I have to take issue with your points
cosmo kramer,
Whilst your suggested solution to the Tenerife incident would indeed have prevented it, in making reference to it here you're simply not comparing like with like.
Our procedures allow for an engine to be shut down without reference to the other pilot, for example following an engine fire after landing. That is quite a different thing to what is being discussed on this thread and I must concur with
BEagle on this one.
With an airspeed of around 200 kts, how survivable do you think that would be...??? Imagine running your car at 230 mph (370 km/hr) over a rough field with hedges, ditches etc. Not an option! Keep her flying at all costs. That is what it's certified for anyway, if limitations had been observed. Rest in peace.
Here you contradict yourself. On the one hand you say keep it flying at all costs. By definition that means (in this scenario) flying it 'downhill' to keep sufficient airspeed to retain control. Of course, le Bourget was a great idea but in having to maintain a descent to remain flying there is the strong possibility of having to land short of the runway.
In many incidences of aircraft crashing at very low altitudes when close to landing, there are some survivors (Sioux City, Kegworth). We have seen the result of losing flying control and crashing upside down from 200ft agl.
There is no grey area here.
And
New Bloke,
I see from your profile that you are an IT consultant. Whilst I applaud your intentions to stick up for the FE in this terrible incident (and what the conversations in the cockpit actually meant seem to be open to interpretation anyway). If you had ever had training as a member of the flight crew in a multi engine operation, you would know that during flight (let alone at such a critical stage) a crew member NEVER acts in isolation, especially in the rather sensitive area of shutting down engines! To do so is to fly in the face of the most fundamental aspect of multi-crew operaions.
The emergency procedures on my fleet are as follows, I would be surprised if they were much different on Concorde.
- No actions (except controlling the flight path, of course) below 500ft agl apart from raising the gear and cancelling any aural/visual warning.
- At 500ft agl the handling pilot instructs the non-handling pilot to 'confirm the failure'
- Having agreed with the NHP's diagnosis, the HP instructs the NHP to carry out the appropriate drill.
I would be interested to hear from a current or former Concorde pilot as to what their procedure is for an emergency just prior to V1. My bet is that it doesn't invlove the FE unilaterally shutting down what he believes is the affected engine!
Edited for punctuation
[ 26 August 2001: Message edited by: beaver eager ]