great instrument cross checks!!!!!
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great instrument cross checks!!!!!
http://youtube.com/watch?v=0qaDVaKQSkQ
Watch this for a full scale w
"we trust the aircraft"
No x checks untill below 1000 amsl @ 8 DME
They should have all gone back to ITS.
Watch this for a full scale w
"we trust the aircraft"
No x checks untill below 1000 amsl @ 8 DME
They should have all gone back to ITS.
Too mean to buy a long personal title
As a mere SLF with no technical knowledge, I'd love an explanation of why.
When I read the report, I'd got the impression that the crew had done a good job of being alive to clues that all was not well, resulting in the GA before things got critical. And I don't remember any criticism of their actions.
What did I miss?
When I read the report, I'd got the impression that the crew had done a good job of being alive to clues that all was not well, resulting in the GA before things got critical. And I don't remember any criticism of their actions.
What did I miss?
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Thank God they did notice even if it was later than they or others would idealy have liked. They then took positive action and put the aircraft in a safe place so good for them. I rather suspect that the lessons they took away will be more firmly imbedded than anything a flight school could impart.
For me its a reminder that any of us on a given day can make errors. I have seen mates I regarded as better operators than I kill themselves by making basic errors and if they could manage it then I am certainly not immune. The thing is we all want to make the evidence fit our model of what we think is happening and the visual cue of an ILS is a strong one. Would I have done any better on the day, don't know. I can only hope that the penny would have dropped and that I would have taken the same positive action.
It has made me think though, which I guess is the aim of the video so thanks for sharing it.
For me its a reminder that any of us on a given day can make errors. I have seen mates I regarded as better operators than I kill themselves by making basic errors and if they could manage it then I am certainly not immune. The thing is we all want to make the evidence fit our model of what we think is happening and the visual cue of an ILS is a strong one. Would I have done any better on the day, don't know. I can only hope that the penny would have dropped and that I would have taken the same positive action.
It has made me think though, which I guess is the aim of the video so thanks for sharing it.
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There but for the grace of God (can I still use that word?) go I. Easy to criticize but the whole purpose of this "internal" educational was to bring this deceptive chain of events to those drivers who feel they're above duffing it.
Here's the splurb:
4HP
.
Here's the splurb:
In the little known drama, a Boeing 767 with 176 people aboard, including three pilots, was using an instrument landing system (ILS) at Samoa's Faleolo Airport about midnight on July 29, 2000. Unbeknown to the pilots, the ILS in Samoa had been damaged by a ditch digger. The signals were faulty and prompted a rapid increase in speed and a steep descent toward the airport. Although they knew something was wrong, the pilots continued to accept ILS information. The pilots tried speedbrakes and even the landing gear to slow themselves down although the ILS data in the cockpit kept telling them they were on a standard approach. Just 120m above the water, the pilots simultaneously realised they were in trouble.
The DVD, which re-enacts the drama, has the co-pilot suddenly blurting out "s–-, those lights are close" just as all three pilots reached for controls to put on power and climb out of the crisis. The drama was regarded as so unusual that Air New Zealand, in co- operation with Boeing Aircraft, Airbus and Flight Safety Foundation, made a 32-minute training film on it entitled NZ60 A Free Lesson. It was not intended for the public, but has recently shown up on popular video website YouTube, owned by Google. When told about it last week, Air New Zealand's initial reaction was to approach Google to get it pulled. But they backed off, as have many other copyright holders in the face of YouTube's popularity. Air New Zealand spokeswoman Pamela Wong said the YouTube version was abridged and did not include the technical analysis of why the Boeing received incorrect signals. "We're disappointed to learn that an edited version of this video has been posted onto the internet," she said. "The video offers some good learnings for the aviation industry, in which a potential incident resulting from external factors outside the control of the crew, was averted by sound teamwork."
The DVD, which re-enacts the drama, has the co-pilot suddenly blurting out "s–-, those lights are close" just as all three pilots reached for controls to put on power and climb out of the crisis. The drama was regarded as so unusual that Air New Zealand, in co- operation with Boeing Aircraft, Airbus and Flight Safety Foundation, made a 32-minute training film on it entitled NZ60 A Free Lesson. It was not intended for the public, but has recently shown up on popular video website YouTube, owned by Google. When told about it last week, Air New Zealand's initial reaction was to approach Google to get it pulled. But they backed off, as have many other copyright holders in the face of YouTube's popularity. Air New Zealand spokeswoman Pamela Wong said the YouTube version was abridged and did not include the technical analysis of why the Boeing received incorrect signals. "We're disappointed to learn that an edited version of this video has been posted onto the internet," she said. "The video offers some good learnings for the aviation industry, in which a potential incident resulting from external factors outside the control of the crew, was averted by sound teamwork."
.
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great Instrument cross checks!!!!!
Hi Globaliser.
A standard ILS slope is 3 degrees, Faleola is a standard airport in Pacific Paradise.
one degree is 108 ft per Nautical mile.
so 3 degrees is 324 ft per mile.
At 8 miles they were 970 ft instead of 2464 ft above MSL
The pilot flying and even the Pilot not flying should be cross checking DME with altitude.
The Pilot flying and the pilots not flying should take a note of the time of capture and the distance of the capture.
Lets Say @ 10 miles so its going to take about 3 minutes at 180Kts to get to the runway.
A mental picture must be present.
Never rely on only one indication of what you are suppose to be doing if another method is available to cross check
These guys had two other sytems, Time over distance and altitude over distance but they all locked on to the IAS ( who looked at the VSI??)
It goes on and on.
They all needed a Base check(180Day check)
Thats Basic instrument flying
Eh
A standard ILS slope is 3 degrees, Faleola is a standard airport in Pacific Paradise.
one degree is 108 ft per Nautical mile.
so 3 degrees is 324 ft per mile.
At 8 miles they were 970 ft instead of 2464 ft above MSL
The pilot flying and even the Pilot not flying should be cross checking DME with altitude.
The Pilot flying and the pilots not flying should take a note of the time of capture and the distance of the capture.
Lets Say @ 10 miles so its going to take about 3 minutes at 180Kts to get to the runway.
A mental picture must be present.
Never rely on only one indication of what you are suppose to be doing if another method is available to cross check
These guys had two other sytems, Time over distance and altitude over distance but they all locked on to the IAS ( who looked at the VSI??)
It goes on and on.
They all needed a Base check(180Day check)
Thats Basic instrument flying
Eh
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One reason why crosschecks are so important with an ILS is that most people think that two narrowly focussed beams intersect to provide the guidance, but they don't!
The "beams" are created electronically by the equipment in the aircraft (that is, voltages are produced from the radio signals, which drive the instruments). This means you can get on-course or on-glidepath indications regardless of your position, as was found by an Air New Zealand 767 in July 2000, which got down to 400', 6 miles short of the runway - maybe that very aircraft?
Phil
The "beams" are created electronically by the equipment in the aircraft (that is, voltages are produced from the radio signals, which drive the instruments). This means you can get on-course or on-glidepath indications regardless of your position, as was found by an Air New Zealand 767 in July 2000, which got down to 400', 6 miles short of the runway - maybe that very aircraft?
Phil
As a mere SLF with no technical knowledge, I'd love an explanation of why.
When I read the report, I'd got the impression that the crew had done a good job of being alive to clues that all was not well, resulting in the GA before things got critical. And I don't remember any criticism of their actions.
What did I miss?
When I read the report, I'd got the impression that the crew had done a good job of being alive to clues that all was not well, resulting in the GA before things got critical. And I don't remember any criticism of their actions.
What did I miss?
From the CAA Report:
2. Analysis
2.1 Introduction
This analysis considers the principal areas where there were opportunities for the incident
to be prevented:
Operational Factors
Aircraft Instrumentation and autoflight system design
ILS Ground facility design and maintenance
Organisational Factors
Only factual information that was considered to have a bearing on the incident has been
included in the analysis.
2.2 Operational Factors
2.2.1 Preflight / Takeoff / Cruise
This was an appropriately cautious crew, displaying a high level of awareness of the
differences between operating to a major airport and operating to the Pacific Islands.
The preflight preparation was thorough and not rushed. The crew was communicating well
and functioning as a team before leaving Flight Dispatch. The crew environment ensured
all crew members were able to express any questions or concerns. The workload allocated
for each crew member was appropriate. With respect to the various NOTAMs on Apia, all
available resources were used to assess and evaluate operational matters pertinent to the
flight.
The preflight and takeoff proceeded normally. During the cruise a minor fault with an
automatic announcement tape was attended to with the assistance of Maintenance Watch
and the onboard Air New Zealand Service Engineer. The crew were unaware of the
presence of the Service Engineer onboard until informed by Maintenance Watch.
Of note is the individual attention to a self-brief by the crew for the approach into Apia and
the thorough and comprehensive descent and approach briefing given by the PF.
So why don't we emphasise a cross check of the Rad Alt? No mental arithmatic required. Rad alt displayed? Then we are 2500 ft AGL or less...is that where we should be?
Well I think that is emphasized in both training and SOPs as well as just being solid airmanship for instrument pilots. Bbg mentioned the 1-in-3 rule and that ratio is a fundamental especially after the radio altimeter is alive. The assumption is obviously that one has a DME or other distance-determining equipment and is using it in concert with the rad-alt.
It works well any time...about 300ft over the 1000ft bar in an instrument lighting system is one of many examples.
It's been some time since I read the AN60 report but the comments regarding the crew's professionalism regarding what they knew was going to be a challenging night approach was what stood out.
If one is interested in comparisons and outcomes of similar initial circumstances, the KAL801 B747 into Guam is an example.
It works well any time...about 300ft over the 1000ft bar in an instrument lighting system is one of many examples.
It's been some time since I read the AN60 report but the comments regarding the crew's professionalism regarding what they knew was going to be a challenging night approach was what stood out.
If one is interested in comparisons and outcomes of similar initial circumstances, the KAL801 B747 into Guam is an example.
bbg,
Assuming your profile is correct, you are obviously an old has-been who now takes delight in sitting on the fence sniping at people who do what you can no longer do (though I wonder if you ever did!!).
These guys had a valid ILS indications, a valid Indent and no flags. These indications are sufficient for us to allow a CATIIIB approach in 50m Vis with no decision height!!
The situation got very rushed very quickly. A perfectly routine approach suddenly started to feel wrong, with the aircraft descending faster than normal.
Perhaps in your day (when accident rates were far higher) you might have decided this was a time to sit back and start trouble shooting. These days, believe it or not, we are taught to FLY THE AEROPLANE, which is exactly what the Captain did.
THEN faced with a confusing and contradictory set of data, the crew rightly concluded thing were not as they should be, went around, and prevented a CFIT. A professional crew doing what there trained to do.
How great is it that ANZ chose to put together a Video to highlight this particular problem, and to raise awareness of the limitations of ILS in general?
Now that any such video ends up on U-Tube, and is subjected to the half-arsed analysis of "Monday Morning Quarterbacks" such as yourself, not to mention scum-bag journalists, how likely is it that such efforts will be made in the future?
Edited to add- We haven't done Base Checks for years (have you heard of a Simulator?) Get up to date or but out!!
Assuming your profile is correct, you are obviously an old has-been who now takes delight in sitting on the fence sniping at people who do what you can no longer do (though I wonder if you ever did!!).
These guys had a valid ILS indications, a valid Indent and no flags. These indications are sufficient for us to allow a CATIIIB approach in 50m Vis with no decision height!!
The situation got very rushed very quickly. A perfectly routine approach suddenly started to feel wrong, with the aircraft descending faster than normal.
Perhaps in your day (when accident rates were far higher) you might have decided this was a time to sit back and start trouble shooting. These days, believe it or not, we are taught to FLY THE AEROPLANE, which is exactly what the Captain did.
THEN faced with a confusing and contradictory set of data, the crew rightly concluded thing were not as they should be, went around, and prevented a CFIT. A professional crew doing what there trained to do.
How great is it that ANZ chose to put together a Video to highlight this particular problem, and to raise awareness of the limitations of ILS in general?
Now that any such video ends up on U-Tube, and is subjected to the half-arsed analysis of "Monday Morning Quarterbacks" such as yourself, not to mention scum-bag journalists, how likely is it that such efforts will be made in the future?
Edited to add- We haven't done Base Checks for years (have you heard of a Simulator?) Get up to date or but out!!
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While I appreciate the 'support' of the crew here, I have to be just a little picky.
They let the A/P fly them down to 400', before they executed the missed approach!
Now, when was the Alt check done?
At the IAF?
At the FAF?
No, it wasn't done in accordance with the very basic requirements of any instrument approach.
This is not an optional check guys.
Dont let the aircraft take you for a little ride
They let the A/P fly them down to 400', before they executed the missed approach!
Now, when was the Alt check done?
At the IAF?
At the FAF?
No, it wasn't done in accordance with the very basic requirements of any instrument approach.
This is not an optional check guys.
Dont let the aircraft take you for a little ride
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Speaking as an engineer (electronic, not flight), it appears that there's a fundamental design fault in how ILS works if it can lose the modulation and still convince an approaching aircraft that it's happily on the correct slope. You almost want to deliberately wobble up and down slightly on approach if it claims a perfect and instant capture just to prove it will tell you to get back on the appropriate slope. I've evolved a very "what if?" approach to things over the years to try and pick up obscure failure modes, and aviation is a rich source of things the designers didn't think of, partly because it's so public and well-documented after the event.
For those that didn't spot it, one of the contributors to the YouTube thread posted a longer version of the video that includes a simplified version of how ILS works and what was wrong in this case.
For those that didn't spot it, one of the contributors to the YouTube thread posted a longer version of the video that includes a simplified version of how ILS works and what was wrong in this case.
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I agree entirely with PJ2. The crew did a good job and it is a shame that this thread is given a title suggesting a lack of airmanship on the part of the crew.
Moreover, Air New Zealand did the whole industry a favour by producing an excellent video of the event and allowing other airlines to use it free of charge.
In our airline we used the video as a basis for an ILS lecture during winter training. We have all learnt from the ANZ incident. Air New Zealand and the crew should be commended for their honesty and initiative in producing a video that could well prevent an accident in the future.
Moreover, Air New Zealand did the whole industry a favour by producing an excellent video of the event and allowing other airlines to use it free of charge.
In our airline we used the video as a basis for an ILS lecture during winter training. We have all learnt from the ANZ incident. Air New Zealand and the crew should be commended for their honesty and initiative in producing a video that could well prevent an accident in the future.
Perhaps ANZ could prevail upon Tube to remove the version which does not include the technical explanation.
Years ago, when flight checking ILS installations, one of the many checks we carried out was one for flyable false glideslopes; although, as indicated by the second video clip, this was not the problem on that occasion.
Wizofoz,
Hey, watch it, mate, there's a lot of us in here - just keeping an eye on you young guys'n gals 
Years ago, when flight checking ILS installations, one of the many checks we carried out was one for flyable false glideslopes; although, as indicated by the second video clip, this was not the problem on that occasion.
Wizofoz,
you are obviously an old has-been
just keeping an eye on you young guys'n gals
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No OM, it's over the sea, just an IAP - both the skipper & the jumpseater picked up the DME discrepancy inside the IAP.
Easy to sit in front of your PC & theorize - try doing it on a dark night at 180 knots when all other indications are what you're used to seeing & there's no flags.
These guys did a great job & we can all learn a lesson here.
4HP
Easy to sit in front of your PC & theorize - try doing it on a dark night at 180 knots when all other indications are what you're used to seeing & there's no flags.
These guys did a great job & we can all learn a lesson here.
4HP
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osbo,
Many thanks for the link!
All we need now is somebody coming up with a link to where we can buy the DVD, so we can refer to it even when this thread has dropped below the horizon.
Many thanks for the link!
All we need now is somebody coming up with a link to where we can buy the DVD, so we can refer to it even when this thread has dropped below the horizon.
Below the Glidepath - not correcting
It's also interesting that for recovery from unusual/upset attitudes/positions, training emphasizes the need to trust the primary instruments and discount your own physiological sensations. In this case, although the other peripheral clues were present, the needles were locked solidly on to the ILS with no indication of failure, so other than a growing sense of discomfort, it was a natural instinct to believe the ILS all the way up to the point where the visual cues outside confirmed the underlying doubts about the approach. The VSI and power settings were disparate enough from the ILS indications to get the hairs on the back of neck up, but the error was not significant enough for the crew to immediately understand what was happening.
This was another good example that it is careful analysis of all the cockpit indications that presents the most likely picture of actual events, not just the one you would most like to believe.
I can see from a legal standpoint ANZ might not want this video to be available to all and sundry, but as a CRM teaching aid it is priceless. For all those here castigating the crew for their slipshod performance, I can only suggest you read more accident reports to identify exactly what kind of pilots find themselves in these situations - given time and the opportunity, all of us.
This was another good example that it is careful analysis of all the cockpit indications that presents the most likely picture of actual events, not just the one you would most like to believe.
I can see from a legal standpoint ANZ might not want this video to be available to all and sundry, but as a CRM teaching aid it is priceless. For all those here castigating the crew for their slipshod performance, I can only suggest you read more accident reports to identify exactly what kind of pilots find themselves in these situations - given time and the opportunity, all of us.