TAM A320 crash at Congonhas, Brazil
Join Date: Jan 2001
Location: UK
Posts: 2,044
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
Could someone enlighten us as to how much thrust 1.20 EPR produces on the A320?
You set 1.05 on IAEs (cf 50% N1 on CFMs) to "stabilise" engines at start of takeoff roll...
Join Date: Mar 2006
Location: A oneworld lounge near you
Posts: 145
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
ArmChair: Please note, as per previous comments between myself and Our man
1. There is no stopway part of the runway strip at this airport
2. There is no Runway End Safety Area at this airport
3. The standards and recommended practices are those published by ICAO and not IFALPA
Previous poster requesting information on the location of the localiser. It is off the stop end of the runway on the huge structure which you can see on the pictures of the crash site, painted white/orange squares. You can see its shadow on the Google Earth picture. It is approximately 90 metres off the end of the runway.
If you are off centreline, then the closer you get to the localiser, the greater the dot deviation. Ignore the last data point on LOC 2 as this is likely to be a null return at impact. Ignore the Glideslope deviations as they are not used in the part of the flight envelope shown. Ignore the radalt signals if you want to watch the descent profile, use the pressure altitude.
The FDR data is showing some bias on some traces and I have not detected any reverse logic in the recordings yet.
1. There is no stopway part of the runway strip at this airport
2. There is no Runway End Safety Area at this airport
3. The standards and recommended practices are those published by ICAO and not IFALPA
Previous poster requesting information on the location of the localiser. It is off the stop end of the runway on the huge structure which you can see on the pictures of the crash site, painted white/orange squares. You can see its shadow on the Google Earth picture. It is approximately 90 metres off the end of the runway.
If you are off centreline, then the closer you get to the localiser, the greater the dot deviation. Ignore the last data point on LOC 2 as this is likely to be a null return at impact. Ignore the Glideslope deviations as they are not used in the part of the flight envelope shown. Ignore the radalt signals if you want to watch the descent profile, use the pressure altitude.
The FDR data is showing some bias on some traces and I have not detected any reverse logic in the recordings yet.
Join Date: Jul 2007
Location: Hadlow
Age: 60
Posts: 597
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
Data recorders
In this day and age, is there really a need to have data recorders on the aircraft at all? 
One would think that the technology exists to have data recorders located away from the aircraft, with information constantly sent via an encrypted satellite link from the aircraft to a base station. This base station could record all details of every flight, not just the last 30mins/24hrs etc as is the case now. Another advantage being that there is no risk of data loss in case of an accident, as is the case currently.
Over to the experts to comment please.
One would think that the technology exists to have data recorders located away from the aircraft, with information constantly sent via an encrypted satellite link from the aircraft to a base station. This base station could record all details of every flight, not just the last 30mins/24hrs etc as is the case now. Another advantage being that there is no risk of data loss in case of an accident, as is the case currently.
Over to the experts to comment please.
foxtrot xray
Join Date: Jan 2002
Location: Midwest USA
Posts: 84
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
VC 10
The only way to communicate the data on a real time basis would be by satellite link. To say that this type of link would eliminate the loss of data problem is incorrect. First, the hundreds of data channels being monitored with high sampling rates on a real time basis would require a relatively wideband channel; with the number of aircraft in the air at any given time this would be a very large system requirement. Second, the communications channel transmission reliability would have to be on the order of 99.9999% which is not practical in a mobile-based channel.
The concept does have merit as a back-up for those cases where the data recorders are destroyed/unusable or lost(e.g., at sea). Another benefit would be to provide early warnings of data corruption due to failing sensors/data busses to insure that all essential data is being properly sampled for the FDR.
There are myriad concerns about who would be able to access the the data and its ultimate use.
The concept does have merit as a back-up for those cases where the data recorders are destroyed/unusable or lost(e.g., at sea). Another benefit would be to provide early warnings of data corruption due to failing sensors/data busses to insure that all essential data is being properly sampled for the FDR.
There are myriad concerns about who would be able to access the the data and its ultimate use.
Join Date: Jul 2007
Location: BRU
Posts: 82
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
Could someone enlighten us as to how much thrust 1.20 EPR produces on the A320?
Last edited by borghha; 11th Aug 2007 at 17:57. Reason: correct semantics
Paxing All Over The World
marciovp
No need, the link was posted in #1504
I have a 13 pages PDF file with all the parameters at the black box. I don´t know how to enter it here but I can send it by e-mail for the asking.
Join Date: Mar 2007
Location: In my head
Posts: 694
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
Originally Posted by originally Gigajoules, I think?
Energy is given by E=mv^2, where m = mass and v=velocity. So, the calculation gave the right answer but using F=ma will not give that answer.
Originally Posted by ELAC
Gigajoules,
Thanks for the correction. Post edited to reflect the correct formula.
Thanks for the correction. Post edited to reflect the correct formula.
Another simple straight line event formula from schoolbook physics that might help is
s = ut + 1/2 a t^2
s = distance travelled
u = initial velocity
a = acceleration (or deceleration)
t = time period under acceleration/deceleration
and you should then be able to get results consistent with F=ma if you can estimate the resultant straight line forces involved with the brakes, the right engine forward thrust and the left engine reverse thrust.
Probably easiest to convert everything to SI units before you start.
ELAC, a first-class series of postings, - many thanks for the time you've taken to contribute. Like others, I'm taking a look at the FDR readings as well.
Super VC10;
In terms of pure possibility, the technology to transmit DFDR data exists. For example, AIMS and ACARS data has been transmitted from aircraft for many years now, first via VHF ground stations but, along with the usual ACARS functions, also via satellite, mainly for maintenance monitoring functions. Bandwidth is an issue but less and less so as wireless transmission technologies (via cell-phone transmission usually at the gate) of QAR data for FOQA/FDA programs are using very high compression rates. One hour of flight for a 320 with 1800 (less for the DFDR) QAR parameters typically takes about 3Mb of storage space - a five hour flight would create a 15Mb file. Upon gate arrival, the encrypted information is transmitted to whatever server is set up for an airline's FOQA/FDA program. The transmission typically takes between 3 and 15 minutes depending upon the compressed file size (flight hours). Cellular charges vary between $35US to around $200US per aircraft per month but these are always negotiable and vary per country. We can imagine what satellite charges would be.
For satellite transmission in real time, the demands for compression and encryption technologies would obviously be even higher but realtime and near-realtime transmission itself is already being done in terms of ACARS. Maintaining an "open" satellite link is the issue using this approach and rates of dataflow and the the time the link would be open (the duration of the flight) would likely make such a system prohibitively expensive. The value of "short-burst" transmissions may assist but the value of "live" FDR information is in the constant stream.
Although digital (solid state) technology is now available , CVR installations are still mostly analogue technologies and as such would be more difficult to format for economic transmission via satellite. I have no doubt that it will be done as pressures for data-analysis increase.
The difficulties of transmitting DFDR and CVR information are not technological but are economic and political.
Super VC10;
One would think that the technology exists to have data recorders located away from the aircraft, with information constantly sent via an encrypted satellite link from the aircraft to a base station. This base station could record all details of every flight, not just the last 30mins/24hrs etc as is the case now. Another advantage being that there is no risk of data loss in case of an accident, as is the case currently.
For satellite transmission in real time, the demands for compression and encryption technologies would obviously be even higher but realtime and near-realtime transmission itself is already being done in terms of ACARS. Maintaining an "open" satellite link is the issue using this approach and rates of dataflow and the the time the link would be open (the duration of the flight) would likely make such a system prohibitively expensive. The value of "short-burst" transmissions may assist but the value of "live" FDR information is in the constant stream.
Although digital (solid state) technology is now available , CVR installations are still mostly analogue technologies and as such would be more difficult to format for economic transmission via satellite. I have no doubt that it will be done as pressures for data-analysis increase.
The difficulties of transmitting DFDR and CVR information are not technological but are economic and political.
Last edited by PJ2; 11th Aug 2007 at 20:11.
Join Date: Jun 2001
Location: East of the Sun & West of the Moon
Posts: 286
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
S+T
Both you and gigajoule are correct. My original intent was not really to get into formula so much as to simply recollect that energy varies as a function of the square of velocity for the purpose of the discussion. From my recollection of basic (very basic) physics F~MA is the starting point from which most other formulae derive so I referenced that. As gigajoule pointed out, that really wasn't the best reference to apply to the discussion.
ELAC
Both you and gigajoule are correct. My original intent was not really to get into formula so much as to simply recollect that energy varies as a function of the square of velocity for the purpose of the discussion. From my recollection of basic (very basic) physics F~MA is the starting point from which most other formulae derive so I referenced that. As gigajoule pointed out, that really wasn't the best reference to apply to the discussion.
ELAC
Join Date: Jul 2007
Location: Germany
Posts: 556
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
Originally Posted by discountinvestigator
Previous poster requesting information on the location of the localiser. It is off the stop end of the runway on the huge structure which you can see on the pictures of the crash site, painted white/orange squares.
If you are off centreline, then the closer you get to the localiser, the greater the dot deviation.
Originally Posted by NigelOnDraft
Wild guess, is a reduced power takeoff is in the high 1.2s... so 1.2 is quite a lot...
At thrust reduction TLA goes to 25 degrees ("CL" detent), EPR reduces to around 1.28.
I don't know what the relation is between EPR and thrust (force).
Bernd
Join Date: Mar 2007
Location: In my head
Posts: 694
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
Yes ELAC I could see your point well made about the velocity squared, but was just concerned that a 50% error might start creeping into further considerations, especially as others are now calling for thrust (force) figures.
We seem to now know the mass, timeline, most of the velocities, and most of the deceleration events whilst still on the airfield so if someone has an idea of the theoretical thrust numbers on the day then it may be possible to come close to reconciling some of the missing braking forces/unwanted foward thrust to the actual distances involved and tabulated braking performance figures.
If that can be narrowed down (as I am sure it largely already has been) then it might also narrow down the "what else?" scenarios.
Whilst I'm here, may I say I am another who really doesn't like what I have read here about the thrust lever logic. Like many others here who might not have been wholly convinced before, I now appreciate how crucial TL set Idle at the flare now is to satisfy the computer, but in my early days as a PPL I was taught to consider leaving a little power on through the flare in two or three light a/c types for directional stability if approach speeds were otherwise not spot on, or windshear or gusts were feared. I was also given blind simulated talk down approaches flying on instruments straight down to the concrete a couple of times, military style, approach power still on in three point touchdown with no flare.
Remaining thrust back to idle was obviously a subsequent action but centreline stability and established effective braking were of prime importance unless a handful of thrust was on. Consequently years later, I could easily see myself as one who might subconsciously "forget" to put the Airbus beans in a row to prevent it applying a handful of thrust of its own making and ruining my attempts at braking.
In one particular light aircraft type (which seemingly hadn't enough elevator authority at landing speeds) it was extremely easy to wheelbarrow unless it was flared with a little power on. Took me a while to master it. It even caught out a pro on one short paved commercial field and was virtually written off when the nosewheel collapsed, but unlike some other types, this one amazingly lived-on to survive a subsequent midair another day where the entire fin was knocked off but where a controlled forced landing by a plucky septagenerian was completely successful...
We seem to now know the mass, timeline, most of the velocities, and most of the deceleration events whilst still on the airfield so if someone has an idea of the theoretical thrust numbers on the day then it may be possible to come close to reconciling some of the missing braking forces/unwanted foward thrust to the actual distances involved and tabulated braking performance figures.
If that can be narrowed down (as I am sure it largely already has been) then it might also narrow down the "what else?" scenarios.
Whilst I'm here, may I say I am another who really doesn't like what I have read here about the thrust lever logic. Like many others here who might not have been wholly convinced before, I now appreciate how crucial TL set Idle at the flare now is to satisfy the computer, but in my early days as a PPL I was taught to consider leaving a little power on through the flare in two or three light a/c types for directional stability if approach speeds were otherwise not spot on, or windshear or gusts were feared. I was also given blind simulated talk down approaches flying on instruments straight down to the concrete a couple of times, military style, approach power still on in three point touchdown with no flare.
Remaining thrust back to idle was obviously a subsequent action but centreline stability and established effective braking were of prime importance unless a handful of thrust was on. Consequently years later, I could easily see myself as one who might subconsciously "forget" to put the Airbus beans in a row to prevent it applying a handful of thrust of its own making and ruining my attempts at braking.
In one particular light aircraft type (which seemingly hadn't enough elevator authority at landing speeds) it was extremely easy to wheelbarrow unless it was flared with a little power on. Took me a while to master it. It even caught out a pro on one short paved commercial field and was virtually written off when the nosewheel collapsed, but unlike some other types, this one amazingly lived-on to survive a subsequent midair another day where the entire fin was knocked off but where a controlled forced landing by a plucky septagenerian was completely successful...
Last edited by slip and turn; 12th Aug 2007 at 00:14.
Join Date: Jul 2007
Location: Germany
Posts: 556
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
Originally Posted by flyingnewbie10
What I would like to know is whether or not the TLA reading continues in order to get the right TL position if A/Thrust gets inactive for some reason other than the TLs passing through idle detent).
Each parameter on the FDR is recorded independent of the other parameters. Interdependencies of these parameters, if any, are interpreted by the analysts.
I support PPRuNe
Join Date: Jul 2007
Location: Belo Horizonte, Brazil
Posts: 162
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
Folha de Săo Paulo
Folha today reveal that the pilot of TAM landed before the spot where the ILS was leading him (-1) probrably because he was concerned with the runway being wet and slippery plus some other variables.
Join Date: Jul 2007
Location: Germany
Posts: 556
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
flyingnewbie10,
Tha autothrust system even uses the thrust lever angle. It is used to limit the maximum power that the autothrust system can set.
This can be used to limit one engine to, e. g. 80% N1 (or whatever equivalent for EPR-engines), when it is found that it produces excessive vibrationsn above this point, while still being able to use autothrust in cruise flight.
So the answer is: yes, TLA is always read and processed by the FADEC.
Thus:
Then autothrust limits the thrust it is allowed to set to the thrust corresponding to the 18-degree-setting in manual thrust mode.
For engines that are working fine this is not a recommended setting, and the FMA will remind you of it by flashing "LVR CLB".
No.
Tha autothrust system even uses the thrust lever angle. It is used to limit the maximum power that the autothrust system can set.
This can be used to limit one engine to, e. g. 80% N1 (or whatever equivalent for EPR-engines), when it is found that it produces excessive vibrationsn above this point, while still being able to use autothrust in cruise flight.
So the answer is: yes, TLA is always read and processed by the FADEC.
Thus:
For instance.
You are at FL 300 with your TLs in CLB detent and autothrust active.
Then you move one of the TLs back to, let's say, 18 degrees (above idle detent).
You are at FL 300 with your TLs in CLB detent and autothrust active.
Then you move one of the TLs back to, let's say, 18 degrees (above idle detent).
For engines that are working fine this is not a recommended setting, and the FMA will remind you of it by flashing "LVR CLB".
Maybe the function (procedure) responsible for detecting TL movements between detents is halted when A/THR is active (at least in this model) in order to reduce processing load.
Join Date: Jun 2001
Location: East of the Sun & West of the Moon
Posts: 286
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
S+T
What you were taught in your PPL days still holds true for the Airbus as well. On a normal day thrust to idle approaching the flare is how it works, but on a day with gusts and shear there's nothing wrong with waiting until the mains touch before pulling the TL's back to idle. Of course the idea is that when you pull them back you will pull both of them back, not only one. I suspect your instructors would have frowned on that idea even on a bad day.
There is a slight difference with autothrust on though in that if you don't pull the thrust levers back when you flare the thrust will start to increase to maintain your approach speed. I'm not sure about the latest models, but on the Boeings I flew if you kept autothrust on to the flare the same thing would occur, so that really doesn't have much to do with whether the levers move or not. Where you're most likely to see this occur is during a shallow flare if you try to milk it for that greaser landing. When it does happen the effect of the increasing thrust is immediately obvious (or at least I thought it was) and is rectified pretty quickly with a bit of lost runway but not too much. On a short wet runway your landing technique of a short flare and firm touchdown pretty much precludes this from happening.
ELAC
What you were taught in your PPL days still holds true for the Airbus as well. On a normal day thrust to idle approaching the flare is how it works, but on a day with gusts and shear there's nothing wrong with waiting until the mains touch before pulling the TL's back to idle. Of course the idea is that when you pull them back you will pull both of them back, not only one. I suspect your instructors would have frowned on that idea even on a bad day.
There is a slight difference with autothrust on though in that if you don't pull the thrust levers back when you flare the thrust will start to increase to maintain your approach speed. I'm not sure about the latest models, but on the Boeings I flew if you kept autothrust on to the flare the same thing would occur, so that really doesn't have much to do with whether the levers move or not. Where you're most likely to see this occur is during a shallow flare if you try to milk it for that greaser landing. When it does happen the effect of the increasing thrust is immediately obvious (or at least I thought it was) and is rectified pretty quickly with a bit of lost runway but not too much. On a short wet runway your landing technique of a short flare and firm touchdown pretty much precludes this from happening.
ELAC
Join Date: Jul 2007
Location: Germany
Posts: 556
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
Originally Posted by flyingnewbie10
If I understood your explanation, that would work even when A/THR was set at SPEED mode ?
One correction, though, if only one thrust lever is below CL detent, and the other in the CL detent, the FMA shows "LVR ASYM" (amber: warning, no immediate action required), if both are below CL it flashes "LVR CLB" (white: information/guidance).
Join Date: Aug 2007
Location: Brazil
Age: 71
Posts: 131
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
Before I ask some questions to the Jet Pilots here, I would like to say I only fly light twins...
On page 3 of the FDR's graphics, it shows an Eng 1 and Eng 2 EPR "split" @ 18:48:23.
1. This significant Thrust differential woudn't cause a left yaw and also make the aircraft "float" and not touchdown on the "spot"?
2. If the Eng 2 TLA was "forgotten" at CLB position, wouldn't be an almost instinctive reaction to reduce Eng 2 TLA to iddle and "kill" excessive yaw?
3. If TLA 2 was at CLB position, why all that Rudder "fight" (page 2, @ 18:48:26) before trying to reduce TLA 2 ?
4. With the aircraft veering left, engage Eng 1 T/R wouldn't aggravate the situation?
IMHO, both TLAs were pulled to iddle, and then reverse. That's why the crew seemed so surprised when hell broke loose. I can imagine why the delay in applying manual brakes, the aircraft was veering a lot.
Comments, please?
Rob
On page 3 of the FDR's graphics, it shows an Eng 1 and Eng 2 EPR "split" @ 18:48:23.
1. This significant Thrust differential woudn't cause a left yaw and also make the aircraft "float" and not touchdown on the "spot"?
2. If the Eng 2 TLA was "forgotten" at CLB position, wouldn't be an almost instinctive reaction to reduce Eng 2 TLA to iddle and "kill" excessive yaw?
3. If TLA 2 was at CLB position, why all that Rudder "fight" (page 2, @ 18:48:26) before trying to reduce TLA 2 ?
4. With the aircraft veering left, engage Eng 1 T/R wouldn't aggravate the situation?
IMHO, both TLAs were pulled to iddle, and then reverse. That's why the crew seemed so surprised when hell broke loose. I can imagine why the delay in applying manual brakes, the aircraft was veering a lot.
Comments, please?
Rob
Last edited by Rob21; 11th Aug 2007 at 22:43.
Join Date: Sep 2003
Location: Not NZ anymore sadly!
Age: 62
Posts: 307
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
TAM 3054 CVR transcipt
Couldn't find this posted within the BIG TAM posting here.
If it is apologies.
Here's an edited version of what our companies policy on the TAM scenario. Bolding is mine:
CAM - Cockpit area microphone voice or sound source
HOT - Flight crew audio panel voice or sound source (1)
PA - Airplane Public Address system voice or sound source
FWC - Automated callout from the Flight Warming Computer
RDO - Radio transmissions from TAM flight 3054
APP - Radio transmission from Approach Control
TWR - Radio transmission from the Congonhas Control Tower
CH2 - sound heard on CVR channel 2
-1 - Voice identified as the captain/PIC
-2 - Voice identified as the first Officer/SIC
-3 - Voice identified as a Flight Attendant
-? - Voice unidentified
* - Unintelligible word
# - Expletive
@ - Non-pertinent word
( ) - Questionable insertion
[ ] - Editorial insertion
Note 1: Times are expressed Local time - reflecting a synchronization to the Flight Data Recorder using the A/P disconnect parameter from the DFDR and the tone heard on the CVR.
Note 2: Generally, only radio transmissions to and from the accident aircraft were transcribed.
Note 3: Words shown with excess vowels, letters, or drawn out syllables are a phonetic representation of the words.
Start Of Transcript
18:18:24.5 (all times are local time)
[start of recording]
18:18:24.5
PA-1 [captain makes speech to passengers]
18:18:53.4
CAM - ? [sound of whistling]
18:20:25.0
CAM [sound of flight attendant door open request]
18:20:28.1
CAM - 1 is ok?
18:20:29.7
CAM - 3 [flight attendant says that everything in the cabin is OK, and then asked where will they be landing]
18:20:33.3
CAM -1 I have just informed.
18:20:34.7
CAM - 3 I didn’t hear - sorry -her talking.
18:20:37.7
CAM -1 but she heard, Congonhas.
18:20:39.3
CAM - 3 is it Congonhas? its great so. she might have heard. thank you.
18:43:04.3
HOT -1 remember, we only have one reverse.
18:43:06.9
HOT-2 yes… only the left.
18:43:24.0
HOT-1 glideslope… LOC blue. LOC star. [LOC star means a an asterisk is displayed on the FMA, which means the loc capture]
18:43:26.6
HOT-2 checked.
18:43:27.1
HOT-1 autopilot one plus two.
18:43:29.4
HOT-1 flaps one.
18:43:30.7
HOT-2 speed checked.
18:43:36.7
HOT-1 clear status.
18:43:41.8
HOT-2 clear status.
18:43:43.8
HOT-2 clear.
18:43:48.2
RDO-2 going to intercept the localizer, TAM three zero five four.
18:43:52.2
APP TAM three zero five four, reduce speed for the approach… and call the tower on frequency one two seven point one five, good afternoon.
18:44:00.0
RDO-2 one two seven one five, over.
18:44:01.7
HOT-1 good afternoon.
18:44:06.4
HOT-1 flaps two.
18:44:08.01
CAM-2 speed checked.
18:44:20.0
HOT-2 flaps at two.
18:44:22.3
RDO-2 Sao Paulo tower, this is TAM three zero five four.
18:44:26.01
TWR TAM three zero five four, reduce minimum speed for approach, the wind is north with zero six. I will report when clear three five left.
18:44:33.4
RDO-2 good evening, reducing to the minimum possible [speed].
18:44:36.3
HOT-1 landing gear down.
18:44:37.7
HOT-2 landing gear down.
18:44:53.9
HOT-1 flaps three.
18:44:55.1
HOT-2 speed checked.
18:44:57.4
HOT-2 flaps three.
18:45:03.9
HOT-1 flap full.
18:45:05.7
CAM-2 speed checked, flaps full.
18:45:10.6
HOT-1 standby final checklist
18:45:12.0
HOT-2 standing by.
18:45:12.9
CAM-1 glide star, set missed approach altitude.
18:45:15.0
CAM-2 ALT**.
18:45:21.0
CAM-2 six thousand feet.
18:45:44.0
CAM [sound of windshield wipers operating]
18:45:52.1
CH2 [sound of outer marker beacon heard on channel 2]
18:46:03.2
HOT-1 final checklist.
18:46:04.6
HOT-2 final checklist, passing DIADEMA [name of the outer marker beacon]
18:46:10.4
PA-2 cabin crew, clear to land. [prepare for landing]
18:46: 14.0
CAM- 2 cabin crew
18:46:15.2
CAM – 1 advised.
18:46:16.00
CAM – 2 auto thrust.
18:46:18. 8
CAM 1 – speed.
18:46:20.0
CAM 2 - **-
18:46:21.1
CAM 1 – landing no blue.
18:46:22.6
CAM 1 – ECAM MEMO (Eletronic Centralized Aircraft Monitor – check memo status)
18:46:23.8
HOT-1 landing, no blue
18:46:24.9
HOT-2 landing no blue.
18:46:26.1
HOT-1 okay?
18:46: 26.7
HOT-2 okay..what?
18:46:28.6
HOT-2 okay.
18:46:30.8
HOT-? *-
18:46:30.8
HOT-2 final checklist complete.
18:46:33.8
CAM-1 runway in sight, landing.
18:46:41.7
CAM-1 ask him [the tower] about the rain condition, the runway condition, and if the runway is slippery.
18:46: 57.0
RDO-2 TAM on final approach, two miles away. could you confirm conditions?
18:47:01.7
TWR it’s wet, and it is slippery. I will report three five left clear, three zero five four.
18:47:06.1
RDO-2 already on final.
18:47:07.5
TWR the aircraft is starting the departure.
18:47:10.7
HOT-1 wet and slippery!
18:47:22.0
HOT-2 The aircraft is starting the takeoff run.
18:47: 34.3
TWR TAM three zero five four, three five left, clear to land, the runway is wet, and is slippery and the wind is three three zero at eight. knots.
18:47:40.6
HOT-2 three three zero at eight, is the wind.
18:47:42.9
HOT-1 checked.
18:47:43.9
TWR three zero five four?
18:47:45.3
RDO-2 three zero five four, roger.
18:47:46.4
FWC four hundred.
18:47:49.8
HOT-1 is the landing clear?
18:47:50.7
HOT-2 clear to land.
18:47:52.3
HOT-1 land green, manual flight.
18:47:53.7
CAM [sound of autopilot disconnect tone]
18:47:54.1
HOT-2 checked.
18:47:54.8
HOT-1 inhibit the glide [GPWS aural warning] for me please.
18:47:55.7
CAM [sound of triple click indicating reversion from CAT II or III to CAT I approach mode (manual flight approach)]
18:47:56.9
HOT-2 what?
18:47:58.8
FWC three hundred.
18:47:59.3
HOT-1 inhibit the glide for me.
18:48:00.6
HOT-2 okay.
18:48:03.0
HOT-2 inhibit.
18:48:05.8
HOT-2 middle.
18:48:11.6
FWC two hundred.
18:48:14.9
HOT-2 one dot now. okay.
18:48: 16.8
HOT-1 okay.
18:48:21.0
FWC twenty.
18:48:21.6
FWC retard.
18:48:23.0
FWC retard.
18:48:24.5
CAM [sound of trust lever movement]
18:48:24.9
CAM [sound of increase engine noise]
18:48:25:5
GPWS retard.
18:48:26:3
CAM [sound similar to touchdown]
18:48:26:7
HOT-2 reverse number one only.
18:48:29:5
HOT-2 spoliers nothing.
18:48:30
HOT-1 aaiii [sigh]
18:48:33:3
HOT-1 look this.
18:48:34:4
HOT-2 decelerate, decelerate.
18:48:35:9
HOT-1 it can’t, it can’t.
18:48:40:0
HOT-1 oh my god….. oh my god.
18:48:42:7
HOT-1 go, go, go, turn turn turn turn.
18:48:44:6
HOT-2 turn turn to…no, turn turn.
18:48:45:5
CAM [sound of crushing noises].
18:48:49:7
CAM-? (oh no) [male voice]
18:48:50:0
CAM [pause in crushing noises]
18:48:50:6
CAM-? [sound of scream, female voice]
18:48:50
CAM-? [sound of crushing noise]
[end of recording]
18:48:51:4
If it is apologies.
Here's an edited version of what our companies policy on the TAM scenario. Bolding is mine:
CONTAMINATED RUNWAY - POLICY FOR LANDING
A runway is contaminated when any operationally significant area is affected by ice, or more than 3mm of standing water, slush or snow.
Slush, snow and standing water affect the landing performance by degrading the braking effectivity and the ability of the aircraft to withstand crosswinds. Landing is NOT permitted on a runway with any of the following:
(a) Standing water, slush or snow deeper than 12mm
(b) A tailwind component
(e) The runway covered by standing water, slush or snow and a NOTAM issued describing the runway’s braking action as VERY POOR
(f) Any aircraft reverser, spoiler or antiskid system inoperative.
@@@
LEGENDSlush, snow and standing water affect the landing performance by degrading the braking effectivity and the ability of the aircraft to withstand crosswinds. Landing is NOT permitted on a runway with any of the following:
(a) Standing water, slush or snow deeper than 12mm
(b) A tailwind component
(e) The runway covered by standing water, slush or snow and a NOTAM issued describing the runway’s braking action as VERY POOR
(f) Any aircraft reverser, spoiler or antiskid system inoperative.
@@@
CAM - Cockpit area microphone voice or sound source
HOT - Flight crew audio panel voice or sound source (1)
PA - Airplane Public Address system voice or sound source
FWC - Automated callout from the Flight Warming Computer
RDO - Radio transmissions from TAM flight 3054
APP - Radio transmission from Approach Control
TWR - Radio transmission from the Congonhas Control Tower
CH2 - sound heard on CVR channel 2
-1 - Voice identified as the captain/PIC
-2 - Voice identified as the first Officer/SIC
-3 - Voice identified as a Flight Attendant
-? - Voice unidentified
* - Unintelligible word
# - Expletive
@ - Non-pertinent word
( ) - Questionable insertion
[ ] - Editorial insertion
Note 1: Times are expressed Local time - reflecting a synchronization to the Flight Data Recorder using the A/P disconnect parameter from the DFDR and the tone heard on the CVR.
Note 2: Generally, only radio transmissions to and from the accident aircraft were transcribed.
Note 3: Words shown with excess vowels, letters, or drawn out syllables are a phonetic representation of the words.
Start Of Transcript
18:18:24.5 (all times are local time)
[start of recording]
18:18:24.5
PA-1 [captain makes speech to passengers]
18:18:53.4
CAM - ? [sound of whistling]
18:20:25.0
CAM [sound of flight attendant door open request]
18:20:28.1
CAM - 1 is ok?
18:20:29.7
CAM - 3 [flight attendant says that everything in the cabin is OK, and then asked where will they be landing]
18:20:33.3
CAM -1 I have just informed.
18:20:34.7
CAM - 3 I didn’t hear - sorry -her talking.
18:20:37.7
CAM -1 but she heard, Congonhas.
18:20:39.3
CAM - 3 is it Congonhas? its great so. she might have heard. thank you.
18:43:04.3
HOT -1 remember, we only have one reverse.
18:43:06.9
HOT-2 yes… only the left.
18:43:24.0
HOT-1 glideslope… LOC blue. LOC star. [LOC star means a an asterisk is displayed on the FMA, which means the loc capture]
18:43:26.6
HOT-2 checked.
18:43:27.1
HOT-1 autopilot one plus two.
18:43:29.4
HOT-1 flaps one.
18:43:30.7
HOT-2 speed checked.
18:43:36.7
HOT-1 clear status.
18:43:41.8
HOT-2 clear status.
18:43:43.8
HOT-2 clear.
18:43:48.2
RDO-2 going to intercept the localizer, TAM three zero five four.
18:43:52.2
APP TAM three zero five four, reduce speed for the approach… and call the tower on frequency one two seven point one five, good afternoon.
18:44:00.0
RDO-2 one two seven one five, over.
18:44:01.7
HOT-1 good afternoon.
18:44:06.4
HOT-1 flaps two.
18:44:08.01
CAM-2 speed checked.
18:44:20.0
HOT-2 flaps at two.
18:44:22.3
RDO-2 Sao Paulo tower, this is TAM three zero five four.
18:44:26.01
TWR TAM three zero five four, reduce minimum speed for approach, the wind is north with zero six. I will report when clear three five left.
18:44:33.4
RDO-2 good evening, reducing to the minimum possible [speed].
18:44:36.3
HOT-1 landing gear down.
18:44:37.7
HOT-2 landing gear down.
18:44:53.9
HOT-1 flaps three.
18:44:55.1
HOT-2 speed checked.
18:44:57.4
HOT-2 flaps three.
18:45:03.9
HOT-1 flap full.
18:45:05.7
CAM-2 speed checked, flaps full.
18:45:10.6
HOT-1 standby final checklist
18:45:12.0
HOT-2 standing by.
18:45:12.9
CAM-1 glide star, set missed approach altitude.
18:45:15.0
CAM-2 ALT**.
18:45:21.0
CAM-2 six thousand feet.
18:45:44.0
CAM [sound of windshield wipers operating]
18:45:52.1
CH2 [sound of outer marker beacon heard on channel 2]
18:46:03.2
HOT-1 final checklist.
18:46:04.6
HOT-2 final checklist, passing DIADEMA [name of the outer marker beacon]
18:46:10.4
PA-2 cabin crew, clear to land. [prepare for landing]
18:46: 14.0
CAM- 2 cabin crew
18:46:15.2
CAM – 1 advised.
18:46:16.00
CAM – 2 auto thrust.
18:46:18. 8
CAM 1 – speed.
18:46:20.0
CAM 2 - **-
18:46:21.1
CAM 1 – landing no blue.
18:46:22.6
CAM 1 – ECAM MEMO (Eletronic Centralized Aircraft Monitor – check memo status)
18:46:23.8
HOT-1 landing, no blue
18:46:24.9
HOT-2 landing no blue.
18:46:26.1
HOT-1 okay?
18:46: 26.7
HOT-2 okay..what?
18:46:28.6
HOT-2 okay.
18:46:30.8
HOT-? *-
18:46:30.8
HOT-2 final checklist complete.
18:46:33.8
CAM-1 runway in sight, landing.
18:46:41.7
CAM-1 ask him [the tower] about the rain condition, the runway condition, and if the runway is slippery.
18:46: 57.0
RDO-2 TAM on final approach, two miles away. could you confirm conditions?
18:47:01.7
TWR it’s wet, and it is slippery. I will report three five left clear, three zero five four.
18:47:06.1
RDO-2 already on final.
18:47:07.5
TWR the aircraft is starting the departure.
18:47:10.7
HOT-1 wet and slippery!
18:47:22.0
HOT-2 The aircraft is starting the takeoff run.
18:47: 34.3
TWR TAM three zero five four, three five left, clear to land, the runway is wet, and is slippery and the wind is three three zero at eight. knots.
18:47:40.6
HOT-2 three three zero at eight, is the wind.
18:47:42.9
HOT-1 checked.
18:47:43.9
TWR three zero five four?
18:47:45.3
RDO-2 three zero five four, roger.
18:47:46.4
FWC four hundred.
18:47:49.8
HOT-1 is the landing clear?
18:47:50.7
HOT-2 clear to land.
18:47:52.3
HOT-1 land green, manual flight.
18:47:53.7
CAM [sound of autopilot disconnect tone]
18:47:54.1
HOT-2 checked.
18:47:54.8
HOT-1 inhibit the glide [GPWS aural warning] for me please.
18:47:55.7
CAM [sound of triple click indicating reversion from CAT II or III to CAT I approach mode (manual flight approach)]
18:47:56.9
HOT-2 what?
18:47:58.8
FWC three hundred.
18:47:59.3
HOT-1 inhibit the glide for me.
18:48:00.6
HOT-2 okay.
18:48:03.0
HOT-2 inhibit.
18:48:05.8
HOT-2 middle.
18:48:11.6
FWC two hundred.
18:48:14.9
HOT-2 one dot now. okay.
18:48: 16.8
HOT-1 okay.
18:48:21.0
FWC twenty.
18:48:21.6
FWC retard.
18:48:23.0
FWC retard.
18:48:24.5
CAM [sound of trust lever movement]
18:48:24.9
CAM [sound of increase engine noise]
18:48:25:5
GPWS retard.
18:48:26:3
CAM [sound similar to touchdown]
18:48:26:7
HOT-2 reverse number one only.
18:48:29:5
HOT-2 spoliers nothing.
18:48:30
HOT-1 aaiii [sigh]
18:48:33:3
HOT-1 look this.
18:48:34:4
HOT-2 decelerate, decelerate.
18:48:35:9
HOT-1 it can’t, it can’t.
18:48:40:0
HOT-1 oh my god….. oh my god.
18:48:42:7
HOT-1 go, go, go, turn turn turn turn.
18:48:44:6
HOT-2 turn turn to…no, turn turn.
18:48:45:5
CAM [sound of crushing noises].
18:48:49:7
CAM-? (oh no) [male voice]
18:48:50:0
CAM [pause in crushing noises]
18:48:50:6
CAM-? [sound of scream, female voice]
18:48:50
CAM-? [sound of crushing noise]
[end of recording]
18:48:51:4
Join Date: Dec 2006
Location: washington,dc
Posts: 486
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
note: sound of "trust" lever moving...wonder if it was one or both.
also, this accident is a good reason to have cockpit camera/video recorder...if the video recorder was installed we would know right now (all things considered) that the pilot moved both or just one thrust lever.
bomarc
also, this accident is a good reason to have cockpit camera/video recorder...if the video recorder was installed we would know right now (all things considered) that the pilot moved both or just one thrust lever.
bomarc
Join Date: Jul 2007
Location: Europe
Posts: 92
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
Could someone give me an indication what kind of N1 / thrust this gives you on the A320?