AIRBUS 17th DEC TELEX 2 DRAFT IBE6463 CRASH UIO

[J.O.]

The blather about him posting a confidential message is a waste of time. He is not posting anything confidential. I received the same AIT from the Airbus flight safety department on December 18, 2007. It is exactly as written in the opening posting of this thread.

When you crash an airplane onto the runway at over twice the normal rate of descent and G load, you must expect that stuff is going to break and not work exactly as designed. Blaming the pilot may be the easy thing to do, but it won't change the fact that the decision to send an A340, or any other heavy jet, into Quito in those conditions is an accident waiting to happen. If the stories are true, this operator had other landing incidents at Quito in the days and months leading up to this accident. The fact that they didn't see these events as a reason to rethink the plan is where the investigation should really be focussed.

[PositiveRate876]

What is the required LDA for a WET RWY 35 with 10kts TW at Quito???

I don't fly an A340-600, so I used the book for A340-500 in an overweight landing condition.

-255t (Accident A/C 249t)
-No autobrake or reverse credit
-Wet figures
-10kt tailwind
-9200ft elevation

Result: 2638m (which is just off the far end of the pavement)

actual landing distance to a complete stop from a point 50 feet above the landing surface with no margin included. (As done by an Airbus test pilot in Toulouse and without the 'Oh ****" factor)

[Strongresolve]

Is true, I work for a company that operates A320 and I have received the same AIT, but mine have some lines less.

I dont have anything about "The THS froze at 100 ft..." and "The A/THR commanded IDLE pwr..."

This clearly reflects behavior of this plane during a critical phase of the landing and the flare, rather than behavior of the pilots.

Here in Spain, I have listen stories of Iberia A340-600 crew having problems to reduce the rate of descente during the flare in high altitude fields, like Bogotá, touching hard the runway with the side stick in the full back position and with TOGA power.

I also know that Iberia has banned the A340-600 in Quito, and that Iberia´s A340 Crews have no information of what have really happened there. The company only have diseminated a four sheet presentation with almost no technical info, that only explains that the accident has been due to a hard landing. Only with the AIT, I have more information than them.

In response the crews are only landing in Quito with the A340-300 with dry runway, good visibility and headwind. If this conditions are not meet, they are diverting to Guayaquil.

[golfyankeesierra]

actual landing distance to a complete stop from a point 50 feet above the landing surface with no margin included. (As done by an Airbus test pilot in Toulouse and without the 'Oh ****" factor)

But without 5 secs delay in manual braking. 5 secs! Thats a long way when going at 189 kts.

BTW re "dirty dive": it has certainly been SOP for many years at UIO to follow the G/S and once visual aim at PAPI and normal t/d zone. Nothing wrong about that.
In fact it's the only way to get a heavy in there!

There is a youtube video somewhere about a KLM MD-11 approach into UIO.
That gives you an impression.
(Where I am now, you tube is blocked).

[Chris Scott]

Civilian FBW before 1983?

Sorry, Bellerophon, you have the advantage on me, and I give up. Which 4-engined passenger jet are you referring to? I think it may have been possible (but forbidden) to select reverse in the air on some 1960s/70s types, but FBW on all surfaces?

Hi, eagle21, I agree the A320 and descendants are not perfect. The sidestick has limitations (e.g., you can easily command some pitch accidentally when you only want roll). With autothrottle, I never did like the non-driven throttle levers, even after 13 years of flying them (although they are brilliant in manual thrust). But the overall package takes a lot of beating.

I hope the Boeing drivers/engineers will not overlook my request for a comparison between B777 and A340/A330 logic in the weight-switches-broken-on-landing scenario.

[J.O.]

BTW re "dirty dive": it has certainly been SOP for many years at UIO to leave the G/S and once visual aim at PAPI. Nothing wrong about that.
In fact it's the only way to get a heavy in there!

Just because it's always been done that way doesn't make it right. Almost every airline in the western world has maintained the "stabilized approach" concept as an integral part of their SOP for some time now, because they recognize the safety implications of dive and drive approaches. To ignore the basic principles of the stabilized approach concept because "it's the only way to get a heavy in there" is to ask for an accident.

[A-3TWENTY]

I`ve been there with the A-330 and with no problems at all, but I recognize this is a runway which requires extreme care.<

I fully understand the position of the Captain regarding to touch in the very begining of the runway since during the last 400,,500 mts the runway is very contaminated with rubber and deposits , and it is not uncommon to feel the antiskid releasing the wheels at speeds as low as 60, 70 kts when the runway is wet which was the case.

175kts -185 kts are common TAs during final...

And circling to runway 17 is not the best things to do with a heavy during daylight...imagine at night...

Poor guy...A lot of headache...

[PA38-Pilot]

Sorry, Bellerophon, you have the advantage on me, and I give up. Which 4-engined passenger jet are you referring to? I think it may have been possible (but forbidden) to select reverse in the air on some 1960s/70s types, but FBW on all surfaces?

Im quite sure he's talking about the pointy one

[NigelOnDraft]

Sorry, Bellerophon, you have the advantage on me, and I give up. Which 4-engined passenger jet are you referring to? I think it may have been possible (but forbidden) to select reverse in the air on some 1960s/70s types, but FBW on all surfaces?

The clues are there Airbus "heritage"... until 5 years ago...

[Chris Scott]

Ouch...

Ah, the pointy one. And the car alarms going off. Halcyon days... Never would have guessed I was in such distinguished (analog) company.

But reverse in the air?

[SeenItAll]

Comparison with BA B777 at LHR

It will be very interesting to compare this landing of the IB A346 at UIO at a vertical descent of 19 fps with the descent parameters of the BA B777 at LHR.

Although the reasons for each accident's initiation appear to have been quite different, both aircraft structures seem to have experienced similar physical challenges in dealing with the landing -- fast descent, broken MLG, IB: no significant reverse thrust, BA: no significant thrust at all.

Both likely to be a trove of comparative information about these planes' structural failure modes.

[golfyankeesierra]

@J.O.

Just because it's always been done that way doesn't make it right. Almost every airline in the western world has maintained the "stabilized approach" concept as an integral part of their SOP for some time now, because they recognize the safety implications of dive and drive approaches. To ignore the basic principles of the stabilized approach concept because "it's the only way to get a heavy in there" is to ask for an accident.

The approach I talk about is NOT a dive and drive approach as you call it.
There are 2 glidepath's, one ILS and one visual. The idea is to transfer at the DA (650') to the visual PAPI glideslope and aim at the normal touchdownzone.
And not to make a stukadive to the threshold in order to cross that at 1 ft.
That's what I call a dive approach.

Of course I agree on the concept of stabilized approaches but there are some airports where the reality is a little bit more challenging. So your airline puts you in the sim or on the jumpseat before you fly in there.

And of course UIO is a much more critical operation than your average 3500m sealevel runway but it's not less safe then say Kai Tak used to be.
Didn't hear many pilots object to that approach.

BTW several sinkrate-warnings on (short) final is not stabilized imho.

[golfyankeesierra]

It will be very interesting to compare this landing of the IB A346 at UIO at a vertical descent of 19 fps with the descent parameters of the BA B777 at LHR.

But there are large differences as well; the triple landed at low speed (stall speed? 100kts? any one?) in soft ground, and the Iberia at almost double speed (189kts GS) on concrete and on a considerable upslope.

Anyone remembers the upslope of the beginning of UIO 35?

[Strongresolve]

SEQU

RWY 35 SLOPE +0,4% LDA ILS 2610m LDA PAPI 3120m

ILS SLOPE 3,2º PAPI SLOPE 3,1º

DIFERENCE OF MAXIMUM LANDING WEIGHT A340E ILS VS PAPI (X1000KG)

ILS DRY WIND CALM 200.8 FULL FLAP
ILS WET WIND CALM 179.0 FULL FLAP

PAPI DRY WIND CALM 227.1 FULL FLAP
PAPI WET WIND CALM 206.4 FULL PLAP

PER 5 KNTS TAIL WIND SUBSTRACT APROX -11.0 (DRY AND WET)

A340E MLW IS 190.0 (X 1000 KG.)

[Doors to Automatic]

Surely the logic could be programmed such that if Radio Alt =0 and/or Airspeed < say 120kts allow thrust over-ride.

This would allow an emergency over-ride in the event of an occasional 3g landing (which takes out the sensors) and avoid write-off of aircraft and/or casualties whilst not allowing anything stupid to be done in the air.

Sound reasonable?

[Check Airman]

I entirely agree that the plane could have been "smarter" so that it could sense that it was on the ground (pilot applying brakes, selecting reversers, nosewheel weight etc...), but I wonder if a Boeing would be any smarter? In either event, I'm not trying to start an Airbus/Boeing debate. Remember that with each added level of complexity to the air/ground sensing, there's something else to go wrong.

I wonder what people think of having a reverser override, or air/ground override switch? It would obviously have to be guarded, but I think it may have saved the day (if not the tires) in Quito.

Also I'm not going to dwell on the tailwind too much. Whenever a pilot lands with a tailwind, people are ready to jump down his throat. Yes, a headwind is better, but sometimes the bigger picture dictates that you take the tailwind.

[Check Airman]

Sensible suggestion Doors to Auto, but I see that for good reason, you've chosen a reasonably low speed. Remember that reversers become less effective as you slow down, so that speed would best be a bit higher...but then you loose the protection...

[Mad (Flt) Scientist]

Surely the logic could be programmed such that if Radio Alt =0 and/or Airspeed < say 120kts allow thrust over-ride.

And if the radalt fails? That then allows inadvertent TR deployment in-air. (if it's an OR gate).

The existing systems for determining the "on ground" state are intentionally complex in order to minimise the risk of inadvertent in-air deployment, even in the event of (possibly dormant) system failures. The hazard associated with in-air deployment is, for most types, severe. The hazard of failure to deploy on-ground is IN GENERAL small - because normal planning factors have sufficient margin to account for failure (or non-use) of reversers. Therefore the correct risk management approach is to bias the design to address the in-air problem, not the on-ground one.

[Togalk]

I fly this Airplane all the time, it looks like to me, the boys screwed up, plain and simple.

[mustpost]

As SLF just putting in my tuppence-worth. Indeed one notices how approaches have changed over the years - I still remember a TAP 707 into Faro 25 years ago which involved a "dirty dive" and a split arse landing .
I still wake up at night....