Concorde documentary

[TwoTun]

Fen Boy;
you said:
<New Bloke - all the fuel tanks on each side feed into each other - it would have burnt for a long time with a flow of 65 litres per second.. >

Once Tank 5 emptied itself through the hole, the crew could have stopped fuel from any other tank feeding into Tank 5. The controls are on the FE's panel, and would have been a simple thing to do.

I also seem to remember that the leak rate was calculated to be somewhere in the region of 100 litres per second, or about 10 tonnes per minute.

[Vfrpilotpb]

Would the slightly odd fact of Cptn Martys lack of full medical cert, have had any implications on the Air France insurance cover, and is that why they seem to have made a very quick( for accident type settlements that is) settlement for all of the pax? And could that be why they have instigated legal proceedings in the hope of some recovery from some third party A/C operator?

[WOK]

AAAaaaarghh - MAGNUS PICUS:

I appreciate your sentiments, but let me make this clear to everyone who may suffer the same misapprehension:-

JOHN H. IS RETIRED AND NOTHING TO DO WITH THE CONC FLEET!

Yes I did intend to shout...

[Flap 5]

I have also seen the program and I don't recall anyone criticizing the crew, accept at one point where John Hucthinson stated that he would be interested to know why the FE shut down the no.2 engine. I thought that his contribution to the program and to the investigation was excellent and the fact that he is now retired has no bearing on his knowledge of Concorde.

The AF pilot was overly protective of AF, obviously concerned at the legal ramifications of AF being found negiligent in any way. This is a cynical attitude after so many people died in such an appalling accident.

The fact that the F/O's medical had expired is a red herring and only applies to the legality of the flight crew.

John Hutchinson did mention the fact that the aircraft was overweight due to the excess taxi fuel, baggage and the tailwind. Does that make him 'in love' with the aircraft? (only a Frenchman could say that)!

[ 09 September 2001: Message edited by: Flap 5 ]

[Magnus Picus]

WOK - I wasn't referring to JH. It was MB I spoke of.

[basil fawlty]

Jackonicko,
You obviously have absolutely no idea about acting as a professional flightcrew member, especially in an abnormal/emergency situation. What should have been done in your (theoretical) opinion will probably make most of the real professional aviators reading it laugh out loud at your naivity. Yes, the flight was not perfect, but thats the real world mate, and the points you raise HAD ABSOLUTELY NO EFFECT ON THE EVENTUAL (SAD) OUTCOME.
If you would care to re-read my last post you will see that I said IN MY EXPERIENCE many pilots technical knowledge is not of a level to make such comments. I stand by that statement regardless of whatever anyone else says. Could your average ATPL change a brakepack for example? or even know where to start? You are trying to lecture a well qualified individual here, and sorry "mate" but it just makes you look sad.....

[twistedenginestarter]

Jackonicko

You are being very adamant about this thing but I'm struggling to pick up the substance of your argument.

Go over to 747Focal's thread on Tech Log and read the official (albeit French) report.

The crew did just what I would expect. The No 2 engine had to be switched off. The captain called for fire drill. There was no argument. Maybe the Flight Engineer made the decision but it was exactly what the captain was going to call for anyway.

The plane was maintaining height and 200 kts for quite a while. Then it crashed. So far I have to agree with the report - physical damage caused the control system(s) to start to fail. It didn't need much given the extreme nature of the situation.

Now tell me what the crew did wrong.

If this is all true then the documentary was correct to paint the picture it did.

The moment the DC10 rubbing strip fell onto the runway, the fate of all those people was sealed.

The documentary just looked out how the final drama was played out. There was little else to add.

[Seat 32F]

The moment the DC10 rubbing strip fell onto the runway, the fate of all those people was sealed.

So if the runway had been swept before Concorde's departure, the accident would not have happened. Which leads me to ask:

1 - what is the normal frequency of take off / landings before runways are swept.

2 - would the runway normally be swept anyway in advance of a Concorde take off / landing given its known vulnerability of tyre damage.

[Jackonicko]

Basil

1) Most of the questions I have raised were also raised by current, practising ATPLs or heavy jet military pilots. Pilots, mark you, not flight engineers, and most of these questions involve an element of judgement as to CRM, the responsibilities of the aircraft captain, and the handling of large commercial aircraft.

2) My 'naive' comments are clearly a product of my training (RAFGSA, RAFVR (UAS), BAFC, etc.). Strangely all of those organisations stressed the need to slavishly adhere to legal maxima and minima and dictated that in emergency, one should stick to established procedure, and not to 'make it up as you go along'.

3) To state that taking off several tonnes overweight, (perhaps with an out-of-limits c of g) careering off the runway thanks to the missing spacer, rotating early (for whatever reason) and having the FE shut down an engine when it was still producing thrust had no effect on the eventual outcome makes you look foolish, not me. As does your apparent contempt for the technical knowledge and abilities of your fellow industry professionals, and your arrogance "I stand by that statement regardless of whatever anyone else says." Mate.


Twisted,

From your profile, I don't know if I'm arguing with a fellow aviator or not, but if your line is that the accident report is right, end of story, then your confidence in it is an example to many highly qualified and experienced pilots.

Naturally I have read the report (in all three versions) and must say that the disparity between structural MTOW, ATOW and RTOW which it reveals is quite breathtaking, as was the manner in which the crew took over the planning from the despatcher when he started being 'troublesome' about the weight. Suffice it to say that many professionals are uneasy about the way in which elements in the chain which clearly had some influence on the disaster were either ignored or dismissed. I suggest that you read the last two Concorde accident threads (one started by me, then one by BEagle) and examine the profiles of those commenting on these factors. Perhaps you'd explain why the factors raised are irrelevant, rather than enjoining us to believe and accept the official report uncritically.

Why do you choose to believe the BEA report over the report prepared by AF Concorde aircrew for the French magistrate, by the way?

I happen to accept that the tyre burst probably was caused by FOD (the magistrates report does not, quoting evidence showing that the tyre had already burst by the time it ran over the strip) and even that the strip came from the Continental DC10 (again, many do not accept this as the origin of the strip).

Moreover, one must question whether a 37 cycle tyre (no BA Concorde tyre does this many landings) would have burst had it not been subject to the stress of an overweight take off (perhaps even a succession of overweight take offs) 'scrubbing' sideways thanks to the missing spacer? Or even whether a Dunlop tyre would have shed debris large enough to cause this kind of result on the tank?

One must also ask whether the hydraulic/hydrostatic shock which caused the tank to explode outwards was a function of its having been filled past its maximum capacity? A slightly emptier tank may have absorbed the shock of the tyre hitting its underside, whereas the fuel in the 'full to bursting' tank had 'nowhere to go'.

Concorde has survived tyre bursts and massive fuel leaks before, however, and what was different in this accident was that there was an ignition source and that the aircraft failed to gain and maintain sufficient airspeed to stay in the air long enough to reach Le Bourget. Hence the relevance of the engine shutdown, and the question of airspeed/altitude and the final turn.

Ask yourself the question. Had it been within its legal, certificated weight limits, and had the crew opted to take off into wind, and had the tyres been newer, and had the fuel tank been emptier, and had the aircraft's undercarriage been serviceable (and thus had the aircraft accelerated more normally) and had the FE not shut down the engine, and had the Captain reached a higher airspeed, and had he turned for Le Bourget even as he crossed the road, would the aircraft still have departed and killed everyone on board?

And they call it a single-cause accident.

Barking!

[Al Weaver]

Quote

"
So if the runway had been swept before Concorde's departure, the accident would not have happened. Which leads me to ask:

1 - what is the normal frequency of take off / landings before runways are swept.

2 - would the runway normally be swept anyway in advance of a Concorde take off / landing given its known vulnerability of tyre damage."

The above seems to be focused on the initiating events. This is normally reserved to lawyers attempting to assign blame among multiple imperfections they care little about understanding.

There are hundreds of initiating events that occur each day in commercial flights yet almost none result in a catastrophic result such as a crash. This is because the design of the product has considered that these events will occur, even with multiple interactions, and that some consequences will result. The design intent was to minimize the number of likely interactions and to mitigate or apply barriers such that the consequential result will not be catastrophic to the passengers. It was therefore assumed that planes using runways would leave parts behind occasionally. If you have ever walked in the grass beside a runway, you would find enough parts to build an aircraft someday.

It was also assumed that some of these parts would cause cut tyres and even flat tyres. After all this data has been documented and recorded on all types of aircraft for years. However, the frequency of a blown tyre causing a fuel tank rupture is extremely rare indeed, no doubt due to the robustness of the fuel tank structure to the more hazardous (size number and release speed of) uncontained engine fragment.

Then after the aircraft was certified under these assumptions, new data became available which raised issues ,not about the initiating event (debris on the runway), but the consequential assumptions of energetic tyre ruptures that could/would puncture fuel tank skins. Some of these lessons were recognized and reinforcing and better understanding of these lessons has now been brought home with the recertification of the aircraft after the unexpected catastrophic accident. What is now being dealt with is a key part of the accident causal chain that will be most practical to interrupt.

Anybody who thinks that the can eliminate the initiating part of the causal chain is kidding themselves.

[Seat 32F]

lomapaseo

Thankyou. I apologise for asking naive questions, and no I am not a lawyer. But regardless of everything else, surely if it was known that Concorde was especially susceptible to the consequences of tyre damage then would it not have been a rudimentary precaution to ensure that the chances of this happening were minimised by the expedient of a runway sweep before each departure? Or is this a 'let's assume we'll get away with it this time' scenario?

[BEagle]

So, basil, 'the flight was not perfect but that's the real world' eh? Are you saying then, that in your 'real world', lip service is paid to performance calculations and that questioning CRM standards is, for some reason, not acceptable? Commercial pressures encouraging flight crews to take short cuts to which airlines turn a blind eye can never be acceptable. Does that sort of thing go on in your airline? If so, please tell us for whom you fly so that we can choose a safer carrier?
The company culture which led to what must be now be well documented errors must seriously be in question; perhaps Concorde's fire would never have happened if the aircraft hadn't been put at risk before the take-off roll was even begun.

Accident inquiries seek the truth these days, they do not apportion blame. Some very searching questions have been posed on this thread - but there has also, regrettably, been considerable nonsense posted by others.

[shortfinals]

One of the early factors in the BA decision to keep flying after the accident was the fact that it had reinforced the water deflector and AF had not.

So isn't it interesting that one of the requirements in the new airworthiness directive for recertification states that the water deflectors are NOT to be reinforced. Reinforcing the deflector, apparently, may make it marginally less likely to become a missile, but renders it a much more dangerous missile if it separates.

So if BA's first justification for mounting it's high horse is now judged to be a faulty premise, I wonder what else has yet to be revealed?

Of course, like some of the other factors which have been mentioned in this thread, the water deflector was, in the first interim report, ruled out as a cause or a factor in this accident. But the CAA and DGAC both know that it has punctured the wing at least once before and presumably want to minimise any effects if it happens again. Incidentally, the water deflectors have to be remodelled anyway because the new Michelin (not Pirelli) tyres have slightly different dimensions.

I must admit that, for all John H's good intentions and his evident pride in BA's Concorde operating standards (and incidentally, I believe BA's standards ARE high), I think he has probably done the company's image more harm than good in this programme.

I agree, Orlebar ought to have been given a say as well. His style would have contrasted with John H's and produced a more balanced result.

[Jackonicko]

Iom

To be strictly accurate, the tank was not punctured by tyre debris, it was burst from within by hydraulic/hydrostatic shock. The tyre debris hit the underside of the tank, and set up a shock wave inside the tank, which 'bounced back' and caused a rupture. This rupture from within 'blew out' a much larger piece of tank than a penetrative hole might have caused. This is why it is interesting to ask whether a less full tank have burst in the same way?

[D Beaver]

There is an excellent article on the Concorde accident and the issues surrounding it in the August/September issue of the Smithsonian Air & Space magazine. A summary of the article and a sample of the magnificent photography can be seen at http://www.airspacemag.com/asm/mag/latest.html.

More interestingly, on the same site, is the text of the passenger's report to the NTSB about the 1979 Dulles incident http://www.airspacemag.com/ASM/mag/s...ncordance.html. The difficulty that the passenger had in getting the cabin crew to appreciate the situation makes for scary reading.

[ 10 September 2001: Message edited by: D Beaver ]

[fen boy]

As I understand it one of the main reasons for the removal of the cable from the water deflector is that, in the unlikely event, that the new tyres do burst then they will shed smaller parts in a different spread than the old tyres did. Hence the manufacturers changed view on the deflector.

[basil fawlty]

Jackonicko, (copy BEagle!)

You seem to think that everything in commercial aviation is clear cut in black and white, but in reality there are many grey areas. Yes, of course we all strive for perfection and precision as professional crews (via the use of SOP's, operating limits etc.), but, sometimes, through no fault of our own, the chain of events and the "system" we have to operate in means that this is not quite attained from time to time. This is what safety margins are for....to ensure a SAFE operation under REAL WORLD CONDITIONS.
Where exactly did I state that the a/c was "several tonnes" overweight?? Bit of a journalistic exaggeration there. IF the a/c was 1.5 tonnes overweight, then I believe that this is only 0.8% of MTOW and 0.9% of RTOW. The rotation speed is typically around 160 kts, so even a 5 kt tailwind component will add a relatively short extra distance to the TO run, given the high acceleration rate of the Concorde aircraft.
Both of these factors are absorbed easily into the available performance margins. This is NOT a desirable scenario, but the a/c got airborne OK. The problems that caused the crash were totally seperate.
I have discussed the dreadful event with friends who have flown Concorde in service at BA, and they agree with my comments.
It is very easy to say the crew should have done this, or the crew shouldn't have done that, blah blah blah. I think that the crew played a fair hand with the cards that they were dealt, and you, mate, are in no position to offer respectable criticism.
Finally with reference to the technical knowledge of ATPL's, I can speak only as I find...Some good, some less so. It is adequate for the day to day normal operation but abnormal/emergency situations?? When our a/c have gone tech away from base the best thing that the pilots can do is go and sip coffee in the terminal cafeteria!! When certain pilots (especially on TV progs) start waxing lyrical about such and such part was wrong/missing/needed changing etc. then they are out of their depth. Sorry, but thats a FACT.

[Jackonicko]

Well over the maximum legal structural weight. Even more over the RTOW for that day's conditions (estimated at 6 tonnes). Fuel tanks over-filled to bursting. Faulty undercarriage maintenance. A 37-cycle tyre pushed beyond its limits? An engine shut down at the wrong time, with catastrophic results. Unanswered questions all over the place. Great unease expressed by AF Concorde aircrew with the BEA report. But you ('cos you know so much more than these mere pilots) know better. It would be funny, were your attitude not so dangerous.

[basil fawlty]

Jackonicko,
It seems to me that it is YOU that THINKS he knows better than everyone else. As I stated previously, my opinions are broadly concurred with by BA Concorde pilots. What qualification do you have to argue against their knowledge and experience?
It seems to me that if I told you my favourite colour was blue, you would try and lecture me that it was not!!
The REAL skill in COMMERCIAL aviation is not purely passing exams and flight tests. It is turning in a consistently SAFE operation despite all of the factors that would cause otherwise.
I will state one more time....
There were mistakes made, the flight was not perfect, BUT the aircraft ultimately crashed for one reason only; because IT WAS SEVERELY ON FIRE.

[Jackonicko]

I listen to what those with relevant experience tell me. Unless and until your wife and all your family bombard me with suggestions that your favourite colour is red, and until I see that you have a red car and wear red shirts and a red hat, I wouldn't dream of questioning your colour choice.

I only wish that some-one could allay my fears and concerns over all of the factors which have been mentioned in this and other threads. I don't prtend to know better than anyone - my role is to weigh and evaluate what evidence others bring to the party.

I would take your opinion much more seriously had you not attempted to undermine the credibility of other experts by casting generalised aspersions at their technical competence, and had you not expressed such contempt and disregard for rules, regulations and procedures. Flying should never be an intuitive game.

Finally, you are factually incorrect. The aircraft did not crash because it was on fire. It crashed because the crew lost control (which may or may not have been as a result of control problems caused by the fire). The aircraft crashed because drag exceeded lift.