Spanair accident at Madrid
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There appear to be mixed messages coming from Spanair and the head of civil aviation in Spain regarding the air temperature gauge.
This is from Associated Press and appears in several newspapers.
Police and investigators probing the deadly plane crash in Madrid have questioned the mechanic who cleared the plane for takeoff after tending to a minor mechanical problem, the airline said Saturday. Spanair said the mechanic dealt with a problem in an air temperature gauge that forced the pilot to abandon a first attempt to take off. About an hour later, when the MD-82 finally did take off, it crashed near the end of the runway, burning and largely disintegrating. A total of 153 of the 172 people aboard were killed.
The newspaper El Pais quoted unnamed sources close to the investigation as saying that during two sessions of testimony Friday - first with police and then with crash investigators - the mechanic insisted that the gauge malfunction was a minor glitch which had nothing to do with Wednesday's crash.
A Spanair official told The Associated Press on Saturday it had no details of the man's testimony, but reiterated that the mechanical problem did not cause the crash. The official spoke on condition of anonymity, citing company rules.
Aviation experts have told The AP this problem probably did not cause the crash.
All 19 survivors of the crash remained hospitalized Saturday, two of them in critical condition. The worst off was a 31-year-old woman with burns to 72 percent of her body. Her husband died in the crash but her six-year-old son survived.
Only 50 bodies have been identified so far. Many were burned beyond recognition and forensic teams have been using DNA techniques for identification.
Spanair said the mechanic dealt with the gauge problem by essentially turning the device off, and said this was an accepted procedure because the gauge was not an absolutely essential piece of equipment.
But the head of Spanish civil aviation, Manuel Bautista, told the AP in an interview Friday that the gauge should be closely examined to see if it did contribute to the accident.
Bautista said a combination of failures likely caused the disaster.
''A problem with a temperature sensor may not matter at all, or it can be very important, depending on what other circumstances accompany it,'' Bautista said. ''We will have to see what other issues were present.''
This can be no comfort to the greiving relatives who are seeking early answers.
This is from Associated Press and appears in several newspapers.
Police and investigators probing the deadly plane crash in Madrid have questioned the mechanic who cleared the plane for takeoff after tending to a minor mechanical problem, the airline said Saturday. Spanair said the mechanic dealt with a problem in an air temperature gauge that forced the pilot to abandon a first attempt to take off. About an hour later, when the MD-82 finally did take off, it crashed near the end of the runway, burning and largely disintegrating. A total of 153 of the 172 people aboard were killed.
The newspaper El Pais quoted unnamed sources close to the investigation as saying that during two sessions of testimony Friday - first with police and then with crash investigators - the mechanic insisted that the gauge malfunction was a minor glitch which had nothing to do with Wednesday's crash.
A Spanair official told The Associated Press on Saturday it had no details of the man's testimony, but reiterated that the mechanical problem did not cause the crash. The official spoke on condition of anonymity, citing company rules.
Aviation experts have told The AP this problem probably did not cause the crash.
All 19 survivors of the crash remained hospitalized Saturday, two of them in critical condition. The worst off was a 31-year-old woman with burns to 72 percent of her body. Her husband died in the crash but her six-year-old son survived.
Only 50 bodies have been identified so far. Many were burned beyond recognition and forensic teams have been using DNA techniques for identification.
Spanair said the mechanic dealt with the gauge problem by essentially turning the device off, and said this was an accepted procedure because the gauge was not an absolutely essential piece of equipment.
But the head of Spanish civil aviation, Manuel Bautista, told the AP in an interview Friday that the gauge should be closely examined to see if it did contribute to the accident.
Bautista said a combination of failures likely caused the disaster.
''A problem with a temperature sensor may not matter at all, or it can be very important, depending on what other circumstances accompany it,'' Bautista said. ''We will have to see what other issues were present.''
This can be no comfort to the greiving relatives who are seeking early answers.
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To SKRIDLOV
Yes the data is available but its' accuracy will depend on lots of factors. The accuracy of these scales can vary by terrific margins (handy hint if they try to charge you excess-use other scales). They may sometimes be calibrated but I have no personal knowledge of this being done.
These scales are subject to enormous wear and tear, dust, being moved about etc. all those fairy light staff jumping on them to see how much weight they have lost.
In other words they are not particularly accurate, and I for one would not like to see them used in a final weight and balance sheet.
The cost of what would have to be done to ensure their accuracy would not be welcome in a business cutting unecessary costs to the bone.
It is mooted that for smaller aircraft, less than 20 pax, the weighing of both the pax and the bags may be useful.
Then of course we get into discrimination etc..and lawyers involved.
As usual things ain't never as easy as they seem to be.
Yes the data is available but its' accuracy will depend on lots of factors. The accuracy of these scales can vary by terrific margins (handy hint if they try to charge you excess-use other scales). They may sometimes be calibrated but I have no personal knowledge of this being done.
These scales are subject to enormous wear and tear, dust, being moved about etc. all those fairy light staff jumping on them to see how much weight they have lost.
In other words they are not particularly accurate, and I for one would not like to see them used in a final weight and balance sheet.
The cost of what would have to be done to ensure their accuracy would not be welcome in a business cutting unecessary costs to the bone.
It is mooted that for smaller aircraft, less than 20 pax, the weighing of both the pax and the bags may be useful.
Then of course we get into discrimination etc..and lawyers involved.
As usual things ain't never as easy as they seem to be.
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Originally Posted by Kyunghee
This can be no comfort to the greiving relatives who are seeking early answers.
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Could somebody please clear up this business about the OAT probe once and for all?
What I have gathered from reading the posts regarding this probe here is:
1. There is OAT probe located at or inside the air intake of the engine which measures the temperature of the air "ingested" by the engine, right?
2. Then there's some heating device which is turned on to heat the OAT probe if the airplane enters icing or low temp conditions to protect the OAT probe from getting clogged by ice and snow and thus producing false readings, right?
So what the mechanic deenergized was the heater, not the OAT probe itself, right?
The OAT was still operational except that if the airplane had entered icing conditions it would have got clogged because it had no heating, right?
What I have gathered from reading the posts regarding this probe here is:
1. There is OAT probe located at or inside the air intake of the engine which measures the temperature of the air "ingested" by the engine, right?
2. Then there's some heating device which is turned on to heat the OAT probe if the airplane enters icing or low temp conditions to protect the OAT probe from getting clogged by ice and snow and thus producing false readings, right?
So what the mechanic deenergized was the heater, not the OAT probe itself, right?
The OAT was still operational except that if the airplane had entered icing conditions it would have got clogged because it had no heating, right?
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Standard weights
I have (probably) survived numerous incidents (accidents) using this simple figure...
100 kg per passenger.
That includes the passenger (his/her fat belly if any), his/her checked baggage, carry-on, and duty free.
xxx
If given "347 pax" from the agent, on MY paper, I write 34,700 kg total payload.
If I am given 330 adults, 15 children, 2 infants, it becomes -
Adults 33,000 kg, children 750 kg, infants "0"... = 33,750 kg total.
I do not care what the official standard weights are. This is what I use for my takeoff computations and speeds.
So far, no chief pilots have fired me because I disregarded standard figures.
xxx
I am still alive after many years of flying - Retiring in 3 months (and happy)...
And in my 747, in does not matter where they sit. The CG is always OK.
No need to say, I have a B.Sc in Math/Physics... and I use that "superior" knowledge.
Takes me 1 minute to get my payload. F/Os or F/Es take 5 minutes, and arrive to... 33,336 kg.
And a lot of wear with their erasers ("rubbers" in UK, and territories).
xxx
Happy contrails
P.S. For Scanair departure from LEMD - I would assume their actual payload was 16,500 kg (165 adults?) -
100 kg per passenger.
That includes the passenger (his/her fat belly if any), his/her checked baggage, carry-on, and duty free.
xxx
If given "347 pax" from the agent, on MY paper, I write 34,700 kg total payload.
If I am given 330 adults, 15 children, 2 infants, it becomes -
Adults 33,000 kg, children 750 kg, infants "0"... = 33,750 kg total.
I do not care what the official standard weights are. This is what I use for my takeoff computations and speeds.
So far, no chief pilots have fired me because I disregarded standard figures.
xxx
I am still alive after many years of flying - Retiring in 3 months (and happy)...
And in my 747, in does not matter where they sit. The CG is always OK.
No need to say, I have a B.Sc in Math/Physics... and I use that "superior" knowledge.
Takes me 1 minute to get my payload. F/Os or F/Es take 5 minutes, and arrive to... 33,336 kg.
And a lot of wear with their erasers ("rubbers" in UK, and territories).
xxx
Happy contrails
P.S. For Scanair departure from LEMD - I would assume their actual payload was 16,500 kg (165 adults?) -
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<quote>
"Luggage may be weighed at check in, but only for the purpose of detecting and hence charging for, overweight bags.
The accumulated weight of the bags at check in is not the figure used for weight and balance."
The relevance to this accident notwithstanding, why not? The data's available.
</quote>
Not necessarily; not every DCS has integral W&B functionality, or is able to export the data to an external tool.
"Luggage may be weighed at check in, but only for the purpose of detecting and hence charging for, overweight bags.
The accumulated weight of the bags at check in is not the figure used for weight and balance."
The relevance to this accident notwithstanding, why not? The data's available.
</quote>
Not necessarily; not every DCS has integral W&B functionality, or is able to export the data to an external tool.
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All this banter about sensors etc reminds me of the Birginair B757
that sadly crashed a few years ago.Although in this case the sensor indicated to have been idled does not seem to be as important to flight.
Lets hope that the relatives can grieve for their lost ones without
conspiracy/speculation & allegations being allowed to fester.
mm
that sadly crashed a few years ago.Although in this case the sensor indicated to have been idled does not seem to be as important to flight.
Lets hope that the relatives can grieve for their lost ones without
conspiracy/speculation & allegations being allowed to fester.
mm
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The Spanair had 162 on board. 20 of those children and 2 babys. 10 were crew members. 19 are currently survivors (3 CHD). It's hopefull that all will survive, but 4 remain serious, out of which 1 severe and 1 critical. An additional 2 passengers were left behind when they showed up 3 minutes late at the gate after they checked-in their luggage on the reportedly (almost?) overbooked flight (I believe 2 crew members were off-duty or not required, but not sure).
Flights to the Canary Islands have the same standard 20kg check-in allowance per person (spreaded in as many bag pieces as desired) and are routinely charged overweight if it goes above about 23kg, but Spanair is quite forgiving generally on a bit of overweight. Spanish travellers usually go on the light side on carry-ons (compared to say North and South America travellers), but it's your usual "if you can lift it and it fits, it goes in" with most airliners in Spain, which don't even enforce the number of carry on items. At least one couple among PAX was returning from their week long honey-moon. I do believe that Spanair has some weighted checked-in luggage reporting software on their system to assist on load calculations (speculative).
Spaniards are not the heaviest on the world (about 25% of population is overweight), but it's safe to assume most standard males will be over 77kg and most females over 57kg. Very recent extensive study among women in Spain showed only 5% being moderately under normal weight, 24.9% overweight.
But MAD-LPA is a VERY cargo-and-courier intensive route. I think we can safely assume the plane was operating a full payload, perhaps even exceeding it a bit (speculative).
Flights to the Canary Islands have the same standard 20kg check-in allowance per person (spreaded in as many bag pieces as desired) and are routinely charged overweight if it goes above about 23kg, but Spanair is quite forgiving generally on a bit of overweight. Spanish travellers usually go on the light side on carry-ons (compared to say North and South America travellers), but it's your usual "if you can lift it and it fits, it goes in" with most airliners in Spain, which don't even enforce the number of carry on items. At least one couple among PAX was returning from their week long honey-moon. I do believe that Spanair has some weighted checked-in luggage reporting software on their system to assist on load calculations (speculative).
Spaniards are not the heaviest on the world (about 25% of population is overweight), but it's safe to assume most standard males will be over 77kg and most females over 57kg. Very recent extensive study among women in Spain showed only 5% being moderately under normal weight, 24.9% overweight.
But MAD-LPA is a VERY cargo-and-courier intensive route. I think we can safely assume the plane was operating a full payload, perhaps even exceeding it a bit (speculative).
Last edited by justme69; 23rd Aug 2008 at 12:12.
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I would assume their actual payload was 16,500 kg (165 adults?)
Assuming all the pax each had a bag weighing 25 kg, that's 165 x 25 = 4125 kg of luggage.
35704+4125+16500 = 56,329 kg.
Boeing state the MRW is 150,500 lbs (68,409 kg), with an MTOW of 149,500 lbs (67,954 kg).
67954-56329 = 11,625 kg worth of fuel they could take based on these figures.
I heard somewhere they had 10 tons of fuel on-board. That works out at full wing tanks, with about a ton in the center tank.
So the initial problem was with the RAT probe?
It's probably nothing, but where is the rudder control tab? The elevators still have theirs attached.
ECAM Actions.
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Donīt expect the flight to be full of holidaymakers with heavy amounts of luggage. Itīs not a charter flight, but a scheduled used mainly by locals and businessmen to get to the country capital. So we have to expect a lot of hand luggage "only".
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As posted by ECAM Actions:
If #2 reverser deployment will be confirmed as a major factor in this accident, it reminds me of TAM flight 402 which crashed on Oct. 31, 1996 due to an uncommanded #2 thrust reverser deployment. This was a Fokker 100 (PT-MRK), an aircraft with similar geometry as the MD-82. Both types have similar (but system wise not identical) clamshell type reversers.
The Fo100 also became airborne briefly (no more than 150 feet), reached an attitude of pronounced tilting and veered to the right. Since this was Sao Paulo's Congonhas Airport, the aircraft descended and crashed into a residential area just outside the airport perimeter and below airport altitude.
In case of the TAM accident, the cause was traced to a dormant failure in the thrust reverser electrical control circuit. If the thrust reverser's secondary lock No. 1 relay failed in the energized position after normal deployment, this failure remained dormant without any indication to the flight crew. This was later corrected by a redesign of the electrical control circuit.
Green-dot
From some of the info now available, it is looking that the #2 reverser deployed.
This idea fits with the following details:
* Low airspeed (Vr, maybe V2 if he's lucky)
* Apparently no fire/explosion evident in CCTV footage
* Aircraft crashed to the right almost immediately after takeoff
* Detached reverser found in fully deployed position on ground
This idea fits with the following details:
* Low airspeed (Vr, maybe V2 if he's lucky)
* Apparently no fire/explosion evident in CCTV footage
* Aircraft crashed to the right almost immediately after takeoff
* Detached reverser found in fully deployed position on ground
The Fo100 also became airborne briefly (no more than 150 feet), reached an attitude of pronounced tilting and veered to the right. Since this was Sao Paulo's Congonhas Airport, the aircraft descended and crashed into a residential area just outside the airport perimeter and below airport altitude.
In case of the TAM accident, the cause was traced to a dormant failure in the thrust reverser electrical control circuit. If the thrust reverser's secondary lock No. 1 relay failed in the energized position after normal deployment, this failure remained dormant without any indication to the flight crew. This was later corrected by a redesign of the electrical control circuit.
Green-dot
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So the initial problem was with the RAT probe?
It wasn't clear from reports what had been disconnected (tripped-off ... technician spokeperson speaks of fuse taken out) but in all likehood it was the ice-protection heating device and not the RAT probe itself.
Whatever it was, seems clear it was some minor glitch and that both the pilot and the technician clearly understood the limitations of their actions and felt confident on the flyability of the plane without issues.
Wheather in Madrid was fairly hot at the time (around 30šC), which with the sea level at Barajas would've called for air density on the low side of things.
It seems the families of the victims are already asking for immediate answers. The Canarias7 website has even conducted an internet poll of 2400 people to ask them what caused the accident. 43 % blame Spanair, 35 % say itīs a technical fault, 6 % blame the pilot and 5 % blame the Spanish aviation authorities 
Link here:
Crashed plane's safety licence 'due to expire' - Telegraph
Link here:
Crashed plane's safety licence 'due to expire' - Telegraph
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Reply to Uncle Maxwell #662
Far as I know the authority ultimately responsible for the investigation are CIAIAC at CIAIAC - Ministerio de Fomento
I stand to be corrected on this though.
The accident has been listed on their website but no details have been provided as yet.
m@c
Far as I know the authority ultimately responsible for the investigation are CIAIAC at CIAIAC - Ministerio de Fomento
I stand to be corrected on this though.
The accident has been listed on their website but no details have been provided as yet.
m@c
Last edited by macroman; 23rd Aug 2008 at 12:57.
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Given that the accident occurred somewhere around 14:45 local time during takeoff with an outside air temp of about 29C/84F, I see no way how a disabled heater for the Ram Air Temp Probe could have contributed to this accident.
Last edited by Flight Safety; 23rd Aug 2008 at 13:08.
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The annual flyability certification obviously expires every year and this plane was a few weeks away from expiration. A simple on-fly inspection during a routine fly is sufficient to renew it for another year. It's, again, likely not related to the accident and standard procedure.
"Real" technical inspections and permits were all fine with the 15 year old (about 5 on Korean Airlines and 10 on Spanair) plane. Airplane maintenance in Spain is usually very high, with Iberia i.e. servicing many other airlines throught europe.
This flight is not your typical "hollday destination overweighted luggage" PAX, with the majority being locals returning home, but again it's safe to assume at least almost full payload, but not necessarily over or way-over (if anything, possibly slightly over).
Spanair also being wholly owned by Scandinavian Airlines SAS, technically headquater in Sweden.
"Real" technical inspections and permits were all fine with the 15 year old (about 5 on Korean Airlines and 10 on Spanair) plane. Airplane maintenance in Spain is usually very high, with Iberia i.e. servicing many other airlines throught europe.
This flight is not your typical "hollday destination overweighted luggage" PAX, with the majority being locals returning home, but again it's safe to assume at least almost full payload, but not necessarily over or way-over (if anything, possibly slightly over).
Spanair also being wholly owned by Scandinavian Airlines SAS, technically headquater in Sweden.
Last edited by justme69; 23rd Aug 2008 at 14:10.
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Macroman,
you're correct about the aviation authority investigation. However, the "highest responsible" authority is actually the Spanish judiciary, in the person of a "fiscal" (inquiring judge). Judge and safety body will likely collaborate in any way possible , but if the justice wants to keep/exclude certain evidence or interrogate certain witnesses or indict people, he can do that before and independently.
EDIT: Said fiscal has mentioned that investigation results should be available within one month.
you're correct about the aviation authority investigation. However, the "highest responsible" authority is actually the Spanish judiciary, in the person of a "fiscal" (inquiring judge). Judge and safety body will likely collaborate in any way possible , but if the justice wants to keep/exclude certain evidence or interrogate certain witnesses or indict people, he can do that before and independently.
EDIT: Said fiscal has mentioned that investigation results should be available within one month.
Last edited by el #; 23rd Aug 2008 at 13:14.
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RAT probe heating.
First, a question (xkoote?):
From what I understand, the RAT probe heating was disabled, and, since it was MEL "go" item under the given conditions, flight could be dispatched.
Would that mean that the RAT probe would be inoperative or unreliable, or that only the heating would be inoperative, but deemed unnecessary, since no icing conditions were expected?
Second, an interesting bit from the Flight Manual, confirming that it almost certainly played no role in the accident:
the checklist for the ice protection panel for the first flight of the day contains:
Pitot, Static, and Probe Heat
All positions of the METER SEL & HEAT selector control, except RAT PROBE, should be individually checked for a meter reading to indicate a normal circuit. All heaters, except RAT probe are turned on as soon as the METER SEL & HEAT selector control is moved out of the OFF position. The RAT probe is not heated on the ground. The PITOT/STALL HEATER OFF annunciator light should be on when the control selector is returned to the OFF position.
(my emphasis).
They never got that far, so I wonder if possibly:
- the SOPs have changed since the release of my version of the FM, or
- SpanAir uses different SOPs, or
- there is an indication of RAT probe heater malfunction other than the circuit testing pre-flight, which, according to what I have, is not done for the RAT probe
Bernd
From what I understand, the RAT probe heating was disabled, and, since it was MEL "go" item under the given conditions, flight could be dispatched.
Would that mean that the RAT probe would be inoperative or unreliable, or that only the heating would be inoperative, but deemed unnecessary, since no icing conditions were expected?
Second, an interesting bit from the Flight Manual, confirming that it almost certainly played no role in the accident:
the checklist for the ice protection panel for the first flight of the day contains:
Originally Posted by MD80 Flight Manual
Pitot, Static, and Probe Heat
All positions of the METER SEL & HEAT selector control, except RAT PROBE, should be individually checked for a meter reading to indicate a normal circuit. All heaters, except RAT probe are turned on as soon as the METER SEL & HEAT selector control is moved out of the OFF position. The RAT probe is not heated on the ground. The PITOT/STALL HEATER OFF annunciator light should be on when the control selector is returned to the OFF position.
Originally Posted by Flight Manual, Sec. 4, CLIMB
It is recommended that when the AFTER TAKEOFF CHECKLIST has been completed and work load permits, the PM make a check of the overhead panel confirming:
[...]
Proper RAT probe heater operation.
[...]
Proper RAT probe heater operation.
- the SOPs have changed since the release of my version of the FM, or
- SpanAir uses different SOPs, or
- there is an indication of RAT probe heater malfunction other than the circuit testing pre-flight, which, according to what I have, is not done for the RAT probe
Bernd