Well Gupp,
I didn't realize I had just walked into a heated discussion of V1 with you and the corp pilots.
I just now read about half of that over at the tech page. Forgive me, but it seems kind of a bitter exchange really on your part. Can't we tolerate an opposing opinion from a lessor experienced aviator without taking everything so personally?
That's how it comes off on paper to me at least. (Are we this stale on trips?) Try throwing a smiley or two in there or else I fear you're going to wind up being "one of those guys" that no one likes to fly with.
Amazingly enough, (since you essentially gave your resume to those guys over there) your background and mine are very similar. On paper, however, it comes across kinda like a pilot who can't go past the book, can't learn from the experiences of others, and not really much of leadership material. Are you even a captain? If we hang out here to teach (and it appears to me now that you have probably been in aviation all your life) why not try a softer approach? Like a mentor instead of a Know-it-all. Maybe we shouldn't be so dogmatic all the time. For years the FAA and fellow pilots blamed pilots who crashed because of wind shear. Now we know that the "old hands" were right; that there are micro-burst situations which no airplane or procedure can escape from. So the book and the government were actually wrong all those years to condone approaches in heavy rain and convective weather. Wouldn't you say?
Your assumptions that any group of aviators that operated the 747 aircraft differently than you do are "fools" is naive in my humble opinion. SOP's at one of the four airlines I flew for specified the tight turning taxi procedure (It was in the FOM) it was approved by the FAA and Boeing. So implying that you're smarter than Boeing and that we were all fools to tear up the airplane, in my mind, peggs you as rather inexperienced yourself, or at least, not very perceptive. Clearly, we were cognizant of preserving the airframe as I stated. It was an unusual procedure that was necessary for example to back taxi to a crossing runway so others could land on the only long runway. Being gentle with the equipment all these years is why you even have an classic to fly at all. You should know by now, that the knowledge in the book you cherish was written by the generation before you; like the 707 Gentleman earlier in this thread. He was contemplating engine out decisions before you or I were born.
I found this interesting over there (tech V1 thread) by another poster:
"ssg . . . if ever you transition from the Citation to the B74, your perception of aborting after V1 will quickly evaporate; even when departing at JKF's longest pavement, 13R [4442m/14572'] If you recall when many moons ago a TWA TriStar crew had aborted on 13R after V1 with disasterous consequences."
[edited for correctness:] Despite being blamed for the accident he was subsequently awarded the ALPA medal of heroism for superior airmanship, ALPA's highest award. He was the PIC and made the best decision he could under the circumstances. Sixteen feet off the ground IIRC the stick shaker went off and the F/O called out "gettin a stall" and then "you got it." Never mind that there was no stall, he listened to his f/o and re-landed.
My hat is still off to him.
It occurs to me that this argument is not really just about V1 at all. It is about PIC authority necessary to preserve safety. It is about understanding airmanship.
At least that's what I think.