Southwest B737 Overrun @ Chcago MDW
Join Date: Jun 2002
Location: Slaving away in front of multiple LCDs, somewhere in the USA
Age: 69
Posts: 174
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
As far as I know, N471WN will be repaired, but I don't if NTSB has released the aircraft yet so Boeing can commence the effort.
Join Date: Jul 2000
Location: U.S.A.
Posts: 474
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
An article in A.I.N. on the new FAA 15% rule states that the new computation would have only added 334 feet of required landing distance and asks the question “would that have made a difference” in the Southwest MDW accident.
http://www.ainonline.com/Issues/07_06/07_06_FAA_1.htm
http://www.ainonline.com/Issues/07_06/07_06_FAA_1.htm
Larry in TN
Please read pages 66 and 66 of the CVR transcript.
Cross 30 South of Fort Wayne at FL 300 was the requirement. It appears to me they were trying to work out how to input that into the FMS in which case it's irelevant whether or not they had the ability to couple it to VNAV. They were using the FMS at the very least for SA.. and apparently having trouble doing that. THAT was my point.
Please read pages 66 and 66 of the CVR transcript.
Cross 30 South of Fort Wayne at FL 300 was the requirement. It appears to me they were trying to work out how to input that into the FMS in which case it's irelevant whether or not they had the ability to couple it to VNAV. They were using the FMS at the very least for SA.. and apparently having trouble doing that. THAT was my point.
Join Date: Aug 2003
Location: Sale, Australia
Age: 80
Posts: 3,832
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
FAA changes landing distance rules for commercial operators
By Matt Thurber “Aviation International News”, July 2006
After a Southwest Airlines Boeing 737-700 ran off a snowy runway while landing at Chicago Midway Airport on December 8 last year, the FAA launched an internal audit of factors related to that accident. One result of that audit is a new FAA policy that imposes mandatory 15-percent landing distance safety margins on Part 91K (fractional), 125, 121 and 135 jet operators. The rule was published in the Federal Register on June 7.
The new requirement is simple: no operator to which the policy applies is allowed to land on any runway without 15 percent more runway available than the actual landing distance. If weather conditions change en route, pilots will have to recalculate the actual landing distance needed, based on runway conditions and use of available equipment such as thrust reversers and spoilers, add 15 percent to that and determine if the destination runway is long enough. If not, they will have to find a suitable runway.
While the NTSB had not posted anything more than a brief preliminary report on the Southwest accident on its Web site, it did address the issue in a safety recommendation dated January 27. The flight crew’s calculation of runway needed to land, using the airline’s operational performance computer, showed that using the WET-FAIR runway braking condition parameter yielded a margin of 560 feet. In other words, if the condition of the runway actually matched the WET-FAIR parameter, then the pilots should have been able to come to a complete stop with 560 feet of runway remaining.
“During post-accident interviews,” the NTSB recommendation letter stated, “the flight crewmembers told Safety Board investigators that they considered 560 feet to be an acceptable safety margin and, therefore, decided to execute the landing.”
The NTSB didn’t take issue with the remaining runway length but criticized the FAA for allowing Southwest Airlines to consider thrust-reverser credit when determining landing distance in that model 737.
“The Safety Board is concerned that the landing distance safety margin is significantly reduced on a contaminated runway when the reverse thrust credit is allowed in landing stopping distance calculations. As a result, a single event, the delayed deployment of the thrust reversers [the NTSB said the flight crew waited 18 seconds after touchdown to deploy the reversers], can lead to an unsafe condition, as it did in this accident. The Safety Board concludes that the safety margin must be restored to those airplanes for which the reverse thrust credit is currently allowed in landing performance calculations.”
Most business jet operators don’t recognize thrust reverser credit when landing on contaminated runways, but the FAA’s new policy accepts that a variety of factors and equipment can be considered when calculating landing distance. Once that distance is calculated, the policy also requires adding the 15-percent safety margin, which probably would not have been obtainable in the Southwest Airlines case at Midway. (The runway used, 31C, is 6,522 feet long. Subtract 560 feet [the landing distance for the WET-FAIR wet-fair parameter] and that leaves 5,962 feet or a 9-percent margin. Add 15 percent–894 feet–and the total runway length with the new margin is 6,856. Would 334 extra feet have made a difference in this accident?)
The FAA requirements in the new policy are as follows: No later than Sept. 1, 2006, jet operators will be required to have procedures in place to ensure that a full-stop landing, with at least a 15-percent safety margin beyond the actual landing distance, can be made on the runway to be used, in the conditions existing at the time of arrival, and with the deceleration means and airplane configuration that will be used.
“This assessment must take into account the meteorological conditions affecting landing performance (airport pressure altitude, wind velocity, wind direction and so on), surface condition of the runway to be used for landing, the approach speed, airplane weight and configuration and planned use of airplane ground deceleration devices. Turbojet operators will be required to ensure that flight crews comply with the operator’s approved procedures. In other words, absent an emergency, after the flight crew makes this assessment using the air carrier’s FAA-approved procedures, if at least the 15-percent safety margin is not available, the pilot may not land the aircraft.”
The formal requirement for this new policy will come in OpSpec/MSpec C082, which will be available July 20. Operators must have procedures in place for complying with the new OpSpec/ MSpec by September 1, and the FAA expects all affected operators will be in compliance by October 1.
Both the National Air Transportation Association (NATA) and NBAA labeled the FAA’s release of the safety margin policy a quasi-rulemaking effort, noting that it was not subject to ordinary public comment and rule-drafting procedures.
“This proposal,” NBAA stated, “exceeds current regulations in place concerning landing procedures, and NBAA believes that, like all new proposals, this one should be subject to the time-tested federal rulemaking process for aviation regulations.”
NBAA also believes the policy is too narrowly focused. “By its nature, the proposal suggests that only one factor– runway landing distance–matters in aircraft landings. In fact, a whole host
of factors are involved, including pilot judgment, aircraft weight and other aspects of landing.” Although NBAA didn’t comment on the Southwest accident, some of the “host of factors” presumably could include proper use of thrust reversers and correct application of contaminated runway braking information, an issue the NTSB also raised.
“The FAA’s notice establishes a new regulatory requirement,” NATA explained, “bypassing the required rulemaking process, and is therefore unacceptable. The notice itself states that this is a new requirement, yet the FAA does not adequately explain why formal rulemaking was not conducted.”
NATA is more concerned about the FAA’s cavalier use of OpSpecs/MSpecs to impose new operational requirements. “The FAA attempts to sell this notice as ‘clarification’ of Parts 135.77, 125.351, 91.3 and 91.1009, which place responsibility for the safe operation of the flight jointly with the operator, pilot-in-command and dispatcher. The association submits that funneling new requirements through by claiming ‘clarification’ of these broadly worded regulations is an abusive interpretation of the regulations. The regulations cited by the FAA are general regulations intended to ensure that in all activities the aircraft is operated in a safe manner. They were not created to be used as an excuse for the FAA to impose specific requirements at any time, so that the agency can avoid the rigors of formal rulemaking.”
The FAR Part 91K and 135 regulation permitting operators of large transport-category airplanes to fly into airports where landing weight allows a full stop landing within 80 percent of available runway length shouldn’t be a factor in the safety-margin policy. If an airplane needs the full 80 percent of the available runway length, this still works out to be less than the amount required by the 15-percent margin policy.
For example, on Chicago Midway’s 6,522-foot-long Runway 31C, the 80-percent rule requires a full stop before reaching 5,217 feet. If 5,217 feet is the actual landing distance, adding 15 percent to that brings the required runway length to 6,000 feet, significantly less than the runway’s total length.
To view the new policy see
http://a257.g.akamaitech.net/7/257/2...06/06-5196.htm
By Matt Thurber “Aviation International News”, July 2006
After a Southwest Airlines Boeing 737-700 ran off a snowy runway while landing at Chicago Midway Airport on December 8 last year, the FAA launched an internal audit of factors related to that accident. One result of that audit is a new FAA policy that imposes mandatory 15-percent landing distance safety margins on Part 91K (fractional), 125, 121 and 135 jet operators. The rule was published in the Federal Register on June 7.
The new requirement is simple: no operator to which the policy applies is allowed to land on any runway without 15 percent more runway available than the actual landing distance. If weather conditions change en route, pilots will have to recalculate the actual landing distance needed, based on runway conditions and use of available equipment such as thrust reversers and spoilers, add 15 percent to that and determine if the destination runway is long enough. If not, they will have to find a suitable runway.
While the NTSB had not posted anything more than a brief preliminary report on the Southwest accident on its Web site, it did address the issue in a safety recommendation dated January 27. The flight crew’s calculation of runway needed to land, using the airline’s operational performance computer, showed that using the WET-FAIR runway braking condition parameter yielded a margin of 560 feet. In other words, if the condition of the runway actually matched the WET-FAIR parameter, then the pilots should have been able to come to a complete stop with 560 feet of runway remaining.
“During post-accident interviews,” the NTSB recommendation letter stated, “the flight crewmembers told Safety Board investigators that they considered 560 feet to be an acceptable safety margin and, therefore, decided to execute the landing.”
The NTSB didn’t take issue with the remaining runway length but criticized the FAA for allowing Southwest Airlines to consider thrust-reverser credit when determining landing distance in that model 737.
“The Safety Board is concerned that the landing distance safety margin is significantly reduced on a contaminated runway when the reverse thrust credit is allowed in landing stopping distance calculations. As a result, a single event, the delayed deployment of the thrust reversers [the NTSB said the flight crew waited 18 seconds after touchdown to deploy the reversers], can lead to an unsafe condition, as it did in this accident. The Safety Board concludes that the safety margin must be restored to those airplanes for which the reverse thrust credit is currently allowed in landing performance calculations.”
Most business jet operators don’t recognize thrust reverser credit when landing on contaminated runways, but the FAA’s new policy accepts that a variety of factors and equipment can be considered when calculating landing distance. Once that distance is calculated, the policy also requires adding the 15-percent safety margin, which probably would not have been obtainable in the Southwest Airlines case at Midway. (The runway used, 31C, is 6,522 feet long. Subtract 560 feet [the landing distance for the WET-FAIR wet-fair parameter] and that leaves 5,962 feet or a 9-percent margin. Add 15 percent–894 feet–and the total runway length with the new margin is 6,856. Would 334 extra feet have made a difference in this accident?)
The FAA requirements in the new policy are as follows: No later than Sept. 1, 2006, jet operators will be required to have procedures in place to ensure that a full-stop landing, with at least a 15-percent safety margin beyond the actual landing distance, can be made on the runway to be used, in the conditions existing at the time of arrival, and with the deceleration means and airplane configuration that will be used.
“This assessment must take into account the meteorological conditions affecting landing performance (airport pressure altitude, wind velocity, wind direction and so on), surface condition of the runway to be used for landing, the approach speed, airplane weight and configuration and planned use of airplane ground deceleration devices. Turbojet operators will be required to ensure that flight crews comply with the operator’s approved procedures. In other words, absent an emergency, after the flight crew makes this assessment using the air carrier’s FAA-approved procedures, if at least the 15-percent safety margin is not available, the pilot may not land the aircraft.”
The formal requirement for this new policy will come in OpSpec/MSpec C082, which will be available July 20. Operators must have procedures in place for complying with the new OpSpec/ MSpec by September 1, and the FAA expects all affected operators will be in compliance by October 1.
Both the National Air Transportation Association (NATA) and NBAA labeled the FAA’s release of the safety margin policy a quasi-rulemaking effort, noting that it was not subject to ordinary public comment and rule-drafting procedures.
“This proposal,” NBAA stated, “exceeds current regulations in place concerning landing procedures, and NBAA believes that, like all new proposals, this one should be subject to the time-tested federal rulemaking process for aviation regulations.”
NBAA also believes the policy is too narrowly focused. “By its nature, the proposal suggests that only one factor– runway landing distance–matters in aircraft landings. In fact, a whole host
of factors are involved, including pilot judgment, aircraft weight and other aspects of landing.” Although NBAA didn’t comment on the Southwest accident, some of the “host of factors” presumably could include proper use of thrust reversers and correct application of contaminated runway braking information, an issue the NTSB also raised.
“The FAA’s notice establishes a new regulatory requirement,” NATA explained, “bypassing the required rulemaking process, and is therefore unacceptable. The notice itself states that this is a new requirement, yet the FAA does not adequately explain why formal rulemaking was not conducted.”
NATA is more concerned about the FAA’s cavalier use of OpSpecs/MSpecs to impose new operational requirements. “The FAA attempts to sell this notice as ‘clarification’ of Parts 135.77, 125.351, 91.3 and 91.1009, which place responsibility for the safe operation of the flight jointly with the operator, pilot-in-command and dispatcher. The association submits that funneling new requirements through by claiming ‘clarification’ of these broadly worded regulations is an abusive interpretation of the regulations. The regulations cited by the FAA are general regulations intended to ensure that in all activities the aircraft is operated in a safe manner. They were not created to be used as an excuse for the FAA to impose specific requirements at any time, so that the agency can avoid the rigors of formal rulemaking.”
The FAR Part 91K and 135 regulation permitting operators of large transport-category airplanes to fly into airports where landing weight allows a full stop landing within 80 percent of available runway length shouldn’t be a factor in the safety-margin policy. If an airplane needs the full 80 percent of the available runway length, this still works out to be less than the amount required by the 15-percent margin policy.
For example, on Chicago Midway’s 6,522-foot-long Runway 31C, the 80-percent rule requires a full stop before reaching 5,217 feet. If 5,217 feet is the actual landing distance, adding 15 percent to that brings the required runway length to 6,000 feet, significantly less than the runway’s total length.
To view the new policy see
http://a257.g.akamaitech.net/7/257/2...06/06-5196.htm
The theory for a maximum weight landing on a runway with minimum length available, is also based upon a very firm landing with a very quick "flare" and jamming on the brakes (is anti-skid on all wheels operative? auto ground spoilers?) for "max. braking".-
at least in the simulator.
Pilots in the real world are usually reluctant to land in a manner which leaves passengers walking off of the plane with a smug smirk on their faces. They have become pampered and spoiled over the years by many fairly soft landings-at least among the more ignorant masses.
But many passengers tend to understand firm landings after feeling the buffeting on final approach, whenever the winds were gusting.
at least in the simulator.
Pilots in the real world are usually reluctant to land in a manner which leaves passengers walking off of the plane with a smug smirk on their faces. They have become pampered and spoiled over the years by many fairly soft landings-at least among the more ignorant masses.
But many passengers tend to understand firm landings after feeling the buffeting on final approach, whenever the winds were gusting.
Join Date: Aug 2005
Location: Europe
Posts: 97
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
Landing Performance Assessments at Time of Arrival
Join Date: Jun 2002
Location: Slaving away in front of multiple LCDs, somewhere in the USA
Age: 69
Posts: 174
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
Join Date: Sep 2006
Location: California U.S.
Posts: 70
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
An Entire Year Passed -- No Final Report
...it's been a whole year since this Southwest Airlines Boeing 737 mishap -- yet the NTSB has yet to issue a formal report.
How long should it take to formally analyze & report on this type of airline mishap ?
Instead of a substantive report, U.S. National Transportation Safety Board Chairman Mark V. Rosenker is now merely "urging" airlines to voluntarily adopt changes in the way they calculate stopping distances on contaminated runways, in accordance with Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) guidance ...
issued in response to a much earlier NTSB recommendation from this Chicago mishap.
The primary facts of this mishap have been known for a long time -- what has caused the reporting delay ??
How long should it take to formally analyze & report on this type of airline mishap ?
Instead of a substantive report, U.S. National Transportation Safety Board Chairman Mark V. Rosenker is now merely "urging" airlines to voluntarily adopt changes in the way they calculate stopping distances on contaminated runways, in accordance with Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) guidance ...
issued in response to a much earlier NTSB recommendation from this Chicago mishap.
The primary facts of this mishap have been known for a long time -- what has caused the reporting delay ??
Join Date: Jun 2002
Location: Slaving away in front of multiple LCDs, somewhere in the USA
Age: 69
Posts: 174
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
>>>The primary facts of this mishap have been known for a long time -- what has caused the reporting delay ??
It's been my observation that NTSB usually turns out a final report any time from 12-18 months after an accident. Last I heard, the report should be out late spring/early summer, which jibes with the 12-18 month figure...
It's been my observation that NTSB usually turns out a final report any time from 12-18 months after an accident. Last I heard, the report should be out late spring/early summer, which jibes with the 12-18 month figure...
Below the Glidepath - not correcting
The primary facts of this mishap have been known for a long time -- what has caused the reporting delay ??
Join Date: Sep 2006
Location: California U.S.
Posts: 70
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
USAF usually seems to produce final reports in well under 6 months.
This SouthWest Airlines mishap would seem much easier than most -- the aircraft was fully intact & easy to examine, plus the pilots were available & extensively interviewed.
What have the NTSB investigators actually been doing each day for the last six months, after the primary facts were in -- office debates on the 'whys' ?
Join Date: Sep 2001
Location: 38N
Posts: 356
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
What have the NTSB investigators actually been doing each day for the last six months, after the primary facts were in -- office debates on the 'whys' ?
Join Date: Sep 2006
Location: California U.S.
Posts: 70
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
Is there any reason why formal aircraft mishap reports should be issued sooner... rather than later ??
Join Date: Feb 2005
Location: flyover country USA
Age: 82
Posts: 4,579
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
Don't hold your breath; there's still 2004 to deal with:
NTSB Identification: DCA05MA003.
On October 14, 2004, at 11:20 EDT, a Northwest AirLink CJR-2 crashed near Jefferson City, Missouri.
NTSB Identification: DCA05MA003.
On October 14, 2004, at 11:20 EDT, a Northwest AirLink CJR-2 crashed near Jefferson City, Missouri.
Join Date: Jun 2001
Location: Surrounded by aluminum, and the great outdoors
Posts: 3,780
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
In the litiguous environment which we operate in the USA, reality takes a back seat to the "cover your ass" phenomenon...hence the less than timely fashion in which reports are released...
sorely needed in aviation
1) standardized certified runway condition determination systems and definitions
2) standardized taxiway designation systems...no not signage..thats happening...the actual way taxiways are named...based on their geographical location to the runway or ramp area...
3) rules like truck drivers have in the USA to prevent totally knackered humans from occuping the front seats of airplanes
and the list goes on and on and on....
sorely needed in aviation
1) standardized certified runway condition determination systems and definitions
2) standardized taxiway designation systems...no not signage..thats happening...the actual way taxiways are named...based on their geographical location to the runway or ramp area...
3) rules like truck drivers have in the USA to prevent totally knackered humans from occuping the front seats of airplanes
and the list goes on and on and on....
Join Date: Dec 2006
Location: washington,dc
Posts: 486
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
flyingphil:
check out: http://www.ntsb.gov/ntsb/major.asp
according to this official site, the final probable cause hasn't been issued.
strange it is taking so long...conspiracy theories anyone?
the public hearing was scheduled for about a year ago...
check out: http://www.ntsb.gov/ntsb/major.asp
according to this official site, the final probable cause hasn't been issued.
strange it is taking so long...conspiracy theories anyone?
the public hearing was scheduled for about a year ago...
Join Date: Feb 2005
Location: flyover country USA
Age: 82
Posts: 4,579
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
The Pinnacle CRJ final report took 30 months.
Join Date: Aug 2005
Location: Europe
Posts: 97
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
NTSB Board Meeting and Press release October 2
NTSB Animation and presentations:
http://www.ntsb.gov/events/Boardmeeting.htm
NTSB Press release:
http://www.ntsb.gov/Pressrel/2007/071002b.htm
NTSB Synopsis AAR-07/06:
http://www.ntsb.gov/Publictn/2007/AAR0706.htm
http://www.ntsb.gov/events/Boardmeeting.htm
NTSB Press release:
http://www.ntsb.gov/Pressrel/2007/071002b.htm
NTSB Synopsis AAR-07/06:
http://www.ntsb.gov/Publictn/2007/AAR0706.htm