Originally Posted by
Globaliser
As a mere SLF with no technical knowledge, I'd love an explanation of why.
When I read the report, I'd got the impression that the crew had done a good job of being alive to clues that all was not well, resulting in the GA before things got critical. And I don't remember any criticism of their actions.
What did I miss?
Discussion regarding this incident by professional aircrews has been around for some time as the lessons in prevention are clear and valuable. Globaliser; - You are correct. This crew did not "screw up", but prevented a CFIT. Bbg is correct in stating the various parameters which need to make sense for
all approaches but the tut-tutting is inappropriate.
From the CAA Report:
2. Analysis
2.1 Introduction
This analysis considers the principal areas where there were opportunities for the incident
to be prevented:
Operational Factors
Aircraft Instrumentation and autoflight system design
ILS Ground facility design and maintenance
Organisational Factors
Only factual information that was considered to have a bearing on the incident has been
included in the analysis.
2.2 Operational Factors
2.2.1 Preflight / Takeoff / Cruise
This was an appropriately cautious crew, displaying a high level of awareness of the
differences between operating to a major airport and operating to the Pacific Islands.
The preflight preparation was thorough and not rushed. The crew was communicating well
and functioning as a team before leaving Flight Dispatch. The crew environment ensured
all crew members were able to express any questions or concerns. The workload allocated
for each crew member was appropriate. With respect to the various NOTAMs on Apia, all
available resources were used to assess and evaluate operational matters pertinent to the
flight.
The preflight and takeoff proceeded normally. During the cruise a minor fault with an
automatic announcement tape was attended to with the assistance of Maintenance Watch
and the onboard Air New Zealand Service Engineer. The crew were unaware of the
presence of the Service Engineer onboard until informed by Maintenance Watch.
Of note is the individual attention to a self-brief by the crew for the approach into Apia and
the thorough and comprehensive descent and approach briefing given by the PF.