Indonesian B737 runway overrun/crash
I'm in one of those moods
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PK.
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.. caught the late news on ABC (I believe it is the same footage as shown yesterday) .. you are absolutely right .. siren ... heat plume from fuel fire right side!
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.. caught the late news on ABC (I believe it is the same footage as shown yesterday) .. you are absolutely right .. siren ... heat plume from fuel fire right side!
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Very sad and unnecessary accident.
As some have stated,the shaking reported by passengers,probably relates to spoiler extension with landing flap.Speedbrake should not be used with flaps greater than TEN.
This airport has 7200' of concrete,less of course on the glide,and we dont know as yet about any NOTAMS.
Its all down to pilot training and this modern cockpit ethos.AP engaged,VOR LOC/GS green,and the pilot sits there and watches the speed build up too afraid to intervene(The FDR will reveal whether or not the flap load relief protection activated or not-Im betting it probably did).In desperation,he takes speedbrake with landing flap.Recovery from a fast or high approach is not a complex maneuver and should be part of any pilots make-up.In a 737 it is not a difficult procedure.Usually it stems from pilots not being trained to recognize that the VNAV profile stored in the FMC doesnt match the vectors/profile that they are being given in real time by ATC.The reliance on the automation and the erosion of traditional flying skills sets the trap very nicely.
Recovery from above the profile is accomplished by engaging VORLOC only,foregoing the profile and throwing out 30/40 flaps,and arming and capturing the GS at a lower platform.If you dont achieve the window by 500/1000 then simply perform a go-around.Tailwind and pilot skill are the critical factors here and determine the mindset.
Ive said it before and Ill say it again;pilots today arent trained to fly the plane.They're trained to program the FMC and use the automatics in a set and standard way.Fear of the QAR and these wretched SOP's divert their attention from their primary goal;FLY THE PLANE.The only relevant SOP here is the stable-approach criteria by 1000/500.If you dont meet it,go-around.
As some have stated,the shaking reported by passengers,probably relates to spoiler extension with landing flap.Speedbrake should not be used with flaps greater than TEN.
This airport has 7200' of concrete,less of course on the glide,and we dont know as yet about any NOTAMS.
Its all down to pilot training and this modern cockpit ethos.AP engaged,VOR LOC/GS green,and the pilot sits there and watches the speed build up too afraid to intervene(The FDR will reveal whether or not the flap load relief protection activated or not-Im betting it probably did).In desperation,he takes speedbrake with landing flap.Recovery from a fast or high approach is not a complex maneuver and should be part of any pilots make-up.In a 737 it is not a difficult procedure.Usually it stems from pilots not being trained to recognize that the VNAV profile stored in the FMC doesnt match the vectors/profile that they are being given in real time by ATC.The reliance on the automation and the erosion of traditional flying skills sets the trap very nicely.
Recovery from above the profile is accomplished by engaging VORLOC only,foregoing the profile and throwing out 30/40 flaps,and arming and capturing the GS at a lower platform.If you dont achieve the window by 500/1000 then simply perform a go-around.Tailwind and pilot skill are the critical factors here and determine the mindset.
Ive said it before and Ill say it again;pilots today arent trained to fly the plane.They're trained to program the FMC and use the automatics in a set and standard way.Fear of the QAR and these wretched SOP's divert their attention from their primary goal;FLY THE PLANE.The only relevant SOP here is the stable-approach criteria by 1000/500.If you dont meet it,go-around.
I Have Control
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? Fly the a/c?
Stable at 500/1000, sure...Standard A320/330/340 SOP, nothing to do with FMS/FMGC, the automatics will do a nice G/A once TOGA selected. 737 can't be so different, bit more primitive, that's all.
Several posters have made comments in regards the flap position as viewed in photos/video.
Fortunately you are not part of the investigation team.
Do you really believe that the position of the flaps, as evident in the photos and post crash, is representative of the flap setting prior to the accident? The forces involved in the accident destroyed the aircraft...but the flaps/slats remained intact & in position? Circumstantial evidence!! Wait for the facts!
Smokey2 took much displeasure at the painting-out of the airline logo on the tail!
It's called PR.
Standard procedure in any company is to white/blackout the company logos..if any remain!! GA, Regional, and Airlines. All countries do it.
Fortunately you are not part of the investigation team.
Do you really believe that the position of the flaps, as evident in the photos and post crash, is representative of the flap setting prior to the accident? The forces involved in the accident destroyed the aircraft...but the flaps/slats remained intact & in position? Circumstantial evidence!! Wait for the facts!
Smokey2 took much displeasure at the painting-out of the airline logo on the tail!
It's called PR.
Standard procedure in any company is to white/blackout the company logos..if any remain!! GA, Regional, and Airlines. All countries do it.
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Apart from a couple of NWA DC-9 ground incidents that may be write-offs, there have been five jet aircraft total losses so far in 2007. Four of those have been PK-registered aircraft. It doesn't matter how much spin or how many excuses you apply to it, that is still a shocking statistic.
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a. Low time Right-seater flying and a quite experienced captain in the LHS being so distracted by the unstable approach that he doesn't lower any flap (normally a RH seater's duty). They may have also landed with a slight tailwind component (judging from the post-crash smoke, there's little wind at all however).
b. RH seater trying so hard to plant it at high-speed (due to the total lack of flap) that he drives the nosewheel in - in a classic porpoise cycle initiation (i.e. a nose-to-main-gear continuing reverberation). (which explains some of the pax descriptions of what they felt).
It would seem to be naught but a classically incompetent very heavy landing carried out by a tyro and supervised very maladroitly by a non-instructor type - notwithstanding any claims of wind-shear.
If we're sticking to what we have evidence for...
The cockpit wasn't attached to the rest of the fuse when it all came to rest and Captain Marwoto quickly shinnied out the flightdeck hatch.
If you look at: http://www2.indoflyer.net/botak/montage1.jpg you can see the elevators were slightly up also, which could mean cables still connected prior to fire.
It's clear in the composite image that the flaps are still up.
http://www2.indoflyer.net/botak/montage2.jpg shows flaps on the left wing deployed but not at 30 as per GA's standard operating procedures. The wing on top is the right wing, slats deployed.
And in http://www2.indoflyer.net/botak/montage1.jpg you can see the inboard leading edge flaps on the left wing were deployed (not just hanging).
Now whether the flap position on the photos are the same as on the approach, we'd have to wait and see, but yes, IT WAS DEPLOYED! If trained eyewitnesses can identify the spoiler being deployed, I'm sure they'd be able to tell if flaps were retracted, somewhere near flap15, or somewhere near flap30/40 as it went by them!
I myself only noticed the flap position on the montage not more than 24hrs ago, and it CAN match a botched flap 15 approach. Whether that was what happened or not, for the moment we can only guess, but please, silly guesses aren't useful.
The head of Garuda's pilot association managed to interview Capt. Marwoto last night, and he quoted that there was a "minor problem" with the aircraft "which was solved and acted upon prior to the landing." Now whether Capt. Marwoto's having selective amnesia or not in his interview, we'd have to wait and see.
Now if the FDRs reveal the opposite of you say Dagger Dirk, I wonder if you'd claim the whole investigation's a cover up?
If you want to speculate, speculate responsibly! Why? As Clandestino said, learning from mishaps is one way to improve... slapping comments like "tyro non-instructor type", or "low hour newbie" isn't one of those ways, unless you know directly or indirectly through someone.
Furthermore, the purser died on duty, reportedly amidst evacuating the business class section, where there were some deaths... I hope you don't brand him as trying to sneak out of the aircraft quickly!
PK-KAR
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referring back to this photo here, http://www2.indoflyer.net/botak/montage1.jpg there is some UP elevator, but it looks to me to be trimmed in a level or nose down trim, with 30 or so flap, i would assume the trim would be a lot more Nose up??
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737 door slide
Quote:
I may be missing something but I didn't notice any escape slides from the forward and aft doors.
I think the slides need to drop a certain distance before they will inflate,
If you look very closely to the footage, You will see that L1 is still intact and faired with fuselage. On the other hand the cabin crew did not attempt to open the door due to the area being completely inaccessible.
On another note; The worse thing anybody can do is to speculate without the facts and I will most certainly not take the words of a pax who's just been involved in one of the most horrific experiences, not to mention the shock they were under during the ordeal as a basis, to identify the cause of a crash. Do yourself a favour and wait for the findings and facts.
As for the slide on the B737, when you close the door you have to physically lift the bar and place it on the floor to arm the slide, then the Red Ribbon is placed across the door pane to indicate it is armed for the people outside. It is not like the Wide-body set up whether it is 747 or A330/A340 or even 320 for that matter which is automatically engaged.
please see below.
A
737-300/400/500
MAINTENANCE MANUAL
MAINTENANCE MANUAL
E_S_C_A_P_E_ _S_L_I_D_E_ _A_S_S_E_M_B_L_Y_ _(_D_O_O_R_-_M_O_U_N_T_E_D_)_ _-_ _D_E_S_C_R_I_P_T_I_O_N_ _A_N_D_ _O_P_E_R_A_T_I_O_N_
1 . G_e_n_e_r_a_l_
A. Each escape slide assembly has these components:
(1) an escape slide pack
(2) an escape slide compartment
(3) two floor brackets.
B. The escape slide assemblies are installed on the lower inboard face of
each entry and galley service door.
C. Two floor brackets are attached to the floor inboard of the doorway.
D. The escape slide pack has these components:
(1) an escape slide
(2) a detachable girt
(3) a girt bar
(4) an air bottle
E. The air bottle holds high-pressure gas to inflate the slide.
F. The compartment holds the slide pack in the folded position and opens
when the slide is used.
2 . O_p_e_r_a_t_i_o_n_ (Fig. 1)
A. Prepare and inflate the escape slide.
(1) Install the slide assembly with the door closed.
(2) To arm the slide, remove the girt bar from the stowage hooks on the
door and install it in the floor brackets.
(3) Open the door as usual but do not hesitate until it is fully open.
(4) The girt will extend while you open the door.
(5) As you open the door, the conection between the girt and the latch
will pull tight, and unlatch the compartment.
(6) When the door is almost fully open, the slide pack will pull down
and out of the compartment.
(7) The slide will fully inflate in approximately six seconds.
(8) If the slide does not inflate automatically, pull the inflation
handle sharply to inflate the slide manually.
(9) To remove the slide from the airplane, lift the flap and pull the
ditching handle.
From the picture, it does not look like the slide was armed!!!
1 . G_e_n_e_r_a_l_
A. Each escape slide assembly has these components:
(1) an escape slide pack
(2) an escape slide compartment
(3) two floor brackets.
B. The escape slide assemblies are installed on the lower inboard face of
each entry and galley service door.
C. Two floor brackets are attached to the floor inboard of the doorway.
D. The escape slide pack has these components:
(1) an escape slide
(2) a detachable girt
(3) a girt bar
(4) an air bottle
E. The air bottle holds high-pressure gas to inflate the slide.
F. The compartment holds the slide pack in the folded position and opens
when the slide is used.
2 . O_p_e_r_a_t_i_o_n_ (Fig. 1)
A. Prepare and inflate the escape slide.
(1) Install the slide assembly with the door closed.
(2) To arm the slide, remove the girt bar from the stowage hooks on the
door and install it in the floor brackets.
(3) Open the door as usual but do not hesitate until it is fully open.
(4) The girt will extend while you open the door.
(5) As you open the door, the conection between the girt and the latch
will pull tight, and unlatch the compartment.
(6) When the door is almost fully open, the slide pack will pull down
and out of the compartment.
(7) The slide will fully inflate in approximately six seconds.
(8) If the slide does not inflate automatically, pull the inflation
handle sharply to inflate the slide manually.
(9) To remove the slide from the airplane, lift the flap and pull the
ditching handle.
From the picture, it does not look like the slide was armed!!!
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Sydney Morning Herald - Captain blames "massive downdraft"
http://www.smh.com.au/news/world/gar...166898059.html
"A MASSIVE downdraft caused Wednesday's catastrophic crash of a Garuda Boeing 737, plunging it into the runway, its pilot says.
The aircraft's wing flaps also may have malfunctioned during the landing, Captain Marwoto Komar has told Captain Stephanus, president of the Garuda Pilots Association.
Although a plane would normally fly around and try to land again in such circumstances, Captain Komar felt he had to continue the landing after the initial impact, Captain Stephanus said.
After the rough landing, the aircraft bounced and ploughed across fences and a road at the end of the runway before bursting into flames.
It is believed five Australians and at least 16 Indonesians perished. Indonesian authorities have said four Australians are confirmed dead: Mark Scott, Morgan Mellish, Allison Sudradjat and Brice Steele. The death of the fifth missing Australian, Liz O'Neill, is yet to be established.
Captain Komar is feeling guilty and depressed and may be suicidal, doctors and Captain Stephanus said. He said the two pilots and the other four surviving crew were being held by police against their will at Harjo Lukito military hospital.
Flight conditions appeared normal until the aircraft was about 1000 feet above the Yogyakarta's runway, Captain Komar and his co-pilot told Captain Stephanus yesterday.
"The captain felt a downdraft and the aircraft sinks so rapidly," Captain Stephanus said. "They just felt the aircraft hit the runway and bounce and then because the speed is very fast the aircraft overran. Then the engines hit the ground."
The pilot did not explain why he was travelling so fast, Captain Stephanus said. "They said there was a problem, there was something wrong with the flaps, the flaps cannot extend normally.
"Usually you should go round, but the captain felt as they had already hit the runway it was best to land. This is a freak incident. We are very sorry; please don't judge us until we find the truth."
Captain Komar was unfit to be questioned, and plans for police to question him were inappropriate as the accident was outside their jurisdiction, Captain Stephanus said. He said police could try to make the pilot a scapegoat.
A hospital doctor has written a letter stating that Captain Komar was mentally depressed and unfit to be questioned. "We are very afraid he could kill himself," Captain Stephanus said. "The captain is very depressed. He is feeling very, very guilty."
Military police guarding the crew said they were under strict instructions to isolate them. They blocked attempts by the Herald to interview the crew.
Captain Stephanus discussed the crash with the crew, including the co-pilot, Gagam Rohman, and four flight stewards, and other Garuda officials yesterday.
Captain Komar, 45, had been a Garuda captain for five years and had 22 years' experience as a pilot, Captain Stephanus said.
He said after the crash the crew followed standard emergency procedures, opened all the exits and managed to evacuate most of the passengers.
Australian police and safety officials yesterday joined the Indonesian investigation into the cause of the crash. They located the aircraft's flight data recorders, which will arrive in Canberra for analysis today.
A deputy director of investigations with the Australian Transport Safety Board, Allan Stray, said the recorders were expected to yield vital clues to the crash, including how fast the aircraft was travelling as it came in to land. This would help to determine the direction of the investigation. The boxes should have recorded all flight information and the final 30 minutes of radio communications and cockpit conversations.
The lead Indonesian investigator, Mardjono Siswosuwarno, of the National Transport Safety Committee, said that as well as examining the hard landing, investigators were looking at whether there could have been a mechanical failure in the aircraft's nose due to cracks or corrosion.
Yesterday airport workers painted out of the Garuda logo on the plane's tail, in an apparent attempt to mask its identity. Officials later pulled the tail down, calling it a potential hazard to aircraft.
Military police guarding the crew said they were under strict instructions to isolate them. They blocked attempts by the Herald to interview the crew.
Captain Stephanus discussed the crash with the crew, including the co-pilot, Gagam Rohman, and four flight stewards, and other Garuda officials yesterday.
Captain Komar, 45, had been a Garuda captain for five years and had 22 years' experience as a pilot, Captain Stephanus said.
He said after the crash the crew followed standard emergency procedures, opened all the exits and managed to evacuate most of the passengers.
Australian police and safety officials yesterday joined the Indonesian investigation into the cause of the crash. They located the aircraft's flight data recorders, which will arrive in Canberra for analysis today.
A deputy director of investigations with the Australian Transport Safety Board, Allan Stray, said the recorders were expected to yield vital clues to the crash, including how fast the aircraft was travelling as it came in to land. This would help to determine the direction of the investigation. The boxes should have recorded all flight information and the final 30 minutes of radio communications and cockpit conversations.
The lead Indonesian investigator, Mardjono Siswosuwarno, of the National Transport Safety Committee, said that as well as examining the hard landing, investigators were looking at whether there could have been a mechanical failure in the aircraft's nose due to cracks or corrosion.
Yesterday airport workers painted out of the Garuda logo on the plane's tail, in an apparent attempt to mask its identity. Officials later pulled the tail down, calling it a potential hazard to aircraft."
"A MASSIVE downdraft caused Wednesday's catastrophic crash of a Garuda Boeing 737, plunging it into the runway, its pilot says.
The aircraft's wing flaps also may have malfunctioned during the landing, Captain Marwoto Komar has told Captain Stephanus, president of the Garuda Pilots Association.
Although a plane would normally fly around and try to land again in such circumstances, Captain Komar felt he had to continue the landing after the initial impact, Captain Stephanus said.
After the rough landing, the aircraft bounced and ploughed across fences and a road at the end of the runway before bursting into flames.
It is believed five Australians and at least 16 Indonesians perished. Indonesian authorities have said four Australians are confirmed dead: Mark Scott, Morgan Mellish, Allison Sudradjat and Brice Steele. The death of the fifth missing Australian, Liz O'Neill, is yet to be established.
Captain Komar is feeling guilty and depressed and may be suicidal, doctors and Captain Stephanus said. He said the two pilots and the other four surviving crew were being held by police against their will at Harjo Lukito military hospital.
Flight conditions appeared normal until the aircraft was about 1000 feet above the Yogyakarta's runway, Captain Komar and his co-pilot told Captain Stephanus yesterday.
"The captain felt a downdraft and the aircraft sinks so rapidly," Captain Stephanus said. "They just felt the aircraft hit the runway and bounce and then because the speed is very fast the aircraft overran. Then the engines hit the ground."
The pilot did not explain why he was travelling so fast, Captain Stephanus said. "They said there was a problem, there was something wrong with the flaps, the flaps cannot extend normally.
"Usually you should go round, but the captain felt as they had already hit the runway it was best to land. This is a freak incident. We are very sorry; please don't judge us until we find the truth."
Captain Komar was unfit to be questioned, and plans for police to question him were inappropriate as the accident was outside their jurisdiction, Captain Stephanus said. He said police could try to make the pilot a scapegoat.
A hospital doctor has written a letter stating that Captain Komar was mentally depressed and unfit to be questioned. "We are very afraid he could kill himself," Captain Stephanus said. "The captain is very depressed. He is feeling very, very guilty."
Military police guarding the crew said they were under strict instructions to isolate them. They blocked attempts by the Herald to interview the crew.
Captain Stephanus discussed the crash with the crew, including the co-pilot, Gagam Rohman, and four flight stewards, and other Garuda officials yesterday.
Captain Komar, 45, had been a Garuda captain for five years and had 22 years' experience as a pilot, Captain Stephanus said.
He said after the crash the crew followed standard emergency procedures, opened all the exits and managed to evacuate most of the passengers.
Australian police and safety officials yesterday joined the Indonesian investigation into the cause of the crash. They located the aircraft's flight data recorders, which will arrive in Canberra for analysis today.
A deputy director of investigations with the Australian Transport Safety Board, Allan Stray, said the recorders were expected to yield vital clues to the crash, including how fast the aircraft was travelling as it came in to land. This would help to determine the direction of the investigation. The boxes should have recorded all flight information and the final 30 minutes of radio communications and cockpit conversations.
The lead Indonesian investigator, Mardjono Siswosuwarno, of the National Transport Safety Committee, said that as well as examining the hard landing, investigators were looking at whether there could have been a mechanical failure in the aircraft's nose due to cracks or corrosion.
Yesterday airport workers painted out of the Garuda logo on the plane's tail, in an apparent attempt to mask its identity. Officials later pulled the tail down, calling it a potential hazard to aircraft.
Military police guarding the crew said they were under strict instructions to isolate them. They blocked attempts by the Herald to interview the crew.
Captain Stephanus discussed the crash with the crew, including the co-pilot, Gagam Rohman, and four flight stewards, and other Garuda officials yesterday.
Captain Komar, 45, had been a Garuda captain for five years and had 22 years' experience as a pilot, Captain Stephanus said.
He said after the crash the crew followed standard emergency procedures, opened all the exits and managed to evacuate most of the passengers.
Australian police and safety officials yesterday joined the Indonesian investigation into the cause of the crash. They located the aircraft's flight data recorders, which will arrive in Canberra for analysis today.
A deputy director of investigations with the Australian Transport Safety Board, Allan Stray, said the recorders were expected to yield vital clues to the crash, including how fast the aircraft was travelling as it came in to land. This would help to determine the direction of the investigation. The boxes should have recorded all flight information and the final 30 minutes of radio communications and cockpit conversations.
The lead Indonesian investigator, Mardjono Siswosuwarno, of the National Transport Safety Committee, said that as well as examining the hard landing, investigators were looking at whether there could have been a mechanical failure in the aircraft's nose due to cracks or corrosion.
Yesterday airport workers painted out of the Garuda logo on the plane's tail, in an apparent attempt to mask its identity. Officials later pulled the tail down, calling it a potential hazard to aircraft."
Several posters have made comments in regards the flap position as viewed in photos/video.
Fortunately you are not part of the investigation team.
Do you really believe that the position of the flaps, as evident in the photos and post crash, is representative of the flap setting prior to the accident? The forces involved in the accident destroyed the aircraft...but the flaps/slats remained intact & in position? Circumstantial evidence!! Wait for the facts!
Fortunately you are not part of the investigation team.
Do you really believe that the position of the flaps, as evident in the photos and post crash, is representative of the flap setting prior to the accident? The forces involved in the accident destroyed the aircraft...but the flaps/slats remained intact & in position? Circumstantial evidence!! Wait for the facts!
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L2 Escape Slide Speculation
I don't want to get involved in the speculation over causes of crash simply make a point that if the L2 slide had deployed, peoples exit from that door would have been severely hampered - the slide is some 14 feet long - the distance to the ground in this specific instance is an easy step. Had the slide been there it would have been a complete hindrance. Maybe we should think the best of the cabin crew (who clearly acted with utmost dignity and professionalism) and assume they disarmed the slide until evidence is posted to the contrary. Prayers are with the relatives and injured.
The reported crew interview hints at an inability to deploy landing flaps. Possible causes are asymmetry as previously noted, hydraulic problem or ??? This may explain the increased landing speed, but does raise the question of finding a longer runway.
Definitely not the time to have windshear added to your troubles
As to the decision to continue with the landing, Air Canada lost a DC-8 at YYZ with all aboard after taking it back up after a heavy landing following an inadvertent spoiler deployment
Definitely not the time to have windshear added to your troubles
As to the decision to continue with the landing, Air Canada lost a DC-8 at YYZ with all aboard after taking it back up after a heavy landing following an inadvertent spoiler deployment
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Door slide not deployed
Cytherea
Quote;"I don't want to get involved in the speculation over causes of crash simply make a point that if the L2 slide had deployed".
I assure you Cytherea and guarantee you that slide was not even armed let alon deployed have agood look at the picture ( The Bustle still attached and the slide is intact).See the operating instruction I post it above.
Sinbad1
Many existing airline pilots have said that the MPL will not cause any aircraft handling incidents under their command - as they simply won't let the MPL holders ever touch the flying controls.
Unexpected buffeting and high sink rate have been mentioned - but although that sounds like classic stall warning, the reported high landing speed certainly does not.
So it's time to wait for the accident report, I would think.
Unexpected buffeting and high sink rate have been mentioned - but although that sounds like classic stall warning, the reported high landing speed certainly does not.
So it's time to wait for the accident report, I would think.
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L2 Slide
Thanks Sinbad, I'm aware of that - What I am suggesting is the reason the slide wasn't armed when the door opened was the person who opened that door had the presence of mind to disarm the slide BEFORE opening the door having taken the outside condition into account. Given their actions after escape I would like to Assume this scenario rather than seek to blame them without evidence
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From an EMAIL Received today
There's a vague possibility that they had a flap asymmetry (which locks the flaps in present position) - and pressed on.
.
However the more I read about passenger and witness descriptions of their perceived sequence of events, the clearer it is that the nosewheel was driven in and that a destructive PIO called "porpoising" began. Porpoising can become a divergent phugoid in a jet that's landed far too fast for its weight (and with insufficient drag flap).
.
What's Porpoising?
After the nosewheel oleo rebounds upwards and the aircraft "bounces" (courtesy of the MLG oleos decompressing a short time later), the neophyte pilot's natural tendency is to instantly lower the nose and again "spot the deck" (i.e. try to force the airplane onto the ground). It's completely opposite to a normal flare and hold-off process. The inevitable result is another nosewheel first strike (and rebound). The PIO is underway......
.
This apparently happened three times and on the third occasion the nosewheel oleo snapped off (thereafter no hydraulics, no nosewheel steering, no directional control via rudder, no reverse and MLG braking only from the brake accumulator - about five applications before it's empty).
.
Complicating matters in turboprops and piston-engined airplanes is the instant power response that's available (i.e. pilots can easily get "out of sync" by adding power in the bounce [i.e. on the rebound]). That added power cycling tends to "eat up" runway remaining. However to achieve the same porpoising effect in a jet, you just have to be "hot" (and high) over the threshold, have little or no flap (i.e. drag to kill off your float speed), try to force the airplane onto the ground (resulting in a tricycle landing or even worse, striking nosewheel first).
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You might recall that I once told you about this being done to me by a gent called XXXXXX in an SP2H Neptune at XXXXXX. He looked up at night to locate and dump the jets, (whose throttles were in the overhead console), and inadvertently let the nose drop whilst in the landing flare. Wildest ride I ever sat through (as a young copilot). Coincidentally he had the worst stutter you'd ever imagine acceptable in a pilot. Seems fitting somehow that he could also create the most memorable porpoising ride of my flying career.
.
Back to porpoising. Adding to these self-wrought woes is the fact that any power "adds" (or throttle manipulation) will inhibit spoiler extension and add to the overrun likelihood. Even without throttle jockeying, you still need the MLG squat switches to be depressed long enough for the spoiler panels to pop up (and then of course, the oleos to remain depressed). During porpoising that just won't happen so, lacking that spoiler effect, the wing just keeps "flying". It's a PIO cycle that's destined to end up destructive and/or off the end, particularly if you're hot and have landed much too far in. We can expect to see many more of these types of "mishandling, confused and fixated" accidents the world over - as pilot experience levels drop (and the new MPL licencees move up in the airline world).
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I have a fairly high degree of confidence in this theory having been the underlying cause for Flight GA200's fate once they'd touched down. But why they allowed it to get hot on finals? I'm sticking my neck out by saying that the RH seater just neglected to select flap (or only took 15 degrees and then totally forgot about the flap lever because of the distraction of a wind-shear/microburst and overshoot trend). If they flew through a sharp gust or thermal and picked up a temporary tailwind and just lowered the nose to correct the overshoot trend? Well that would just indicate a fairly inept handling of a common everyday problem. Unless there was some other complication, I'd tend to put it down to an inability to cope with the environmentals - and the inexperience of the RH seater. I believe the captain was actually quite experienced, but probably let it all go too far. Porpoising is a PIO - and by definition it can be a self-sustaining destructive process. And fixation (leading to task saturation) is by far the most common cause of mishandling accidents during the landing evolution.
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For some examples of porpoising, try this link
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However the more I read about passenger and witness descriptions of their perceived sequence of events, the clearer it is that the nosewheel was driven in and that a destructive PIO called "porpoising" began. Porpoising can become a divergent phugoid in a jet that's landed far too fast for its weight (and with insufficient drag flap).
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What's Porpoising?
After the nosewheel oleo rebounds upwards and the aircraft "bounces" (courtesy of the MLG oleos decompressing a short time later), the neophyte pilot's natural tendency is to instantly lower the nose and again "spot the deck" (i.e. try to force the airplane onto the ground). It's completely opposite to a normal flare and hold-off process. The inevitable result is another nosewheel first strike (and rebound). The PIO is underway......
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This apparently happened three times and on the third occasion the nosewheel oleo snapped off (thereafter no hydraulics, no nosewheel steering, no directional control via rudder, no reverse and MLG braking only from the brake accumulator - about five applications before it's empty).
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Complicating matters in turboprops and piston-engined airplanes is the instant power response that's available (i.e. pilots can easily get "out of sync" by adding power in the bounce [i.e. on the rebound]). That added power cycling tends to "eat up" runway remaining. However to achieve the same porpoising effect in a jet, you just have to be "hot" (and high) over the threshold, have little or no flap (i.e. drag to kill off your float speed), try to force the airplane onto the ground (resulting in a tricycle landing or even worse, striking nosewheel first).
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You might recall that I once told you about this being done to me by a gent called XXXXXX in an SP2H Neptune at XXXXXX. He looked up at night to locate and dump the jets, (whose throttles were in the overhead console), and inadvertently let the nose drop whilst in the landing flare. Wildest ride I ever sat through (as a young copilot). Coincidentally he had the worst stutter you'd ever imagine acceptable in a pilot. Seems fitting somehow that he could also create the most memorable porpoising ride of my flying career.
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Back to porpoising. Adding to these self-wrought woes is the fact that any power "adds" (or throttle manipulation) will inhibit spoiler extension and add to the overrun likelihood. Even without throttle jockeying, you still need the MLG squat switches to be depressed long enough for the spoiler panels to pop up (and then of course, the oleos to remain depressed). During porpoising that just won't happen so, lacking that spoiler effect, the wing just keeps "flying". It's a PIO cycle that's destined to end up destructive and/or off the end, particularly if you're hot and have landed much too far in. We can expect to see many more of these types of "mishandling, confused and fixated" accidents the world over - as pilot experience levels drop (and the new MPL licencees move up in the airline world).
.
I have a fairly high degree of confidence in this theory having been the underlying cause for Flight GA200's fate once they'd touched down. But why they allowed it to get hot on finals? I'm sticking my neck out by saying that the RH seater just neglected to select flap (or only took 15 degrees and then totally forgot about the flap lever because of the distraction of a wind-shear/microburst and overshoot trend). If they flew through a sharp gust or thermal and picked up a temporary tailwind and just lowered the nose to correct the overshoot trend? Well that would just indicate a fairly inept handling of a common everyday problem. Unless there was some other complication, I'd tend to put it down to an inability to cope with the environmentals - and the inexperience of the RH seater. I believe the captain was actually quite experienced, but probably let it all go too far. Porpoising is a PIO - and by definition it can be a self-sustaining destructive process. And fixation (leading to task saturation) is by far the most common cause of mishandling accidents during the landing evolution.
.
For some examples of porpoising, try this link
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B737 Flap system
Cytherea,
I accept your explanation, apology for the misunderstanding.
For those flyers that are not Boeing and who are interested in B737, below some explanation with regards to that discussion that has taken place to the Flap position and what might and might not happend. I am sorry I can not upload schematic for some reason on the Pprune sight (I did try photo buckets) but no joy. Enjoy it or
ignore it
http://www.b737.org.uk/flightcontrols.htm
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PK’, thanks for the details on JOG approaches. I think your efforts at giving us information as accurately as possible may, unfortunately, be lost on some. Despite the compelling information so far indicating a probable course of events (and probably discounting others), some are still making suggestions in a surprisingly confident manner, when based on the most wild and tenuous of witness reports – akin to the remarks of the housewife that you mentioned. The media have continued in a similar vein: “jets of fire”, “series of explosions”, “’jumping the road’”, c**p, rubbish, waffle etc. As in common with many other disasters, yesterday’s event were big enough, dramatic enough and TRAGIC enough NOT to warrant the usual religious use of inaccuracy, over-emphasis, and over-exaggeration demonstrated by much of the press. Reminds me of: http://www.pprune.org/forums/showthread.php?t=265200…………
As for the report that the captain indicates encountering a downdraft, and resultant high sinkrate: PK – you indicated winds of around 20kts at the time – I presume, in the absence of a detailed weather report for the accident time, that it was Easterly. It makes me wonder; if we give him the benefit of doubt, with an Easterly airflow over the mountains/high terrain to the East, it seems to me that the possibility (even probability) for terrain induced turbulence is quite high. Maybe even to the point of rotor/vortex type structures being generated. I’m taking a stab in the dark here, but wonder what others might think. To date, I have a not too large experience base on Indonesian (spec. Yogya!) local weather/climate – I’ve noticed reports of deaths in recent days/weeks as a result of high winds etc, (Jakarta and Probolinggo) which make me wonder if the area around Yogya can experience the odd unusual ‘perturbation’?? After all, although a lot of the time we can consider ourselves smug in our knowledge of weather and aircraft performance – it’s not beyond the bounds of possibilities for something to jump up out of the blue occasionally and bite in the *ss!
While I concede that landing with flaps appearing to be deployed well above 30 would be a symptom of possible asymmetry, I personally think it can be discounted for the following reason: The captain is reported to have said they encountered a “minor” problem which was rectified before (attempted!) landing. If this report is accurate, would he have described flap asymmetry and possible drive stop at a lower setting as a “minor” problem, or that it had been rectified if (he felt) forced to land in a less than optimum configuration for runway length because of it?
Now I must resist the temptation for further speculation - like others have quite correctly said, the FDR readout should answer a lot of questions.
As for the report that the captain indicates encountering a downdraft, and resultant high sinkrate: PK – you indicated winds of around 20kts at the time – I presume, in the absence of a detailed weather report for the accident time, that it was Easterly. It makes me wonder; if we give him the benefit of doubt, with an Easterly airflow over the mountains/high terrain to the East, it seems to me that the possibility (even probability) for terrain induced turbulence is quite high. Maybe even to the point of rotor/vortex type structures being generated. I’m taking a stab in the dark here, but wonder what others might think. To date, I have a not too large experience base on Indonesian (spec. Yogya!) local weather/climate
– I’ve noticed reports of deaths in recent days/weeks as a result of high winds etc, (Jakarta and Probolinggo) which make me wonder if the area around Yogya can experience the odd unusual ‘perturbation’?? After all, although a lot of the time we can consider ourselves smug in our knowledge of weather and aircraft performance – it’s not beyond the bounds of possibilities for something to jump up out of the blue occasionally and bite in the *ss!While I concede that landing with flaps appearing to be deployed well above 30 would be a symptom of possible asymmetry, I personally think it can be discounted for the following reason: The captain is reported to have said they encountered a “minor” problem which was rectified before (attempted!) landing. If this report is accurate, would he have described flap asymmetry and possible drive stop at a lower setting as a “minor” problem, or that it had been rectified if (he felt) forced to land in a less than optimum configuration for runway length because of it?
Now I must resist the temptation for further speculation - like others have quite correctly said, the FDR readout should answer a lot of questions.
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Investigative facts
Here are some facts to consider;
Captain Komar, 45, had been a Garuda captain for five years and had 22 years' experience as a pilot, Captain Stephanus said.
Which mean, he would have been performing this landing to perfection and knowing the landing check list by heart.
- The head of Garuda's pilot association managed to interview Capt. Marwoto last night, and he quoted that there was a "minor problem" with the aircraft "which was solved and acted upon prior to the landing. Flight conditions appeared normal until the aircraft was about 1000 feet above the Yogyakarta's runway, Captain Komar and his co-pilot told Captain Stephanus yesterday.
- Captain Stephanus said. "They said there was a problem, there was something wrong with the flaps, the flaps cannot extend normally.
- According to his chief pilot
If the hard landing would have been the cause of such damage ( I think not) you could only go back to Adam Air and see the difference. Unless of course he landed the aircraft nose first which could definitely cause the nose gear to smash. Also such landing would have reduced the engine clearance to the ground. Just to remind you of the A320 in the USA when it landed with the nose wheel completely off to the side.
- Loss of hydraulic fluid do not cause the aircraft to veer to the side or catch fire. The hydraulic system has fuses which seal the affected area downstream of the leak after a few drops of leak have been detected. Hydraulic power from system A is used to turn the nose wheels to either side from zero to 78 degrees. In addition, on some airplanes system B may also be used to turn the nose wheels. An alternate nose wheel steering system, activated by a switch on the captain's forward panel (Fig 1), allows power from hydraulic system B to turn the nose wheels if power from hydraulic system A is lost.
The captain said after the crash the crew followed standard emergency procedures, opened all the exits and managed to evacuate most of the passengers.
Finally, my sincere sympathies go to the families who have lost their loved ones and can't help feeling sorry for the flight crew. I am sure nobody would want to be in that situation no matter what the reason is. I salute the cabin crew for their heroic efforts.