Southwest B737 Overrun @ Chcago MDW
Jon DC-9: "Pilots it is up to you, if you are still commanders of your aircraft". Very good point.
One problem on various Pprune topics is that many of the "300-hour wonders" (or 500-) appear to be unsure, despite the fact that they are FOs (even as 'handling pilot') whether the pilot or the vnav/lnav/autothrottle is 'boss', or whether the automation is in command. The B-757 and the Airbus do require getting used to, but after that?
Part of the apparent confusion seems to be that their Flight Ops. policies seem to require the full use of all automation at almost all times, not just enroute but during takeoffs and approaches, as a substitute for lack of experience. With none or very little background flying planes such as the DHC-6 Twin Otter, Shorts 360, Emb-110 Bandeirante, Beech-1900 or SF-340 into major airports with a high traffic density (i.e. DFW or ORD), many airlines seem to be afraid of pilots experiencing what years ago, was quite normal.
Lufthansa has reportedly for many years had an excellent program at Goodyear, Arizona, where the ab initio student pilots even fly the high-performance Piper Cheyenne.
Jungs...AUSgezeichnet!
One problem on various Pprune topics is that many of the "300-hour wonders" (or 500-) appear to be unsure, despite the fact that they are FOs (even as 'handling pilot') whether the pilot or the vnav/lnav/autothrottle is 'boss', or whether the automation is in command. The B-757 and the Airbus do require getting used to, but after that?
Part of the apparent confusion seems to be that their Flight Ops. policies seem to require the full use of all automation at almost all times, not just enroute but during takeoffs and approaches, as a substitute for lack of experience. With none or very little background flying planes such as the DHC-6 Twin Otter, Shorts 360, Emb-110 Bandeirante, Beech-1900 or SF-340 into major airports with a high traffic density (i.e. DFW or ORD), many airlines seem to be afraid of pilots experiencing what years ago, was quite normal.
Lufthansa has reportedly for many years had an excellent program at Goodyear, Arizona, where the ab initio student pilots even fly the high-performance Piper Cheyenne.
Jungs...AUSgezeichnet!
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consider:
flying an automated plane, the pilot takes off, cleans up and engages the autopilot. what , about 3000 feet agl? climb to altitude, watching the autothrottles and the autopilot and yaw damper do their thing. We fly about 5 hours across the nation...descend on autopilot and click off, in trim, on glideslope and fly the last minute or so to touchdown (or an auto touchdown if you like).
ON a 5 hour flight, maybe, maybe 5 minutes of hand flying.
While I understand that southwest pilots hand fly a bit more, the whole idea is for the pilot to have a real feel for the plane.
to use the autobrakes, having NEVER trained on them, in a highly critical landing is akin to doing brain surgery without having held a scalpel before.
perhaps not, but somewhere the system failed. I understand the copilot is back to flying status, the captain is not, but is so close to the 60 retirement age, one can only imagine that he took his sick time and retired.
OPE
jon
flying an automated plane, the pilot takes off, cleans up and engages the autopilot. what , about 3000 feet agl? climb to altitude, watching the autothrottles and the autopilot and yaw damper do their thing. We fly about 5 hours across the nation...descend on autopilot and click off, in trim, on glideslope and fly the last minute or so to touchdown (or an auto touchdown if you like).
ON a 5 hour flight, maybe, maybe 5 minutes of hand flying.
While I understand that southwest pilots hand fly a bit more, the whole idea is for the pilot to have a real feel for the plane.
to use the autobrakes, having NEVER trained on them, in a highly critical landing is akin to doing brain surgery without having held a scalpel before.
perhaps not, but somewhere the system failed. I understand the copilot is back to flying status, the captain is not, but is so close to the 60 retirement age, one can only imagine that he took his sick time and retired.
OPE
jon
I think that this sort of accident is fairly inevitable when many aeroplanes around the world are landing at restrictive airports in these kind of conditions.
There are too many variables involved in the actual line operation to be able to accurately predict stopping distances. You can work backwards from whatever happened to write the accident report and do it in great detail but it's very 'fuzzy' looking the other way.
There are many assumptions made when calculating landing performance but more importantly, the actual 'input' in the 'real world' is much more variable than, say, when taking off. If you had the same crew and aeroplane do a series of takeoffs and landings, using exactly the same technique each time, I would take a large wager that they would leave the ground in pretty much the same place each time but there would be far more 'scatter' in where they finally came to rest. I feel you would observe this effect on a dry runway in calm conditions, let alone in the middle of a snowstorm.
I think that it has become a matter of 'garbage in - garbage out' in some ways. If the wind and contamination state are not what you thought they were, you carry a few more knots over the threshold, float a bit, delay the reversers slightly, etc. these factors will soon erode all of your safety margin as they multiply up. If one of these things is causing the problem on it's own, it will be more obvious but a subtle combination of slightly exceeding a large amount of parameters will put you off the end just as surely.
My final point is that if you plotted calculated stopping distances against achieved stopping distances for a significant sample of flights, you would mostly likely end up with something approaching a 'normal distribution'. Once you have established that, it's only a matter of probability that someone will go off the end of a short, contaminated runway. It's the area under the tail of the curve, beyond the overrun point, that matters and that could be significant on the runway mentioned above.
I remember landing into ABZ (pretty comparable to Midway) one snowy night in a 737. We had done the calculations (using very conservative data), the runway friction had just been measured (we took a bit off to be on the safe side) and the wind was on the nose (we used nil). With full braking and max. reverse off a fairly firm touchdown, 'on the numbers', we eventually came to a halt 50m from the other end of the runway. Not an experience I wish to repeat.
There are too many variables involved in the actual line operation to be able to accurately predict stopping distances. You can work backwards from whatever happened to write the accident report and do it in great detail but it's very 'fuzzy' looking the other way.
There are many assumptions made when calculating landing performance but more importantly, the actual 'input' in the 'real world' is much more variable than, say, when taking off. If you had the same crew and aeroplane do a series of takeoffs and landings, using exactly the same technique each time, I would take a large wager that they would leave the ground in pretty much the same place each time but there would be far more 'scatter' in where they finally came to rest. I feel you would observe this effect on a dry runway in calm conditions, let alone in the middle of a snowstorm.
I think that it has become a matter of 'garbage in - garbage out' in some ways. If the wind and contamination state are not what you thought they were, you carry a few more knots over the threshold, float a bit, delay the reversers slightly, etc. these factors will soon erode all of your safety margin as they multiply up. If one of these things is causing the problem on it's own, it will be more obvious but a subtle combination of slightly exceeding a large amount of parameters will put you off the end just as surely.
My final point is that if you plotted calculated stopping distances against achieved stopping distances for a significant sample of flights, you would mostly likely end up with something approaching a 'normal distribution'. Once you have established that, it's only a matter of probability that someone will go off the end of a short, contaminated runway. It's the area under the tail of the curve, beyond the overrun point, that matters and that could be significant on the runway mentioned above.
I remember landing into ABZ (pretty comparable to Midway) one snowy night in a 737. We had done the calculations (using very conservative data), the runway friction had just been measured (we took a bit off to be on the safe side) and the wind was on the nose (we used nil). With full braking and max. reverse off a fairly firm touchdown, 'on the numbers', we eventually came to a halt 50m from the other end of the runway. Not an experience I wish to repeat.
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Boeing publishes, within the QRH advisory information for various regimes of flight.
As a rule of thumb, we use the “Normal Configuration Landing Distance” table, contained within our QRH, for the applicable landing flap setting to be used. The figures, corrections contained in the tables, such as weight, auto brake, wind, slope, etc. is then multiplied by two. The multiple is our reference for minimum desired runway length if the landing runway length is marginal. It is a very helpful tool.
As a rule of thumb, we use the “Normal Configuration Landing Distance” table, contained within our QRH, for the applicable landing flap setting to be used. The figures, corrections contained in the tables, such as weight, auto brake, wind, slope, etc. is then multiplied by two. The multiple is our reference for minimum desired runway length if the landing runway length is marginal. It is a very helpful tool.
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http://www.aviationweek.com/avnow/ne...aw062606p3.xml
FAA Policy Change Aimed at Ensuring Safe Landings
By: Frances Fiorino
06/25/2006 08:50:11 PM
MAKING LANDINGS SAFER
A proposed FAA policy revision--spurred by a fatal Southwest Airlines accident last winter--would require turbojet operators to establish methods of ensuring safer landings on contaminated runways.
On July 20, the FAA plans to issue a policy change dubbed "OpSpecs/MSpec Co82 Landing Performance Assessments." Under it, all turbojet operators are by Sept. 1 to submit to their principal operations inspectors proposed procedures that would assure a full-stop landing--with at least a 15% safety margin beyond the actual landing distance--could be made on the runway in the meteorological conditions at the time of arrival. Deceleration means and airplane configuration to be used must also be factored in. The procedures are to be in place by Oct. 1.
It means flight crews must make a specific calculation not before each landing, but only when they learn en route that conditions at a destination airport have deteriorated. In other words, the revised policy dictates that a pilot may not land an aircraft if a 15% safety margin is not available in the assessment, emergencies excepted, according to the FAA.
The policy affects all turbojet operators, Parts 91, 121, 125 and 135, who hold operations or management specifications or Part 125 letter of deviation authority. Foreign operators are excluded.
Southwest's runway overrun accident that spurred the changes occurred Dec. 8, 2005, at 7:14 p.m. CST. Flight 1248 was en route from Baltimore-Washington International to Chicago Midway, operating in instrument meteorological conditions. On landing on Midway's snow-covered Runway 31C, the Boeing 737-700 (N471WN) with 103 people on board, continued rolling through a jet blast deflector, an airport perimeter fence and onto a roadway.
It came to a stop there after hitting two cars and killing a six-year-old child in one of them. The accident injured another 12 people on the ground and four on board the aircraft.
The NTSB's June 20-21 hearing aimed at digging deeper for factual information about the accident--including runway friction measurement and methods used to relay those estimates to the flight crew, and aircraft landing performance on contaminated runways. Investigators continue to examine the braking system's effectiveness and the activation of thrust reversers.
The captain, who was flying the aircraft during landing, told the safety board the reversers were difficult to unstow. The flight data recorder readout indicates the first officer activated them, but not until 18 sec. after touchdown and 14 sec. before the collision with the jet blast deflector (AW&ST Dec. 19/26, 2005, p. 11). According to the NTSB documents, a pilot who flew the same aircraft prior to Flight 1248 said the brakes and reversers operated normally.
The cockpit voice recorder transcript indicates the tower advised the Flight 1248 crew Runway 31C conditions were "fair the first half," and "poor at the second half." By FAA definition, "fair/medium" conditions indicate "noticeably degraded braking conditions" and crews are to plan for long stopping distances. "Poor" indicates "very degraded" braking conditions with a potential for hydroplaning, and crews should plan for "significantly longer stopping distances."
The crew used an onboard laptop performance computer to calculate landing performance, based on factors such as wind speed and direction, aircraft gross weight at touchdown and reported braking action, according to the NTSB. The laptop, using "credit" for use of thrust reversers, calculated what remaining runway would be available after stopping under "wet-poor" and "wet-fair" conditions--and came up with 30-ft. and 560-ft. margins, respectively.
In January, the NTSB urged the FAA to prohibit airlines from using thrust reverser credit when determining stopping distances. If credit had not been included, the Flight 1248 laptop computer would have indicated a safe landing was not possible, according to the NTSB.
Following the accident, the FAA initiated an internal audit to assess the adequacy of current regulations and guidance information. The agency discovered about 50% of operators do not have policies in place to assess sufficient landing distances at time of arrival--even when runway conditions changed or had deteriorated from those forecast at departure. In addition, the FAA found that not all operators have procedures that account for runway surface conditions or reduced braking conditions. Thus the review led to the FAA's revised policy.
Meanwhile, the NTSB continues its probe, and acting Chairman Mark V. Rosenker says he hopes the final Flight 1248 report will be completed by year-end or early next year.
FAA Policy Change Aimed at Ensuring Safe Landings
By: Frances Fiorino
06/25/2006 08:50:11 PM
MAKING LANDINGS SAFER
A proposed FAA policy revision--spurred by a fatal Southwest Airlines accident last winter--would require turbojet operators to establish methods of ensuring safer landings on contaminated runways.
On July 20, the FAA plans to issue a policy change dubbed "OpSpecs/MSpec Co82 Landing Performance Assessments." Under it, all turbojet operators are by Sept. 1 to submit to their principal operations inspectors proposed procedures that would assure a full-stop landing--with at least a 15% safety margin beyond the actual landing distance--could be made on the runway in the meteorological conditions at the time of arrival. Deceleration means and airplane configuration to be used must also be factored in. The procedures are to be in place by Oct. 1.
It means flight crews must make a specific calculation not before each landing, but only when they learn en route that conditions at a destination airport have deteriorated. In other words, the revised policy dictates that a pilot may not land an aircraft if a 15% safety margin is not available in the assessment, emergencies excepted, according to the FAA.
The policy affects all turbojet operators, Parts 91, 121, 125 and 135, who hold operations or management specifications or Part 125 letter of deviation authority. Foreign operators are excluded.
Southwest's runway overrun accident that spurred the changes occurred Dec. 8, 2005, at 7:14 p.m. CST. Flight 1248 was en route from Baltimore-Washington International to Chicago Midway, operating in instrument meteorological conditions. On landing on Midway's snow-covered Runway 31C, the Boeing 737-700 (N471WN) with 103 people on board, continued rolling through a jet blast deflector, an airport perimeter fence and onto a roadway.
It came to a stop there after hitting two cars and killing a six-year-old child in one of them. The accident injured another 12 people on the ground and four on board the aircraft.
The NTSB's June 20-21 hearing aimed at digging deeper for factual information about the accident--including runway friction measurement and methods used to relay those estimates to the flight crew, and aircraft landing performance on contaminated runways. Investigators continue to examine the braking system's effectiveness and the activation of thrust reversers.
The captain, who was flying the aircraft during landing, told the safety board the reversers were difficult to unstow. The flight data recorder readout indicates the first officer activated them, but not until 18 sec. after touchdown and 14 sec. before the collision with the jet blast deflector (AW&ST Dec. 19/26, 2005, p. 11). According to the NTSB documents, a pilot who flew the same aircraft prior to Flight 1248 said the brakes and reversers operated normally.
The cockpit voice recorder transcript indicates the tower advised the Flight 1248 crew Runway 31C conditions were "fair the first half," and "poor at the second half." By FAA definition, "fair/medium" conditions indicate "noticeably degraded braking conditions" and crews are to plan for long stopping distances. "Poor" indicates "very degraded" braking conditions with a potential for hydroplaning, and crews should plan for "significantly longer stopping distances."
The crew used an onboard laptop performance computer to calculate landing performance, based on factors such as wind speed and direction, aircraft gross weight at touchdown and reported braking action, according to the NTSB. The laptop, using "credit" for use of thrust reversers, calculated what remaining runway would be available after stopping under "wet-poor" and "wet-fair" conditions--and came up with 30-ft. and 560-ft. margins, respectively.
In January, the NTSB urged the FAA to prohibit airlines from using thrust reverser credit when determining stopping distances. If credit had not been included, the Flight 1248 laptop computer would have indicated a safe landing was not possible, according to the NTSB.
Following the accident, the FAA initiated an internal audit to assess the adequacy of current regulations and guidance information. The agency discovered about 50% of operators do not have policies in place to assess sufficient landing distances at time of arrival--even when runway conditions changed or had deteriorated from those forecast at departure. In addition, the FAA found that not all operators have procedures that account for runway surface conditions or reduced braking conditions. Thus the review led to the FAA's revised policy.
Meanwhile, the NTSB continues its probe, and acting Chairman Mark V. Rosenker says he hopes the final Flight 1248 report will be completed by year-end or early next year.
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Originally Posted by FullWings
There are too many variables involved in the actual line operation to be able to accurately predict stopping distances.
I think that it has become a matter of 'garbage in - garbage out' in some ways.
I think that it has become a matter of 'garbage in - garbage out' in some ways.
Read the CVR transcript and weep. These guys had trouble working out a crossing restriction in the FMS, they struggled with the hold and they appear to be unsure of how to "clean up" the FMS for the final approach. Not to mention the question of the autobrakes and the unbelievable delay in activating reverse thrust.Complex automated aeroplanes are here to stay. They will only get more automated. It's time to stop sticking our heads in the sand, wringing our wrists over how little stick time we get and acknowledge the real problem. We must understand the automation. We must train our crews to use that automation and we need to structure our sim instruction to that end. Endless V1 cuts, emergency descents and other time honoured checks make us great stick and rudder guys but don't prepare us for just such a scenario as this crew faced. They were a product of their training.
So read the CVR and weep..weep for this unfortunate crew who were given the tools but not the know how.
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flown it:
you make some excellent points. but there is one more point to be made...if they were excellent "stick and rudder" guys, they might have salvaged it...note:
"high on glideslope" call
no call outs of " spoilers deployed, reversers ready, no autobrakes, no calls of airspeed while decelerating (80 knots/60 knots)...
while southwest may have other callouts, I think something similiar to the above might be about right.
and TUNNEL vision...why didn't f/o scream, GET INTO REVERSE or something and not wait some 18 seconds. My gosh, that's the introduction and first strain of the "washington post march" in time!
and shame on southwest for putting a memo out about auto brakes and not training in the sim!
don't even get me started about tailwind landings at midway!
oh well
j
you make some excellent points. but there is one more point to be made...if they were excellent "stick and rudder" guys, they might have salvaged it...note:
"high on glideslope" call
no call outs of " spoilers deployed, reversers ready, no autobrakes, no calls of airspeed while decelerating (80 knots/60 knots)...
while southwest may have other callouts, I think something similiar to the above might be about right.
and TUNNEL vision...why didn't f/o scream, GET INTO REVERSE or something and not wait some 18 seconds. My gosh, that's the introduction and first strain of the "washington post march" in time!
and shame on southwest for putting a memo out about auto brakes and not training in the sim!
don't even get me started about tailwind landings at midway!
oh well
j
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flown-it,
I agree with your assessment of learning the aircraft you are flying. That seems like a given and should not have to be explained. But at airports like MDW, no amount of automation or magic aircraft will help you if the conditions are against you and you decide to land. If you don't have "accurate information" to make an "informed decision", then accidents such as this will happen. The airport is safe but totally unforgiving when the conditions get tough. Operations will continue non stop out of MDW but this same accident or one very similiar will happen again as the airport has no room for error. There was a reason all the air carriers left MDW and moved to ORD many years ago. Just because we have LCC's trying to get an edge doesn't mean the airport is any different than it was 40 years ago.
I agree with your assessment of learning the aircraft you are flying. That seems like a given and should not have to be explained. But at airports like MDW, no amount of automation or magic aircraft will help you if the conditions are against you and you decide to land. If you don't have "accurate information" to make an "informed decision", then accidents such as this will happen. The airport is safe but totally unforgiving when the conditions get tough. Operations will continue non stop out of MDW but this same accident or one very similiar will happen again as the airport has no room for error. There was a reason all the air carriers left MDW and moved to ORD many years ago. Just because we have LCC's trying to get an edge doesn't mean the airport is any different than it was 40 years ago.
Last edited by JustAnothrWindScreen; 30th Jun 2006 at 04:32.
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just another wind screen:
you are quite right. perhaps Chicago should have built ORD (orchard field) with the condition that MDW be non air carrier only. this could still be done by declaring the runways to be only 3800 feet long, with the rest as an over-run. not too many air carriers could make money at that field.
so too with the other metro area short fields that have been kept in use even thought JFK, IAD, DTW and the rest have been built.
j
you are quite right. perhaps Chicago should have built ORD (orchard field) with the condition that MDW be non air carrier only. this could still be done by declaring the runways to be only 3800 feet long, with the rest as an over-run. not too many air carriers could make money at that field.
so too with the other metro area short fields that have been kept in use even thought JFK, IAD, DTW and the rest have been built.
j
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Originally Posted by jondc9
... perhaps Chicago should have built ORD (orchard field) with the condition that MDW be non air carrier only...
j
j
After deregulation, several carriers started moving back into MDW.
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Originally Posted by jondc9
just another wind screen:
. this could still be done by declaring the runways to be only 3800 feet long, with the rest as an over-run. not too many air carriers could make money at that field.j
. this could still be done by declaring the runways to be only 3800 feet long, with the rest as an over-run. not too many air carriers could make money at that field.j
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weasil
I do agree with you that landing at MDW is a wonderful challenge to a pilot. One must be completely in the moment and one with the plane to plant it right where you want it and get the stopping drills underway.
But, how fun is the takeoff, and possible abort?!
j
I do agree with you that landing at MDW is a wonderful challenge to a pilot. One must be completely in the moment and one with the plane to plant it right where you want it and get the stopping drills underway.
But, how fun is the takeoff, and possible abort?!
j
"perhaps Chicago should have built ORD (orchard field) with the condition that MDW be non air carrier only"
DFW had the Wright agreement to stifle competition. What would they call that one, the Daley agreement?
DFW had the Wright agreement to stifle competition. What would they call that one, the Daley agreement?
A B-757 (300) ran off the end of what might have been a dry Midway runway, a few years ago. Because nobody was killed, thank God, I had almost no luck reading anything about the accident. A check of the NTSB website might help.
About five days ago during descent into Charlotte (CLT), near max landing weight (maybe 106,000#) for a 10,000' runway, 18R, I told the FO that if the tailwind component were to increase and go over 10 knots, we would immed. divert to GSP. No alternate fuel but had plenty of reserve + cont. This was a dry runway, but Charlotte Approach Control was not ready to "turn the airport around", as the wind direction was to improve. If the wind had increased, maybe ATC would have found the "commercial incentive" to allow planes to land on 36L and R.
Jon DC-9. Another top airport candidate on your list would also be DCA. Politics (world-class egos
) before safety. The FAA would never be allowed to consider closing it. Who appoints the top administrators? 
Maybe "they" could allow some civilian charter flights into Andrews AFB, which has much longer runways. Security? A STAR into BWI takes you right over Andrews anyway-and BWI ops never required the ludicrous, former "daily secret code". Anybody could order Jepps. Maybe there is too much red tape for our enlightened bureaucratic "leadership" to sort out, as with the sad "Three Stooges Circus" after Hurricane Katrina. Too many bloated federal departments to "support"...
Never mind on many winter days at short runways such as Traverse City (TVC) MI. My company, due to incorrect airport runway treatments or past invalid braking action/RCR reports, has a detailed block of info in the Jepps for more than a few airports in the upper Midwest. Landing any jet, especially with no slats (CRJ), former DC-9 dash 10) into some of these places is seriously risking your career each time you go in, more so than with flaps and slatted wings.
Years ago, even at an airport (GFK) which has a very expensive, excellent university aviation school on location, some airport workers threw sand on an icy runway, but no chemicals, and a heavy jet slid off of the side, mostly due to the much reduced rudder ineffectiveness of tail-mounted engines. The Captain had never flown the plane as FO, for what it is worth-another trap.
About five days ago during descent into Charlotte (CLT), near max landing weight (maybe 106,000#) for a 10,000' runway, 18R, I told the FO that if the tailwind component were to increase and go over 10 knots, we would immed. divert to GSP. No alternate fuel but had plenty of reserve + cont. This was a dry runway, but Charlotte Approach Control was not ready to "turn the airport around", as the wind direction was to improve. If the wind had increased, maybe ATC would have found the "commercial incentive" to allow planes to land on 36L and R.
Jon DC-9. Another top airport candidate on your list would also be DCA. Politics (world-class egos
) before safety. The FAA would never be allowed to consider closing it. Who appoints the top administrators? Maybe "they" could allow some civilian charter flights into Andrews AFB, which has much longer runways. Security? A STAR into BWI takes you right over Andrews anyway-and BWI ops never required the ludicrous, former "daily secret code". Anybody could order Jepps. Maybe there is too much red tape for our enlightened bureaucratic "leadership" to sort out, as with the sad "Three Stooges Circus" after Hurricane Katrina. Too many bloated federal departments to "support"...Never mind on many winter days at short runways such as Traverse City (TVC) MI. My company, due to incorrect airport runway treatments or past invalid braking action/RCR reports, has a detailed block of info in the Jepps for more than a few airports in the upper Midwest. Landing any jet, especially with no slats (CRJ), former DC-9 dash 10) into some of these places is seriously risking your career each time you go in, more so than with flaps and slatted wings.
Years ago, even at an airport (GFK) which has a very expensive, excellent university aviation school on location, some airport workers threw sand on an icy runway, but no chemicals, and a heavy jet slid off of the side, mostly due to the much reduced rudder ineffectiveness of tail-mounted engines. The Captain had never flown the plane as FO, for what it is worth-another trap.
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Originally Posted by flown-it
These guys had trouble working out a crossing restriction in the FMS
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Originally Posted by filejw
I believe you will find no 737-500's in the SWA fleet.
http://www.airliners.net/open.file/0917511/M/