Ueberlingen collision Trial started

[keepin it in trim]

Only a couple of months ago, in spanish airspace, I heard another aircraft advise atc "tcas climb" and the controller came back and told him not to climb as he would go clear of the other traffic. If I hadn't heard it myself I wouldn't have believed it!

[ATC Watcher]

Kontrolor :

ultimately controller on duty cleared two planes on conflicting route to the same level. .

Not quite correct my friend, he did not clear them together . The 757 was cleared off route direct by Geneva, and the Tu154 cleared off route direct by Munich , on the strip he had them 7 minutes appart .When he discovered ( very late ) that they were in fact coming together , he cleared one down , not both... ( all this ,and more , on the BFU report ).

I do not agree with blaming the last one on the chain, wether it is a controller or a simple hand deck sailor ( Like the one that closed the door , also too late, of the "Herald of Free Entreprise ") because it does not solve anything, and confort the real responsibles in their views that since they have not been made responsible, there is nothing to change to prevent it from happening again.

Now the latest on the trial :
Tuesday the prosecutor made a strong requisition against the od Skyguide management, talking about " a negligent climate in the entreprise " he requested 15 months jail suspended sentence for the 3 top managers, 12 months for the maintenance head that authorised the systems to be switched off ,8 months for the other controller that went on break and 6 months for the 2 others accused .

It is still too early to say which way the Judge(s) will go.

[Frangible]

I don't believe the official report made anything of both planes being on the same flight level. Why, like the GOL 73 and the Legacy, were they on the same FL in the first place and not at odd or even FLs according to which side of the north-south line they were heading?

[Carnage Matey!]

Because they were both heading west?

[Green Guard]

Tim Dawson........Best comment so far

ATC Watcher
"the757 crew responded correctly (to TCAS) and the Tu154 did not"

Yes?

But you fail to say that:

757 crew responded incorrectly to ATC, while the TU154 responded correctly to ATC,
they were on the same frequency, weren't they?

This accident actually proves that almighty TCAS is not fail-safe at all.
You need one or both or more aircraft to obey TCAS command,
to get out of a collision
but if one of them starts dangerous direction descent or climb,
here you have it...

[ironbutt57]

How did the 757 crew respond incorrectly to atc??

[BEagle]

Green Guard, please tell me that you don't fly or control commercial air transport aircraft.......

[Nubboy]

Green Guard, please tell me WHAT the 75 crew did wrongly, with regard to ATC?
I regard TCAS as I do EGWPS. It's an automated system thats looking out for me. When it tells em to do something, it normally means failure to follow its instructions means you die. Period.
People miss things and get them wrong.
The ATC'er saw a conflict and kept trying to resolve it, long after he should have shut up.
The TU crew had a conflict, TCAS and ATC, and never resolved it.
THE 75 crew did everything they should have done and died.
ICAO must ensure that such an avoidable trgedy doesn't occur again. If you can't, or won't comply with TCAS RAs, THEN YOU SHOULDN'T BE IN CONTROLLED AIRSPACE.
Regardless of the faults with the ATC system that night, TCAS was the LAST safeguard. By choosing not to comply with the HARD RA, for whatever reason, then that safeguard was wilfully removed.
Apart the question of different languages on frequency TCAS is not only a lifesaver, it's also our best on board tool for Situational awareness. Some of our A320's have (had?) a software variant which wouldn't display TCAS targets if the range on the ND was over 40nm. On those aircfraft I never left the range over 40nm once I'd verified the next TO waypoint. Surely basic airmanship dictates that you look where you're going, using all the tools available to you.
I too, am very unhappy about any MEL alleviation that lets you operate without a fully serviceable TCAS system.

[MartinBaker]

Hi all
just a short note regarding this painful case.
When investigating the LX498 crash (Zurich, 10Jan 2000) we travelled to Moscow, St Petersburg and Cisinau (Moldova) as the Captain was a Moldovan national and former (pre 1989) Aeroflot regional pilot.
Our knowledge of selection, training and operations in the FSU needed to be updated and documented.
This was an enriching and valuble experience which highlighted the professionalism of personnel, operations and proceedures in FSU and the use of Russian equipment.
However it also highlighted the different approach to HUFAC and its application. In particular a, then slightly 'old school', prevalent sceptiscism and mistrust of electronic in avionics. There was a very human oriented approach to most problems encountered in flight ops.
In particular TCAS was viewed as a gadget foisted upon Airlines and operators that (from Eastern European and beyond ops) seemed to be un-necessary. It was viewed with almost disgust and its challenge to human reasonning questionned!
We imagined the Uberlingen scenario where a pilot would listen to the human controller and not the TCAS command with its tragic consequences, and felt that this was a note-worthy point to raise with authorities in the west however it is/was one of those warnings lost in 'paper-space' and unheeded until proven correct....unfortunately in our own 'back garden' and not somewhere on the other side of the world!
This was 7 years ago and this attitude has probably died out now, and unfortunately with the 'watershed' accident in Uberlingen the point is made clearly regarding TCAS and its implications.
IMHO any one who still questions TCAS should rethink his/her position......on the ground, before joining the rest of us in an ever more crowded sky where we each survive thanks to each others (ATC included) professional dedication.
best regards
MB

[Lon More]

Many pilots from the old East block countries were bought up in a much more rigid system of absolute obedience to instructions from the ground. If in doubt follow your training. At that time TCAS was still seen by many as riddled with faults ( Dallas Bump etc.) and as a non-revenue producing system not much time would be spent on instructing in it's use.

From an ATC point of view there was also initial resentment as it was seen by many as something that reduced our authority. Again, how much time was invested in training the actual controllers on the workings of the system From memory, most of the info we received came from ICAO posters and a campaign by EGATS (Merci, ATC Watcher) than from management. How much actual training did Peter Nielsen receive?

looks like the initial statements by management at the trial were a poor attempt at CYAS by muddying the waters

[anotherthing]

Pure speculation regarding this tragic case, but I was reliably informed a few years ago that to fly in certain parts of European airspace, A/C above a certain weight/seat allocation had to have TCAS fitted.

It was believed that some airlines fitted the kit to permit them to fly in said airspace, but did not train the crew in the correct use as that would have added more expense.

I am not in any way saying that this is what happened here - but in a regime whereby authority is everything and a way of life, it must be difficult, especially with regards to newish technology, to ignore commands/instructions given (in good faith) by an ATCO etc.

Fortunately, as Lon alludes to, Crews and ATCOs are now more aware of what should happen during a TCAS event.

Although a horrific incident, is a court case and possible prison sentence the best way to end this? Open reporting of incidents is what is needed - the threat of disciplinary action, either by company or courts, is not conducive to this.

Also, so many years have passed, and the ATCO involved is no longer with us - this leaves an instant and convenient scapegoat, which may mean that the truth, and indeed lessons to be learned, may never surface.

[ATC Watcher]

ACAS Training issues, Oh yes... that was and still is a problem.
A study made by SOFREAVIA in 2005 based on on board recordings from 4 European airlines ( 2 majors and 2 commuters ) over 4 years ( 2001-2004) showed that only 28% of the RAs were correctly followed by the pilots and in 10% of the cases the pilots choose not to follow the RAs or acted opposite to it. Althought the percentages might be better today, seen the incidents reports we read, there is still a lot of room for improvement, and not only in Russia...

Frangible :
I forgot to mention that to read the BfU report you must have a bit of aviation knowledge. It was not made for journalists or the common layman.
Green Guard : you said :

757 crew responded incorrectly to ATC

Please expand : I do not know what you are trying to say.
Back to te trial :
Yesterday was Defense day :
Not surprisingly the defense lawyers put all the blame on the controller on duty, to prove that the management they defend was not responsible.
One said " The controller created himself the problem . he committed many large errors and contrary to what the prosecution said , he was not overworked or stressed "
Another quote " he made himself responsible for the severe faults he made which ultimately led to the catastrophe "
Another lawyer said : The telephone was not a factor , he should have put the Airbus A320 on hold while solving the telephone problem "
I always like when lawyers are telling us how we should have done our job, Afterwards of course.....

[Green Guard]

ATC vs TCAS

Quote:
"757 crew responded incorrectly to ATC "

because ATC never asked that crew to descend. It was TCAS that made them to descend.

It is easy to give statements from in front of our computers. But on every day of our duty we always follow ATC instructions (whether we are from West or East), and any TCAS TA makes us see the picture, before RA comes out. We can all swear to act exactly like the 757 crew did. But in the heat of moment or a pressure, TA, RA and in the same time LOUD command from ATC, to start and expedite descend they did what they did.

And 757 crew did everything correct regarding TCAS and died.

We all need even love TCAS. "I can see you on my TCAS"

Main question here is how this tragedy could have been avoided. We all know one answer:
If both parties responded correctly to TCAS and incorrectly to ATC.
Second answer may be about new TCAS perhaps.

[av8boy]

"757 crew responded incorrectly to ATC "...because ATC never asked that crew to descend. It was TCAS that made them to descend.

Main question here is how this tragedy could have been avoided. We all know one answer: If both parties responded correctly to TCAS and incorrectly to ATC.

Oh nonsense.

To follow a TCAS RA in the absence of any ATC instruction at all is nothing like an incorrect response to an ATC instruction. Hell, to follow a TCAS RA which is exactly the opposite of an ATC instruction is exactly the right thing to do! We've all agreed (us controllers and you pilots) that a TCAS RA supersedes an ATC instruction. Therefore, the 75 crew did what we all depended upon them to do, and the TU crew did not. Think of it this way, a TCAS RA is the ultimate ATC instruction. It trumps all others. For crying out loud, it erases the ATC instruction. How can you respond incorrectly to an ATC instruction that has been erased? We ATCers support that idea. To echo BEagle, PLEASE tell me that you don't fly or control transport aircraft...

Where the hell is Jerricho when you need him?

And Nubboy...

The ATC'er saw a conflict and kept trying to resolve it, long after he should have shut up.

Actually, until we all have some technology in place that tells us you guys are getting an RA, we're not going to be shutting up. That's because we have no way of knowing whether or not you're getting the RA up there or not, and we're accustomed to trying to resolve the situation as long as there is an opportunity to do so. So I beg you, ignore me. Tune me out. Follow the RA. But know I'll keep chattering...

-Dave

[Avman]

Green Guard, I'm all for intelligent debate, but you're coming out with complete and utter garbage proving that you know pi$$ all about which you are talking about. You make my blood boil

[Nubboy]

Cheers
Dave
I fully take your point about not knowing if wehave an RA or not.
Isn't the technology there to broadcast/receive teh TCAS instructions so that at least you could be shouting in harmony with machines instead of against, as was so painfully the case here? Just a thoughtfor the techies.
As for Greenguard..........thank God I'm part time which reduces, statistically, the chance of ever having you on any side of a frequency I might be using.

[FlyGooseFly!]

I reckon most posters are forgetting the whole point of this thread - it's about a court case and not about the facts as they see them.

Yes, the SOP's will be gone over and may be criticised along with the actions of the pilots but I believe the overiding factor here is once you have agreement on the regulation of the skies in that we have ATC - it's their ultimate responsiblity to prevent collisions - no matter why or how - the guy in charge at the time will be blamed.

On top of that we have the additional National interests and affronts of "we wouldn't do that kind of thing here" and "how dare you insult us," plus and increasing lobby of folk who seem bent on indicting company directors at every turn to further some kind of vendetta against corporate business.

[kontrolor]

757 crew never stated that they are in TCAS descend.

and as far as same level - both aircraft were cleared to FL360. so he should have put more attention to them.

but generaly - I'm working in relatively small ACC unit, but nobody would allow such degradation of service without backup. I think Zurich controllers accepted what the managment threw at them and result was a tragedy.

and I'm not blaming the atco, I just wanted to emphesase, that he had a responsibility and he failed to use all the resorces he had in order to prevent the collision (ultimately).

[BEagle]

kontroler, that is not true.

The accident report clearly states that the B757 crew did indeed make such a call:

21:35:19, Crew report TCAS descent to ACC Zurich

[Nogbad the Bad]

I think Zurich controllers accepted what the managment threw at them and result was a tragedy.

Chances are they had no say in the matter !!