kenya airlines 737-800 missing
Spadhampton,
Very plain, very simple - but also very harsh of you.
The same accident has now befallen the Kenyan, Flash Air and probably Ethiopian 737s within a few years. It is not just a third world malaise, I have seen it happen several times with British crew and I see reports of it happening to UK carriers several times a year. Due to the design of the 737 it is easily over looked. It is probably ending in tragedy more often these days because crews are more reliant on automation then they were 40+ years ago when the type was designed.
PEI_3721 had it right at the top of the page:
Very plain, very simple - but also very harsh of you.
The same accident has now befallen the Kenyan, Flash Air and probably Ethiopian 737s within a few years. It is not just a third world malaise, I have seen it happen several times with British crew and I see reports of it happening to UK carriers several times a year. Due to the design of the 737 it is easily over looked. It is probably ending in tragedy more often these days because crews are more reliant on automation then they were 40+ years ago when the type was designed.
PEI_3721 had it right at the top of the page:
I am reminded not to rush when engaging the autopilot, and after selection to check for correct engagement and the selected mode operation.
Before engagement confirm that the aircraft is in trim and no stick force is being held – like you, the autopilot does not like out of trim aircraft either.
These require self discipline, conscious thought and effort, all at the root of airmanship.
How can airmanship to be improved – a mixture of knowledge, habit, example, review, and memory, and with honest self criticism just to start with … but then we don’t always have good days.
Before engagement confirm that the aircraft is in trim and no stick force is being held – like you, the autopilot does not like out of trim aircraft either.
These require self discipline, conscious thought and effort, all at the root of airmanship.
How can airmanship to be improved – a mixture of knowledge, habit, example, review, and memory, and with honest self criticism just to start with … but then we don’t always have good days.
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the little "push button" autopilot engage switch on the newer generation on B737's requires one to look at the FMA to confirm engagement, not so with the older B737-200's and 300's where the paddle has to be engaged positevely into the magnetic lock....there is no doubt as to if the autopilot has engaged or not.....possibly something to look at in future designs of the B737 MCP....maybe going back to this older design woudn't be a bad idea.
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The PF should have been looking at the PFD as the PM engages the autopilot.
How much trouble is it to look at the top of the PFD to see if it has engaged before removing your hands? I'd say its worth about the lives of your crew and passengers.
How much trouble is it to look at the top of the PFD to see if it has engaged before removing your hands? I'd say its worth about the lives of your crew and passengers.
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I've flown the 737 for more than a few years, although, I don't claim to be a "Greybeard". On a few occasions, I've thought I'd engaged the autopilot, and sat there, fat dumb and happy, wondering why the aeroplane wasn't doing what it was "supposed to".
The point is, if it ain't doing what you like, don't just sit there and watch it happen. Do something about it. That's why you're there.
The point is, if it ain't doing what you like, don't just sit there and watch it happen. Do something about it. That's why you're there.
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Thats exactly why, in my airline, we can only say "autopilot A/B in command" after we have verified the FMA indication. Just pressing the button doesn't mean anything - the slightest bit of pressure on the control column means the AP will not engage. I would hope that other operators also follow this SOP?
Davecr,
Your airlines SOP, whilst well intentioned, is at best a sticking plaster covering a latent threat and at worst just a**e covering. How many times have you, or have you flown with somebody, who will give you the standard response to a checklist item, because it is a habit? Eg “Seat belts … AUTO – oops no they are not, now they are”. We have all done it and just because there is an SOP to catch it is not a cast iron guarantee that it will not happen.
IMHO the best fix is a redesign of the A/P engage mechanism to give a warning if attempted engagement fails, eg the A/P disconnect wailer. This will be difficult to design & install. The most effective quick fix is to go back to the paddle engage switches which have tactile feedback if they are not engaged.
Your airlines SOP, whilst well intentioned, is at best a sticking plaster covering a latent threat and at worst just a**e covering. How many times have you, or have you flown with somebody, who will give you the standard response to a checklist item, because it is a habit? Eg “Seat belts … AUTO – oops no they are not, now they are”. We have all done it and just because there is an SOP to catch it is not a cast iron guarantee that it will not happen.
IMHO the best fix is a redesign of the A/P engage mechanism to give a warning if attempted engagement fails, eg the A/P disconnect wailer. This will be difficult to design & install. The most effective quick fix is to go back to the paddle engage switches which have tactile feedback if they are not engaged.
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Sad..they say the cause is spatial disorientation but I wish the authority's were a bit more specific just so younger guy would learn....The capt was concerned about the TRW and i dont blame him and in a rush didn't make sure the A/P said command....so simple a mistake...look for the Ethiopian accident to be much of the same...
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I believe in the case of the Egypt Air accident where the captain was shouting for the autopilot to be engaged as a means of recovering from an unusual attitude (not a sensible thing to do as it turned out...), the CVR showed the F/O was in fact reading back to the captain using the words "God Willing autopilot engaged" In other words you would at first think he was telling the captain that the autopilot was indeed engaged. But it wasn't - at least not initially, anyway. The F/O merely repeated back a direction from the captain and this read-back possibly misled an incompetent captain into believing the autopilot was now engaged and he could take a deep breath and relax knowing his lack of hand flying skills would not be exposed. Unfortunately and tragically for everyone abord, they were exposed soon after.
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I fully agree with the statements regarding the paddle autopilot selector,
when in hard thunderstorm weather and heading out into pitch black darkness, the over-riding urge to get the autopilot engaged as soon as possible and go heads down to plot and plan around the severe weather is overwhelming, now with the old paddle autopilot selector it is very obvious to the pilot flying, under severe pressure to get it engaged, as to who is actually still flying the aircraft ie PF or "george" and until the autopilot paddle has latched magnetically. the PF would defenitely not loose control over the attitude of the aircraft as he is still in "command" of attitude/heading/speed etc,
with the newer autopilot selector the engagement is far to subtle, and in the "heat" of the moment of needing to get heads down and onto the radar etc it seems to have been shown on more than 2 occasions that the autopilot engagement was never accomplished, whislt the crew urgently diverted their attention to the task at hand of plot and plan around severe weather, thinking the autopilot was engaged.
it is all fine and well to talk of SOP's regarding the calls and the monitoring function around autopilot engagement sequence, but when faced with severe weather just after take-off, the crews mind is more focussed on avoiding weather safely, than being concerned if "all the i's have been dotted and t's been crossed" w.r.t. SOP.....and in these scenarios a tactile autopilot paddle engagement will defenitley relieve the pilot flying with rest assuredness that the autopilot is now in charge.....and even the Pilot non flying can see this due to paddle being held up and engaged.....no need to create a whole "broadway play of calls" to confirm autopilot engagement, and thus ...with respect Mr Boeing....the older system was beter.
when in hard thunderstorm weather and heading out into pitch black darkness, the over-riding urge to get the autopilot engaged as soon as possible and go heads down to plot and plan around the severe weather is overwhelming, now with the old paddle autopilot selector it is very obvious to the pilot flying, under severe pressure to get it engaged, as to who is actually still flying the aircraft ie PF or "george" and until the autopilot paddle has latched magnetically. the PF would defenitely not loose control over the attitude of the aircraft as he is still in "command" of attitude/heading/speed etc,
with the newer autopilot selector the engagement is far to subtle, and in the "heat" of the moment of needing to get heads down and onto the radar etc it seems to have been shown on more than 2 occasions that the autopilot engagement was never accomplished, whislt the crew urgently diverted their attention to the task at hand of plot and plan around severe weather, thinking the autopilot was engaged.
it is all fine and well to talk of SOP's regarding the calls and the monitoring function around autopilot engagement sequence, but when faced with severe weather just after take-off, the crews mind is more focussed on avoiding weather safely, than being concerned if "all the i's have been dotted and t's been crossed" w.r.t. SOP.....and in these scenarios a tactile autopilot paddle engagement will defenitley relieve the pilot flying with rest assuredness that the autopilot is now in charge.....and even the Pilot non flying can see this due to paddle being held up and engaged.....no need to create a whole "broadway play of calls" to confirm autopilot engagement, and thus ...with respect Mr Boeing....the older system was beter.
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the over-riding urge to get the autopilot engaged as soon as possible and go heads down to plot and plan around the severe weather is overwhelming,
Why is this so. If the thunderstorm is that close then commonsense would surely dictate you simply delay the take off until the flight path is clear. And even if circumstances dictate you depart into a thunderstorm then it takes only a few seconds to engage the autopilot into heading select. The radar should have already been on and tilt control organised before the take off roll.
In any case, there is a third way out, and that is have the first officer fly the departure under your direction while you study the flight path around a storm on the radar. When time permits and at your direction as captain, he can engage the autopilot. It seems from the various accident reports mentioned that it was the undue rush to engage the aautopilot that caused distraction to the primary task of flying the aircraft until such times it is appropriate to carefully engage the autopilot.
Of course if the first officer is incapable of hand flying in IMC because of his inexperience and lack of training as a pilot, then it becomes a single pilot operation - not healthy under thunderstorm conditions. I suspect the latter comment is often true in some airlines..
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unfortunately i beg to differ with your last statement, word has it that investigations confirmed a break in the controls meaning the F/O was putting conflicting inputs to the captain and in the right direction for the recovery, unfortunately in this situation only the spoilers are controlled by the F/O and the ailerons by the captains stick so very little he could have done.
Classic scenario of CRM failure in the cockpit
Classic scenario of CRM failure in the cockpit
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odericko2000, I am at a loss to understand what you mean by a break in the controls.
This did not appear in the final report and my understanding, imperfect as it is, is that in a Boeing there is no discontinuity in the controls, that is, both control columns have full authority.
However, there was far more failing in that cockpit than CRM.
This did not appear in the final report and my understanding, imperfect as it is, is that in a Boeing there is no discontinuity in the controls, that is, both control columns have full authority.
However, there was far more failing in that cockpit than CRM.
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@Plovett,
the ailerons on the 73ng are connected to the captains control wheel via the aileron feel centering unit whereas the F/o control wheel is connected to the spoilers via the spoiler mixer and the two controls are both connected via a cable drive system giving both control columns full authority over the ailerons and spoilers.
in the event that the ailerons are jammed the FOs control column will then break away n the column will move the spoilers only for roll control and vice versa.
in this case the captains column had an opposing force to the First officers having an effect equivalent to jammed ailerons, hence each of the control columns was controling different surfaces in this case the captains controling the ailerons n the FOs the spoilers.
But all said and done the recovery by the FO was initiated too late to have any impact n i concur there was lots more than CRM failure
the ailerons on the 73ng are connected to the captains control wheel via the aileron feel centering unit whereas the F/o control wheel is connected to the spoilers via the spoiler mixer and the two controls are both connected via a cable drive system giving both control columns full authority over the ailerons and spoilers.
in the event that the ailerons are jammed the FOs control column will then break away n the column will move the spoilers only for roll control and vice versa.
in this case the captains column had an opposing force to the First officers having an effect equivalent to jammed ailerons, hence each of the control columns was controling different surfaces in this case the captains controling the ailerons n the FOs the spoilers.
But all said and done the recovery by the FO was initiated too late to have any impact n i concur there was lots more than CRM failure
A question for those in the military...
Would a magnetic anomaly detector, i.e. one of those things you hunt subs with on Nimrods, P3s S3s etc detect a large metal mass, like a 2 tonne jet engine in the jungle ?
Would a magnetic anomaly detector, i.e. one of those things you hunt subs with on Nimrods, P3s S3s etc detect a large metal mass, like a 2 tonne jet engine in the jungle ?
Tried to find an F-16 that crashed near Adana Turkey, 1985, using MAD on my helicopter.
No luck.
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Kenyan Airways 737-800
Comment by Skylion:
<Kenya Airways originally intended to temprarily employ foreign contract pilots to assist the Kenyan Pilots through their period of rapid growth. This was rejected by KALPA>.
I read of the above air accident with interest because a lot of people in Kenya do not seem to know what actually happened. They attribute the accident to the bad weather as was originally foretold.
Just a comment; during the time of East African Airways, this was the case, where expatriate pilots trained the locals. I remember East African pilots flying for long periods as co-pilots both on domestic and international flights, before they qualified to pilots. I know there are a number of qualified and experienced Kenyan Pilots, formerly of East African Airways.
Just wondering why would Kenya Airways Management give in to KALPA in rejecting this arrangement
, when actually it would conform with the safety regulation as stipulated by ICAO. Is Kenya Airways not a member of ICAO? And also why doesn't the KQ management put experienced pilots on this West African Route which has already claimed two Kenya Airways aicrafts and a number of fatalities?
How sad this was!
<Kenya Airways originally intended to temprarily employ foreign contract pilots to assist the Kenyan Pilots through their period of rapid growth. This was rejected by KALPA>.
I read of the above air accident with interest because a lot of people in Kenya do not seem to know what actually happened. They attribute the accident to the bad weather as was originally foretold.
Just a comment; during the time of East African Airways, this was the case, where expatriate pilots trained the locals. I remember East African pilots flying for long periods as co-pilots both on domestic and international flights, before they qualified to pilots. I know there are a number of qualified and experienced Kenyan Pilots, formerly of East African Airways.
Just wondering why would Kenya Airways Management give in to KALPA in rejecting this arrangement
, when actually it would conform with the safety regulation as stipulated by ICAO. Is Kenya Airways not a member of ICAO? And also why doesn't the KQ management put experienced pilots on this West African Route which has already claimed two Kenya Airways aicrafts and a number of fatalities?How sad this was!
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Kenya Airways 737-800
Commenting on Arkroyal: "Remembers Capt. was ex=military. You could be right. What I know is, he was employed by KQ as a flight steward initially, then after a couple of years KQ was recruiting some pilots and he applied and was accepted. What I don't know is whether KQ sponsored his training or not, since he was already working with them or where he was sent for training. That I don't know.
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Kenya Airways 737-800
Noelbaba's third paragraph; "The crash report compiled by the Cameroonian Civil Aviation Authority, found the captain did not adhere to the standard operating procedures and the plane took off without authorization from the Air Traffic Control".
At the time, there was a rumour circulating in Nairobi, that when the captain was refused permission to take off due to bad weather by the Cameroonian ATC, he called Nairobi to consult with Titus Naikuni,and that the captainwas told to take off immediately and return to Nairobi. Whether this rumour was true or not, it is only Titus who can confirm.
This does not excuse the pilot's error.
At the time, there was a rumour circulating in Nairobi, that when the captain was refused permission to take off due to bad weather by the Cameroonian ATC, he called Nairobi to consult with Titus Naikuni,and that the captain
was told to take off immediately and return to Nairobi. Whether this rumour was true or not, it is only Titus who can confirm.This does not excuse the pilot's error.
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Kenya Airways 737-800
General questions to experienced pilots
Is Boeng 737-800 a safe aircraft, considering a number of accidents, this type of aircraft has been involved in, up to now? Or is it too difficulty to fly?
Is Boeng 737-800 a safe aircraft, considering a number of accidents, this type of aircraft has been involved in, up to now? Or is it too difficulty to fly?
Last edited by flyawaybird; 15th Aug 2010 at 04:53.