Bombardier sued over Pinnacle CRJ crash
Dear jondc9
It will be up to NTSB experts to have the final say wether tail blanketing was involved too, but I doubt it. Tail blanketing on T-tails easily leads to deep stall from which recovery is possible only by the means of antispin chute, installed only for test flights. Don't anyone get an idea we should use those chutes in regular operation, we have stick-pushers preventing deep stall nicely, unless overriden.
I've never, ever flown any jet, at any level, let alone CRJ at FL410, but aerodynamics and jet powerplants were part of my fATPL syllabus! Important lesson was that short, circular engine intakes are quite efficient at low AoA but at high AoA they tend to disturb airflow to engine and all kind of nasties, like compressor stall, can happen. Difference between CRJ and aforementioned fighter jets is that they're designed for manuevering at altitude while CRJ and all the rest of paxjets are only good for cruising! If you want to manuever at altitude, put big wedge-shaped, downturned intakes well ahead of your fan or compressor's first stage and set them ahead of the wing or below the fuselage - very practical indeed if you're designing the pax jet. So don't redesign the plane, stick to its limitations and procedures.
Every pilot who was ever worth of being called pilot knows that his engine has to be respected, be it GE, P&W, Klimov, Lycoming or Rotax! The ones that needed this crash to find out their engines are to be respected are indeed 
poor pilots. I really hope they're only product of my sick imagination. I'm pretty certain that in order to attach engine to aircraft, manufacturer has to demonstrate that engine's envelope always matches or exceeds aircraft's one. Now go on and suggest it was CRJ's tiny envelope at fault.
I haven't seen much of our deceased comrades bashing around and besides no one can be more harsh to our colleagues than themselves. We've seen execution of the capital punishment, now the NTSB will tell what preceeded it, but from preliminary reports I don't think there will be many new lesons to learn. My guess is they'll be: Don't climb too slow. Don't let your airspeed bleed off. If you have sufficient altitude and insufficent airspeed, make a trade-off. Power available goes down with altitude. Always respect your stall warning. If you lose all power, go for best glide and turn towards nearest appropriate landing area before trying to restart. Respect and obvserve SOPs, checklists and limitations, they're there to save your life.
Maybe that's just me but my instructors taught me all of that before I was allowed to touch the aeroplane, let alone fly it. And I'm talking about cessna 150 here.
One atitude that worries me and it was amply demonstrated on this forum is: "Aircraft was certified to fly at FL410, so it should have held that level". So you bring your shiny jet to some high level, leave power at climb and speed starts to trickle away. Now what do you do? A)Come to conclusion that either manufacturer lied to you or you don't know the whole story and start descending or B) stubbornly remain on your level because plane-has-to-be-capable-of-doing-it even when shaker warns you it's not good idea. Please answer it for yourself while it's still hipothetical
as to air intakes and being blanked by the wing, does that mean the t tail was blanked by the wing too?
unless you personally have knowledge of flew the CRJ at FL410 with exact weights, speeds, aoa and the rest, specualtion on the capability of the air intake is a bit odd. and bringing up a slew of fighter planes means nothing
still, no matter what really happened and why, every pilot today now knows that the GE engines on the CRJ need to be respected and given a safer envelope.
poor pilots. I really hope they're only product of my sick imagination. I'm pretty certain that in order to attach engine to aircraft, manufacturer has to demonstrate that engine's envelope always matches or exceeds aircraft's one. Now go on and suggest it was CRJ's tiny envelope at fault.
Let's not be too harsh to our fallen comrades in the CRJ. They taught us all something
Maybe that's just me but my instructors taught me all of that before I was allowed to touch the aeroplane, let alone fly it. And I'm talking about cessna 150 here.
One atitude that worries me and it was amply demonstrated on this forum is: "Aircraft was certified to fly at FL410, so it should have held that level". So you bring your shiny jet to some high level, leave power at climb and speed starts to trickle away. Now what do you do? A)Come to conclusion that either manufacturer lied to you or you don't know the whole story and start descending or B) stubbornly remain on your level because plane-has-to-be-capable-of-doing-it even when shaker warns you it's not good idea. Please answer it for yourself while it's still hipothetical
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regarding stalls:
yes I meant altitude and not attitude...though wings level does help.
I am constantly reminded that the Wright Brothers still know more than the FAA.
They knew enough to take off and land into the wind. (they moved from ohio to north carolina to do this and the FAA still allows tail wind operations at Chicago Midway, but don't get me started on that one)
To decrease AOA when stalling.
And to avoid Wind Flurries ( their words for what we know now as windshear)
by the way, is it possible that the CRJ in question was some how over loaded and the pilots didn't know the true weight.
you see, at night, "empty" one would expect the plane to be more sprightly in performance than fully loaded.
oh well,
jon
yes I meant altitude and not attitude...though wings level does help.
I am constantly reminded that the Wright Brothers still know more than the FAA.
They knew enough to take off and land into the wind. (they moved from ohio to north carolina to do this and the FAA still allows tail wind operations at Chicago Midway, but don't get me started on that one)
To decrease AOA when stalling.
And to avoid Wind Flurries ( their words for what we know now as windshear)
by the way, is it possible that the CRJ in question was some how over loaded and the pilots didn't know the true weight.
you see, at night, "empty" one would expect the plane to be more sprightly in performance than fully loaded.
oh well,
jon
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Originally Posted by Clandestino
...One atitude that worries me and it was amply demonstrated on this forum is: "Aircraft was certified to fly at FL410, so it should have held that level". So you bring your shiny jet to some high level, leave power at climb and speed starts to trickle away. Now what do you do? A)Come to conclusion that either manufacturer lied to you or you don't know the whole story and start descending or B) stubbornly remain on your level because plane-has-to-be-capable-of-doing-it even when shaker warns you it's not good idea. Please answer it for yourself while it's still hipothetical
1) You've reach 410 by unsound means, too high a ROC, putting you on the back side of the power curve, or
2) The engine(s) or airplane is subpar (draggy, overweight, whatever) for some reason beyond your control.
In this case I'll pick your A).
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Clandestino ... "Come to conclusion that either manufacturer lied to you or you don't know the whole story and start descending"
Think about the circumstances of their arrival at FL410. Aircraft have recommended climb profiles for a reason and, should you choose not to follow them, you do so at your own peril. If you get well behind the power curve at the edge of your aircraft's operating envelope you should choose to descend of your own volition. Either way it is soon not going to be an option. CRJs fly quite well at FL410 if you abide by the performance tables and recommended climb procedures. It is not dangerous or even risky but it is certainly no place for amateurs or cowboys. As for the relight procedures ... follow the AFM. It is no time to start being creative.
Think about the circumstances of their arrival at FL410. Aircraft have recommended climb profiles for a reason and, should you choose not to follow them, you do so at your own peril. If you get well behind the power curve at the edge of your aircraft's operating envelope you should choose to descend of your own volition. Either way it is soon not going to be an option. CRJs fly quite well at FL410 if you abide by the performance tables and recommended climb procedures. It is not dangerous or even risky but it is certainly no place for amateurs or cowboys. As for the relight procedures ... follow the AFM. It is no time to start being creative.
Quoting Clandestino:
"If you lose all power, go for best glide and turn towards nearest appropriate landing area before trying to restart."
There's been discussion here as to whether the priority should have been to relight or establish the best glide to an alternate. Mostly either/or. Clandestino's quote above states the blindingly obvious. What one thought was the basic airmanship learned in unreliable machinery over hostile terrain: always have half an eye out for some place to put the thing down and get out intact.
These two pilots were within gliding distance of more than one airport, weren't they. When they came around to considering the possibility of having to deadstick, it was too late.
It's almost embarrassing to ask if there's a generalised mindset, some sort of overconfidence to do with the US being dotted so densely with airports, that might lead people, like these two, to invert the priorities.
"If you lose all power, go for best glide and turn towards nearest appropriate landing area before trying to restart."
There's been discussion here as to whether the priority should have been to relight or establish the best glide to an alternate. Mostly either/or. Clandestino's quote above states the blindingly obvious. What one thought was the basic airmanship learned in unreliable machinery over hostile terrain: always have half an eye out for some place to put the thing down and get out intact.
These two pilots were within gliding distance of more than one airport, weren't they. When they came around to considering the possibility of having to deadstick, it was too late.
It's almost embarrassing to ask if there's a generalised mindset, some sort of overconfidence to do with the US being dotted so densely with airports, that might lead people, like these two, to invert the priorities.
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In a brief search of the Internet I didn't find any good engine restart statistics, and I wish I had them to back up this discussion, but I really want to elaborate on what Broadreach said:
Truly when all engines shutdown (whether a single, dual, tri, or quad) at any significant altitude, basic airmanship must be:
Again engine restart stats would be helpful here, but I think it's fair to assume that when all engines shutdown, the odds of a successful restart are generally fair, but I'd think they are less than 50 percent. I also think it's fair to assume that if you do get an engine restart, that the odds of having full power are less than 50 percent (either less than all engines, or less than full power from any engine, including a single).
The reasons I think the odds would fall somewhere in these ranges, has to do with the common reasons for all engines shutting down. Some of these are:
I really think that the odds are perhaps 1-in-4 (and maybe less) that you can regain full power after an all engine shutdown. Therefore I think the above basic procedure is paramount to your survival, should you suffer an all engine shutdown at altitude.
What one thought was the basic airmanship learned in unreliable machinery over hostile terrain: always have half an eye out for some place to put the thing down and get out intact.
- secure O2 if needed
- start a glide to a landing
- try a restart
Again engine restart stats would be helpful here, but I think it's fair to assume that when all engines shutdown, the odds of a successful restart are generally fair, but I'd think they are less than 50 percent. I also think it's fair to assume that if you do get an engine restart, that the odds of having full power are less than 50 percent (either less than all engines, or less than full power from any engine, including a single).
The reasons I think the odds would fall somewhere in these ranges, has to do with the common reasons for all engines shutting down. Some of these are:
- Icing
- Fuel exhaustion
- Fuel contamination
- Fuel transfer problem
- FOD damage (large volumes of water, ice ingestion, hail, ash, etc.)
- Airflow disruption (maneuvering error, etc)
- Maintenance error (that is common to all engines)
- Pilot procedure error
- Engine overtemp
- Other reasons
I really think that the odds are perhaps 1-in-4 (and maybe less) that you can regain full power after an all engine shutdown. Therefore I think the above basic procedure is paramount to your survival, should you suffer an all engine shutdown at altitude.
Flightsafety, regarding 'grinding" of seals, blades, etc. GE were not kidding. This is a recognised process called "tip grinding" conducted on a massive thing called ...a tip grinder.
You put the built up shaft assembly into the grinder, spin it up to 2000-3000 rpm and then apply the grinding wheel to the tips of the blades, that way you are setting tip clearances under something closer to the dynamic loads and you can thus set tighter tolerances elsewhere.
You put the built up shaft assembly into the grinder, spin it up to 2000-3000 rpm and then apply the grinding wheel to the tips of the blades, that way you are setting tip clearances under something closer to the dynamic loads and you can thus set tighter tolerances elsewhere.
JonDC9 (by the way, nice plane):
Quite true, and "...those who forget the lessons of history are doomed to repeat them" or similar words. About those accidents:
One major problem at Air Florida is that the First Officer (on probation) KNEW that something was not right, and said something ("those gauges don't look right"?) but they were already on the takeoff roll. There were probably no recommended minimum N1 settings back then on the P&W engines, i.e. 88-92%. Many pilot might consider ordering "Blind Trust" by John Nance. He established definite links between US de-regulation and airline accidents. His book about Braniff was so fundamental that the threat of libel (allegedly' at the insistence of American Airlines
) caused the publisher to destroy the book's first edition!
Will the British/Irish and Europeans, often suffering under their de-regulation, learn some of these mistakes the hard way? If they are unfamiliar with past events on other continents, are repititions almost impossible-because their nations are supposedly highly-regulated and maneuvers+ flows and checklists+SOPA call-outs are rigidly complied with? Will weather forecasting theory and clearway methodology etc be an adequate prevention (say we lose an IRS, then *** and then an EFIS screen...)?
After the TWA accident, Approach Controller told their aircraft to "maintain **** (altitude) until established on an (published) approach segment", or such.
The more Captains think that they know it all and display an equivalent ego, the harder it is for a junior FO (especially new at the company) to clearly question or contradict the Captain's decisions. The MD-80 at Little Rock had an FO on probation with a Chief Pilot-tough combination?
Not for us, hiding here behind our computer monitors, about to single-handedly fly a WW2 plane against an enemy aircraft (...Forgotten Battles...) or anti-aircraft fire.
Or better yet, tomorrow-in the left seat. If we allow an ego to inflate, and don't want to consider other crewmember's advice or questions, we cut corners on safety. For you newer, younger pilots, what character types should fly YOUR family around?
Quite true, and "...those who forget the lessons of history are doomed to repeat them" or similar words. About those accidents:
One major problem at Air Florida is that the First Officer (on probation) KNEW that something was not right, and said something ("those gauges don't look right"?) but they were already on the takeoff roll. There were probably no recommended minimum N1 settings back then on the P&W engines, i.e. 88-92%. Many pilot might consider ordering "Blind Trust" by John Nance. He established definite links between US de-regulation and airline accidents. His book about Braniff was so fundamental that the threat of libel (allegedly' at the insistence of American Airlines
) caused the publisher to destroy the book's first edition!Will the British/Irish and Europeans, often suffering under their de-regulation, learn some of these mistakes the hard way? If they are unfamiliar with past events on other continents, are repititions almost impossible-because their nations are supposedly highly-regulated and maneuvers+ flows and checklists+SOPA call-outs are rigidly complied with? Will weather forecasting theory and clearway methodology etc be an adequate prevention (say we lose an IRS, then *** and then an EFIS screen...)?
After the TWA accident, Approach Controller told their aircraft to "maintain **** (altitude) until established on an (published) approach segment", or such.
The more Captains think that they know it all and display an equivalent ego, the harder it is for a junior FO (especially new at the company) to clearly question or contradict the Captain's decisions. The MD-80 at Little Rock had an FO on probation with a Chief Pilot-tough combination?
Not for us, hiding here behind our computer monitors, about to single-handedly fly a WW2 plane against an enemy aircraft (...Forgotten Battles...) or anti-aircraft fire.
Or better yet, tomorrow-in the left seat. If we allow an ego to inflate, and don't want to consider other crewmember's advice or questions, we cut corners on safety. For you newer, younger pilots, what character types should fly YOUR family around?
Last edited by Ignition Override; 22nd Feb 2006 at 05:30.
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ignition over-ride
yes the DC9 is wonderful. and we have a setting called, IGNITION OVERIDE! quite handy setting too!
yes, ego in cockpit has caused so many accidents. in my first 6 weeks at airline "x" we were going to IND (indianapolis, indiana) at night. I had never been there and asked the captain for vectors to the ILS from atc. he said, look the damn airport is right over there you moron.
I said, I don't see it, but if you do...
the next moment atc says, "where the hell are you going".
we got the ILS
the next morning, to his credit, the captain apologized.
somewhere out there is a movie about the air florida crash, (maybe called ''miracle on the potomac''?). Hope everyone sees it. Great stuff. One crew is briefing takeoff and talking about going to firewall power if needed, the air florida crew is so laid back that there is no thinking going on in the left seat.
Probabtion at airlines should last through the last day of sim training. AFter that you are either qualified or not.
I really can't stand any of John Nance's books. or John Nance for that matter either. But I do agree with the idea that deregulation is making airline flying unsafer.
As to the idea that some pilots in jets are not looking for emergency landing fields, it is quite true. Give some guys 2 jet engines or 2 engines at all and they forget you might just want to get on the ground pronto for one reason or another.
When I was an active CFII, I made my students under the hood with just vor/dme be able to glide towards an airport without an instrument approach. AFter all, the engine doesn't know you are vfr or ifr (vmc/imc)
As to other reasons for multiple engine failure, add VOLCANIC ASH.
regards
jon
yes the DC9 is wonderful. and we have a setting called, IGNITION OVERIDE! quite handy setting too!
yes, ego in cockpit has caused so many accidents. in my first 6 weeks at airline "x" we were going to IND (indianapolis, indiana) at night. I had never been there and asked the captain for vectors to the ILS from atc. he said, look the damn airport is right over there you moron.
I said, I don't see it, but if you do...
the next moment atc says, "where the hell are you going".
we got the ILS
the next morning, to his credit, the captain apologized.
somewhere out there is a movie about the air florida crash, (maybe called ''miracle on the potomac''?). Hope everyone sees it. Great stuff. One crew is briefing takeoff and talking about going to firewall power if needed, the air florida crew is so laid back that there is no thinking going on in the left seat.
Probabtion at airlines should last through the last day of sim training. AFter that you are either qualified or not.
I really can't stand any of John Nance's books. or John Nance for that matter either. But I do agree with the idea that deregulation is making airline flying unsafer.
As to the idea that some pilots in jets are not looking for emergency landing fields, it is quite true. Give some guys 2 jet engines or 2 engines at all and they forget you might just want to get on the ground pronto for one reason or another.
When I was an active CFII, I made my students under the hood with just vor/dme be able to glide towards an airport without an instrument approach. AFter all, the engine doesn't know you are vfr or ifr (vmc/imc)
As to other reasons for multiple engine failure, add VOLCANIC ASH.
regards
jon
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Originally Posted by jondc9
...
I really can't stand any of John Nance's books. or John Nance for that matter either. But I do agree with the idea that deregulation is making airline flying unsafer...
I really can't stand any of John Nance's books. or John Nance for that matter either. But I do agree with the idea that deregulation is making airline flying unsafer...
But the statistics will show that overall safety has been on a steady improving path for decades, an order of magnitude better than a few decades ago, at least in the West. Don't throw out the baby with the bathwater!
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Originally Posted by barit1
There have been bad examples long before deregulation as well as long after. (Gann will tell you about Dudley.)
But the statistics will show that overall safety has been on a steady improving path for decades, an order of magnitude better than a few decades ago, at least in the West. Don't throw out the baby with the bathwater!
But the statistics will show that overall safety has been on a steady improving path for decades, an order of magnitude better than a few decades ago, at least in the West. Don't throw out the baby with the bathwater!
OK Barit1.
First off there are lies, damn lies and statistics. Second off, we cannot know how much safer airline flying would be if de-regulation had not happened. All the same advancements in engines, air frames, TCAS, enhanced GPWS plus an economic base that would prevent airlines from having to:
try to save money by not lubricating jack screws as often as the manufacturer thinks proper.
hiring outside mx (that's maintenance in aero shorthand) to rig elevators on a Beech 1900, then overloading it out of CG.
among other things that would take up too much space.
And yes, I know all about Dudley. To those who don't know, this was a pilot character in "Fate is the Hunter" by Ernest Kellog Gann. He somehow got a job as a pilot, a copilot on a new airline ( the steamship airline). He proved to be incompetent and after investigation it was found that Dudley didn't even have an instrument rating.
While spending lots of money is no guarantee of an accident free airline, I can guarantee that being cheap around airplanes doesn't guarantee safety either.
Bring Back the CAB and keep the advances we have made over the years. Do you want YOUR airliner maintained by a third world MX center?
jon
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Originally Posted by jondc9
OK Barit1.
First off there are lies, damn lies and statistics. Second off, we cannot know how much safer airline flying would be if de-regulation had not happened. All the same advancements in engines, air frames, TCAS, enhanced GPWS plus an economic base that would prevent airlines from having to...
First off there are lies, damn lies and statistics. Second off, we cannot know how much safer airline flying would be if de-regulation had not happened. All the same advancements in engines, air frames, TCAS, enhanced GPWS plus an economic base that would prevent airlines from having to...
What we know for sure is that fares have come down dramatically, there are FAR more folks flying today, and far more flight crews taking home paychecks. Return to the CAB and put thousands of airline people out of work? Well OK - have it your way...
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barit 1:
of interest to all. from the pen of Don Phillips.
maybe we can't unscramble the egg, but we can wonder.
Free flow: An airline deregulator has second thoughts
By Don Phillips International Herald Tribune
WEDNESDAY, FEBRUARY 22, 2006
The U.S. Congress would have killed airline deregulation a quarter century
ago if lawmakers had known the effect it would have on employees,
taxpayers and smaller cities, according to a man who helped make the bill
into law.
Tom Allison, then the chief counsel to the Senate Commerce Committee, said
the movement to allow open competition and remove restrictions on where
airlines could fly, now spreading through Europe and Asia, would prove to
be the right move over time. But it has produced so much disruption and
expense, he said, that no member of Congress would have dared vote for it
in 1980 if legislators had had a clear view of the future. And he said he
wished Congress had added significant human and financial protections to
the law.
Allison, now a semiretired attorney living in Seattle, contacted the
International Herald Tribune after reading a Free Flow column about
Jeffrey Shane, a top Transportation Department official who is shepherding
a series of regulatory changes designed to open U.S. and European skies to
much greater airline competition. At the same time, European airlines
would be allowed to invest more freely in U.S. airlines.
Allison and Shane worked together on the U.S. deregulation bill in 1979
and 1980, shortly after Allison left his position as a Senate staff member
to take a job in President Jimmy Carter's administration as general
counsel for the Transportation Department. Shane was then assistant
general counsel for international affairs.
Allison said that he had a great deal of respect for Shane and that they
both worked hard in 1979 and 1980 to shepherd deregulation through
Congress. But, he said, "I don't think Congress would have passed
deregulation if they had known what would happen."
The public now sees the effects mainly as lower airfares between big
cities, but it fails to understand some of the serious human and other
costs of deregulation, he said.
"I had no idea these things would occur," Allison said.
Airline employees in particular have suffered because of deregulation, he
said. In many cases, salaries have been cut and retirement benefits
slashed, he said, and unemployment has risen in the industry even as the
frequency of service increases.
Passengers may think they received a bargain with deregulation, and fares
have stayed relatively low on many routes between major cities around the
world, he said. But many small cities have lost air service entirely, and
the cost of flying to medium-size cities is much higher than it used to
be, he said.
"It's cheaper to fly to Paris than to Missoula," Montana, he said.
Despite all the freedom, airlines are also in terrible financial
condition, and many are in bankruptcy or just emerging from bankruptcy, he
said. At the same time, passengers suffer from a loss of service quality,
he added.
"It's not as nice as it used to be," he said.
One thing that many people overlook, including politicians, is the massive
shift of airline pension debt to the public, he said. Years ago, the
United States set up the Pension Benefit Guarantee Corporation to
guarantee that pensions would be paid even if a company went bankrupt or
went out of business.
The original expectation was that this government body would pay out a
relatively small amount of money and that a lot of that money would be
made up by seizing the assets of bankrupt companies.
But apparently, no one counted on the dumping of billions of dollars in
pension obligations by major transportation companies. U.S. transportation
companies may go bankrupt under Chapter 11 of the bankruptcy law, which
does not result in a shutdown but instead protects the company from
creditors while the company reorganizes. Thus, transportation company
pensions may be dumped on the government with no real way to recoup
federal costs.
"A private cost is shifted to a public cost," he said.
Allison said he would never go back to the days of strict regulation, but
if he could do it over he would add more safeguards for workers and the
public.
"I don't think you could go back," he said. "Once you scramble the egg,
it's scrambled."
E-mail: [email protected]
of interest to all. from the pen of Don Phillips.
maybe we can't unscramble the egg, but we can wonder.
Free flow: An airline deregulator has second thoughts
By Don Phillips International Herald Tribune
WEDNESDAY, FEBRUARY 22, 2006
The U.S. Congress would have killed airline deregulation a quarter century
ago if lawmakers had known the effect it would have on employees,
taxpayers and smaller cities, according to a man who helped make the bill
into law.
Tom Allison, then the chief counsel to the Senate Commerce Committee, said
the movement to allow open competition and remove restrictions on where
airlines could fly, now spreading through Europe and Asia, would prove to
be the right move over time. But it has produced so much disruption and
expense, he said, that no member of Congress would have dared vote for it
in 1980 if legislators had had a clear view of the future. And he said he
wished Congress had added significant human and financial protections to
the law.
Allison, now a semiretired attorney living in Seattle, contacted the
International Herald Tribune after reading a Free Flow column about
Jeffrey Shane, a top Transportation Department official who is shepherding
a series of regulatory changes designed to open U.S. and European skies to
much greater airline competition. At the same time, European airlines
would be allowed to invest more freely in U.S. airlines.
Allison and Shane worked together on the U.S. deregulation bill in 1979
and 1980, shortly after Allison left his position as a Senate staff member
to take a job in President Jimmy Carter's administration as general
counsel for the Transportation Department. Shane was then assistant
general counsel for international affairs.
Allison said that he had a great deal of respect for Shane and that they
both worked hard in 1979 and 1980 to shepherd deregulation through
Congress. But, he said, "I don't think Congress would have passed
deregulation if they had known what would happen."
The public now sees the effects mainly as lower airfares between big
cities, but it fails to understand some of the serious human and other
costs of deregulation, he said.
"I had no idea these things would occur," Allison said.
Airline employees in particular have suffered because of deregulation, he
said. In many cases, salaries have been cut and retirement benefits
slashed, he said, and unemployment has risen in the industry even as the
frequency of service increases.
Passengers may think they received a bargain with deregulation, and fares
have stayed relatively low on many routes between major cities around the
world, he said. But many small cities have lost air service entirely, and
the cost of flying to medium-size cities is much higher than it used to
be, he said.
"It's cheaper to fly to Paris than to Missoula," Montana, he said.
Despite all the freedom, airlines are also in terrible financial
condition, and many are in bankruptcy or just emerging from bankruptcy, he
said. At the same time, passengers suffer from a loss of service quality,
he added.
"It's not as nice as it used to be," he said.
One thing that many people overlook, including politicians, is the massive
shift of airline pension debt to the public, he said. Years ago, the
United States set up the Pension Benefit Guarantee Corporation to
guarantee that pensions would be paid even if a company went bankrupt or
went out of business.
The original expectation was that this government body would pay out a
relatively small amount of money and that a lot of that money would be
made up by seizing the assets of bankrupt companies.
But apparently, no one counted on the dumping of billions of dollars in
pension obligations by major transportation companies. U.S. transportation
companies may go bankrupt under Chapter 11 of the bankruptcy law, which
does not result in a shutdown but instead protects the company from
creditors while the company reorganizes. Thus, transportation company
pensions may be dumped on the government with no real way to recoup
federal costs.
"A private cost is shifted to a public cost," he said.
Allison said he would never go back to the days of strict regulation, but
if he could do it over he would add more safeguards for workers and the
public.
"I don't think you could go back," he said. "Once you scramble the egg,
it's scrambled."
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Originally Posted by jondc9
barit 1:
of interest to all. from the pen of Don Phillips.
... "A private cost is shifted to a public cost," he said...
of interest to all. from the pen of Don Phillips.
... "A private cost is shifted to a public cost," he said...
(And the many thousand of blacksmiths and buggy-whip makers and streetsweepers displaced by Mr. Ford's Model T had their pensions funded by... Who?)
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Unforunately, our legal system capitalizes on the uneducated, passionate Juries to determine guilt. No doubt this one will be settled by a Jury of Truck drivers, housewives, and Food Service workers that have never been exposed to the consquences of responsibility.
Our system of Justice has evolved into the infamous $-liability-$ issue and how much can be squeezed out of an Individual or Corporation that happened to be near the incident in question.
When our President uses "legalize" to tell the Nation that Oral Sex in the Oval Office is not really Sex, he is telling the Legal system it is okay redefine a situation's true intent for liability protection.
Doesn't really matter what happened at FL410 above Jefferson, Missouri that night. Our indescriminate Lawyers will find the way force a Corporation's Insurance Co. to pay out early in order they may avoid a costly confrontation in Court in front of an overly compassionate , under-informed Jury.
Our system of Justice has evolved into the infamous $-liability-$ issue and how much can be squeezed out of an Individual or Corporation that happened to be near the incident in question.
When our President uses "legalize" to tell the Nation that Oral Sex in the Oval Office is not really Sex, he is telling the Legal system it is okay redefine a situation's true intent for liability protection.
Doesn't really matter what happened at FL410 above Jefferson, Missouri that night. Our indescriminate Lawyers will find the way force a Corporation's Insurance Co. to pay out early in order they may avoid a costly confrontation in Court in front of an overly compassionate , under-informed Jury.
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Climb technique: it has been mentioned here that using v/s modes to climb is unsafe; I disagree. Especially at higher altitudes, turbulence and temp variations during climb, using airspeed/mach with autopilot, can result in large variations in pitch, as airspeed fluctuates and the autopilot pitches up and down to catch up; autopilot lag can result in ever increasing pitch variations, making the climb uncomfortable and erratic. Climb in v/s used to be quite standard; adjust the v/s to maintain an airspeed/mach, which can be much smoother, as small variations can be averaged out. The problem is inattention; setting 500 feet/min and forgetting about it, is as silly as setting 290 airspeed up to 410. A minimum, at least, of attention is required in all cases. V/S is just as safe, with proper attention, as any other mode; it DOES require a little care, but then this IS aviation.
BTW, Mr. Don Phillips is a great writer, on railways as well as aviation.
BTW, Mr. Don Phillips is a great writer, on railways as well as aviation.
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Previous Incident
I have on good authority that a UK registered CRJ 200 on revenue service had a similar problem at high altitude en route LYS - BHX in June 2001, but the crew were able to recover to a lower altitude and continue to destination.
Does anyone have further information on this?
Were any lessons learned?
No.9
Does anyone have further information on this?
Were any lessons learned?
No.9
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alycidon:
I have not heard of this one, but lessons learned are not always shared properly.
the British CAA knew all about 737 problems taking off in ice with minimum flaps/leds. sadly air florida didn't know about this.
In canada, they knew about problems with Fokker F28 aircraft taking off in icing conditions...sadly usairways didn't know this.
I am not blaming the CAA or Canadian equiv. I blame people who don't actively seek out information to prevent crashes.
to the person that thinks Don Phillips is a good writer...YES he is! He is a pal of mine and I will tell him, or you can e mail me and I will give you his e mail address. He used to write for the Washington Post (great paper, especially ifyou hate bush!)but now writes for International Herald Tribune out of the Paris office.
I met him while talking about an american airlines near accident at Windsor Locks ( hartford, conn's airport). I'm sure you all remember how they got a little low and sucked some trees (lucky for them, they were in an MD80 and not a 737).
jon
[email protected]
I have not heard of this one, but lessons learned are not always shared properly.
the British CAA knew all about 737 problems taking off in ice with minimum flaps/leds. sadly air florida didn't know about this.
In canada, they knew about problems with Fokker F28 aircraft taking off in icing conditions...sadly usairways didn't know this.
I am not blaming the CAA or Canadian equiv. I blame people who don't actively seek out information to prevent crashes.
to the person that thinks Don Phillips is a good writer...YES he is! He is a pal of mine and I will tell him, or you can e mail me and I will give you his e mail address. He used to write for the Washington Post (great paper, especially ifyou hate bush!)but now writes for International Herald Tribune out of the Paris office.
I met him while talking about an american airlines near accident at Windsor Locks ( hartford, conn's airport). I'm sure you all remember how they got a little low and sucked some trees (lucky for them, they were in an MD80 and not a 737).
jon
[email protected]