Did the pilot originally scheduled to fly [i]that[/i] Concorde refuse?
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As I've said above the statement from Marty at 14 43 45 mean absolutely clearly (in french) "Shut down the engine Two" And Ive yet said that's even sligthy impatient.
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BEagle:
"...desperate attempt to reach Le Bourget only option...."
No! The only option under the circumstances was to have crash landed on the highway or in a farmer's field. It should have been an instinctive survival decision. A decision reguiring neither time nor thought. A decision based soley on the Airspeed, which was decreasing. Three times the F/O had warned Marty about decreasing airspeed.
Regardless of an impossible situation, never for one second give up the struggle to stay alive. Marty did not possess the ultimate survival instinct.
It's a classic scenario of controlled crash vs. stall and assured death.
"...desperate attempt to reach Le Bourget only option...."
No! The only option under the circumstances was to have crash landed on the highway or in a farmer's field. It should have been an instinctive survival decision. A decision reguiring neither time nor thought. A decision based soley on the Airspeed, which was decreasing. Three times the F/O had warned Marty about decreasing airspeed.
Regardless of an impossible situation, never for one second give up the struggle to stay alive. Marty did not possess the ultimate survival instinct.
It's a classic scenario of controlled crash vs. stall and assured death.
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the land between CDG and Le Bourget have sadly not more than 100 M maxi of field without big houses, and the highway is a highly used road with a car every 30m or so...
For the translation, it's evident.Failure engine 2, Alarm fire, the FE annonce engine 2 cut, procedure fire done,end of fire alarm . 20 sec later, the fire alarm came in again, and then Marty ask the FE to shut the engine, if not yet.
without questions.
For the translation, it's evident.Failure engine 2, Alarm fire, the FE annonce engine 2 cut, procedure fire done,end of fire alarm . 20 sec later, the fire alarm came in again, and then Marty ask the FE to shut the engine, if not yet.
without questions.
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MGloff:
You're completely missing the point. No airplane can sustain controlled flight without sufficient airspeed. Better to deliberately land in any field or on any highway rather than to stall and to fall out of the sky.
You're completely missing the point. No airplane can sustain controlled flight without sufficient airspeed. Better to deliberately land in any field or on any highway rather than to stall and to fall out of the sky.
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Did you deliberatly land on a road with plenty of cars? or in a 100m long field between two hostels? Its just NOT POSSIBLE (without killing even more people)!
and Le Bourget was at a few hundred of meters (+- 1km).
and Le Bourget was at a few hundred of meters (+- 1km).
Thread Starter
Mglof
You may be French, but you don't know that bit of Paris' suburbs, evidement!
Go back to p.3 of this thread and look at the satellite photo. Draw a line from point 6 to Le Bourget's runway threshold and tell me again that
"the land between CDG and Le Bourget have sadly not more than 100 M maxi of field without big houses, and the highway is a highly used road with a car every 30m or so..." the small fields may be separated by small hedges, but aren't crossed by a serious obstacle until you reach road until nearly Le Bourget's perimeter. Not perfect (but nothing would ever be for a forced landing in Concorde) but eminently survivable for a high proportion of those on board - and less dangerous for those on board and those on the ground than 'spinning in' perilously close to a built up area.
You may be French, but you don't know that bit of Paris' suburbs, evidement!
Go back to p.3 of this thread and look at the satellite photo. Draw a line from point 6 to Le Bourget's runway threshold and tell me again that
"the land between CDG and Le Bourget have sadly not more than 100 M maxi of field without big houses, and the highway is a highly used road with a car every 30m or so..." the small fields may be separated by small hedges, but aren't crossed by a serious obstacle until you reach road until nearly Le Bourget's perimeter. Not perfect (but nothing would ever be for a forced landing in Concorde) but eminently survivable for a high proportion of those on board - and less dangerous for those on board and those on the ground than 'spinning in' perilously close to a built up area.
Faced with loss of thrust between Vr (198 KIAS) and Vzrc LG extended on 3 engines (205 KIAS), the last thing any pilot would reasonably consider would be to call for any engine to be shut down - particularly if the adjacent engine had also suffered a brief loss of thrust. In fact they seem to have acheived 205 KIAS and the captain subsequently ordered the landing gear to be raised. During the ensuing landing gear confusion and robbed of any available thrust from the No 2 engine, the speed fell below 205 and a positive climb gradient with Nos 1, 3 and 4 engines at contingency power would not have been acheived. The FO gave clear warning concerning the airspeed, but by then the aircraft was no longer able to climb, let alone accelerate to V2. Seeing a runway, the captain made a last and undeniably heroic effort to reach it; regrettably the aeroplane departed controlled flight before the runway could be reached.
No matter how damaged it might have been, if the No 2 engine was producing ANY thrust it should have been left running with all 4 throttles fully forward until Vzrc3le or even V2 was attained.
No matter how damaged it might have been, if the No 2 engine was producing ANY thrust it should have been left running with all 4 throttles fully forward until Vzrc3le or even V2 was attained.
Thread Starter
It should perhaps be pointed out that BEagle is a four-engined jet pilot of more than 20 years experience, with a significant amount of four-jet Delta wing experience. Moreover he's a senior flying instructor on four-jet aeroplanes, in an organisation whose reputation for imparting the best flying skills is unsurpassed. Short of Concorde captains there's no-one we should listen to with more care on this subject, IMHO.
But he doesn't have my good looks!
But he doesn't have my good looks!
Thanks for the CV, Jacko, but I am NOT an expert on Concorde. I really hope that someone will prove that I'm talking bollocks and that the crew neither took off above max certificated take-off weight, nor handled the emergency in anything other than an exemplary manner in an impossible situation.
Sadly, and much as it pains me to say so, I cannot yet reach that conclusion.
RIP F-BTSC and all who flew in her, but the important thing - the really important thing - is that the lessons learnt will mean that such an accident can never be repeated.
Sadly, and much as it pains me to say so, I cannot yet reach that conclusion.
RIP F-BTSC and all who flew in her, but the important thing - the really important thing - is that the lessons learnt will mean that such an accident can never be repeated.
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In these days of CRM isn’t an engineer empowered to shut down a malfunctioning engine? Lack of CRM was cited after the terrible crash at Teneriffe, the KLM FE asked during the power up if they were cleared for take-off. On a recent “black box” program the FE was almost castigated for not pulling back the thrust levers.
NO!! A FE would certainly never be empowered to shut down any engine without a clear command from the handling pilot (or Captain - Company SOPs may vary). Even then, the shut down actions would be monitored by the non-handling pilot (or FO) before the engine was positively shut down and thrust irrevocably lost. NEVER, NEVER would such a critical action be taken without cross-monitoring - and that is one of the cornerstones of CRM!
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While the text books say crash land rather than stall --- I think I would have tried to make Le Bourget also --- even it it meant exploring the upper limits of AOA. They had a full load of fuel and were already on fire --- chance of surving a crash landing in a field =0.
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GlueBall
MGloff:
You're completely missing the point. No airplane can sustain controlled flight without sufficient airspeed. Better to deliberately land in any field or on any highway rather than to stall and to fall out of the sky.
MGloff:
You're completely missing the point. No airplane can sustain controlled flight without sufficient airspeed. Better to deliberately land in any field or on any highway rather than to stall and to fall out of the sky.
BEagle
NO!! A FE would certainly never be empowered to shut down any engine without a clear command from the handling pilot (or Captain - Company SOPs may vary). Even then, the shut down actions would be monitored by the non-handling pilot (or FO) before the engine was positively shut down and thrust irrevocably lost. NEVER, NEVER would such a critical action be taken without cross-monitoring - and that is one of the cornerstones of CRM!
NO!! A FE would certainly never be empowered to shut down any engine without a clear command from the handling pilot (or Captain - Company SOPs may vary). Even then, the shut down actions would be monitored by the non-handling pilot (or FO) before the engine was positively shut down and thrust irrevocably lost. NEVER, NEVER would such a critical action be taken without cross-monitoring - and that is one of the cornerstones of CRM!
Thread Starter
NO NO NO NO NO NO NO!
NO!
Any forced landing holds out the slender chance of survival. Driving my car at 230 mph over fields is less likely to kill me than driving off a multi storey car park. Waiting 'til you lose control at low altitude will ALWAYS kill you. Turning towards Le Bourget (and the open fields) was always going to be a better option. And if he hadn't been overweight, with an aft cg, he might have made the runway.
NO!
Any forced landing holds out the slender chance of survival. Driving my car at 230 mph over fields is less likely to kill me than driving off a multi storey car park. Waiting 'til you lose control at low altitude will ALWAYS kill you. Turning towards Le Bourget (and the open fields) was always going to be a better option. And if he hadn't been overweight, with an aft cg, he might have made the runway.
Had the FE not permitted the throttles to be opened at Tenerife, then it is possible that the accident might not have happened. But that decision would have happened at 0 KIAS on the ground, not at a critical state of flight. Similarly, had the Concorde FE or FO said, "Capt - we are overweight for take-off and we must recheck the RTOW if you wish to take-off with an 8kt tailwind", instead of reacting to his "Top" call, the Concorde accident wouldn't have happened. Did they know that they were overweight - in which case they were complicit - or did they harbour their fears but did not have the positive CRM manner to state their concern?
I agree that a controlled forced landing might have resulted in less fatalities, whereas to depart controlled flight at high AoA and low airspeed would virtually guarantee a 100% fatality rate.
I agree that a controlled forced landing might have resulted in less fatalities, whereas to depart controlled flight at high AoA and low airspeed would virtually guarantee a 100% fatality rate.
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I still think we are being a little unfair on the FE here. His job is to monitor the engines' health, he sees 1,3 & 4 working properly, he hears on the radio that they have a fire in the vicinity of the No 2 engine and notices a reading on his instruments that tell him No 2 isn't that healthy. The two guys facing forward seem to have rather a lot on their plate and why should he add to their burden?
Never-the-less from reading all of these posts it seems that breaking more than one link in this chain would have been needed for this tragic event not to have occured.
Never-the-less from reading all of these posts it seems that breaking more than one link in this chain would have been needed for this tragic event not to have occured.
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I have to take issue with your points cosmo kramer,
Whilst your suggested solution to the Tenerife incident would indeed have prevented it, in making reference to it here you're simply not comparing like with like.
Our procedures allow for an engine to be shut down without reference to the other pilot, for example following an engine fire after landing. That is quite a different thing to what is being discussed on this thread and I must concur with BEagle on this one.
Here you contradict yourself. On the one hand you say keep it flying at all costs. By definition that means (in this scenario) flying it 'downhill' to keep sufficient airspeed to retain control. Of course, le Bourget was a great idea but in having to maintain a descent to remain flying there is the strong possibility of having to land short of the runway.
In many incidences of aircraft crashing at very low altitudes when close to landing, there are some survivors (Sioux City, Kegworth). We have seen the result of losing flying control and crashing upside down from 200ft agl.
There is no grey area here.
And New Bloke,
I see from your profile that you are an IT consultant. Whilst I applaud your intentions to stick up for the FE in this terrible incident (and what the conversations in the cockpit actually meant seem to be open to interpretation anyway). If you had ever had training as a member of the flight crew in a multi engine operation, you would know that during flight (let alone at such a critical stage) a crew member NEVER acts in isolation, especially in the rather sensitive area of shutting down engines! To do so is to fly in the face of the most fundamental aspect of multi-crew operaions.
The emergency procedures on my fleet are as follows, I would be surprised if they were much different on Concorde.
I would be interested to hear from a current or former Concorde pilot as to what their procedure is for an emergency just prior to V1. My bet is that it doesn't invlove the FE unilaterally shutting down what he believes is the affected engine!
Edited for punctuation
[ 26 August 2001: Message edited by: beaver eager ]
Whilst your suggested solution to the Tenerife incident would indeed have prevented it, in making reference to it here you're simply not comparing like with like.
Our procedures allow for an engine to be shut down without reference to the other pilot, for example following an engine fire after landing. That is quite a different thing to what is being discussed on this thread and I must concur with BEagle on this one.
With an airspeed of around 200 kts, how survivable do you think that would be...??? Imagine running your car at 230 mph (370 km/hr) over a rough field with hedges, ditches etc. Not an option! Keep her flying at all costs. That is what it's certified for anyway, if limitations had been observed. Rest in peace.
In many incidences of aircraft crashing at very low altitudes when close to landing, there are some survivors (Sioux City, Kegworth). We have seen the result of losing flying control and crashing upside down from 200ft agl.
There is no grey area here.
And New Bloke,
I see from your profile that you are an IT consultant. Whilst I applaud your intentions to stick up for the FE in this terrible incident (and what the conversations in the cockpit actually meant seem to be open to interpretation anyway). If you had ever had training as a member of the flight crew in a multi engine operation, you would know that during flight (let alone at such a critical stage) a crew member NEVER acts in isolation, especially in the rather sensitive area of shutting down engines! To do so is to fly in the face of the most fundamental aspect of multi-crew operaions.
The emergency procedures on my fleet are as follows, I would be surprised if they were much different on Concorde.
- No actions (except controlling the flight path, of course) below 500ft agl apart from raising the gear and cancelling any aural/visual warning.
- At 500ft agl the handling pilot instructs the non-handling pilot to 'confirm the failure'
- Having agreed with the NHP's diagnosis, the HP instructs the NHP to carry out the appropriate drill.
I would be interested to hear from a current or former Concorde pilot as to what their procedure is for an emergency just prior to V1. My bet is that it doesn't invlove the FE unilaterally shutting down what he believes is the affected engine!
Edited for punctuation
[ 26 August 2001: Message edited by: beaver eager ]
Thread Starter
With so many years in service, there must be dozens of Concorde or ex-Concorde guys out there. What a pity that none of them will add some expertise as we thrash around looking for answers.....
And yes, that's a request/challenge, whatever.
And yes, that's a request/challenge, whatever.