BA747 3 engine LAX-LHR article
PPRuNe Person
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Overstress, I'm quite familiar with the routes in question, thank you.
But your point that you're not familiar with BA SOPs - they are very different from your GASOs. If your 'operating authority' prefers you to bring the a/c home, and it's within the rules, you'd better have a good reason not to.
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For me the real point is why the crew felt it necessary to declare a mayday and did this indicate that safety was compromised.
In trying to reach destination the crew, for whatever reason, considered safety to have been so compromised, that they decided it prudent to declare an emergency in order to effect a safe landing. I am entirely with the crew on this one and have never criticised them in any way.
Now though, some of you guys argue that actually a mayday wasn't necessary - they had all the fuel they needed and that the flight was as safe as any other! You want us to investigate the entire fuel system of the 744 to make us agree with you. Well, the crew certainly didn't think so at the time otherwise they might well have done things differently. Perhaps, for example, like landing at GLA or some other suitable airfield without the need for a mayday.
No chaps - it's you I have a problem with (you know who you are), not the crew of this flight. Your aggressive defense of a system that, on this occasion, clearly failed, simply encourages others to ask questions that you can only answer by resorting to feigned exasperation or ridicule. 'How dare someone has the impudence to question the safety of a BA flight!'
On balance, I'm with the FAA on this one.
BS
In trying to reach destination the crew, for whatever reason, considered safety to have been so compromised, that they decided it prudent to declare an emergency in order to effect a safe landing. I am entirely with the crew on this one and have never criticised them in any way.
Now though, some of you guys argue that actually a mayday wasn't necessary - they had all the fuel they needed and that the flight was as safe as any other! You want us to investigate the entire fuel system of the 744 to make us agree with you. Well, the crew certainly didn't think so at the time otherwise they might well have done things differently. Perhaps, for example, like landing at GLA or some other suitable airfield without the need for a mayday.
No chaps - it's you I have a problem with (you know who you are), not the crew of this flight. Your aggressive defense of a system that, on this occasion, clearly failed, simply encourages others to ask questions that you can only answer by resorting to feigned exasperation or ridicule. 'How dare someone has the impudence to question the safety of a BA flight!'
On balance, I'm with the FAA on this one.
BS
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Sorry but theres some serious contradictions in that post Bullshot. You say you are completely with the crew and do not criticise them but imply that there is something wrong with BAs handling of the operation, yet that is completely at odds with the reality of the situation. The handling of the flight and all the associated flight planning was spot on right up until top of descent at which point a misunderstanding by the crew led them to declare an unnecessary mayday. If you want to start levelling criticism then I'm sorry to have to tell you this but the error made on the day was that of the crew, not the people on the ground. The fact that you think the crew should have landed at GLA shows that you simply haven't grasped what caused the mayday to be declared. AT NO STAGE PRIOR TO TOP OF DESCENT DID IT APPEAR THE CREW WOULD HAVE INSUFFICIENT FUEL TO MAKE THEIR CHOSEN DESTINATION WITH RESERVE FUEL INTACT. Is that clear enough for you?
Warning Toxic!
Disgusted of Tunbridge
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It goes in circles, doesn't it. Head, wall, banging, against,....say the same thing again and again to the same people, and some other poster comes up with the same thing that has been rebutted 3 pages ago.
Folks, the flight continuation policy is correct (for a 747-400). It works well, and is perfectly safe. The events at the end of a flight were an automatic emergency alert, not an emergency call.....you have to understand the rules in aviation! Those events at the end were a separate issue, not a direct consequence of the original problem. Argue until the cows come home, the policy is correct, the CAA apparently agrees, the FAA has got other drums to bang as well and is definitely not to be trusted. The policy still applies in BA and is supported by the very people who follow it. Those people have the option to not follow it, but they do willingly! Does that not tell you something?
Folks, the flight continuation policy is correct (for a 747-400). It works well, and is perfectly safe. The events at the end of a flight were an automatic emergency alert, not an emergency call.....you have to understand the rules in aviation! Those events at the end were a separate issue, not a direct consequence of the original problem. Argue until the cows come home, the policy is correct, the CAA apparently agrees, the FAA has got other drums to bang as well and is definitely not to be trusted. The policy still applies in BA and is supported by the very people who follow it. Those people have the option to not follow it, but they do willingly! Does that not tell you something?
Just another number
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bullshot
Whether or not you agree with the continuation policy, the fuel on board was initially enough to make LHR. However, due to en-route circumstances the crew elected to divert. The logical choice of alternate was one with two runways, ie Manchester. The fuel remaining at MAN was predicted to be well above reserves. However, on final approach the crew thought that some of their fuel might be unuseable, and therefore in compliance with JAR rules, they declared an 'mayday'. The reasons for the confusion were explained at length in the previous thread. In aviation we are always learning, and this incident taught us all a great deal about fuel management (how many times have you seen an inboard engine failed on the simulator?). I apologise if you see this as condescending, it is not intended to be.
BEagle
Sorry to disappoint you but the forward bookings for the LHR-LAx route are well up for 2006 (PM me and I'll send you the figures). It would seem that the passengers are voting with their feet.
Airclues
Whether or not you agree with the continuation policy, the fuel on board was initially enough to make LHR. However, due to en-route circumstances the crew elected to divert. The logical choice of alternate was one with two runways, ie Manchester. The fuel remaining at MAN was predicted to be well above reserves. However, on final approach the crew thought that some of their fuel might be unuseable, and therefore in compliance with JAR rules, they declared an 'mayday'. The reasons for the confusion were explained at length in the previous thread. In aviation we are always learning, and this incident taught us all a great deal about fuel management (how many times have you seen an inboard engine failed on the simulator?). I apologise if you see this as condescending, it is not intended to be.
BEagle
Sorry to disappoint you but the forward bookings for the LHR-LAx route are well up for 2006 (PM me and I'll send you the figures). It would seem that the passengers are voting with their feet.
Airclues
"Argue until the cows come home, the policy is correct, the CAA apparently agrees, the FAA has got other drums to bang as well and is definitely not to be trusted. The policy still applies in BA and is supported by the very people who follow it"
This would appear to bear out your comment, bullshot.
Why is the 'apparent agreement' of the CAA any more to be accepted than the view of the FAA which, it is being alleged, is 'definitely not to be trusted'?
The fact that there has been such a difference in views means that this is far from a cut and dried issue.
The redundancy of 747-400 systems is totally irrelevant to this issue; this was a 4-engined aeroplane which lost 25% of its available thrust on take-off. The issue at stake is whether, as a general concept, it is an acceptably low degree of risk to plan to fly the remaininder of the flight to the original destination with fare paying passengers on board over such a lengthy sector.
This would appear to bear out your comment, bullshot.
Why is the 'apparent agreement' of the CAA any more to be accepted than the view of the FAA which, it is being alleged, is 'definitely not to be trusted'?
The fact that there has been such a difference in views means that this is far from a cut and dried issue.
The redundancy of 747-400 systems is totally irrelevant to this issue; this was a 4-engined aeroplane which lost 25% of its available thrust on take-off. The issue at stake is whether, as a general concept, it is an acceptably low degree of risk to plan to fly the remaininder of the flight to the original destination with fare paying passengers on board over such a lengthy sector.
Keeping Danny in Sandwiches
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BEagle
Having read this thead and the previous, the answer is: Yes it is.
Surely what it comes down to is that there is no single answer as to what to do in the circumstances. What hacks me off is that there is always someone on this board who thinks that the crew did the wrong thing. Aviation isn't like that and that's what makes it interesting.
Having read this thead and the previous, the answer is: Yes it is.
Surely what it comes down to is that there is no single answer as to what to do in the circumstances. What hacks me off is that there is always someone on this board who thinks that the crew did the wrong thing. Aviation isn't like that and that's what makes it interesting.
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No, never heard the word HOMITIS, not sure it's even a word in this language. Perhaps you mean something like the phrase 'press-on-itis' which you would understand did not apply in this case if you had bothered to read the threads fully instead of just repeating previous points.
The FAA have a mandate to promote the commercial interests of the American aviation industry, hence their lobbying for increasing ETOPS times whilst minimising the advantage of quads. Even the manufactureres don't trust the FAA. If you think the FAA are acting with complete impartiality in this matter then you are rather naive.
It normally loses 25% of its thrust at 1000ft when we go back to climb power or less. Are you familiar with the term Max Continous Thrust?
Goodness me, why is it so difficult for you to understand? You make it sound like they were off to a remote desert island with nothing but ocean on the way. The crew had the option to turn it into a short a sector at any time. It was unnecessary to do so until the reached the far side of the atlantic.
Why is the 'apparent agreement' of the CAA any more to be accepted than the view of the FAA which, it is being alleged, is 'definitely not to be trusted'?
The redundancy of 747-400 systems is totally irrelevant to this issue; this was a 4-engined aeroplane which lost 25% of its available thrust on take-off
fly the remaininder of the flight to the original destination with fare paying passengers on board over such a lengthy sector.
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'HOMITIS'? Well, they didn't make it home! (It wasn't due to being on 3 engines). One aspect is that there were numerous enroute alternates. After departure the crew were not commited in making LHR on 3 engines. This was not an unsafe or illegal flight.
Yet again you don't take the trouble to read things properly....
I wrote "25% of its available thrust". So the question of MCT on 4 is irrelevant in this context.
One hopes that you take the trouble to read your aircraft manuals rather more carefully.
Anyway, irrespective of airline, type of 4-engined aeroplane or particular incident, the question remains whether it is should be considered sufficiently safe to continue for 5000 miles after the loss of an engine on take-off, or whether regulation should be applied to limit the level of such risk to a lower level. For example, perhaps 'the flight may continue provided that the aeroplane shall remain within tbd minutes flight time of a suitable alternate aerodrome for the remainder of the flight' for circumstances such as the reported incident.
Now discuss tbd. I open with 60....
Incidentally, I agree that the incident in question was neither unsafe nor illegal. I contend that it was, however, imprudent.
I wrote "25% of its available thrust". So the question of MCT on 4 is irrelevant in this context.
One hopes that you take the trouble to read your aircraft manuals rather more carefully.
Anyway, irrespective of airline, type of 4-engined aeroplane or particular incident, the question remains whether it is should be considered sufficiently safe to continue for 5000 miles after the loss of an engine on take-off, or whether regulation should be applied to limit the level of such risk to a lower level. For example, perhaps 'the flight may continue provided that the aeroplane shall remain within tbd minutes flight time of a suitable alternate aerodrome for the remainder of the flight' for circumstances such as the reported incident.
Now discuss tbd. I open with 60....
Incidentally, I agree that the incident in question was neither unsafe nor illegal. I contend that it was, however, imprudent.
Too mean to buy a long personal title
Originally Posted by BEagle
Now discuss tbd. I open with 60....
Source: the Great Circle mapper
That mapper is a trifle optimistic if you aren't careful!
I used it to display 60 min @ 480 G/S from 744-capable aerodromes (even considering Goose and Narsasuaq). Getting to the East Coast as far north as Montreal/Halifax was no problem, but for the great circle track from LAX-LHR there are some considerable gaps with a 60 min-from-suitable-alternate limit.
Thus LAX to Montreal would be do-able with such a 60 min requirement, for example. And I think that perhaps that would be a reasonable, sensible compromise.
I used it to display 60 min @ 480 G/S from 744-capable aerodromes (even considering Goose and Narsasuaq). Getting to the East Coast as far north as Montreal/Halifax was no problem, but for the great circle track from LAX-LHR there are some considerable gaps with a 60 min-from-suitable-alternate limit.
Thus LAX to Montreal would be do-able with such a 60 min requirement, for example. And I think that perhaps that would be a reasonable, sensible compromise.
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I wrote "25% of its available thrust". So the question of MCT on 4 is irrelevant in this context.
Looking at that great circle map it would appear the aircraft can do the route within 60 minutes of an alternate anyway. Montreal is too far south from the actual route but if the aircraft crosses the US/Canada border at Winnipeg then there is Edmonton, Churchill and Iqualuit en route. The only time things might get tight is between Iqualuit and Sondestrom but that is no different to crossing the pond at a more southerly latitude where there'll be a crunch between St Johns and Sondestrom. Once within 60 minutes of Sondrestrom there's good coverage via Keflavik then Prestwick. I would also suggest that 60 minutes is far too conservative for an aircraft certified to fly indefinitely on three engines. Its still got 4 hydraulic systems, three generators and three engines, which is a damn site more than a 777 on one engine. Whilst the ETOPs kit might have a statistical probability of failure of one engine perhaps an order of magnitude smaller than the non-ETOPs engines, the probability of two independent failures on a 744 would be at least an order of magnitude smaller still. We allow ETOPS aircraft to fly 206 minutes from a suitable alternate but wish to restrict the 744 to 60 minutes when the chances of a double failure reducing its capability below that of a 777 on one are much smaller?
Last edited by Hand Solo; 7th Apr 2006 at 16:36.
Not sure that Iqaluit or Kangerlussuaq in the middle of a winter night on 2 engines would be a nice place to be.....
However, perhaps the main benefit of this thread is the scope for professional debate concerning an acceptable level of risk.
However, perhaps the main benefit of this thread is the scope for professional debate concerning an acceptable level of risk.
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BEagle, so you think 60 minutes from an alternate should apply to a 4 engined aircraft with 1 shut down .............I suppose you think that 180 minutes on a 2 engine aircraft with 1 shut down is also prudent??
BEagle
...I agree that the incident in question was neither unsafe nor illegal...
A somewhat different view to the one you posted a year or so ago!
...To my mind they got away with it by the skin of their teeth...
...'halfway around the world' on 3 engines and a very tight fuel state anticipated on arrival? Many see that as just too chancy - I certainly do...
Good to see reason taking over from rant!
Best regards
Bellerophon
...I agree that the incident in question was neither unsafe nor illegal...
A somewhat different view to the one you posted a year or so ago!
...To my mind they got away with it by the skin of their teeth...
...'halfway around the world' on 3 engines and a very tight fuel state anticipated on arrival? Many see that as just too chancy - I certainly do...
Good to see reason taking over from rant!
Best regards
Bellerophon
DOVE
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Would they have been instructed and proceeded towards the destination (admitted that there were a spare engine and a technical staff to replace it) if they were performing the LHR-LAX sector?
This is what I mean with "HOMITIS": a dangerous temptation to go back home at any cost.
Please fly safe!
DOVES
This is what I mean with "HOMITIS": a dangerous temptation to go back home at any cost.
Please fly safe!
DOVES