Ryanair Tail Strike at Dublin Sept 11
Incurable Romantic
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I think the phrase I'm looking for is "Much ado about nothing".
Nobody died,damage to the aircraft apparently minimal,crew appears to have acted professionally and correctly.In short.nothing to write home about.
In fact I'm surprised at myself for keeping the thread going.
Nobody died,damage to the aircraft apparently minimal,crew appears to have acted professionally and correctly.In short.nothing to write home about.
In fact I'm surprised at myself for keeping the thread going.
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Warning - passenger speaking.
Out of interest, at what point does a tailscrape become an event ?
13Alpha
The tailscrape itself was a complete non event, the cartridge wasn't crushed and the paint was barely scraped on the pad.......
13Alpha
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With regard to the MAYDAY call being over the top, as an ATCO at one of london's finest I am constantly amazed at the continual under reporting of problems to ATC. I have lost count of the number of times that we get a diversion back which will be a "normal approach and landing" only to discover subsequently that there has been a hydraulic problem or some other issue which could turn into something much more serious. It is no good to me knowing that you have a hydraulic fluid leak ten minutes after you land and have contaminated the runway which I have continued to use. It is also not much use when your unreported minor problem becomes a major one on short final and by the time the outside emergency services get here (we get extra help for full emergencies and worse) the disaster has already happened.
I have seen a couple of instances where a "no emergency declared" diversion was unable to vacate the runway after landing. Great, thanks guys, let me just apologise on your behalf to the the four on approach behind you going around and the ten at the holding point most of which wouldn't have been there if I was expecting a problem.
I appreciate that there is a reluctance to discuss problems over the RT but we cannot help if we don't know. I would rather get the fire service out as a precaution every time than be caught out by something out of the blue that was deemed not important enough to pass on.
Rant over. Have a nice day.
I have seen a couple of instances where a "no emergency declared" diversion was unable to vacate the runway after landing. Great, thanks guys, let me just apologise on your behalf to the the four on approach behind you going around and the ten at the holding point most of which wouldn't have been there if I was expecting a problem.
I appreciate that there is a reluctance to discuss problems over the RT but we cannot help if we don't know. I would rather get the fire service out as a precaution every time than be caught out by something out of the blue that was deemed not important enough to pass on.
Rant over. Have a nice day.
I am with captplaystation on this one (I think). The 737 QRH does not say depressurize the airplane. It says CAUTION: Do not pressurize airplane due to possible structural damage.
If the airplane already has a significant differential pressure, (at FL100 already around 4 PSI), opening the outflow valve could conceivably make the structural situation worse and if cabin altitude climbs high enough to trigger the masks will certainly ground the airplane till the oxygen generators have been replaced.
I accept that the crew may have been following the checklist in good faith. But their actions (if this is really what happened) do not seem to have been entirely logical.
If the airplane already has a significant differential pressure, (at FL100 already around 4 PSI), opening the outflow valve could conceivably make the structural situation worse and if cabin altitude climbs high enough to trigger the masks will certainly ground the airplane till the oxygen generators have been replaced.
I accept that the crew may have been following the checklist in good faith. But their actions (if this is really what happened) do not seem to have been entirely logical.
Last edited by lederhosen; 18th Sep 2008 at 12:35.
If they were at FL150 as suggested earlier I think the differential would actually be a bit higher. I just happen to know the figures for FL100 as it is a personal check of mine to see that the pressurisation system is OK, equates to 1:20 if you think of the indicator as a clock. (Thanks to Pat Boone.)
I am not suggesting this is insignificant. Actually what I am mulling over is whether dumping the pressure at this point is serving a useful purpose. You already have put considerable strain on the structure,then you make a rapid change the other way. If it has been damaged is a rapid movement the other way such a good idea?
I think that the QRH was probably not designed with this scenario in mind. Rather it suits the more typical wrong flap and or speeds on a short runway, pull hard and bash the tail getting airborne, then return rapidly for tea no biscuits.
I am not suggesting this is insignificant. Actually what I am mulling over is whether dumping the pressure at this point is serving a useful purpose. You already have put considerable strain on the structure,then you make a rapid change the other way. If it has been damaged is a rapid movement the other way such a good idea?
I think that the QRH was probably not designed with this scenario in mind. Rather it suits the more typical wrong flap and or speeds on a short runway, pull hard and bash the tail getting airborne, then return rapidly for tea no biscuits.
Well that was nicely done. 
Training Capt thinks there's a problem so gives the climbing aircraft to a brand new FO as he removes himself from the flying and the comms. Whatever happened to "Fly the aircraft and make it safe"? Bung it into a hold at 6000'? No - do it Helios-style.
Training Capt can't talk to CC due to scratchcard sale priority.
Training Capt does talk to CC and establishes it is a scrape so levels the aircraft and de-pressurises it. At FL120.
CC panic and start running and shouting.
Pax follow suit and panic. CC tell pax to use oxygen masks that are not yet down. When some come down it is revealed that the CC don't know how to release the others.
Meanwhile the Training Capt is now doing the depressurisation checks and donning oxygen. The CSS is kicking against the cockpit door because the FD cannot hear the dings.
Training Capt declares a mayday. A/C return where emergency services are waiting with a pot of blue paint.
Now, most NN events can be done better when the events get scrutinised by the hindsight department, but is it just me or was this a complete shambles?
Training Capt thinks there's a problem so gives the climbing aircraft to a brand new FO as he removes himself from the flying and the comms. Whatever happened to "Fly the aircraft and make it safe"? Bung it into a hold at 6000'? No - do it Helios-style.
Training Capt can't talk to CC due to scratchcard sale priority.
Training Capt does talk to CC and establishes it is a scrape so levels the aircraft and de-pressurises it. At FL120.
CC panic and start running and shouting.
Pax follow suit and panic. CC tell pax to use oxygen masks that are not yet down. When some come down it is revealed that the CC don't know how to release the others.
Meanwhile the Training Capt is now doing the depressurisation checks and donning oxygen. The CSS is kicking against the cockpit door because the FD cannot hear the dings.
Training Capt declares a mayday. A/C return where emergency services are waiting with a pot of blue paint.
Now, most NN events can be done better when the events get scrutinised by the hindsight department, but is it just me or was this a complete shambles?
Indeed. I was thinking a Command Assesment Sim. Not that a trainer would ever give something as simple as a minor tail strike (maybe at FR, I don't know) but if you responded with a performance like that you would be glued to the RHS for ever.
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The QRH procedure for this problem is clearly expected to be done below 10000 ft.
The commander showed poor systems knowledge when he called for the tail strike QRH procedure to be done at 12000 ft. At least when I came to the outflow valve bit.
The first officer did not close the outflow valve (Loss of pressure procedure), so that indicates to me that he was aware these two procedures was actually working against each other.
The commander handed over control... Good call. Flying, analyzing, communicating, decision making, all together is not easy.
Confusion in the cabin. Multiple calls to don oxygen masks when no masks have been deployed.
Cabin crew hammering on the cockpit door. Good! Helios in mind, this is the way it should be. However, ordering the flight crew to release the masks?
I suspect the commander got into overload after the initial problems followed by cabin altitude warning, masks on, banging on the door, reports of smoke, request for masks, etc. It is very easy to end up in this situation. That applies for all of us.
The very thing that would have made his life easy on the day, and what I have been told numerous times in all the companies I've worked for:
If you suspect a tail strike or pressurization problems-Press alt hold.
The commander showed poor systems knowledge when he called for the tail strike QRH procedure to be done at 12000 ft. At least when I came to the outflow valve bit.
The first officer did not close the outflow valve (Loss of pressure procedure), so that indicates to me that he was aware these two procedures was actually working against each other.
The commander handed over control... Good call. Flying, analyzing, communicating, decision making, all together is not easy.
Confusion in the cabin. Multiple calls to don oxygen masks when no masks have been deployed.
Cabin crew hammering on the cockpit door. Good! Helios in mind, this is the way it should be. However, ordering the flight crew to release the masks?
I suspect the commander got into overload after the initial problems followed by cabin altitude warning, masks on, banging on the door, reports of smoke, request for masks, etc. It is very easy to end up in this situation. That applies for all of us.
The very thing that would have made his life easy on the day, and what I have been told numerous times in all the companies I've worked for:
If you suspect a tail strike or pressurization problems-Press alt hold.
The commander handed over control... Good call. Flying, analyzing, communicating, decision making, all together is not easy.
I suspect the commander got into overload after the initial problems... That applies for all of us.
This TC left the a/c with the FO as it busily rocketed skywards.
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Hobby Flyer
Care to add any further review of your previous comment now the facts are evident?
lgw warrior
And you too? Still think it was a good idea to depressurise above 10,000ft?
NIGELINOZ
Yeah?
captainplaystation summed it up quite well before the report was published
Hindsight is wonderful, LEARNING from it is clever. Perhaps those who I have quoted above may like to learn something from this report.
PP
the flightcrew acted impeccably, and completely by the book
lgw warrior
the guys get the info,talk about it (CRM,PIOSSE etc) then decide to action the QRH checklist,which involves depressurising/limiting the cabin, possibly manually operating the out flow valve etc, a good dicision to manually drop masks if above 140.as far as i can tell, they made a plan, executed it and returned to base.well done lads.....again, well done fellas,good work.
NIGELINOZ
Nobody died,damage to the aircraft apparently minimal,crew appears to have acted professionally and correctly.In short.nothing to write home about.
captainplaystation summed it up quite well before the report was published
One thing to read/complete a QRH, quite another to think through/ challenge what you are doing and why.
PP
From the report page 5.
"...the Commander attempted to contact the CSS. As the CSS was engaged in her after take-off announcements, it took some time for the Commander to confirm with the aft CSA’s that a tailstrike had occurred."
I think it should have been asked what the content of these announcements was. If they were trying to push the scratchcards etc at a key stage of flight when the commander may need to contact the cabin crew, then a prohibition on that should appear in the recommendations.
"...the Commander attempted to contact the CSS. As the CSS was engaged in her after take-off announcements, it took some time for the Commander to confirm with the aft CSA’s that a tailstrike had occurred."
I think it should have been asked what the content of these announcements was. If they were trying to push the scratchcards etc at a key stage of flight when the commander may need to contact the cabin crew, then a prohibition on that should appear in the recommendations.
Or a triple ding, or a combo of the PA override and the triple ding.
No - why not sit and wait, while the FO (on his first line flight after passing his line check the day before) watches the aircraft climb skywards...
No - why not sit and wait, while the FO (on his first line flight after passing his line check the day before) watches the aircraft climb skywards...
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So, a western crew with Danish and Irish licences get into an awful mess with a non normal checklist for the 737. Who is to blame for their apparent lack of capacity, SA and general knowledge? Why does such a simple problem blow up so quickly and dramatically. Someone said, smoke, banging on flightdeck door, communication problems and a virtual trainee in the RHS (although a very good one, I know) may have been contributory.
Stand back and forget the name on the tail guys, is this not yet another 737 pressurisation problem? Is this not another poorly written checklist trying to cover a poorly designed system? Or, are many pilots out there poorly prepared for non normal management of modern pressurised airliners. Should Boeing have written in the NNC - When the a/c is below 10,000 ft put the Press Mode sel to MAN ......etc
Let's face it, the dumbing down of training and checking standards by all the agencies involved is a contributory factor here. The box ticking checking for dummies guide is responsible here. Let's start training and checking like the old days again where one had to demonstrate a hell of a lot more airmanship and capacity than the current pathetic LPC/OPC stroll in the park. It could even be done nicely so people aren't offended I don't mind giving a little. Let's also see more stringent requirements for airlines to promote to the training ranks, it's far far too little in many outfits and it certainly isn't the best people that apply for those positions is it?
Let's make sure we don't take this report at face value, dig a little below the surface and it is quite obvious what is going on in this industry.
I should have just put Chesly's speach to the US Senate in here, he says it much more elegantly than anyone.
Stand back and forget the name on the tail guys, is this not yet another 737 pressurisation problem? Is this not another poorly written checklist trying to cover a poorly designed system? Or, are many pilots out there poorly prepared for non normal management of modern pressurised airliners. Should Boeing have written in the NNC - When the a/c is below 10,000 ft put the Press Mode sel to MAN ......etc
Let's face it, the dumbing down of training and checking standards by all the agencies involved is a contributory factor here. The box ticking checking for dummies guide is responsible here. Let's start training and checking like the old days again where one had to demonstrate a hell of a lot more airmanship and capacity than the current pathetic LPC/OPC stroll in the park. It could even be done nicely so people aren't offended I don't mind giving a little. Let's also see more stringent requirements for airlines to promote to the training ranks, it's far far too little in many outfits and it certainly isn't the best people that apply for those positions is it?
Let's make sure we don't take this report at face value, dig a little below the surface and it is quite obvious what is going on in this industry.
I should have just put Chesly's speach to the US Senate in here, he says it much more elegantly than anyone.