AIRBUS 17th DEC TELEX 2 DRAFT IBE6463 CRASH UIO
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AIRBUS 17th DEC TELEX 2 DRAFT IBE6463 CRASH UIO
FROM : AIRBUS FLIGHT SAFETY DEPARTAMENT TOULOUSE
>
>
>
> ACCIDENT INFORMATION TELEX - ACCIDENT INFORMATION TELEX
>
> SUBJECT: IBERIA FLIGHT IB6463 ACCIDENT IN QUITO, EQUADOR
> OUR REF: IBE6463 AIT Nº2 dated 17 December 2007
> PREVIOUS REF : IBE IB6463 AIT Nº1 dated 12 November 2007
>
> This AIT is an update of AIT IB6463 Nº1 regarding the A340-600 accident during landing
> on runway 35 at Quito, Ecuador, on the 09th of November 2007 at 17:10 local time.
>
> The data which follows has been approved for release by the commission of
> investigation led by the Ecuador Investigation Authorities.
>
> The analysis of available data, including the accident recorders (DFDR & CVR),
> indicates the following sequence of events.
>
> IB6463 was approaching on ILS 35 to Quito airport. Latest reported information to the
> crew during the final approach were:
> - wind 170/06;
> - visibility 3000m;
> - wet runway.
> The Captain was Pilot Flying (PF).
>
> Quito runway 35 altitude is 9198ft. The total runway length is 3120 m. The Landing
> Distance Available (LDA) is 3120 m. The runway is equipped with a PAPI. However this
> runway has an ILS displaced threshold of 510 m (remaining LDA for ILS approach is
> then 2610 m).
>
> The CVR records confirm the crew intent was initially to follow the ILS until sufficient
> visual references were available, then to leave the Glide Slope to visually capture and
> follow the PAPI path and use the full runway for landing.
>
> The approach was performed with both AP1&2 engaged in LOC and GLIDE track
> modes, A/THR engaged in managed speed mode. Till touchdown, A/THR maintained
> the VAPP. For final approach, the aircraft was configured to land (gear down, auto-brake
> set to HIGH, ground spoilers armed, flaps fully extended). Landing weight was 249t,
> Vapp 151 kt. Given the altitude and the tailwind, the True Air Speed was 181 kt and the Ground Speed 189kt.
>
> While AP 1+2 were engaged, the aircraft remained stabilized on the LOC and GLIDE.
> Runway 35 was in sight just prior to minimum, DA(H) being 9850ft(652ft).
>
> AP 1+2 were disconnected at the minimum. The PF applied nose-down stick inputs to
> reach the PAPI flight path. This resulted into an increased rate of descent above
> 1400ft/mn between 450ft and 150ft radio-altitude. The GPWS “SINK RATE” warning was
> triggered at 270ft radio-altitude, it was followed by transient nose-up inputs from the PF.
> As programed, the THS froze at 100ft, mantaining a sightly nose down position.
> The “SINK RATE” warning was triggered again below 50ft AGL.
> The A/THR commanded IDLE power, reducing the pitch up momentum.
>
> The touch-down ocurred at about 200m after the full runway threshold (remaining
> distance was 2920 m).
>
> The landing was extremely hard ( more than 3g vertical acceleration,
about 19ft/sec
> 1100ft/mn), which lead to:
> - Breakage of the lower articulation link of both Main Landing Gear (MLG);
> - Abrupt derotation of both bogie beams;
> - Burst at impact of all 4 MLG front wheels;
> - And damage of the wiring looms of RH an LH boogie proximity sensors that are
> used to detect the GROUND condition hence allowing engine thrust reversers
> deployment.
>
> As a consequence of the 4 MLG front wheels burst, the AUTO BRAKE function was lost.
>
> At touchdown, engine throttles were retarded to idle thus A/THR disengaged, and the
> ground spoilers deployed immediately.
>
> The thrust reversers were selected but did not deploy because the GROUND condition
> monitored by the Engines Control Computers was not fulfilled due to the above
> mentioned sensors loom damage. For the same reason, engines stayed at FLIGHT
> IDLE instead of GROUND IDLE.
>
> Full manual braking was applied 5 seconds after touchdown for the whole rollout. The
> average deceleration achieved during this landing phase was 0.15g.
It was consistent
> with:
> - the wet condition of the runway;
> - the 4 MLG front wheel tyre burst;
> - the non-deployment of the engine thrust reversers.
>
> The runway overrun occurred at 85kt in a right turn sideslip attitude resulting from right
> rudder pedal inputs. The aircraft finally came to a rest at about 200m from the runway
> end. All passengers and crew members were safely evacuated.
>
> At this stage of the investigation, Airbus reminds operators to comply with Standard
> Operating Procedure to achieve stabilized approach conditions. Go-around must be
> initiated if the stabilized conditions are not met at defined altitudes.
> Airbus also reminds, that under certain conditions a G/S or a Glide Path Angle not
> guarantee a stabilized approach.
> The engagement of A/THR is fully recomended for al flight phases, regarding the Pilot
> as the last responsible of its correct operation and use.
>
> Futher update will be provided through the normal communication channel to
> customers.
>
>
> YANNICK MALINGE
> VICE PRESIDENT FLIGHT SAFETY
> AIRBUS
>
>
> This e-mail is intended only for the above addressee. It my contain privileged information.
> If you are not the addressee you must not copy, distribute, disclose or use any of the information in it.
> If you have received it in error please delete it and immediately notify the sender.
> Security Notice: all e-mail, sent to or from this address, may be accessed by someone other than the recipient, for system management and security reasons.
> This access is controlled under Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000, Lawful Business Practises.
>
>
>
>
> ACCIDENT INFORMATION TELEX - ACCIDENT INFORMATION TELEX
>
> SUBJECT: IBERIA FLIGHT IB6463 ACCIDENT IN QUITO, EQUADOR
> OUR REF: IBE6463 AIT Nº2 dated 17 December 2007
> PREVIOUS REF : IBE IB6463 AIT Nº1 dated 12 November 2007
>
> This AIT is an update of AIT IB6463 Nº1 regarding the A340-600 accident during landing
> on runway 35 at Quito, Ecuador, on the 09th of November 2007 at 17:10 local time.
>
> The data which follows has been approved for release by the commission of
> investigation led by the Ecuador Investigation Authorities.
>
> The analysis of available data, including the accident recorders (DFDR & CVR),
> indicates the following sequence of events.
>
> IB6463 was approaching on ILS 35 to Quito airport. Latest reported information to the
> crew during the final approach were:
> - wind 170/06;
> - visibility 3000m;
> - wet runway.
> The Captain was Pilot Flying (PF).
>
> Quito runway 35 altitude is 9198ft. The total runway length is 3120 m. The Landing
> Distance Available (LDA) is 3120 m. The runway is equipped with a PAPI. However this
> runway has an ILS displaced threshold of 510 m (remaining LDA for ILS approach is
> then 2610 m).
>
> The CVR records confirm the crew intent was initially to follow the ILS until sufficient
> visual references were available, then to leave the Glide Slope to visually capture and
> follow the PAPI path and use the full runway for landing.
>
> The approach was performed with both AP1&2 engaged in LOC and GLIDE track
> modes, A/THR engaged in managed speed mode. Till touchdown, A/THR maintained
> the VAPP. For final approach, the aircraft was configured to land (gear down, auto-brake
> set to HIGH, ground spoilers armed, flaps fully extended). Landing weight was 249t,
> Vapp 151 kt. Given the altitude and the tailwind, the True Air Speed was 181 kt and the Ground Speed 189kt.
>
> While AP 1+2 were engaged, the aircraft remained stabilized on the LOC and GLIDE.
> Runway 35 was in sight just prior to minimum, DA(H) being 9850ft(652ft).
>
> AP 1+2 were disconnected at the minimum. The PF applied nose-down stick inputs to
> reach the PAPI flight path. This resulted into an increased rate of descent above
> 1400ft/mn between 450ft and 150ft radio-altitude. The GPWS “SINK RATE” warning was
> triggered at 270ft radio-altitude, it was followed by transient nose-up inputs from the PF.
> As programed, the THS froze at 100ft, mantaining a sightly nose down position.
> The “SINK RATE” warning was triggered again below 50ft AGL.
> The A/THR commanded IDLE power, reducing the pitch up momentum.
>
> The touch-down ocurred at about 200m after the full runway threshold (remaining
> distance was 2920 m).
>
> The landing was extremely hard ( more than 3g vertical acceleration,
about 19ft/sec
> 1100ft/mn), which lead to:
> - Breakage of the lower articulation link of both Main Landing Gear (MLG);
> - Abrupt derotation of both bogie beams;
> - Burst at impact of all 4 MLG front wheels;
> - And damage of the wiring looms of RH an LH boogie proximity sensors that are
> used to detect the GROUND condition hence allowing engine thrust reversers
> deployment.
>
> As a consequence of the 4 MLG front wheels burst, the AUTO BRAKE function was lost.
>
> At touchdown, engine throttles were retarded to idle thus A/THR disengaged, and the
> ground spoilers deployed immediately.
>
> The thrust reversers were selected but did not deploy because the GROUND condition
> monitored by the Engines Control Computers was not fulfilled due to the above
> mentioned sensors loom damage. For the same reason, engines stayed at FLIGHT
> IDLE instead of GROUND IDLE.
>
> Full manual braking was applied 5 seconds after touchdown for the whole rollout. The
> average deceleration achieved during this landing phase was 0.15g.
It was consistent
> with:
> - the wet condition of the runway;
> - the 4 MLG front wheel tyre burst;
> - the non-deployment of the engine thrust reversers.
>
> The runway overrun occurred at 85kt in a right turn sideslip attitude resulting from right
> rudder pedal inputs. The aircraft finally came to a rest at about 200m from the runway
> end. All passengers and crew members were safely evacuated.
>
> At this stage of the investigation, Airbus reminds operators to comply with Standard
> Operating Procedure to achieve stabilized approach conditions. Go-around must be
> initiated if the stabilized conditions are not met at defined altitudes.
> Airbus also reminds, that under certain conditions a G/S or a Glide Path Angle not
> guarantee a stabilized approach.
> The engagement of A/THR is fully recomended for al flight phases, regarding the Pilot
> as the last responsible of its correct operation and use.
>
> Futher update will be provided through the normal communication channel to
> customers.
>
>
> YANNICK MALINGE
> VICE PRESIDENT FLIGHT SAFETY
> AIRBUS
>
>
> This e-mail is intended only for the above addressee. It my contain privileged information.
> If you are not the addressee you must not copy, distribute, disclose or use any of the information in it.
> If you have received it in error please delete it and immediately notify the sender.
> Security Notice: all e-mail, sent to or from this address, may be accessed by someone other than the recipient, for system management and security reasons.
> This access is controlled under Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000, Lawful Business Practises.
>
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Merci beaucoup,
My fingers are very fast.
And I not doing any wrong because this telex was never sent, was a Draft.
I think it is important, because Airbus and Iberia are going to blame the pilot, and this aircraft model is not suitable for fields above 5500 feet.
Adieu
My fingers are very fast.
And I not doing any wrong because this telex was never sent, was a Draft.
I think it is important, because Airbus and Iberia are going to blame the pilot, and this aircraft model is not suitable for fields above 5500 feet.
Adieu
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The thrust reversers were selected but did not deploy because the GROUND condition monitored by the Engines Control Computers was not fulfilled due to the above mentioned sensors loom damage. For the same reason, engines stayed at FLIGHT IDLE instead of GROUND IDLE.
THS freeze at 100ft
This is to provide a simulation of the elevator control forces (as felt by the pilot) during the landing flare on a conventional aeroplane. Prior to that, Normal Law constantly re-trims the "trimable" horizontal stabiliser every time the pilot selects a new pitch angle, the IAS changes, or the wing is reconfigured.
Hope this helps.
Hope this helps.
Authority of weight-switches
Doors to Automatic, you might like to know that the provision of ground idle (as opposed to flight idle) for landing and taxying is a relatively recent thing (25 years). If it was possible to select it in the air, it might compromise the engines.
Similarly, selection of reverse thrust in the air went out with the Spey-powered Trident. [It used to enable an excrutiating rate of descent, I believe.]
I doubt that the certification authorities would allow an override, making it possible for either to be selected in the air. In this case, the aeroplane had every reason to "think" it was still airborne. Just as well the ground-spoilers deployed, or the brakes would have been even less effective...
Similarly, selection of reverse thrust in the air went out with the Spey-powered Trident. [It used to enable an excrutiating rate of descent, I believe.]
I doubt that the certification authorities would allow an override, making it possible for either to be selected in the air. In this case, the aeroplane had every reason to "think" it was still airborne. Just as well the ground-spoilers deployed, or the brakes would have been even less effective...
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I would humbly submit that landing that type of aircraft in Quito with a 6-knot tailwind will always involve a Dirty Dive.....
(See previous threads for description of PAPI vs. Glideslope there.)
(See previous threads for description of PAPI vs. Glideslope there.)
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think it is important, because Airbus and Iberia are going to blame the pilot, and this aircraft model is not suitable for fields above 5500 feet.
Do not SAA fly this type out of FAJS which is tad higher than 5500ft?
Do not SAA fly this type out of FAJS which is tad higher than 5500ft?
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Well I have never flown such a heavy jet at such elevation, but in this whole matter there is one piece of information that rings bells in my mind:
GS189 so ROD for a 3 degree path = 1000ft/min, this must require a big derotation and lots of anticipation.
It just doesn't sound possible to be stable on this approach at any time if at minimums you decide to land 500 shorter.
What is the required LDA for a WET RWY 35 with 10kts TW at Quito???
Maybe is also time to make this airbus planes a little bit more logical, I mean , spoilers deployed, pilot demanding reverse , tyres burst ( it would help if they had a pressure indiation/sensor), RA reading O, angle of attack constant and speed decreasing, pilot braking to the maximum,
How many more clues does an airbus need to know that it is on the ground???
GS189 so ROD for a 3 degree path = 1000ft/min, this must require a big derotation and lots of anticipation.
It just doesn't sound possible to be stable on this approach at any time if at minimums you decide to land 500 shorter.
What is the required LDA for a WET RWY 35 with 10kts TW at Quito???
Maybe is also time to make this airbus planes a little bit more logical, I mean , spoilers deployed, pilot demanding reverse , tyres burst ( it would help if they had a pressure indiation/sensor), RA reading O, angle of attack constant and speed decreasing, pilot braking to the maximum,
How many more clues does an airbus need to know that it is on the ground???
Last edited by eagle21; 3rd Feb 2008 at 21:24.
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I think it is important, because Airbus and Iberia are going to blame the pilot, and this aircraft model is not suitable for fields above 5500 feet.
Seems to me there was a disconnect back in Madrid long before the ground proximity detectors became disconnected.
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How many more clues does an airbus need to know that it is on the ground???
(sorry, but a 3g "landing" isn't a landing anymore...)
This thread has certainly given opportunity for the Airbus-knockers to get on-song again... One wonders if there might be a covert budget somewhere in Seattle! Ever since Airbus pioneered civil FBW (roll spoilers) and ECAM on the A310, 25 years ago, the wise guys have been taking the Mickey out of Airbus logic.
I also loved eagle21's sharp turn of phrase, though, and there's a lot in what he/she says. No doubt Airbus will be looking at their "aircraft on the ground and staying there" sensing logic, and considering introducing some more 'AND'-gates and 'OR'-gates. There's certainly not a shortage of available sensors. How can a non-VTOL aeroplane maintain 1g (vertical) at a negligible angle of attack (and IAS) if airborne?
Can Boeing aficionados assure us, however, of the infallibility of Boeing's logic in similar scenarios?
This aeroplane was indeed crippled, and the nose-gear weight switches (yes, they are fitted, but used for other systems) are arguably more vulnerable than the main-gear ones.
As for the mysterious Griffone, of dubious intent, he must be gutted that he was the leaker of non-news. But Airbus needs to avoid any accusations of being less than transparent, as in the A340 engine-run accident at Blagnac.
I also loved eagle21's sharp turn of phrase, though, and there's a lot in what he/she says. No doubt Airbus will be looking at their "aircraft on the ground and staying there" sensing logic, and considering introducing some more 'AND'-gates and 'OR'-gates. There's certainly not a shortage of available sensors. How can a non-VTOL aeroplane maintain 1g (vertical) at a negligible angle of attack (and IAS) if airborne?
Can Boeing aficionados assure us, however, of the infallibility of Boeing's logic in similar scenarios?
This aeroplane was indeed crippled, and the nose-gear weight switches (yes, they are fitted, but used for other systems) are arguably more vulnerable than the main-gear ones.
As for the mysterious Griffone, of dubious intent, he must be gutted that he was the leaker of non-news. But Airbus needs to avoid any accusations of being less than transparent, as in the A340 engine-run accident at Blagnac.
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Assuming that the fax is a reasonably fair assessment of events It's difficult to see how the guys up front can be totally absolved from this one... with the best will in the world it would appear that this accident began when the approach was commenced... A ppl with a whizz wheel could have calculated the effects of altitude/tail-wind on TAS... then factored for a wet runway... the dive to intercept the PAPIS/VASIS or whetever should have been the final wake-up call, after all this was never going to be a laid back approach... the pulses must have been racing .. what happened after the 'landing' re the unavailablility of some systems can be laid at the door of AI... heavy landing or not, a couple of broken undercarriage pieces should not turn an incident into a catastrophic accident... these won't be the last guys to screw up.
Chris Scott
...Similarly, selection of reverse thrust in the air went out with the Spey-powered Trident...
Hmm....could have sworn I was still using reverse thrust in the air, on a four-engined passenger jet, until about five years ago.
...Ever since Airbus pioneered civil FBW (roll spoilers) and ECAM on the A310, 25 years ago...
FBW (all control surfaces) was in use on (the same) civilian jet aircraft long before 1983.
Can't deny the Airbus heritage though!
Regards
Bellerophon
...Similarly, selection of reverse thrust in the air went out with the Spey-powered Trident...
Hmm....could have sworn I was still using reverse thrust in the air, on a four-engined passenger jet, until about five years ago.
...Ever since Airbus pioneered civil FBW (roll spoilers) and ECAM on the A310, 25 years ago...
FBW (all control surfaces) was in use on (the same) civilian jet aircraft long before 1983.
Can't deny the Airbus heritage though!
Regards
Bellerophon
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PA38-Pilot
Chris Scott
More reasons why the plane should assume it is on the ground when combined together.
Chris Scott
The thing is the pilots might have made an error, but the way the aicraft is designned did not help to recover this situation.
I am also an airbus pilot and sometimes it worries me that there have been many accidents in the past and there will be in future due what they call lack of understanding of the systems from the pilots side, but this is not always the case.
When people say that the airbus is an easy to fly plane they simly don't know what they are talking about , it is a serious step in aircraft design and we are still adjusting to it.
As an example: http://aviation-safety.net/database/...?id=20010207-0
As the crew applied TOGA power for a go-around, with both pilots pulling back on their sidesticks, the alpha protection law reduced the elevator nose-up command. Instead of a go- around, the aircraft struck the runway with a vertical speed of approx. 1,200 fpm.
This incident prompted Airbus to develop a modification to its flight control software. It will prevent the airplane's built-in protection against stall from being activated by a high rate of change in angle of attack
Quote:
How many more clues does an airbus need to know that it is on the ground???
Probably NOT crashing into the runway would help (sorry, but a 3g "landing" isn't a landing anymore...)
How many more clues does an airbus need to know that it is on the ground???
Probably NOT crashing into the runway would help (sorry, but a 3g "landing" isn't a landing anymore...)
How can a non-VTOL aeroplane maintain 1g (vertical) at a negligible angle of attack (and IAS) if airborne?
Chris Scott
Ialso loved eagle21's sharp turn of phrase, though, and there's a lot in what he/she says
I am also an airbus pilot and sometimes it worries me that there have been many accidents in the past and there will be in future due what they call lack of understanding of the systems from the pilots side, but this is not always the case.
When people say that the airbus is an easy to fly plane they simly don't know what they are talking about , it is a serious step in aircraft design and we are still adjusting to it.
As an example: http://aviation-safety.net/database/...?id=20010207-0
As the crew applied TOGA power for a go-around, with both pilots pulling back on their sidesticks, the alpha protection law reduced the elevator nose-up command. Instead of a go- around, the aircraft struck the runway with a vertical speed of approx. 1,200 fpm.
This incident prompted Airbus to develop a modification to its flight control software. It will prevent the airplane's built-in protection against stall from being activated by a high rate of change in angle of attack
