[?] ... that amount of pedal displacement ... doesn't sound like a tremendous amount ..."

These pilot-readers are mostly focused on PILOT-factors, the engineering weaknesses sometimes get less attention on such forums.

Aircraft Pilot Coupling is discussed in that AAR-04/04, on pgs 150-2,

"... Another design characteristic of the A300-600 rudder system that may increase its susceptibility to an APC event is the changing performance as airspeed increases (a characteristic of all variable stop rudder systems). For APC prevention, the NRC report notes that a flight control system should be designed “to perform consistently throughout as much of the flight envelope as possible.” Although the design characteristics of the A300-600 provide a consistent ratio between the rudder pedal and rudder surface deflection at all airspeeds, the response of the airplane to a given rudder pedal input increases as airspeed increases, resulting in significantly different performance characteristics at opposite ends of the design envelope...."

In the flight 587 accident sequence, the small pedal displacements of the A300-600 rudder control system at 240 knots may have facilitated the first officer’s large, rapid inputs to the rudder system. The first officer performed sustained full alternating rudder pedal inputs that led to a hazardous buildup in sideslip angle in a short period of time. A system with large pedal displacements would make achieving these inputs more demanding physically, providing greater feedback regarding the magnitude of the pilot’s efforts on the controls. Thus, the ability to achieve full rudder deflection with the small pedal displacements on the A300-600 at 240 knots was a likely factor in sustaining the flight 587 event.

From AAR pg 24 you can read about magnitudes, here's the point:

"... In designing the A300-600 rudder control system, Airbus made two changes to the rudder control system that was used on the airplane’s predecessors, the A300B2 and A300B4. First, Airbus decreased the forces required to depress the rudder pedals on the A300-600...."

[IweinVanCaelenberg]

Standby bus off

Why anybody would want to turn this discussion into a crazy AA bashing contest is beyond me, but here's a quote from my 757-200 QRH. Sorry I can't render all the Boeing typography. The dotted lines below step 3 an 4 stand for 'end of checklist'

STANDBY BUS OFF

message:STANDBY BUS OFF
condition:one or more of these busses are not energized
.AC standby bus
.DC standby bus

1. STBY POWER selector............BAT

2. choose one:

*standby power bus OFF light stays illuminated and right bus off
light is not illuminated
>> goto step 4

*standby power bus OFF light is not illuminated or right BUS OFF light
stays illuminated
>> goto step 3

3. the battery will provide standby bus power for approximately 90
minutes
---------------------------

4. standby power selector.........AUTO
---------------------------

[Nocti]

Reality Check please........

Airbus vs Boeing..........and all that crap.......


In the light of the A300 accident all manufacturers provided guidance on the use of the rudder, as cyclical use of it could greatly exceed design parameters.

Think about it - it is a huge control surface designed to give way more control moment than any other - aileron or elevator; to cater for an extreme situation, where at minimum control speed, Vmca, with one engine at full thrust and the other at idle, directional control can be maintained.

It was never considered in the design that the structure would have to cope with full deflection in one direction rapidly followed by the opposite. To go rapidly from Full Scale Deflection in one direction to FSD in the other creates a force way beyond the design parameters.

The NTSB and all other agencies associated with the A300 accident came to the same conclusion, that sufficent loads were generated in the manouevres involved that resulted in the fin detaching itself from its mountings. If replicated in just about any other transport category aircraft, the result would be the same.

The repercussions are simple - we (professional pilots) all fly aircraft that have limitations on handling. Rudders have the greatest amount of gearing compared with other surfaces and have the highest risk of being over extended. Full control input followed by full opposite input may exceed the structural integrity of the aircraft.

I think it is quite amazing that such lessons are only being learnt in the 21st century- one hundred years after we first learnt to fly.

[411A]

I think it is quite amazing that such lessons are only being learnt in the 21st century...

Interesting comment, wrong conclusion.
Boeing positively knew about large powered rudder abrupt cyclic movements a long time ago, circa 1950's, with the original B707.

Large airline training departments as well, as nearly all of these airlines had B707 aircraft in their fleets.

Page forward many years, the old hands in the training departments(s) retire, new young turks in charge who, quite frankly wouldn't know a B707 if they saw one (let alone having actually flown one), introduce an abrupt control 'advanced' maneuvering training program...and find, through the inappropriate use of the powered rudder, severe structural failure, and much loss of life.

The majority blame for the loss of the AA A300-600 rests squarely at the doorstep of American Airlines, and nowhere else.
Minority blame can be attributed to the specific aircraft design.

[FlexibleResponse]

Chris Scott - no cheap shots from me at a foreign manufacturer. But you will continue to get heat from a lot of us AA folks simply due to the fact that the NTSB investigation NEVER was able to determine whether the f/o manipulated the rudder the way he did. And our training program never had us resorting to rudder only during a wake encounter. Unusual attitudes, yes - ailerons supplemented with rudder. But not just a wake encounter. And due to the history of the Airbus' rudder/tail problems, it is very suspect.

Absolute Rubbish!

These statements are in direct conflict with the conclusions of the Accident Report (Aircraft Accident Report NTSB/AAR-04/04). In particular, read the evidence given by other AA flight deck crew who witnessed this FO previously performing "aggressive" rudder inputs in similar circumstances. When questioned, the FO defended himself by saying that "the AA Advanced Aircraft Maneuvering Program directed him to use to rudder pedals in that manner" (page 12 if you are interested).

Read the goddam Report before sprouting such rubbish. A lot of perople died in this accident and if you don't understand what happened then their sacrifice (both the lives of the crew and passengers) are wasted and we are doomed to repeat history.

Please sick to the facts. We don't need a bunch of clowns going around sprouting self-opinionated or other political bull**** to try and change history so those extremely valuable lessons that we in the professional aviation community have learned at enormous human cost are simply denigrated.

[Airbubba]

When questioned, the FO defended himself by saying that "the AA Advanced Aircraft Maneuvering Program directed him to use to rudder pedals in that manner"

I had this training program inflicted upon me in the late 1990's during sim training.

Probably a matter of interpretation by the sim instructor but I repeatedly raised the BS flag and questioned whether such agressive rudder deflection was appropriate in an airliner. I was assured that it was.