One of the early factors in the BA decision to keep flying after the accident was the fact that it had reinforced the water deflector and AF had not.
So isn't it interesting that one of the requirements in the new airworthiness directive for recertification states that the water deflectors are NOT to be reinforced. Reinforcing the deflector, apparently, may make it marginally less likely to become a missile, but renders it a much more dangerous missile if it separates.
So if BA's first justification for mounting it's high horse is now judged to be a faulty premise, I wonder what else has yet to be revealed?
Of course, like some of the other factors which have been mentioned in this thread, the water deflector was, in the first interim report, ruled out as a cause or a factor in this accident. But the CAA and DGAC both know that it has punctured the wing at least once before and presumably want to minimise any effects if it happens again. Incidentally, the water deflectors have to be remodelled anyway because the new Michelin (not Pirelli) tyres have slightly different dimensions.
I must admit that, for all John H's good intentions and his evident pride in BA's Concorde operating standards (and incidentally, I believe BA's standards ARE high), I think he has probably done the company's image more harm than good in this programme.
I agree, Orlebar ought to have been given a say as well. His style would have contrasted with John H's and produced a more balanced result.