747 Crash At Brussels

[HEisLEGEND]

hats off for this elegant discussion.

[SNS3Guppy]

Fair enough. Just because a guy has to clear a TS and fly into a hot zone to pick up hazzard pay, you're not going to cut him any slack. I supposed you wouldn't be impressed with my dessert shield and storm medal either.

Not particularly relevant to the airplane at Brussels, nor to the conversation, of course, and therefore, you're right. No slack.

Do they still even hand those out anymore?

No.

If I had to guess guppy, I'd say you're a former management pilot. If you still did it, you wouldn't have time to hang out on a rumour board here and police people's war stories (no offense.)

If you had to guess, which you don't, you'd be wrong. I'm a line pilot, flying the Classic.

Do you have much experience in the third world on runways where you must not use the taxiways because they aren't stressed for the weight? Doing 180's on less than 150 foot wide runways in the dark can be done if you use the differential technique.

I do, but that's also irrelevant here, as we don't use runways on which we can't meet the book requirements for the turn. We base our planning on legal numbers, not "tribal knowledge," and we don't break airplanes to make a buck. I've flown my share of assignments, trips, and missions under urgent or demanding conditions, and to this day firmly believe and preach that there is no flight which must be made. When one compromises safety of flight because someone is dangling a dollar or a euro or a riyal out front, then one is acting unprofessionally and foolishly. Presently my employer will not fly into a location in which we can't turn on the book value or have a tug available to assist. We're not going to tear up any airplane just to turn around on a runway.

Of course this also wrecks a set of tires too, but during a war or a profitable charter who cares.

I do.

Every operator is different however, perhaps they don't allow the captain any real command authority were you work. Or perhaps your airframes were too decrepit to do this. Or perhaps you just weren't aware it could be done.

Perhaps we simply hire professionals who aren't stupid enough to break airplanes just to make a book, who have the command authority and the backbone to say no, and respect our airframes enough not to abuse them. We actually look beyond the current trip and plan on having that airframe available and in good shape down the line for future trips. I'm aware it can be done; I'm aware of a lot of foolish thins that can be done. That does not imply by necessity or otherwise that one need be foolish enough to do it.

So long as you impressed the ladies in your thirties, apparently that's all that counts.

[pacplyer]

Lol Guppy!

That's why I suspected maybe you were a management pilot, your tremendous sense of humor!

So in your vast thirty year jet career you never accepted a substandard alternate right next to destination that was somewhat lacking in facilities or weather independence? Wow. Airports in the islands must have all been widened and staffed with heavy tuggs just waiting just for you in case you had to divert! Are you a Saudi prince?

Why do I get the feeling that instead, you are a flight engineer on this classic? You must be an important one though since you tell your company you're not going all the time!

We used to have a saying when ops handed us an iffy game plan and I'd get on the phone to discuss it: "We're going anyway!"

Cheers mates!

pac

[SNS3Guppy]

Pacplayer,

I don't have to tell the company I'm not going, because we don't go to places that require breaking the airplane to get the job done. You see, the company doesn't want the airplane broken, either.

I hold a flight engineer certificate, but no, I'm not a flight engineer, and I don't try to be. I don't want to have to work that hard.

You like assumptions, don't you?

[pacplyer]

Well Gupp,

I didn't realize I had just walked into a heated discussion of V1 with you and the corp pilots. I just now read about half of that over at the tech page. Forgive me, but it seems kind of a bitter exchange really on your part. Can't we tolerate an opposing opinion from a lessor experienced aviator without taking everything so personally? That's how it comes off on paper to me at least. (Are we this stale on trips?) Try throwing a smiley or two in there or else I fear you're going to wind up being "one of those guys" that no one likes to fly with.

Amazingly enough, (since you essentially gave your resume to those guys over there) your background and mine are very similar. On paper, however, it comes across kinda like a pilot who can't go past the book, can't learn from the experiences of others, and not really much of leadership material. Are you even a captain? If we hang out here to teach (and it appears to me now that you have probably been in aviation all your life) why not try a softer approach? Like a mentor instead of a Know-it-all. Maybe we shouldn't be so dogmatic all the time. For years the FAA and fellow pilots blamed pilots who crashed because of wind shear. Now we know that the "old hands" were right; that there are micro-burst situations which no airplane or procedure can escape from. So the book and the government were actually wrong all those years to condone approaches in heavy rain and convective weather. Wouldn't you say?

Your assumptions that any group of aviators that operated the 747 aircraft differently than you do are "fools" is naive in my humble opinion. SOP's at one of the four airlines I flew for specified the tight turning taxi procedure (It was in the FOM) it was approved by the FAA and Boeing. So implying that you're smarter than Boeing and that we were all fools to tear up the airplane, in my mind, peggs you as rather inexperienced yourself, or at least, not very perceptive. Clearly, we were cognizant of preserving the airframe as I stated. It was an unusual procedure that was necessary for example to back taxi to a crossing runway so others could land on the only long runway. Being gentle with the equipment all these years is why you even have an classic to fly at all. You should know by now, that the knowledge in the book you cherish was written by the generation before you; like the 707 Gentleman earlier in this thread. He was contemplating engine out decisions before you or I were born.

I found this interesting over there (tech V1 thread) by another poster:

"ssg . . . if ever you transition from the Citation to the B74, your perception of aborting after V1 will quickly evaporate; even when departing at JKF's longest pavement, 13R [4442m/14572'] If you recall when many moons ago a TWA TriStar crew had aborted on 13R after V1 with disasterous consequences."

[edited for correctness:] Despite being blamed for the accident he was subsequently awarded the ALPA medal of heroism for superior airmanship, ALPA's highest award. He was the PIC and made the best decision he could under the circumstances. Sixteen feet off the ground IIRC the stick shaker went off and the F/O called out "gettin a stall" and then "you got it." Never mind that there was no stall, he listened to his f/o and re-landed.

My hat is still off to him.

It occurs to me that this argument is not really just about V1 at all. It is about PIC authority necessary to preserve safety. It is about understanding airmanship.

At least that's what I think.

[barit1]

The TWA NTSB report (unrevised) is at http://www.scribd.com/doc/2463395/Ab...w-York-July-30

or http://www.airdisaster.com/reports/ntsb/AAR93-04.pdf

and the unrevised summary at http://www.ntsb.gov/ntsb/brief.asp?e...11X15125&key=1

I note this is recorded as a nonfatal accident.

Do you know where the revised probable cause might be found?

[pacplyer]

Correction

Thanks Barit1,

You're right, no fatalities on this one. One in critical condition for a while it says on some sources. And he was 16 feet in the air not 25. Remembered it wrong. I'm having trouble finding the NTSB reversal also. Maybe there isn't one. Maybe this was the one where ALPA disagreed with the NTSB and made the award to the crew in protest. I'll have to research further.

Looks like I'm making Guppy's case for him!

[added:] I was originally confusing this ntsb investigation with the EAL 727 windshear pilot error crash which resulted in a rare ntsb ruling reversal many years later.

Thanks again Barit1 for keeping me straight.

[barit1]

pacplyer - don't give up. I have caught NTSB on other occasions of archiving incomplete or preliminary reports that missed key issues.

[slowto280]

Condolences Connie

ENGLISHTOWN, N.J. - Scott Kalitta died Saturday when his Funny Car burst into flames and crashed at the end of the track during the final round of qualifying for the Lucas Oil NHRA SuperNationals at Old Bridge Township Raceway Park. The NHRA said the 46-year-old Kalitta — the 1994 and 1995 Top Fuel season champion who had 18 career victories, 17 in Top Fuel and one in Funny Car — was taken to the Old Bridge division of Raritan Bay Medical Center, where he died a short time later.
Kalitta's Toyota Solara was traveling at about 300 mph when it burst into flames.
The Palmetto, Fla., resident started his career at Old Bridge Township Raceway Park in 1982. His father, Connie Kalitta, was a longtime driver and team owner known as "The Bounty Hunter," and his cousin, Doug Kalitta, also drives competitively.
"We are deeply saddened and want to pass along our sincere condolences to the entire Kalitta family," the NHRA said in a statement. "Scott shared the same passion for drag racing as his legendary father, Connie. He also shared the same desire to win, becoming a two-time series world champion. He left the sport for a period of time, to devote more time to his family, only to be driven to return to the drag strip to regain his championship form. ... He will be truly missed by the entire NHRA community."

[pacplyer]

For the rest of the story about TWA 843, the article that defends the captain's actions was published in Air Line Pilot magazine September 1993. Link is here:

http://ntlsearch.bts.gov/tris/record/tris/00835785.html

Unfortunately, I threw my old magazine collections away at the hostile demands of my wife! My recollection was that the article "TWA Flight 843: a Hobson's choice", focused on the fact that the Captain was correct to make the choice he did in light of the prior 100% fatal American Airlines DC-10 accident in Chicago O'hare.

Can somebody look it up and correct me?

Thanks.

pac

[stilton]

Once in a while stick shakers go off, it does not mean you are stalling, merely close to it, or a false warning (as in this case) even a gust can set it off.

Had it go off a couple of times in the 727 over the years, usually on a heavyweight take off at high altitude, Mexico City for example.

Max power and lower the nose a smidgem, and fly out of it.

To put it down again is unthinkable, no matter how much runway is left.

'Hobsons choice !' This incident was in an L1011, one of the best engineered
jet transports ever made, no reason whatsoever to think disaster is at hand.

It certainly did not help that the FO 'gave up' at a critical moment, but the aircraft was flying and they should have kept it so.

[411A]

In actual fact, the referenced TWA L1011 accident was totally unnecessary.
As stilton mentioned, stick shakers activate once in awhile when in actual fact there is nothing wrong (otherwise) with the airplane.
Lets face facts here.
You have airspeed (on the L1011, big round dials, really hard to miss), you have the necessary thrust, airplane is climbing away quite nicely...and yet, a few unfortunate guys just simply cannot get around the fact, and panic.
Yes, panic.
Just unlatch the relevant switchlight (on the L1011) and press on.
This has been, and certainly is now a simulator exercise...no different in the airplane.
In other words...RTFB.
It's all there, in black and white.

Yeah, it's that simple.
It doesn't take an astronaut to figure it out.

[johnnyramjet]

sad year for the Kalitta family

http://video.msn.com/?mkt=en-us&vid=...videoByTag:tag

[slowto280]

It's more than just airplanes..........

Get it???????????

[pacplyer]

Correction to my above post: It was a World Airways DC10 not CAL (under CAL mtc) that overran the runway at LAX doing everything right on the reject. It was the Captains last flight before retirement!

Good points everybody. All things considered, I'm inclined to still agree with the conventional wisdom of not reversing your decision after V1 in 99 percent of cases. Guppy actually does (on the tech thread), and others do make good arguments about the severe consequences to the validity of runway data not being linear and therefore not being valid for any kind of interpolation past V1. I agree with him. But V1 reject decisions are actually rocket science. There's a lot you don't know about what's going on downstairs. Fuse pins are getting older. Machines are still crashing. Airport Runway Data Analysis has been shown to be wrong in the past. The 2% runway slope data at one field for us was backwards for over five years and nobody questioned it. It was quietly revised one day. Was a new runway put in? No. Engineering just f***ed up, that's all.

These airframes have gone decades past their intended service life. Although Boeing used to say that there's no time or cycle limit if it's maintained, all one has to do is visit Mojave to see that that's not true. At some point, cold lapp metal bonding issues risk the Aloha experience of structural failure and the machine is scrapped. Sometimes, it's not scrapped soon enough. As I was telling Guppy, we had a structural failure that could have been real bad after V1 since it took about five seconds for the reverser lights to activate in the cockpit. (We don't know why it took so long, but hey, it wasn't a book engine any more.) After the Chinese Gong when off, and five seconds of confusion, at higher airspeed the sleeve just left, so the yaw was not that noticeable... but a little while after V1 it might have been ugly.

Nobody's suggesting panic, but that shouldn't condition the PIC into a mindless robot who can't deal with a non-book situation when it shows up once in a while. It certainly shouldn't make the discussion taboo. The O'hare AAL DC10 accident (another big tri-jet of the period that was probably in the TWA captain's mind) had airspeed on the big round steam-gauge, had proper power and body attitude but was still unflyable at V2 because of unsymmetrical slat retraction. He would have lived at V2+10. But prior to that, we were all trained and forced to yank the machine into the sky (because "it wasn't rocket science") hanging at V2 no matter how high the rate of climb. Most of us didn't wait for the procedures to change. When the relevent facts came out in Chicago, we began putting more wind in the wires on climbout. I commuted across the country and many airline crews were doing this.

Agree with Stilton the 727jock in Mexico City. If the stall warning vane (a big paddle) is working properly, and it goes off steady, I would venture to say, that it's a valid warning (regardless of IAS,) since the "vane always knows" the temp and density altitude based on it's deflection against the relative wind. IIRC, the B727 stall system doesn't need a fdc correction, but needs a led/flp config input. It is going to report the actual AOA, (assuming no gusts or sideslip) which is why it went off. Does this happen when the amigos have overloaded the baggage holds and everybody is coming to America with all the hand held luggage they can drag on board? I think you were quite possibly overweight. We had this happen once with mac flights on t/o. We wound up adding about 10kts to all our speeds!

To ignore a steady stick shaker on takeoff past V1 is just not realistic. Personally, I think almost all pilots today will revert to wind shear training (not known then) firewall power and tried to fly out of it at intermittent shaker. (and then it would be obvious on TWA 843 that it was false ind.) ALPA's position was back then, however, that with all that remaining runway and the F/O assertively saying abort, the captain did not err in what he did.

But I'm old school from scumbag outfits, and I flew with a lot of guys who walked away from crashes. They gave me a lot to think about.

Makes for stimulating bar talk anyway, don't you think?

pac

[411A]

Correction to my above post: It was a World Airways DC10 not CAL (under CAL mtc) that overran the runway at LAX doing everything right on the reject. It was the Captains last flight before retirement!

You were right the first time, Continental.
Yes, the Captains last flight, his wife was on board, headed toward HNL.Tyre burst.
Reject at V1+3. The Captain, I knew, casually, through another CO pilot..
Not wise.

As for heading for V2 when an engine fails on climbout...not while 411A is in command.
A higher speed will be flown, because 411A started on old B707 straightpipes, where you had to fly faster, in order to keep the blue side up, due mainly to very high rudder forces with an outboard engine failed.
Those of us, old enough, remember well.

[pacplyer]

Gulmp! Non-boosted rudders on the big iron? (early ones?) Scary. My old man flew those with USAF and WAL. (water injection runs out and....???????)

Thanks 411a,

It's slowly coming back to me now. I think the ill fated World Airways DC10 was at Logan now that I think about it.

So CAL at LAX he rejected at V1+3 after reaction time?, to an event at V1, is that how it went? Is that the official version or what really happened? Hoot Gibson type mystery hangs in the balance here.....

I remember that mtc had ground off the brake stack housing knobs during overhaul which were essential surface area to achieve heat dissipation. Fire crews were sitting right there practicing when he rolled up on fire. Two elderly jumped out the downwind exit and died as I recalled.

What's your opinion on DC10 stopping ability if you have any? I was only on it for one year but it was kind of a poor stopping machine at gross weights.

[411A]

Gulmp! Non-boosted rudders on the big iron? Scary. My old man flew those with AF and WAL. (water injection runs out and....???????)

Oh, they had rudder boost, alright, just not very good rudder boost.
Both feet on the respective pedal would sometimes be desired, and this is kinda hard to do at 50 feet, when number 4 goes bang.

When the water ran out, it got very quiet.

So CAL at LAX he rejected at V1+3 after reaction time?, to an event at V1, is that how it went? Is that the official version or what really happened? Hoot Gibson type mystery hangs in the balance here.....

It's what actually happened, according to the FDR.

[Ignition Override]

Pacplyer: Aviation Week stated several years ago that the missing aircraft logbook pages on that TWA 727 were mysteriously found after a strange, decades-long absence. The pages documented uncommanded LE extension before the Hoot Gibson incident over Michigan, and Boeing's attempts to "invent a cause" for the incident. I saw the article in a public library, don't know the date.

Somebody else mentioned the substandard, worn-out parts in so many aircraft. How many spare parts have been reworked?

Our problem a few nights ago might have been caused by the present airline outsourcing mania.
Four start attempts (packs off, both pneu. x-feeds open etc, normal 36 psi, valve open light..), using the 'abnormal book' procedure to double check the last three, no rotation on N2, oil press., nor N1.
The spare starter, which was a reworked part, would not fit on the engine after two difficult hours for both mechanics (engineers). I doubt very much that the spare starter came from an airline facility. And in the starter which they removed from the jet to allow the spare to be connected, it had never been lubricated and the impeller had seized. He showed us the gouges in the grey metal. In other starter problems, the shaft shears at a high speed. This time, lack of lubrication.

A Captain aborted during the initial takeoff roll over a year ago because the rudder pedals were not both connected to the nose gear: one had apparently not been connected in the normal manner.
Better than finding out during a winter night landing when the tower is often closed somewhere.
The Check Airman who was in the right seat told me about their incident.
This was soon after out-sourced maintenance: $$$$.
My main sympathies, along with for those Kallitta pilots, are with our new-hires and the huge numbers who returned from a five-year furlough to watch this industry continue deeper into a melt-down with little seniority.

Back to some hobby websites.

[SNS3Guppy]

Your assumptions that any group of aviators that operated the 747 aircraft differently than you do are "fools" is naive in my humble opinion.

I made no such assertion. I will stand by my statements that those who intentionally damage the airplane to please the company or make a buck do so in error, and are indeed fools.

Many ways are to be had in operating an airplane safely and efficiently, but not a single good one involves intentionally damaging the airframe, breaking windows, or blowing out tires.