Heathrow separation
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zkdli
Bolleaux!
Every and I do mean every reported LOS/Airprox is investgated by a panel of "Professionals" drawn from CAA....BALPA...AOPA...BGA...RAF...et al. You get my drift?
If it's a Hawk overflying a Microlight site...or 2xB737s getting close...in the opinion of the Pilot or ATCO...there will be an investigation
OOI [off the top of my head] An AIRPROX has occurred if there was less than 5nm/1000ft sep or 3nm/1000 in app mode.
watpiktch
The only people who can state categorically that a loss of separation is an AIRPROX are the pilots or controllers invovled in the incident. The replays and investigations can say what happened, why it happened and how it happened BUT it cannot say that the pilot should have reported the incident as an AIRPROX because in the investigator's opinion it was - the defintion is specific in that it is only the pilot or controller at the time of the incident who can say that
Every and I do mean every reported LOS/Airprox is investgated by a panel of "Professionals" drawn from CAA....BALPA...AOPA...BGA...RAF...et al. You get my drift?
If it's a Hawk overflying a Microlight site...or 2xB737s getting close...in the opinion of the Pilot or ATCO...there will be an investigation
OOI [off the top of my head] An AIRPROX has occurred if there was less than 5nm/1000ft sep or 3nm/1000 in app mode.
watpiktch
TheOddOne said, "We're talking about the UK version of Class 'A' airspace here, where traffic is all IFR. Separation is maintained between aircraft by ATC, whether or not the pilots can see out (OK, there's Special VFR available, but that isn't applicable in the discussion here)."
I fully understand that these aircraft are on an IFR flight plan but when they are in Visual Meteorological Conditions (VMC) it's the pilots who must look out for other aircraft and not run into them. Time and again I've had to remind controllers not to panic when I'm in VMC.
I fully understand that these aircraft are on an IFR flight plan but when they are in Visual Meteorological Conditions (VMC) it's the pilots who must look out for other aircraft and not run into them. Time and again I've had to remind controllers not to panic when I'm in VMC.
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Well thank God someone has the guts to speak up when they see something wrong. Should he have kept it 'in house'? Yeah right. Then something gets done about it only after a major incident happens. 
I also can not understand why some of you are so annoyed that this 'Andrew' has grassed on your colleagues. Eh? If anything he has helped his colleagues by ensuring something is done about it by top management. Senior management will have to make sure something is done now or they know that if an incident happens and nothing has been done then then they know who the finger would be pointed at. Senior management would have no excuses if they had been made aware beforehand. Of course if it had been kept 'in house' they could always deny any knowledge of such a report. How many times has the government done that in recent times?
I also can not understand why some of you are so annoyed that this 'Andrew' has grassed on your colleagues. Eh? If anything he has helped his colleagues by ensuring something is done about it by top management. Senior management will have to make sure something is done now or they know that if an incident happens and nothing has been done then then they know who the finger would be pointed at. Senior management would have no excuses if they had been made aware beforehand. Of course if it had been kept 'in house' they could always deny any knowledge of such a report. How many times has the government done that in recent times?
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Flap 5
I think your point hits the nail on the head. If more pilots were willing to put their heads above the parapet then issues like fatigue would hit the headlines more.
It is the opposite of disloyal to report systemic faults as only public pressure will get results. We've all seen how effective "regulation" is.
It is the opposite of disloyal to report systemic faults as only public pressure will get results. We've all seen how effective "regulation" is.
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I've been a controller for a few years (25 to be precise) although have never worked the LTMA.
My reading of Andrew's report is that controllers are being expected to sequence aircraft to the required minina (3nm/2.5nm/1000ft - take your pick). When I was taught how to keep blips apart it was beaten into us that these minima were precisely that, minima. There are lots of occasions where barely achieving that standard is about the only thing you should do. But, if the system relies upon a controller to constantly achieve the minima (ie no less and no more than) then it is inevitable that there will be losses of separation.
i heard an anecdotal story a few years back (don't know whether it was true of not) about a London controller (single runway south of HRW) who failed to validate in ADC because she only achieved a runway utilisation rate of 41 ac/hr as opposed to the 43 required. As I said, I don't know how true this was. However, the point is that the system required the controller to work, without and leeway, to two sets of criteria. On the one hand was the regulation, n the other hand was the commercial imperative. This is a similar scenario to airlines pushing crew scheduling to the absolute limit whilst staying within the law.
Somebody else has already said it. HRW has an outstanding reputation but one would think that 21st century technology could solve a lot of these issues.
My reading of Andrew's report is that controllers are being expected to sequence aircraft to the required minina (3nm/2.5nm/1000ft - take your pick). When I was taught how to keep blips apart it was beaten into us that these minima were precisely that, minima. There are lots of occasions where barely achieving that standard is about the only thing you should do. But, if the system relies upon a controller to constantly achieve the minima (ie no less and no more than) then it is inevitable that there will be losses of separation.
i heard an anecdotal story a few years back (don't know whether it was true of not) about a London controller (single runway south of HRW) who failed to validate in ADC because she only achieved a runway utilisation rate of 41 ac/hr as opposed to the 43 required. As I said, I don't know how true this was. However, the point is that the system required the controller to work, without and leeway, to two sets of criteria. On the one hand was the regulation, n the other hand was the commercial imperative. This is a similar scenario to airlines pushing crew scheduling to the absolute limit whilst staying within the law.
Somebody else has already said it. HRW has an outstanding reputation but one would think that 21st century technology could solve a lot of these issues.
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Some input from someone who analyses the safety of critical systems for a living.
slip and turn has made a crucial intervention, early on, by pointing to a paper of Peter Brooker of Cranfield on how to assess the safety of very safe sociotechnical systems. This is implicitly what most correspondents here are debating ("we're the safest"; "yes, but you're getting closer to some limit", and so on).
So has anybody else here read the paper?
Let me quote:
Debating that, rather than the morals of individual actors, would be worthwhile. I would add something else. There is no "safe/not safe" dichotomy which it makes sense to employ. Safety can be better thought of as a continuum and the question is better phrased as assessing the level of safety.
What has happened here is fairly straightforward. A controller apparently was concerned that the level of safety in certain operations had been reduced, and that this reduction did not necessarily show up in the statistics on currently-sampled events (airproxes, MORs and so on). He expressed his concern in a report which looked at those events and others. The report was apparently well-written. NATS management apparently wanted to keep the report internal. The author and the BBC obviously thought it was worthwhile to put the information in the public domain.
Now, I don't see anything wrong with any of that, and I certainly don't see any reason for anyone to be upset at any aspect of it. If I were working in NATS management, I would likely want to keep it internal, for the usual political reasons; and if I were not working in NATS management, I would want to know the information anyway because this is a public system with a public level of safety. So there is an obvious conflict there, but it is not clear that anyone can judge which side is "right".
I work with a group of colleagues who are prominent in system safety. Many of us feel that safety information should generally be public domain. There are a number of reasons for it. One is that one major applicable standard, for functional safety of electrical/electronic/programmable electronic (E/E/PE) systems, IEC 61508, requires one explicitly to assess the publically-acceptable level of safe operations in order to determine the so-called "Safety Integrity Level" to which a system or subsystem must be demonstrated to conform. Now, obviously you cannot determine the publically-acceptable level of safe operations unless the public has the details. Which are often kept out of the public domain by those who have them. So there is a political problem there which hinders the application of an international standard. The easiest solution is to put that info in the public domain.
A second reason is this. The so-called safety case is a written argument that a system achieves a certain level of safety. The UK pioneered the use of safety cases, and the requirement for safety cases is now spreading throughout the world. Most of the safety cases which I have seen, however, have included very poor arguments which do not necessarily establish the conclusion (that the required level of safety has been reached). One set of exceptions to that general observation on poor safety cases are, I believe, the safety cases for U.K. nuclear plants, which are exemplary in their arguments for a given level of safety and on which my colleague Bev Littlewood is a principal consultant. Many of us feel that an obvious way to improve the quality of safety cases, and thereby to assure that the level of safety achieved by a system is well-established, is to require safety cases to be public, and thus potentially subject to open peer review by anyone who cares to do so.
It does seem clear that, if the trend is for the public to be required to determined a level of acceptable safety for systems which involve public safety, then that information must be made publically available.
PBL
slip and turn has made a crucial intervention, early on, by pointing to a paper of Peter Brooker of Cranfield on how to assess the safety of very safe sociotechnical systems. This is implicitly what most correspondents here are debating ("we're the safest"; "yes, but you're getting closer to some limit", and so on).
So has anybody else here read the paper?
Let me quote:
Originally Posted by Brooker on safety measures
"Is the system safe?" .... getting a good answer to this simple-formed question is not easy.
What has happened here is fairly straightforward. A controller apparently was concerned that the level of safety in certain operations had been reduced, and that this reduction did not necessarily show up in the statistics on currently-sampled events (airproxes, MORs and so on). He expressed his concern in a report which looked at those events and others. The report was apparently well-written. NATS management apparently wanted to keep the report internal. The author and the BBC obviously thought it was worthwhile to put the information in the public domain.
Now, I don't see anything wrong with any of that, and I certainly don't see any reason for anyone to be upset at any aspect of it. If I were working in NATS management, I would likely want to keep it internal, for the usual political reasons; and if I were not working in NATS management, I would want to know the information anyway because this is a public system with a public level of safety. So there is an obvious conflict there, but it is not clear that anyone can judge which side is "right".
I work with a group of colleagues who are prominent in system safety. Many of us feel that safety information should generally be public domain. There are a number of reasons for it. One is that one major applicable standard, for functional safety of electrical/electronic/programmable electronic (E/E/PE) systems, IEC 61508, requires one explicitly to assess the publically-acceptable level of safe operations in order to determine the so-called "Safety Integrity Level" to which a system or subsystem must be demonstrated to conform. Now, obviously you cannot determine the publically-acceptable level of safe operations unless the public has the details. Which are often kept out of the public domain by those who have them. So there is a political problem there which hinders the application of an international standard. The easiest solution is to put that info in the public domain.
A second reason is this. The so-called safety case is a written argument that a system achieves a certain level of safety. The UK pioneered the use of safety cases, and the requirement for safety cases is now spreading throughout the world. Most of the safety cases which I have seen, however, have included very poor arguments which do not necessarily establish the conclusion (that the required level of safety has been reached). One set of exceptions to that general observation on poor safety cases are, I believe, the safety cases for U.K. nuclear plants, which are exemplary in their arguments for a given level of safety and on which my colleague Bev Littlewood is a principal consultant. Many of us feel that an obvious way to improve the quality of safety cases, and thereby to assure that the level of safety achieved by a system is well-established, is to require safety cases to be public, and thus potentially subject to open peer review by anyone who cares to do so.
It does seem clear that, if the trend is for the public to be required to determined a level of acceptable safety for systems which involve public safety, then that information must be made publically available.
PBL
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Does anyone remember that BBC programme from 2003 The Day Britain Stopped? Which featured gridlock on the country's roads and chaos at Heathrow after an aircraft going around collides with another aircraft on climb-out.
It was prompted (among other things) by a report which:
"calculated there would be one collision following a missed approach at Heathrow, on average, every 20 years"
NATS' response (quite rightly I think) was that it could not endorse the findings of the report (conducted in 1993) considering that "Heathrow has been operating for more than fifty years without a single collision."
My understanding of is that Heathrow runs very safely, but occasionally, like when a plane shuts a runway by strewing burst tyre all over it safety can be compromised.
It was prompted (among other things) by a report which:
"calculated there would be one collision following a missed approach at Heathrow, on average, every 20 years"
NATS' response (quite rightly I think) was that it could not endorse the findings of the report (conducted in 1993) considering that "Heathrow has been operating for more than fifty years without a single collision."
My understanding of is that Heathrow runs very safely, but occasionally, like when a plane shuts a runway by strewing burst tyre all over it safety can be compromised.
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'Operating for 50 years without a collision'. Yes but the numbers of aircraft using Heathrow has increased significantly in that time. One collision in 20 years is merely a mathematical probability. It doesn't have to actually happen.
Not having happened in the last 50 years is good but it doesn't invalidate the statistical probability. I would say it hasn't happened because of the professionalism of controllers. Management and government have relied on that for too long.
Not having happened in the last 50 years is good but it doesn't invalidate the statistical probability. I would say it hasn't happened because of the professionalism of controllers. Management and government have relied on that for too long.
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My understanding of is that Heathrow runs very safely, but occasionally, like when a plane shuts a runway by strewing burst tyre all over it safety can be compromised.
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This loss of separation implies that it is the controller(s) sole fault....Don't sensationalise it -and why did "Andrew" not voice his concerns as an active controller?
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SkiesFull,
All pilots and air traffic controllers are first concerned with safety. Although, I think we all know of incidents/accidents where systemic and/or corporate culture/pressure lead to close calls and fatalities. The "culture" (pressure) is handled differently by everyone. Don't forget about fatigue, either. Many "sole" faults have occurred as direct result of fatigue. And, the fatigue could also be a result of not handling the corporate/management culture (pressure) very well. (ie...they can be interrelated)
IMO, this isn't sensationalism, but another "wake up call" to those (pilots & controllers) who might otherwise, possibly NOT handle the "pressure" the appropriate way. With this in mind, this reporting can only help make the skies more safe.
Oh yeah, as far as not voicing those concerns while an active controller...well, the culture & pressure applies to this too.
KC135777
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SkiesFull,
All pilots and air traffic controllers are first concerned with safety. Although, I think we all know of incidents/accidents where systemic and/or corporate culture/pressure lead to close calls and fatalities. The "culture" (pressure) is handled differently by everyone. Don't forget about fatigue, either. Many "sole" faults have occurred as direct result of fatigue. And, the fatigue could also be a result of not handling the corporate/management culture (pressure) very well. (ie...they can be interrelated)
IMO, this isn't sensationalism, but another "wake up call" to those (pilots & controllers) who might otherwise, possibly NOT handle the "pressure" the appropriate way. With this in mind, this reporting can only help make the skies more safe.
Oh yeah, as far as not voicing those concerns while an active controller...well, the culture & pressure applies to this too.
KC135777
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I don't want to put words in Contacttower's mouth, HD, but surely if you remove contingency time (opposite of engineers' 'take a number and double it') you are already into a compromise rather like the red wire?/blue wire? conundrum of a bomb disposal expert in the last few seconds against the timer.
I know some of you ATC types like to compare your skills to those of competition chess players against the clock, and that officianado chess players call time trouble zeitnot.
A quick look at the alternative methodologies described at http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Zeitnot might make for uncomfortable reading ... I think ERG may already have been there in developing their yardsticks for NATS
I know some of you ATC types like to compare your skills to those of competition chess players against the clock, and that officianado chess players call time trouble zeitnot.
A quick look at the alternative methodologies described at http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Zeitnot might make for uncomfortable reading ... I think ERG may already have been there in developing their yardsticks for NATS
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One collision in 20 years is merely a mathematical probability. It doesn't have to actually happen.
My previous career (30+years) was out on the airfield at large London aerodromes. We had our own separation criteria for aircraft from fixed objects, buildings and so on. It took all of those 30 years to witness sufficient incidents to be able to demonstrate that these distances, laid down many years ago, are adequate or a little conservative. 3 come to mind, an American carrier with a 747 coming close to the South Terminal at Gatwick and again a 757 leaving the paved surface and running along the grass adjacent, again at Gatwick. You could also include the 747 at LHR who forgot to straighten its nosewheel steering and went charging off to the side on takeoff (27R, remember that one, HD?). Thus we have a small amount of data upon which to base decisions about whether or not to change these criteria. Where is your database for airborne collisions between public transport aircraft in the vicinity of an aerodrome? The PT mid-airs I can recall (4) were all in the en-route phase. There's one PT/GA midair that I can recall in the States, but we're not discussing that issue here.
As has already been said in posts above, all you can do in the absence of meaningful data is to take an educated guess and say that millions and millions of incident-free movements have shown the system to work. It may well be that you could now reduce these separation minima as has already been done over the Atlantic etc. We're allowed 500' vertical separation outside controlled airspace on a purely procedural basis without incident (Quadrantal Rule), why not with Radar cover?
TheOddOne
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Originally Posted by HEATHROW DIRECTOR
I'm not impressed with contactower's remarks. Safety is never "compromised".
Originally Posted by HEATHROW DIRECTOR
Perhaps he would explain further..?
http://www.aaib.dft.gov.uk/cms_resou...pdf_501135.pdf
It was more than ten years ago and I'm sure it wouldn't be allowed to happen now. I'm just really interested to hear what people have to say on this 'issue' (if indeed there is an issue at all).
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I heard a pilot say the other day:
'Provided the IRVR is >125M, the rest of the weather is irrelevant'.
Not strictly true the whole time, but the case for 99% of his ops.
'Provided the IRVR is >125M, the rest of the weather is irrelevant'.
Not strictly true the whole time, but the case for 99% of his ops.
Back to flying his Microsoft-built flying machine I think.
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I've been on the UK Airprox Board ... well not on it 
, but dippng into their published reports ... http://www.airproxboard.org.uk/defau...90&pageid=5638
Fascinating language some of it ... e.g. one report involving a couple of Airbuses:
'All other things being equal, Members considered that best practice is to reduce the v/s to a much lower rate to reduce the chances of TCAS and STCA generating alerts'
'Both ac had been cleared to separated levels which had been correctly read back, therefore there are no ATC errors disclosed'
So, for Mission Impossible fans, if I read that correctly, your mission, should you choose to accept it and read it back, is to stick to what you are told and be careful not to upset the movement detectors, and a quiet life with a mission completed is your reward?
, but dippng into their published reports ... http://www.airproxboard.org.uk/defau...90&pageid=5638Fascinating language some of it ... e.g. one report involving a couple of Airbuses:
'All other things being equal, Members considered that best practice is to reduce the v/s to a much lower rate to reduce the chances of TCAS and STCA generating alerts'
'Both ac had been cleared to separated levels which had been correctly read back, therefore there are no ATC errors disclosed'
So, for Mission Impossible fans, if I read that correctly, your mission, should you choose to accept it and read it back, is to stick to what you are told and be careful not to upset the movement detectors, and a quiet life with a mission completed is your reward?
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Earlier at thread 40 someone asked if mixed mode operation at LHR would increase the movement rate. The rational being at LGW, mixed mode, when the w/x gets adverse, strong H/Ws or low vis. proceedures, they have less delays because the extra separation is partially built in. Clearly at LHR with the current tight separation and non mixed mode, everything goes pearshaped fairly quickly. I suspect the ground movement problems would be a nightmare and could lead to gridlock. Would anyone in the know care to comment, at least it would quash this proposal which BAA seem to trot out from time to time.
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Walnut,
Unfortunately 'mixed mode' doesn't do much to cure the Low Viz bugbear. It is still a requirement that no aircraft be within the Localizer Sensitive Area for landing clearance to be issued at 2 miles, whether the a/c in front is another arrival (as at LHR) or a departing a/c. During LVPs, the landing rate at LGW is effectively reduced to 12 an hour, down from 25-30 feasable in normal Ops.
This is a funadamental limitation of the current Localizer technology which is basically unsolveable so long as you're transmitting a VHF phased signal. The much-heralded Microwave Landing System (MLS) which may well have solved this problem wasn't taken up because insufficient airports and airlines were prepared to invest in it. I believe the only operational installation in the UK is on 27R at LHR. British Airways did fit the appropriate kit at considerable expense to much of their fleet but unless everyone else has it too and all the procedures are re-written, then the reduced spacing possible in LVPs can't be used.
The future lies with GPS technology, already deployed in several airports in the US, but our regulator is very conservative when it comes to implementation of new technology. We may have to wait for the European satellite constellation to be operational before EASA/UKCAA will accept these approaches.
Meanwhile, we will continue to have disruption to services in extended periods of LVP. Thankfully they are pretty few and far between. Most vis below 600M only lasts for an hour or so. Procedures are in place now, certainly at LGW, to take advantage of even momentary improvements of IRVR above 550M to increase the movement rate.
It's not too many years ago that an airport would come to a halt in LVPs, despite being CATIII equipped as many aircraft/crews weren't. Now practically all a/c are, people are justifiably irritated by delays.
TheOddOne
Unfortunately 'mixed mode' doesn't do much to cure the Low Viz bugbear. It is still a requirement that no aircraft be within the Localizer Sensitive Area for landing clearance to be issued at 2 miles, whether the a/c in front is another arrival (as at LHR) or a departing a/c. During LVPs, the landing rate at LGW is effectively reduced to 12 an hour, down from 25-30 feasable in normal Ops.
This is a funadamental limitation of the current Localizer technology which is basically unsolveable so long as you're transmitting a VHF phased signal. The much-heralded Microwave Landing System (MLS) which may well have solved this problem wasn't taken up because insufficient airports and airlines were prepared to invest in it. I believe the only operational installation in the UK is on 27R at LHR. British Airways did fit the appropriate kit at considerable expense to much of their fleet but unless everyone else has it too and all the procedures are re-written, then the reduced spacing possible in LVPs can't be used.
The future lies with GPS technology, already deployed in several airports in the US, but our regulator is very conservative when it comes to implementation of new technology. We may have to wait for the European satellite constellation to be operational before EASA/UKCAA will accept these approaches.
Meanwhile, we will continue to have disruption to services in extended periods of LVP. Thankfully they are pretty few and far between. Most vis below 600M only lasts for an hour or so. Procedures are in place now, certainly at LGW, to take advantage of even momentary improvements of IRVR above 550M to increase the movement rate.
It's not too many years ago that an airport would come to a halt in LVPs, despite being CATIII equipped as many aircraft/crews weren't. Now practically all a/c are, people are justifiably irritated by delays.
TheOddOne
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slip and turn
What are you on about? That reference is about selection of Vertical Speed - and it is a bloody good practice in busy airspace not to select a high climb/descent speed as TCAS picks it up as a prospective target, regardless of the level that you have assigned, and could cause an RA - which in the LTMA certainly ain't much appreciated.
And for the chap who posted about challenging safety, I absolutely agree with you. Nats and their controllers should not be afraid of challenge - and they are not. But let's do it through the right channels, not by running with hysterical stories to a broadcasting corporation who love kicking Nats anyway (yes you do) and accuse your former colleagues of "errant" practice.
P7
What are you on about? That reference is about selection of Vertical Speed - and it is a bloody good practice in busy airspace not to select a high climb/descent speed as TCAS picks it up as a prospective target, regardless of the level that you have assigned, and could cause an RA - which in the LTMA certainly ain't much appreciated.
And for the chap who posted about challenging safety, I absolutely agree with you. Nats and their controllers should not be afraid of challenge - and they are not. But let's do it through the right channels, not by running with hysterical stories to a broadcasting corporation who love kicking Nats anyway (yes you do) and accuse your former colleagues of "errant" practice.
P7
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Exactly Point Seven, just like alarms in my neighbourhood go off for all manner of bad practice reasons and ain't much appreciated ... so much so that they're ALL bloody useless now, and if the police do turn up, they're often missing something more important.
And as for the right channels, well some of us are becoming rather impatient with those ... look at 777 fuel ...
Call it a demonstration of protest if you like. The banners read something like
____________
| Better Safe |
| than Sorry..|
|......
......|
___________
and not
______________
|Better no Delay|
| than Penalty.. |
| .......
.......|
______________
And as for the right channels, well some of us are becoming rather impatient with those ... look at 777 fuel ...
Call it a demonstration of protest if you like. The banners read something like
____________
| Better Safe |
| than Sorry..|
|......
......|___________
and not
______________
|Better no Delay|
| than Penalty.. |
| .......
.......| ______________
Last edited by slip and turn; 21st Mar 2008 at 16:33.