Green Guard, please tell me WHAT the 75 crew did wrongly, with regard to ATC?
I regard TCAS as I do EGWPS. It's an automated system thats looking out for me. When it tells em to do something, it normally means failure to follow its instructions means you die. Period.
People miss things and get them wrong.
The ATC'er saw a conflict and kept trying to resolve it, long after he should have shut up.
The TU crew had a conflict, TCAS and ATC, and never resolved it.
THE 75 crew did everything they should have done and died.
ICAO must ensure that such an avoidable trgedy doesn't occur again. If you can't, or won't comply with TCAS RAs, THEN YOU SHOULDN'T BE IN CONTROLLED AIRSPACE.
Regardless of the faults with the ATC system that night, TCAS was the LAST safeguard. By choosing not to comply with the HARD RA, for whatever reason, then that safeguard was wilfully removed.
Apart the question of different languages on frequency TCAS is not only a lifesaver, it's also our best on board tool for Situational awareness. Some of our A320's have (had?) a software variant which wouldn't display TCAS targets if the range on the ND was over 40nm. On those aircfraft I never left the range over 40nm once I'd verified the next TO waypoint. Surely basic airmanship dictates that you look where you're going, using all the tools available to you.
I too, am very unhappy about any MEL alleviation that lets you operate without a fully serviceable TCAS system.