Bmi Airbus lands with park brake on (Report)
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It would be nice to know if someone had looked at the Human Factors elements in this one, of which there seem to be several from the report linked above, and taken the appropriate action to prevent a re-occurrence.
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Like this:
The aircraft manufacturer said there had been five similar events worldwide and the operator said it had now updated its pre-landing checks.
Click here to go to the report on the AAIB web site.
I've seen pictures - can't remember where - of an American nuclear power station were some handles had beer taps on the from different brewers, so as to more rapidly and accurately identify them.
A simple non-software fix is at hand !
I've seen pictures - can't remember where - of an American nuclear power station were some handles had beer taps on the from different brewers, so as to more rapidly and accurately identify them.
A simple non-software fix is at hand !
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Even Concorde had a system that wouldn't allow the brakes to become effective until the wheels had spun up.... Is there any feasible reason you would WANT to land with the parking brake on?
If not (and I can't see that there is but I'm not yet a pilot) surely Airbus could have implemented a similar warning/advisory message on the ECAM or some kind of system that prevents the parking brake being applied while airborne?
If not (and I can't see that there is but I'm not yet a pilot) surely Airbus could have implemented a similar warning/advisory message on the ECAM or some kind of system that prevents the parking brake being applied while airborne?
Whoops.....I slipped up asking about the HF angle had been looked at, based on the BBC report, before reading the AAIB report.
The operator even called in a psychologist to help them with this aspect. So it was a silly question.
But I am doubtful about what then happened. The report picks up a number of issues that could be described as contributory, but the eventual single recommendation only concerns changing SOPs to include a look at the lower right quadrant of the ECAM screen in the pre-landing checks.
With respect to AAIB, this is only going to capture the error if, or when it's made again, and does nothing to prevent it happening in the first place.
In the engineering world, a Boeing MEDA investigation, now in common use, systematically analyses ALL contributory factors, and then derives from that analysis recommendations to prevent a re-occurrence of the error, not just to improve its capture. Most events are found to be the culmination of a number of contributory factors leading to errors and, perhaps, violations.
The AAIB report, and /or the psychologist's report, quite rightly mentions the lever design and location, cockpit workload, and the commander's focus on the weather, as contributory factors. But it was not a systematic analysis, and the recommendation ignored most of the contributory factors it did find. I'll bet there were some more, too.
It's not the AAIB's job only to make recommendations with little financial impact. For example; was the design issue irrelevant? Not according to the report; "The ability to grasp the parking brake handle in a similar manner to the flap selector......may.. have prevented the commander from obtaining initial tactile feedback...". It's what we old folk call a "Murphy" and they need to be fixed when found, not left to entrap the next poor sod (This was No 5, wasn't it?).
The sentence
may well be a realistic take on our approach to safety today, but it makes me weep. Simply rewriting the pre-landing check to improve the probability of capturing the error is totally inadequate.
The operator even called in a psychologist to help them with this aspect. So it was a silly question.
But I am doubtful about what then happened. The report picks up a number of issues that could be described as contributory, but the eventual single recommendation only concerns changing SOPs to include a look at the lower right quadrant of the ECAM screen in the pre-landing checks.
With respect to AAIB, this is only going to capture the error if, or when it's made again, and does nothing to prevent it happening in the first place.
In the engineering world, a Boeing MEDA investigation, now in common use, systematically analyses ALL contributory factors, and then derives from that analysis recommendations to prevent a re-occurrence of the error, not just to improve its capture. Most events are found to be the culmination of a number of contributory factors leading to errors and, perhaps, violations.
The AAIB report, and /or the psychologist's report, quite rightly mentions the lever design and location, cockpit workload, and the commander's focus on the weather, as contributory factors. But it was not a systematic analysis, and the recommendation ignored most of the contributory factors it did find. I'll bet there were some more, too.
It's not the AAIB's job only to make recommendations with little financial impact. For example; was the design issue irrelevant? Not according to the report; "The ability to grasp the parking brake handle in a similar manner to the flap selector......may.. have prevented the commander from obtaining initial tactile feedback...". It's what we old folk call a "Murphy" and they need to be fixed when found, not left to entrap the next poor sod (This was No 5, wasn't it?).
The sentence
He was not the first one and will for sure not be the last one
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For example; was the design issue irrelevant?
If you have to apply the footbrakes to engage the Parking brake then it is highly unlikely that you will do that in flight.
Airbus's switch might make the F/C workload easier but has obvious implications for safety.
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Many moons ago on the Vanguard the procedure was that the handling pilot on take off used to apply the footbrakes for a couple of seconds to stop the wheels from spinning before calling for the undercarriage to be raised.
The manufacturer thought that the forces on retraction might, over time, cause damage to the undercarriage. If however an engine failed on take off then the pilot called for undercarriage up straight away, to remove the drag as quickly as possible.
When base training a simulated failure might be done a dozen times in a detail so the procedure was for the trainee to call for the undercarriage keeping his feet on the floor, the training captain discretely pulled and released the handbrake to stop the wheels before the gear was raised.
I think you're all probably ahead of me here, the rubber marks were clearly visible ten years later.
The manufacturer thought that the forces on retraction might, over time, cause damage to the undercarriage. If however an engine failed on take off then the pilot called for undercarriage up straight away, to remove the drag as quickly as possible.
When base training a simulated failure might be done a dozen times in a detail so the procedure was for the trainee to call for the undercarriage keeping his feet on the floor, the training captain discretely pulled and released the handbrake to stop the wheels before the gear was raised.
I think you're all probably ahead of me here, the rubber marks were clearly visible ten years later.
Last edited by Seat1APlease; 13th Sep 2007 at 22:26. Reason: I meant on the rudder to control the swing not on the floor
Latest aircraft have an ECAM warning if park brake is set in flight. Can't remember if it is being retrofitted with new software updates. I seem to remember from my distant 737 days that it had locked wheel protection, would that have helped if the park brake was set or did it just stop you bursting a tyre if your size 12s were on the brake pedals?
If it's the one I am thinking of then I am sure he was a great help
The operator even called in a psychologist to help them with this aspect.
I had a quick search as I thought it had been covered before...have a look at
http://www.pprune.org/forums/showthr...=parking+brake
and
http://www.pprune.org/forums/showthr...=parking+brake
with colour pictures!!
http://www.pprune.org/forums/showthr...=parking+brake
and
http://www.pprune.org/forums/showthr...=parking+brake
with colour pictures!!
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some of these posts particularly those knocking airbus a bit off the mark. Quite a few aircraft from various manufacturers have done exactly the same. Also most airliners including airbus have some form of anti-skid (like ABS) and have done since Dunlop's Maxaret system was marketed in the 1960's. But it won't help in landing with the park brake on.
Similar things have happened on Boeings. I have seen on more than one occassion hands go to the flap lever instead of the gear lever when asking for gear up. Different levers but with the same action and associated with each others use could lead to mistaken operation.
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Another angle...
Was listening to David Gunson's "What goes up..." yesterday. Ironic, isn't it - he reminds us in his typically hilarious way of the stench of burning rubber, the bangs from the tyres and the mountain of paperwork to follow. Hilarious the way he tells it; the reality is... just the same, only without the hilarity. Glad everyone safe.
JC
JC
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i do recall I asked last year can you set the parking brake in flight on an airbus and the usual detractors just took the piss and laughed me off the stage.....why would a fool do such a thing was the smut written....well now I know you can set it.....I feel sorry for the skipper but setting the parking brake on approach is no excuse.