Spanair accident at Madrid
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Originally Posted by The Manual
Thrust Recoveries for Engine Failure During Takeoff
In takeoff mode, two separate systems attempt to provide maximum available
thrust when the performance of one engine significantly differs from the
other. These systems are automatic reserve thrust (ART) and automatic
thrust restoration (ATR).
Automatic Reserve Thrust (ART) System
The ART system combines features of the digital flight guidance computer
(DFGC) and the JT8D-200 fuel control to provide maximum rated thrust in
the event of an engine failure during a normal thrust takeoff. Upon actuation
of the ART system, thrust is increased without throttle movement by the
opening of a solenoid-operated fuel valve in the engine fuel controls of both
engines.
The ART system is READY when the airplane is on the ground, the ART
switch is in AUTO, either slat is extended, both engines are operating at or
near idle, and the ART system self-test is complete. The ART system is
subsequently armed when the N1 on both engines reaches 64% RPM.
The ART system is actuated when the DFGC detects any one of the
following: 30.2% differential in N1 RPM, invalid N1, DFGC failure,
electrical power loss, or manual DFGC switching. Upon actuation, the ART
system increases the EPR of the operating engine(s) from normal takeoff
EPR to maximum takeoff EPR (an increase of approximately .05 EPR) by
opening the solenoid-operated fuel valve in the engine fuel control. Once
ART is actuated, the maximum takeoff EPR limit is displayed on the thrust
rating indicator, and the EPR gauge. Once actuated, the ART system is
latched (ART fuel valve remains open) until the ART switch is moved to OFF.
The ART has an automatic self-test feature. If the ART system fails the selftest,
the ART INOP annunciation illuminates. Dispatch is allowed with a failed
self-test; however, the ART switch must be moved to OFF to disable the ART
system.
The ART switch, with AUTO and OFF positions, is on the upper instrument
panel. Two annunciator lights are on the center instrument panel. The
READY light indicates ART has successfully passed the self-test. The ART light
indicates the system has successfully activated.
In takeoff mode, two separate systems attempt to provide maximum available
thrust when the performance of one engine significantly differs from the
other. These systems are automatic reserve thrust (ART) and automatic
thrust restoration (ATR).
Automatic Reserve Thrust (ART) System
The ART system combines features of the digital flight guidance computer
(DFGC) and the JT8D-200 fuel control to provide maximum rated thrust in
the event of an engine failure during a normal thrust takeoff. Upon actuation
of the ART system, thrust is increased without throttle movement by the
opening of a solenoid-operated fuel valve in the engine fuel controls of both
engines.
The ART system is READY when the airplane is on the ground, the ART
switch is in AUTO, either slat is extended, both engines are operating at or
near idle, and the ART system self-test is complete. The ART system is
subsequently armed when the N1 on both engines reaches 64% RPM.
The ART system is actuated when the DFGC detects any one of the
following: 30.2% differential in N1 RPM, invalid N1, DFGC failure,
electrical power loss, or manual DFGC switching. Upon actuation, the ART
system increases the EPR of the operating engine(s) from normal takeoff
EPR to maximum takeoff EPR (an increase of approximately .05 EPR) by
opening the solenoid-operated fuel valve in the engine fuel control. Once
ART is actuated, the maximum takeoff EPR limit is displayed on the thrust
rating indicator, and the EPR gauge. Once actuated, the ART system is
latched (ART fuel valve remains open) until the ART switch is moved to OFF.
The ART has an automatic self-test feature. If the ART system fails the selftest,
the ART INOP annunciation illuminates. Dispatch is allowed with a failed
self-test; however, the ART switch must be moved to OFF to disable the ART
system.
The ART switch, with AUTO and OFF positions, is on the upper instrument
panel. Two annunciator lights are on the center instrument panel. The
READY light indicates ART has successfully passed the self-test. The ART light
indicates the system has successfully activated.
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I don't think there is much doubt about the latter - just looking at the terrain it's obvious they wouldn't have got there as quickly as on the flat, and firefighters are now being quoted saying as much: "There were too few firefighters at the beginning".
In terms of the initial impact it depends on what exactly happened, which isn't at all clear yet. If the aircraft rotated and then came down again on its wheels and then veered off the runway, then on flat ground it might well have slid on its belly for a better result. On the other hand, if it became airborne and then (for whatever reason) put a wing into the ground (as some reports have suggested) then it could have cartwheeled in and broken up even on flat ground.
Sioux City had some horrible initial decelerative forces but if my memory serves correctly, people primarily self-evacuated from the large pieces after they slid to a halt. I am not sure that level access for the fire services was a significant survival factor on that one, just lots of level space to decelerate uniformly in one plane...maybe it was a bit of both, but the passengers fared proportionately so much better than in this one, I think?
Originally Posted by transcript of speech by the captain
in the back of
our mind that where we were, if we had to ditch, we could probably find
some fairly flat land, and we might have a chance of survival. So that
relieved a lot of pressure on us, in whether or not we were going to
make the airport.
our mind that where we were, if we had to ditch, we could probably find
some fairly flat land, and we might have a chance of survival. So that
relieved a lot of pressure on us, in whether or not we were going to
make the airport.
There are some other differences which may considerably affect survival rate though:
- flight 232 had plenty of warning of the crash
- they were not at takeoff with full fuel load - in fact they dumped fuel (as you would expect)
- airport had advance warning and emergency vehicles were out and ready
- hospitals and surrounding emergency services had advance warning
- passengers on the plane had warning - brace position in theory allows much better survival of deceleration (although how it gets done in practice I don't know, I've never met an economy class seat it was physically possible in (excepting exit-row), and I don't think I am exceptionally tall)
Even if there are recommendations on survivability they may be largely academic - the industry tends to focus a lot more on not crashing in the first place rather than crashing and surviving. I am pretty sure that after Sioux city and Kegworth there were recommendations on infant seating and restraint - but two decades on they are still on parents laps. Then there's smoke hoods... or rather there aren't.
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Spanair = Organised Chaos
THERE COULD BE MORE TO THIS CRASH.
The Times Online, Is now reporting that the Spanair Pilots sent numerous e-mails to the then Chief Executive - Lars?? informing him the way the Airline was run.
The Pilot's members of SEPLA, were so concerened at how the Daily operations were run they voiced their concerns.
It also said, The crews were transported around like 'Popstars' to run Spanair's busy route network.
They were concerened about the Airline's maintainence, And overall passenger safety calling it 'Organised Chaos'
SAS has being trying to sell off Spanair for the last year, And had planned to cut the 4,000 workforce by a 1/3.
There are now fears that SAS itself could lose alot of it's passengers, Due to it being the same company.
Spanair execs have not decided to ground the rest of the MD80'S believing that they are safe??
The MD80's should have been replaced by 2007 as promised.
Have Spanair being the contributory cause??
Sadly I can see a new theory of this crash now.
I hope not.
Full article @ Timesonline.co.uk
The Times Online, Is now reporting that the Spanair Pilots sent numerous e-mails to the then Chief Executive - Lars?? informing him the way the Airline was run.
The Pilot's members of SEPLA, were so concerened at how the Daily operations were run they voiced their concerns.
It also said, The crews were transported around like 'Popstars' to run Spanair's busy route network.
They were concerened about the Airline's maintainence, And overall passenger safety calling it 'Organised Chaos'
SAS has being trying to sell off Spanair for the last year, And had planned to cut the 4,000 workforce by a 1/3.
There are now fears that SAS itself could lose alot of it's passengers, Due to it being the same company.
Spanair execs have not decided to ground the rest of the MD80'S believing that they are safe??
The MD80's should have been replaced by 2007 as promised.
Have Spanair being the contributory cause??
Sadly I can see a new theory of this crash now.
I hope not.
Full article @ Timesonline.co.uk
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Why stop flying the type? There is no evidence for this (yet).
From some of the info now available, it is looking that the #2 reverser deployed.
This idea fits with the following details:
* Low airspeed (Vr, maybe V2 if he's lucky)
* Apparently no fire/explosion evident in CCTV footage
* Aircraft crashed to the right almost immediately after takeoff
* Detached reverser found in fully deployed position on ground
Couple the low airspeed with yaw to the right induced by full forward thrust on the port engine, full reverse thrust on the starboard engine, and insufficient control authority coupled with decreasing airspeed and subsequent stall, and it's not looking good at all.
Given the above, they had little time to do anything.
ECAM Actions.
From some of the info now available, it is looking that the #2 reverser deployed.
This idea fits with the following details:
* Low airspeed (Vr, maybe V2 if he's lucky)
* Apparently no fire/explosion evident in CCTV footage
* Aircraft crashed to the right almost immediately after takeoff
* Detached reverser found in fully deployed position on ground
Couple the low airspeed with yaw to the right induced by full forward thrust on the port engine, full reverse thrust on the starboard engine, and insufficient control authority coupled with decreasing airspeed and subsequent stall, and it's not looking good at all.
Given the above, they had little time to do anything.
ECAM Actions.
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Where Now?
The survivors are obviously not in the best mental condition so it is not clear how much their testimony can be relied upon at this stage. However, the way the matter is described, the vibration and yaw at and just after TO does seem to indicate a stall? Would it be reasonable to speculate on the most likely causes thereof. But then of course we are back to square one. Almost.
Regarding the terrain between parallel runways, I can only add that if this had happened under similar circumstances should there have been similar terrain between parallel runways at LAX, the Americal lawyers would already be salivating at the prospects. But then that would, of course, be true irrespective.
Regarding the terrain between parallel runways, I can only add that if this had happened under similar circumstances should there have been similar terrain between parallel runways at LAX, the Americal lawyers would already be salivating at the prospects. But then that would, of course, be true irrespective.
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Quote
Couple the low airspeed with yaw to the right induced by full forward thrust on the port engine, full reverse thrust on the starboard engine, and insufficient control authority coupled with decreasing airspeed and subsequent stall, and it's not looking good at all.
Reply
Could the ground maintainance engineers have touched a wire (by accident) that connects to the Reversers when 'Quickly' cutting off the fault??
Sounds odd that the Reverser was open on the Starboard Engine.
Just a 'Theory' that's all.
No Beef.
Couple the low airspeed with yaw to the right induced by full forward thrust on the port engine, full reverse thrust on the starboard engine, and insufficient control authority coupled with decreasing airspeed and subsequent stall, and it's not looking good at all.
Reply
Could the ground maintainance engineers have touched a wire (by accident) that connects to the Reversers when 'Quickly' cutting off the fault??
Sounds odd that the Reverser was open on the Starboard Engine.
Just a 'Theory' that's all.
No Beef.
BYALPHAINDIA;
The complexities of discerning organizational influences, especially in terms of examining the traces back to original causes, is difficult, requiring special training, experience and support for the "broader" view. This isn't to say they're not there or to say that by their obscurity they are merely distant antecedents with less validity. Cultural aspects play huge roles within organizations but that role is invisible to all because it is "the way" things are done -the underlying assumptions are similarly invisible. We don't see "normal" - we only see "difference" when it emerges. It's akin to hindsight in terms of understanding what happened.
Most directly involved want "the" cause and are impatient if not in disagreement with complexity because they want some one or some thing to blame, typically not themselves.
Whether what you say is relevant or not depends first on those involved having the sense of such factors so they may see them for what they are and how they influence "normal" decision-making and how abberant decisions are "made normal", (as did Diane Vaughan in her book, "The Challenger Launch Decision" well worth purchasing/reading as is, "Organization at the Limit" about Columbia).
In other words, if one is examining a decision-making process (returning to gates, continuing with MEL items etc etc etc etc...), one must also remain cognizant of the organizational environment in which such decision-making takes place.
Pilots especially, are keenly aware of "the unwritten" and "the unsaid" in corporate cultures and may either be encouraged to exchange information with the organization's leadership or, as is almost universally the case, the leadership of the organization can dismiss them as "expensive resources" in hopes that they continue to fly the company's airplanes on schedule with minimal fuss and disruption.
I believe this touches on some of the matters you raise in your post.
Almost certainly not. That's not the way airplanes or mechanics work.
We know absolutely nothing that is meaningful or important about the reversers, the engines, the takeoff, the flight path, the crew's demeanour etc etc. Even videos are not "knowledge".
Knowledge of the fleet type is part of a good discussion as is discussions about SOPs and what is actually known about the flight.
But it's a free discussion. (Steve, don't waste your breath and blood pressure on trolls...).
PJ2
The complexities of discerning organizational influences, especially in terms of examining the traces back to original causes, is difficult, requiring special training, experience and support for the "broader" view. This isn't to say they're not there or to say that by their obscurity they are merely distant antecedents with less validity. Cultural aspects play huge roles within organizations but that role is invisible to all because it is "the way" things are done -the underlying assumptions are similarly invisible. We don't see "normal" - we only see "difference" when it emerges. It's akin to hindsight in terms of understanding what happened.
Most directly involved want "the" cause and are impatient if not in disagreement with complexity because they want some one or some thing to blame, typically not themselves.
Whether what you say is relevant or not depends first on those involved having the sense of such factors so they may see them for what they are and how they influence "normal" decision-making and how abberant decisions are "made normal", (as did Diane Vaughan in her book, "The Challenger Launch Decision" well worth purchasing/reading as is, "Organization at the Limit" about Columbia).
In other words, if one is examining a decision-making process (returning to gates, continuing with MEL items etc etc etc etc...), one must also remain cognizant of the organizational environment in which such decision-making takes place.
Pilots especially, are keenly aware of "the unwritten" and "the unsaid" in corporate cultures and may either be encouraged to exchange information with the organization's leadership or, as is almost universally the case, the leadership of the organization can dismiss them as "expensive resources" in hopes that they continue to fly the company's airplanes on schedule with minimal fuss and disruption.
I believe this touches on some of the matters you raise in your post.
Could the ground maintainance engineers have touched a wire (by accident) that connects to the Reversers when 'Quickly' cutting off the fault??
We know absolutely nothing that is meaningful or important about the reversers, the engines, the takeoff, the flight path, the crew's demeanour etc etc. Even videos are not "knowledge".
Knowledge of the fleet type is part of a good discussion as is discussions about SOPs and what is actually known about the flight.
But it's a free discussion. (Steve, don't waste your breath and blood pressure on trolls...).
PJ2
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I believe two survivors described being bounced side to side, I was wondering if this could be a response to a "rudder dance" (from the perspective of rows 14-19), as described earlier in this thread?
EDIT: It seems a little soon to speculate on the TR(s) being open contributing to this accident. They could have been purposefully opened after touchdown.
EDIT: It seems a little soon to speculate on the TR(s) being open contributing to this accident. They could have been purposefully opened after touchdown.
Last edited by md80fanatic; 23rd Aug 2008 at 02:27.
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Fake Sealion
Having followed this thread from early on in this tragic incident I have been aware of the numerous uses of the word reported
Reported engine fire
Reported explosion
Reported smoke from engine
and so on.....
Is it now time to install a high quality CCTV system which records each and every departure at major airports. Such unambiguous evidence would surely permit in some cases, the AAIB teams to reach important conclusions very quickly and set in motion remedial action to enhance safety.
Having followed this thread from early on in this tragic incident I have been aware of the numerous uses of the word reported
Reported engine fire
Reported explosion
Reported smoke from engine
and so on.....
Is it now time to install a high quality CCTV system which records each and every departure at major airports. Such unambiguous evidence would surely permit in some cases, the AAIB teams to reach important conclusions very quickly and set in motion remedial action to enhance safety.
Ditto for landings too btw.
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The Pilots' union letter to Spanair stating their concerns was basically your usual generic mostly-political-agenda in faith of a pending 1,100 jobs cut and pay reduction for another 700 employees plan propossed by the company recently. The pilots complained that "bad management" and bad "ground operation caos" was starting to affect fly security by means of "more stressed enviroments" among "delays, cancelled flights, insufficient man power".
I think it's fair to assume it's not "directly" related to the unfortunate accident. I have taken 6 Spanair flights between the Canary Islands and Madrid in the past two weeks prior to this accident and indeed one was cancelled and several delayed.
Spanair has promised more technical information about the accident to the families Saturday at 6pm.
Nothing else I have seen reported on the press except that whatever little wind there was (raging between about 7 and 9 knots) was actually tail-wind. Spanair approves of MD-82 fit to take off at up to 10kt of tail wind.
The flight had been overbooked. An additional couple of passengers was holding a ticket and reportedly checked-in luggage, but reached the gate 3 minutes late and were denied boarding. The flight operated at full PAX, so I don't know where they were planning on sitting them even if they had reached the door on time, not to mention that the airplane returned to gate after the "overheat warning red light" (likely a warning for a outside-air-temperature probe system malfunction) came on and finally took off over 1h late.
Again in low-ish air density, high-ish temperature conditions, presumably max. weight with good visibility on a "brand-new" long-ish airstrip where they reached V1 (perhaps a bit later than "normal"), VR, nose up, front gear left the ground, likely the back gears too w/o visual or reported anomalities other than perhaps a "bit weird nose angle" (no info on flaps/slats) and then perhaps moved erratically while airbone (survivors not clearly stating if felt "side-to-side" movement ocurred airbone or on the ground) to then for unknown reasons "attempted to land" (or falling down) again, bouncing-around, reportedly hitting briefly the ground with a wing (which doesn't seem to have left any large debri on the strip or produce extensive visual damage to the airplane structure at that point, but was reported by source cited as viewing the security footage), presumably sustaining some damage due to somewhat violent touch-down over max. landing weight (witneses saying things like "started to break in pieces", but no pieces seem to have been reported that close to the strip) and lost direction veiring off the runaway and later crashing against obstacles at presumably high speed a few hundred meters later with perhaps at least one thrust reverser properly deployed, leaving a river of fire along its path.
Skid marks were left on the landing strip that seem to show all three wheels were touching ground "properly" and braking on a "normal looking" straight line for a short while and then turning somewhat steeply to the side (significant strip length was still available in the front), exiting the runaway to the terrain in-between strips where it crashed very violently (hardly any pieces larger than a car where left at all of the whole plane and debri and victims expanded a significantly large area, thus the high victims count).
There is no clear account reported exactly like that, but it's what can be infered by the vague comments reported by press from witnesses or "oficials".
All that has been said repetidly and clearly is that "no fire was visible until it had 'hit the ground' 'several times' (bouncing around).
Some survivors seem to have been "ejected" from the plane landing in a small creek. One of them approached the wreckage and helped rescue two children. Most survivors seem to have suffered at least one (usually more) fractures (mostly limbs, limbs+ribs or limbs+skull). Many were "low mass" people (3 CHD, several women). There were possibly a few more inmediate survivors, but the fire spread quickly (vegetation didn't help, one survivor with internal burns from inhalation, one survivor helping rescue a woman's child at her petition only to return and find her and her other child 'unrescuable', one survivor and one of the first ground rescue personnel accounting for some people shouting "I'm soffocating" or "help"). Rescue efforts were very prompt and effective, but very challenged by the fire, very large spread-out scenario and not so easy terrain access.
One initial survivor died soon after in the hospital, leaving the total count to 19 current survivors. Only 4 of those remain in severe condition. Doctors are hopefull for all, but one passenger remains critical. Several are basically fully recovered (except for the fractures, which obviously take weeks/months to properly heal). About 50 of the victims have been identified, with the remaining aprox. 100 still in need for DNA identification, as physical matching was not possible. All victims accounted for, although it took an extra day to find the remains of the two initially unaccounted victims, a baby and another small children, at the devastation scene.
So sorry for all the victims and their families :'-(
Like it's normal in us imperfect creatures, we all would like to know what happened and how to try to avoid it and find some strange confort in trying to figure out the truth. I guess it's our way of dealing with the pain and frustration, specially knowing that with a damaged flight recorder the (hopefully) definitive answer on the cause may be many months, if not years, away. At this point, this accident doesn't seem to have a clear-cut probable cause and it seems further speculation on the many possible scenarios could be pointless without more information, so I guess we'll have to sit and wait.
Descriptions like this could help understand the damage that can results of high speed impact, aborted take-offs, unnecessary uneven terrain/vegetation around landing strips, fires, etc, and perhaps will help to avoid it happening again.
I think it's fair to assume it's not "directly" related to the unfortunate accident. I have taken 6 Spanair flights between the Canary Islands and Madrid in the past two weeks prior to this accident and indeed one was cancelled and several delayed.
Spanair has promised more technical information about the accident to the families Saturday at 6pm.
Nothing else I have seen reported on the press except that whatever little wind there was (raging between about 7 and 9 knots) was actually tail-wind. Spanair approves of MD-82 fit to take off at up to 10kt of tail wind.
The flight had been overbooked. An additional couple of passengers was holding a ticket and reportedly checked-in luggage, but reached the gate 3 minutes late and were denied boarding. The flight operated at full PAX, so I don't know where they were planning on sitting them even if they had reached the door on time, not to mention that the airplane returned to gate after the "overheat warning red light" (likely a warning for a outside-air-temperature probe system malfunction) came on and finally took off over 1h late.
Again in low-ish air density, high-ish temperature conditions, presumably max. weight with good visibility on a "brand-new" long-ish airstrip where they reached V1 (perhaps a bit later than "normal"), VR, nose up, front gear left the ground, likely the back gears too w/o visual or reported anomalities other than perhaps a "bit weird nose angle" (no info on flaps/slats) and then perhaps moved erratically while airbone (survivors not clearly stating if felt "side-to-side" movement ocurred airbone or on the ground) to then for unknown reasons "attempted to land" (or falling down) again, bouncing-around, reportedly hitting briefly the ground with a wing (which doesn't seem to have left any large debri on the strip or produce extensive visual damage to the airplane structure at that point, but was reported by source cited as viewing the security footage), presumably sustaining some damage due to somewhat violent touch-down over max. landing weight (witneses saying things like "started to break in pieces", but no pieces seem to have been reported that close to the strip) and lost direction veiring off the runaway and later crashing against obstacles at presumably high speed a few hundred meters later with perhaps at least one thrust reverser properly deployed, leaving a river of fire along its path.
Skid marks were left on the landing strip that seem to show all three wheels were touching ground "properly" and braking on a "normal looking" straight line for a short while and then turning somewhat steeply to the side (significant strip length was still available in the front), exiting the runaway to the terrain in-between strips where it crashed very violently (hardly any pieces larger than a car where left at all of the whole plane and debri and victims expanded a significantly large area, thus the high victims count).
There is no clear account reported exactly like that, but it's what can be infered by the vague comments reported by press from witnesses or "oficials".
All that has been said repetidly and clearly is that "no fire was visible until it had 'hit the ground' 'several times' (bouncing around).
Some survivors seem to have been "ejected" from the plane landing in a small creek. One of them approached the wreckage and helped rescue two children. Most survivors seem to have suffered at least one (usually more) fractures (mostly limbs, limbs+ribs or limbs+skull). Many were "low mass" people (3 CHD, several women). There were possibly a few more inmediate survivors, but the fire spread quickly (vegetation didn't help, one survivor with internal burns from inhalation, one survivor helping rescue a woman's child at her petition only to return and find her and her other child 'unrescuable', one survivor and one of the first ground rescue personnel accounting for some people shouting "I'm soffocating" or "help"). Rescue efforts were very prompt and effective, but very challenged by the fire, very large spread-out scenario and not so easy terrain access.
One initial survivor died soon after in the hospital, leaving the total count to 19 current survivors. Only 4 of those remain in severe condition. Doctors are hopefull for all, but one passenger remains critical. Several are basically fully recovered (except for the fractures, which obviously take weeks/months to properly heal). About 50 of the victims have been identified, with the remaining aprox. 100 still in need for DNA identification, as physical matching was not possible. All victims accounted for, although it took an extra day to find the remains of the two initially unaccounted victims, a baby and another small children, at the devastation scene.
So sorry for all the victims and their families :'-(
Like it's normal in us imperfect creatures, we all would like to know what happened and how to try to avoid it and find some strange confort in trying to figure out the truth. I guess it's our way of dealing with the pain and frustration, specially knowing that with a damaged flight recorder the (hopefully) definitive answer on the cause may be many months, if not years, away. At this point, this accident doesn't seem to have a clear-cut probable cause and it seems further speculation on the many possible scenarios could be pointless without more information, so I guess we'll have to sit and wait.
Descriptions like this could help understand the damage that can results of high speed impact, aborted take-offs, unnecessary uneven terrain/vegetation around landing strips, fires, etc, and perhaps will help to avoid it happening again.
Last edited by justme69; 23rd Aug 2008 at 05:26.
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You bet your @rse it makes a difference if the plae is overloaded. Although, in all seriousness we all kow that the meager standard weights used these days I personally think that any flight which is at MTOW on paper is a few hundred k's over. That's my opinion based on what I see entering the cabin sometimes, and the exceptional ability (especially the caribbean region) of passengers to have a 20 inch tall handbag weigh close to 30 pounds. The poor carriage wheels got stuck under the weight loooong ago to the point that they are half circle shaped as they've been scraped down to axle 
But those extra kilo's are mostly carried over in the margin of error calculations, but to add 2000 Kilo's of known overweight into the plane will most definitely affect single engine performance.
I wanted to elaborate on the MD-80 thrust settings, but I see that it appears clear to most.
But those extra kilo's are mostly carried over in the margin of error calculations, but to add 2000 Kilo's of known overweight into the plane will most definitely affect single engine performance.
I wanted to elaborate on the MD-80 thrust settings, but I see that it appears clear to most.
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How much margin is there?
xkoote: in your opinion, assuming the MD-82 briefly was successfully airborne for a few seconds and lets assume the worst possible scenario of a bit of overweight, 10kt of tail wind and slightly low air density, a bit understimated V2, a bit oversteep take-off angle and a bit reduced thrust (i.e. slightly bad quality fuel).
How unlikely is that the plane could have stalled even with nothing else "wrong" (i.e. no major loss of engine power)? Does major engine malfunction is basically a necessity for take-off failure or the above conditions coupled with say a 2º error on Flaps deploiment be enough to potentially stall the plane?
If the anwer is what I think, then too many highly speculative scenarios open up on why the pilot could have decided to try to land rather than continue to fly.
Also, goverment officials said they saw the airport security tape and the accident was recorded but that they couldn't see anything significant (for them, speaking as politicians and not aviation experts) on the causes of the accident. In other words, they implied they couldn't see any obvious physical reason for the accident (no major explosions or large fires or obvious engine malfunctions or large errors on operation prior to the abrupt landing, of course, from whatever small image could be seen from the potentially far away camera). They didn't mention the reported wing touchng the floor when it "abruptly landed". They even said something to the bold extend of: "The accident was recorded but there is nothing on the tape as to why the accident happened"
How unlikely is that the plane could have stalled even with nothing else "wrong" (i.e. no major loss of engine power)? Does major engine malfunction is basically a necessity for take-off failure or the above conditions coupled with say a 2º error on Flaps deploiment be enough to potentially stall the plane?
If the anwer is what I think, then too many highly speculative scenarios open up on why the pilot could have decided to try to land rather than continue to fly.
Also, goverment officials said they saw the airport security tape and the accident was recorded but that they couldn't see anything significant (for them, speaking as politicians and not aviation experts) on the causes of the accident. In other words, they implied they couldn't see any obvious physical reason for the accident (no major explosions or large fires or obvious engine malfunctions or large errors on operation prior to the abrupt landing, of course, from whatever small image could be seen from the potentially far away camera). They didn't mention the reported wing touchng the floor when it "abruptly landed". They even said something to the bold extend of: "The accident was recorded but there is nothing on the tape as to why the accident happened"
Last edited by justme69; 23rd Aug 2008 at 06:24.
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Whch Engine
Incidentally, I have read the complete thread and amny reports but cannot find a reference as to which engine was reponsible for the earlier return to gate? I have a feeling this about to become a more important issue. Can anyone confirm based on reliable sources?
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What is known about the first return to gate was that a failure indicator lighted on the cabin. The captain informed the PAX that he wasn't sure what it was and was returning to gate to have it checked. He later said (and Spanair and technician in charge of the repairs, through the spokeperson for the airplane repair technicians' union confirms) that the indicator was for overheating of the device that warms the air intake tube orifice (that leads to the outside air temperature probe) to avoid the formation of ice on cold weather. Since the flight from MAD to LPA was not thought to be in any danger of bad weather or ice formation, it was turned off by taking the fuse out, in accordance to approved operations giving a 10 days margin for finding the fault and repair it properly.
The captain reportedly informed the PAX, which remained on board during the aprox. 1h delay, that it was a "broken heat sensor that was repaired" and were now ready to take off (late).
Captain and technician signed the flight fit-to-fly. The technician was totally confident his action couldn't be in any way part of the cause of the accident and expressed his sadness for the loss of the crew which he knew well personally and spent the last minutes of their lives with.
Most sources close to the investigation seriously doubt it was related to the accident, but of course it's being investigated. Worst case scenario would perhaps imply that outside air temperature automatic measurement could be off or not working properly, but even that is unlikely.
The captain reportedly informed the PAX, which remained on board during the aprox. 1h delay, that it was a "broken heat sensor that was repaired" and were now ready to take off (late).
Captain and technician signed the flight fit-to-fly. The technician was totally confident his action couldn't be in any way part of the cause of the accident and expressed his sadness for the loss of the crew which he knew well personally and spent the last minutes of their lives with.
Most sources close to the investigation seriously doubt it was related to the accident, but of course it's being investigated. Worst case scenario would perhaps imply that outside air temperature automatic measurement could be off or not working properly, but even that is unlikely.
Last edited by justme69; 23rd Aug 2008 at 06:44.
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IMHO, such anecdotal "Evidence" is, at best irrelevant and contributes nothing to the thread.
Overweight = BAD in the event of engine out, particularly.
I have heard of overwheights in the range of 2000kgs.
Could this be a contributing factor after an engine failure?
Could this be a contributing factor after an engine failure?
2,000 kg over when you're looking at 67,954 kgs MTOW = 2.9% overweight.
A valid point is raised regarding standard weights and certain pax, and indeed luggage etc.. At least the luggage is weighed at check-in.
A "standard" male is now considered to weigh 80 kgs. I personally weigh 89 kgs. That's an 11% increase right there.
ECAM Actions.
Last edited by ECAM_Actions; 23rd Aug 2008 at 07:02.
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Luggage may be weighed at check in, but only for the purpose of detecting and hence charging for, overweight bags.
The accumulated weight of the bags at check in is not the figure used for weight and balance.
A standard figure per bag (25lbs under FAA regs) is what is used. On the not unreasonable understanding that some will be under and some over the set weight.
Pax are averaged at 180lbs in summer and five more in winter, once again under FAA regs. Which to be honest seems pretty low given some of the people one sees on the street.
Now add the hand luggage and bear in mind that at least one airline has no limit to weight as long as you can lift it, and it doesn't appear dangerous.
The above figures are as stood the last time I had to know, they may have changed.
The accumulated weight of the bags at check in is not the figure used for weight and balance.
A standard figure per bag (25lbs under FAA regs) is what is used. On the not unreasonable understanding that some will be under and some over the set weight.
Pax are averaged at 180lbs in summer and five more in winter, once again under FAA regs. Which to be honest seems pretty low given some of the people one sees on the street.
Now add the hand luggage and bear in mind that at least one airline has no limit to weight as long as you can lift it, and it doesn't appear dangerous.
The above figures are as stood the last time I had to know, they may have changed.
"Luggage may be weighed at check in, but only for the purpose of detecting and hence charging for, overweight bags.
The accumulated weight of the bags at check in is not the figure used for weight and balance."
The relevance to this accident notwithstanding, why not? The data's available.
The accumulated weight of the bags at check in is not the figure used for weight and balance."
The relevance to this accident notwithstanding, why not? The data's available.
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With the reasonably large number of children on the flight, does this alter appreciably this hypothetical overweight scenario, or is it more on the baggage side of things?