Southwest B737 Overrun @ Chcago MDW
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@fepate: you are correct, I have been looking at the first post of this thread where the time (and subsequent the METAR) is wrong.
Are the types of the a/c landing ahead of Flight 1248 known?
Are the types of the a/c landing ahead of Flight 1248 known?
I landed at London-Luton Airport in a 737 last night. Runway 26 has a turning which I guess most pilots try to make because it negates the need to backtrack.
It is located approx 5500ft from the threshold and most times in the 737 touchdown is between 1000ft and 1500ft past the threshold leving 4000ft to stop. This requires full reverse and liberal use of brakes. In other words little margin for error.
At least at Luton if it all goes pear shaped you have an extra 1500 feet past this turn to stop! However in all my times landing there we have always made this turn.
It is located approx 5500ft from the threshold and most times in the 737 touchdown is between 1000ft and 1500ft past the threshold leving 4000ft to stop. This requires full reverse and liberal use of brakes. In other words little margin for error.
At least at Luton if it all goes pear shaped you have an extra 1500 feet past this turn to stop! However in all my times landing there we have always made this turn.
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Sometimes all the experience, skills,planning,briefing and monitoring, just simply are not enough to ensure safe flight. There are still unknowns (not the Rumsfeld type!).
Such as:-
will the snow hitting the windshield at 145kts cause visual disorientation when transitioning fron instruments to visual?
will the contamination be thicker than last checked?
will the braking action still be as last reported?
are the tyres and brakes in excellent condition, or are they approaching replacement time?
will the reversers deploy instantly and evenly and be available until a safe stop is ensured?
sorry - finger trouble posted my thread before finishing!
To continue:-
The NTSB will report it\'s findings in due course and will no doubt include recommendations that may suggest a rewriting of performance calculations and a re-emphasis on techniques to be used. Tragically, this improvement in safety will come at the loss of a young life and the grief of the family and the trauma of all involved.
Speculation is human and unavoidable, but apportioning blame based on speculation is unacceptable. Despite my experience as a pilot, I still have one thought after reading incident and accident reports. Not the thought that I would have done things differently or not got into that situation, but the thought that \"there but for the grace................\".
I have a feeling that this accident report will give me the same thought.
Such as:-
will the snow hitting the windshield at 145kts cause visual disorientation when transitioning fron instruments to visual?
will the contamination be thicker than last checked?
will the braking action still be as last reported?
are the tyres and brakes in excellent condition, or are they approaching replacement time?
will the reversers deploy instantly and evenly and be available until a safe stop is ensured?
sorry - finger trouble posted my thread before finishing!
To continue:-
The NTSB will report it\'s findings in due course and will no doubt include recommendations that may suggest a rewriting of performance calculations and a re-emphasis on techniques to be used. Tragically, this improvement in safety will come at the loss of a young life and the grief of the family and the trauma of all involved.
Speculation is human and unavoidable, but apportioning blame based on speculation is unacceptable. Despite my experience as a pilot, I still have one thought after reading incident and accident reports. Not the thought that I would have done things differently or not got into that situation, but the thought that \"there but for the grace................\".
I have a feeling that this accident report will give me the same thought.
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To go back to the auto/manual brakes issue...
I assume that just after touch down, speed brakes and reverse are going to perform most of the braking (especially on a contaminated surface). So fundamentally, whether the brakes are applied immediately by the autobrake system or whether there is a slight delay because of human hesitation in case of manual braking, the stopping distance won't vary THAT much. However... Since the important thing would be to apply reverse ASAP, I would chose to have as little distraction as possible (i.e. should I jump on the brakes now?) and leave it to the autobrakes, so that I don't mess up engaging reverse by doing so too early (or when the thrust levers have not been retarded all the way back) and ending up fighting the levers.
If indeed, as per NTSB report quoted earlier in this thread, max manual braking gives a slightly shorter stopping distance than max autobrakes, then the pilot can jump on its brakes (thus cancelling autobraking) once reverse is engaged. Sounds to me like this operating procedure would offer the least risk of messing up engaging reverse, while producing maximum wheel braking effectiveness. No?
BTW, I'm just fresh out of ATPL school (hence the alias), so I could be talking crap :-)
P
I assume that just after touch down, speed brakes and reverse are going to perform most of the braking (especially on a contaminated surface). So fundamentally, whether the brakes are applied immediately by the autobrake system or whether there is a slight delay because of human hesitation in case of manual braking, the stopping distance won't vary THAT much. However... Since the important thing would be to apply reverse ASAP, I would chose to have as little distraction as possible (i.e. should I jump on the brakes now?) and leave it to the autobrakes, so that I don't mess up engaging reverse by doing so too early (or when the thrust levers have not been retarded all the way back) and ending up fighting the levers.
If indeed, as per NTSB report quoted earlier in this thread, max manual braking gives a slightly shorter stopping distance than max autobrakes, then the pilot can jump on its brakes (thus cancelling autobraking) once reverse is engaged. Sounds to me like this operating procedure would offer the least risk of messing up engaging reverse, while producing maximum wheel braking effectiveness. No?
BTW, I'm just fresh out of ATPL school (hence the alias), so I could be talking crap :-)
P
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But the inescapable fact is that had there been an EMAS installed - most will contain an a/c travelling at >75kts the aircraft would have made it onto the road and young Woods' family's car.
The FAA demands that a RESA of 1000ft be availible on runways used by airline traffic or failing that a EMAS. The sad fact is that this requirment has been fudged and runway with 'grandfathered rights' like Midway (and 300 more in the US alone) don't meet this requirement (from the end of the paved surface to the fence at 31C is 82ft ) and unless they require Federal funding for an upgrade or resurfacing tht type of thing they never will. Given that if you take the figures for the last 15 years or so there are an average of four (that's right four) overruns a month by airline operations the quation is is this risk acceptable? Is it not time that the RESA/EMAS requirement be extended to apply to all airports (outside US too the FAA requirement is based on ICAO standards)?
The industry dodged a bullet in Toronto with the exception of the Woods family and other lighter injuries one was dodged again at Midway (come to that Burbank too - imagine what would have happened if the a/c had slid a yard or two further and into the petrol pumps).
Or is it a case of waiting till an accident kills lots of people before action happens? (same as usual)
The FAA demands that a RESA of 1000ft be availible on runways used by airline traffic or failing that a EMAS. The sad fact is that this requirment has been fudged and runway with 'grandfathered rights' like Midway (and 300 more in the US alone) don't meet this requirement (from the end of the paved surface to the fence at 31C is 82ft ) and unless they require Federal funding for an upgrade or resurfacing tht type of thing they never will. Given that if you take the figures for the last 15 years or so there are an average of four (that's right four) overruns a month by airline operations the quation is is this risk acceptable? Is it not time that the RESA/EMAS requirement be extended to apply to all airports (outside US too the FAA requirement is based on ICAO standards)?
The industry dodged a bullet in Toronto with the exception of the Woods family and other lighter injuries one was dodged again at Midway (come to that Burbank too - imagine what would have happened if the a/c had slid a yard or two further and into the petrol pumps).
Or is it a case of waiting till an accident kills lots of people before action happens? (same as usual)
Last edited by Ace Rimmer; 14th Dec 2005 at 12:47.
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Permafrost,
You can select reverse in the air (10').
Autobrakes or not, they needed 7000' or more to land (according to the Boeing 737-700 QRH figures I posted yesteday).
So people can go on and on about reversers and brakes, but if the QRH says they needed more runway than what was available, then I suspect that the enquiry may be a short one.
You can select reverse in the air (10').
Autobrakes or not, they needed 7000' or more to land (according to the Boeing 737-700 QRH figures I posted yesteday).
So people can go on and on about reversers and brakes, but if the QRH says they needed more runway than what was available, then I suspect that the enquiry may be a short one.
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And if you barely make the numbers on a contaminated runway reported as "fair" or "good", and it in fact turns out to be "fair to poor" or less, your antiskid will cycle you right off the end of the runway every time, autobrakes or manual, TR's deployed instantly or not.
Midway leaves no room for leeway under those conditions. What's the mystery here?
Midway leaves no room for leeway under those conditions. What's the mystery here?
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Stu - you would think so, but this is the USA, where there is a hidden level of politics called 'lobbying'....
SWA has some of the most influential lobbyists (look at the Wright repeal efforts), and I am certain all kinds of phasers-on-stun will be applied here to stop any recommendations for change to SWA's modus-operandi by the NTSB. Watch this space...
Any US corporation would do the same, BTW, not just SWA.
SWA has some of the most influential lobbyists (look at the Wright repeal efforts), and I am certain all kinds of phasers-on-stun will be applied here to stop any recommendations for change to SWA's modus-operandi by the NTSB. Watch this space...
Any US corporation would do the same, BTW, not just SWA.
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R31C/4500FT SNINCR 1/10 P0000 T10331050
RWY 31C RVR 4500ft, snow increasing rapidly; not sure about the rest
1/10 snowing 1 inch per hour/10 inches on the ground
P0000 Precipitation in the last hour
T10331050 Temperature -3.3C dewpoint - 5.0C
RWY 31C RVR 4500ft, snow increasing rapidly; not sure about the rest
1/10 snowing 1 inch per hour/10 inches on the ground
P0000 Precipitation in the last hour
T10331050 Temperature -3.3C dewpoint - 5.0C
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Some more discussion on the use of automation in this article:
Southwest pilot violated braking policy
December 14, 2005
BY MARK J. KONKOL Transportation Reporter
The Southwest Airlines pilot at the helm during Thursday's snowy crash at Midway Airport told federal investigators he used the Boeing 737's "autobrakes," a device airline officials say their pilots are told not to activate.
National Transportation Safety Board investigators said they found the autobrake switch in the "maximum" position on the flight panel. The system is designed to activate when the landing gear hits the runway.
Investigators are still trying to determine if the system was operable when flight 1248 overshot the runway, crashed through an airport barrier fence into traffic, killing 6-year-old Joshua Woods as he rode in his family's car.
The pilot's use of the autobrakes against airline policy raises questions about Southwest's braking procedures, especially for landing in inclement weather.
"It's a really weird violation of Southwest policy. . . . Maybe he was a sharp pilot, and he decided to use the technology," said Ron Stearney Jr., an attorney representing the Woods family.
"But did [the pilot] get the training to use that stuff when for all these years Southwest has prohibited pilots from doing so?
"Maybe he was not trained properly. I don't know. But the weather at Midway [Thursday] was the ultimate test, and what we had was Titanic syndrome -- relying on technology to buck Mother Nature. A plane landing in a snowstorm with seven inches on the ground."
On-time issue
Aviation sources said Southwest is preparing to lift the ban on autobrakes, but Federal Aviation Administration, NTSB and Southwest officials would not comment or provide documents regarding requests or plans to change Southwest's flight operation procedures regarding autobrakes.
Southwest spokeswoman Linda Rutherford would not provide any details, policies or flight procedures regarding the use of autobrakes because that system -- along with the plane's reverse thrusters and the tailwind landing -- have fallen under the scope of the NTSB investigation. She confirmed that using autobrakes was not Southwest policy.
A former Southwest pilot with 13 years experience said the airline's decision not to use autobrakes has historically had more to do with on-time performance than safety.
Bert Yetman of the Professional Pilots Federation said that during his tour with Southwest, pilots were told to slow planes to 80 knots using reverse thrusters before applying braking systems.
That allowed planes to stay in the air as long as possible -- with 10-minute turnaround times -- avoiding the "brake cooling period" required when brakes are used at speeds higher than 80 knots, Yetman said.
"Safety does not come into question. It's how long the runway is and how quick you want to turn around," he said.
High setting on brakes
The pilot told investigators autobrakes were at a high setting and "deployed virtually the moment the plane lands on the runway," NTSB officials said.
As flight crews began to realize the plane was not decelerating the way it should, they "took over the brakes and pressed them as hard as they could," according to the NTSB.
The plane left the runway, blasting through the airport fence near 55th and Central, raising questions about whether the short safety zone beyond the airstrip is adequate.
City aviation officials have been working with the FAA on ways to make the runway and safe zone longer. The city submitted a proposal in May 2004, which the FAA returned asking officials to "add more to this," FAA spokesman Tony Molinaro said.
There was never a deadline on when the work or study should be completed, and negotiations were not final, he said. It's part of a national effort to lengthen runway safe zones that has been in the works for five years.
Molinaro said 46 airports have made improvements and 37 still need changes. "Midway is one of them," Molinaro said. "And it's one of the challenging ones."
Another tool
In addition to the autobrakes, transportation expert Aaron Gellman, head of Northwestern University's Transportation Center, says part of the crash probe should center on whether the pilot was using the plane's "head-up display" which provides flight path guidance in low visibility landings.
"It's used in such a way that touchdown is at a very low speed and also puts you down right near the end of the runway," Gellman said. "If he was not using it, he was not using one of the major tools available to him."
Rutherford said the cockpit of the plane in Thursday's crash was equipped with the "head-up display," but she would not say whether the pilot was using it at the time of the crash.
Navigational equipment on runway 31-C knocked out in Thursday's crash was repaired and checked by 6:50 p.m. Tuesday, when the runway was open to accept air traffic, aviation department spokeswoman Wendy Abrams said.
http://www.suntimes.com/output/news/...-midway14.html
Southwest pilot violated braking policy
December 14, 2005
BY MARK J. KONKOL Transportation Reporter
The Southwest Airlines pilot at the helm during Thursday's snowy crash at Midway Airport told federal investigators he used the Boeing 737's "autobrakes," a device airline officials say their pilots are told not to activate.
National Transportation Safety Board investigators said they found the autobrake switch in the "maximum" position on the flight panel. The system is designed to activate when the landing gear hits the runway.
Investigators are still trying to determine if the system was operable when flight 1248 overshot the runway, crashed through an airport barrier fence into traffic, killing 6-year-old Joshua Woods as he rode in his family's car.
The pilot's use of the autobrakes against airline policy raises questions about Southwest's braking procedures, especially for landing in inclement weather.
"It's a really weird violation of Southwest policy. . . . Maybe he was a sharp pilot, and he decided to use the technology," said Ron Stearney Jr., an attorney representing the Woods family.
"But did [the pilot] get the training to use that stuff when for all these years Southwest has prohibited pilots from doing so?
"Maybe he was not trained properly. I don't know. But the weather at Midway [Thursday] was the ultimate test, and what we had was Titanic syndrome -- relying on technology to buck Mother Nature. A plane landing in a snowstorm with seven inches on the ground."
On-time issue
Aviation sources said Southwest is preparing to lift the ban on autobrakes, but Federal Aviation Administration, NTSB and Southwest officials would not comment or provide documents regarding requests or plans to change Southwest's flight operation procedures regarding autobrakes.
Southwest spokeswoman Linda Rutherford would not provide any details, policies or flight procedures regarding the use of autobrakes because that system -- along with the plane's reverse thrusters and the tailwind landing -- have fallen under the scope of the NTSB investigation. She confirmed that using autobrakes was not Southwest policy.
A former Southwest pilot with 13 years experience said the airline's decision not to use autobrakes has historically had more to do with on-time performance than safety.
Bert Yetman of the Professional Pilots Federation said that during his tour with Southwest, pilots were told to slow planes to 80 knots using reverse thrusters before applying braking systems.
That allowed planes to stay in the air as long as possible -- with 10-minute turnaround times -- avoiding the "brake cooling period" required when brakes are used at speeds higher than 80 knots, Yetman said.
"Safety does not come into question. It's how long the runway is and how quick you want to turn around," he said.
High setting on brakes
The pilot told investigators autobrakes were at a high setting and "deployed virtually the moment the plane lands on the runway," NTSB officials said.
As flight crews began to realize the plane was not decelerating the way it should, they "took over the brakes and pressed them as hard as they could," according to the NTSB.
The plane left the runway, blasting through the airport fence near 55th and Central, raising questions about whether the short safety zone beyond the airstrip is adequate.
City aviation officials have been working with the FAA on ways to make the runway and safe zone longer. The city submitted a proposal in May 2004, which the FAA returned asking officials to "add more to this," FAA spokesman Tony Molinaro said.
There was never a deadline on when the work or study should be completed, and negotiations were not final, he said. It's part of a national effort to lengthen runway safe zones that has been in the works for five years.
Molinaro said 46 airports have made improvements and 37 still need changes. "Midway is one of them," Molinaro said. "And it's one of the challenging ones."
Another tool
In addition to the autobrakes, transportation expert Aaron Gellman, head of Northwestern University's Transportation Center, says part of the crash probe should center on whether the pilot was using the plane's "head-up display" which provides flight path guidance in low visibility landings.
"It's used in such a way that touchdown is at a very low speed and also puts you down right near the end of the runway," Gellman said. "If he was not using it, he was not using one of the major tools available to him."
Rutherford said the cockpit of the plane in Thursday's crash was equipped with the "head-up display," but she would not say whether the pilot was using it at the time of the crash.
Navigational equipment on runway 31-C knocked out in Thursday's crash was repaired and checked by 6:50 p.m. Tuesday, when the runway was open to accept air traffic, aviation department spokeswoman Wendy Abrams said.
http://www.suntimes.com/output/news/...-midway14.html
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Curious - doors?
Probably a simple answer, but I looked at the photos from airliners posted above, and the only exit that I could see open was the stbd rear.
Admittedly the port front could not be seen in the pics, but I would have thought (wrongly?) that all or most of the exits would have been used to de-plane in this sort of situation?
Obviously if an exit would be dangerous to use for any reason, it would not be opened, but it would appear that the overwing exits, and the front stbd were not used (the rear port may have been considered to be too high with the nose on the ground, but the rear stbd was the only apparently open. (confused)
Admittedly the port front could not be seen in the pics, but I would have thought (wrongly?) that all or most of the exits would have been used to de-plane in this sort of situation?
Obviously if an exit would be dangerous to use for any reason, it would not be opened, but it would appear that the overwing exits, and the front stbd were not used (the rear port may have been considered to be too high with the nose on the ground, but the rear stbd was the only apparently open. (confused)
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Ace Rimmer
Unfortunately you've only hit the rumours spot in Rumours and News, and the subtle inaccuracies in your rumours present a picture which is not quite as it is in real life.
EMAS installed - most will contain an a/c travelling at >75kts the aircraft would have made it onto the road and young Woods' family's car
EMAS is designed to decelerate the design aircraft expected to use the runway at exit speeds of 70 knots (approach category C and D aircraft)
The FAA demands that a RESA of 1000ft be availible [sic] on runways used by airline traffic or failing that a EMAS.
Look I'm not too well up on the latest FAA but ICAO is 90m RESA required (300 ft); and the 240m RESA (790 ft) for code 3&4 aircraft is only a recommendation. I can't see the FAA as being too different.
Midway …… (from the end of the paved surface to the fence at 31C is 82ft
It was this point that made me wonder if your post was either journalistic or legalese rumour (our Texan colleagues have a pithy turn of phrase starting with 'bulls' and ending with 'hit'). The fact is that the end of the runway to the fence is 420 feet along the extended centreline. Airbubba's great links to the satellite photos show this quite clearly. There is paved area beyond the end of the runway – this is the normal paving to reduce jet blast erosion, and is not part of the declared distances. There is a jet blast attenuator fence, but this is not the 'fence' and is modestly frangible.
Given that if you take the figures for the last 15 years or so there are an average of four (that's right four) overruns a month by airline operations the quation is is [sic sic] this risk acceptable? Is it not time that the RESA/EMAS requirement be extended to apply to all airports (outside US too the FAA requirement is based on ICAO standards)? Regretably I haven't the time to go into risk nor statistics right now, so I reserve discussion for later. But I have a gut feel what the answer will be
Unfortunately you've only hit the rumours spot in Rumours and News, and the subtle inaccuracies in your rumours present a picture which is not quite as it is in real life.
EMAS installed - most will contain an a/c travelling at >75kts the aircraft would have made it onto the road and young Woods' family's car
EMAS is designed to decelerate the design aircraft expected to use the runway at exit speeds of 70 knots (approach category C and D aircraft)
The FAA demands that a RESA of 1000ft be availible [sic] on runways used by airline traffic or failing that a EMAS.
Look I'm not too well up on the latest FAA but ICAO is 90m RESA required (300 ft); and the 240m RESA (790 ft) for code 3&4 aircraft is only a recommendation. I can't see the FAA as being too different.
Midway …… (from the end of the paved surface to the fence at 31C is 82ft
It was this point that made me wonder if your post was either journalistic or legalese rumour (our Texan colleagues have a pithy turn of phrase starting with 'bulls' and ending with 'hit'). The fact is that the end of the runway to the fence is 420 feet along the extended centreline. Airbubba's great links to the satellite photos show this quite clearly. There is paved area beyond the end of the runway – this is the normal paving to reduce jet blast erosion, and is not part of the declared distances. There is a jet blast attenuator fence, but this is not the 'fence' and is modestly frangible.
Given that if you take the figures for the last 15 years or so there are an average of four (that's right four) overruns a month by airline operations the quation is is [sic sic] this risk acceptable? Is it not time that the RESA/EMAS requirement be extended to apply to all airports (outside US too the FAA requirement is based on ICAO standards)? Regretably I haven't the time to go into risk nor statistics right now, so I reserve discussion for later. But I have a gut feel what the answer will be
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Evacuation exits
M609:
“Was evacuation possible from via the aft slides? Look a bit high.”
- Slides would be useless (dangling). No person can jump from that height without serious injury. A non-inflated slide MAY be used as a means of climbing down, for the above-average athlete. Although, with a raging fire in the cabin no doubt most people would prefer broken bones.
ExSimGuy:
“…that all or most of the exits would have been used to de-plane in this sort of situation?”
- The car beneath the inner flap of the left wing (pic 2) gives a fair perspective. When there’s NO FIRE in the cabin, why let pax onto a slippery wing and have them fall from 3 m height? The pic’s are taken long after the evac, so we don’t know which exits they used. Ground crew may have opened/closed any of them.
“Was evacuation possible from via the aft slides? Look a bit high.”
- Slides would be useless (dangling). No person can jump from that height without serious injury. A non-inflated slide MAY be used as a means of climbing down, for the above-average athlete. Although, with a raging fire in the cabin no doubt most people would prefer broken bones.
ExSimGuy:
“…that all or most of the exits would have been used to de-plane in this sort of situation?”
- The car beneath the inner flap of the left wing (pic 2) gives a fair perspective. When there’s NO FIRE in the cabin, why let pax onto a slippery wing and have them fall from 3 m height? The pic’s are taken long after the evac, so we don’t know which exits they used. Ground crew may have opened/closed any of them.
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Looking at the previously posted accident photos it appears to me the port side main entry door is open and the aft starboard service door is open. Neither appear to have their chutes deployed suggesting main entry 'walk off' evacuation. The over wing exit plug-type doors are still in place suggesting they weren't used either. With the aeroplane essentially nose down as opposed to level, I'd think the main entry door would have been the better option.
(Creative licence used by author due to the fact things may have happened in between the aeroplane coming to rest and the time these photos were taken)
To Auto Brake or not to Auto Brake? That was my question.
The newspaper article quoting the Captain would indicate Southwest has a no Auto Brake use policy.
AH HA!!!
take that arewenearlythereyet! (how was the hat, BTW)
As Stu Bigzorst has stated, based on the QRH figures which some have had the opportunity to look at in the slower-paced comfort of their homes, there wasn't enough runway available to prevent this overrun.
As someone has already eluded to, this was only a matter of time for Midway.
Next?
(Creative licence used by author due to the fact things may have happened in between the aeroplane coming to rest and the time these photos were taken)
To Auto Brake or not to Auto Brake? That was my question.
The newspaper article quoting the Captain would indicate Southwest has a no Auto Brake use policy.
AH HA!!!
take that arewenearlythereyet! (how was the hat, BTW)
As Stu Bigzorst has stated, based on the QRH figures which some have had the opportunity to look at in the slower-paced comfort of their homes, there wasn't enough runway available to prevent this overrun.
As someone has already eluded to, this was only a matter of time for Midway.
Next?
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Overrun:
Whoops bit of finger trouble there should have typed 70... a million apologies but you might consider these points:
Suggest you look at the FAA requirements for airports seeking federal funding for runway upgrades including re-surfacing works.
Then you might also look at the provisions of the Lautenberg Bill which Dubya signed into law a few weeks back something about 1000ft of overrun required or EMAS (albeit not until 2015) - yep the FAA's requiremts are different from ICAOs - you only have to file a difference if you don't meet ICAO standards not if you exceed them.
Oh yes, incidentally, you might also reflect that in the ICAO Annex it talks not about the runway end but the end of the paved surface. But of course this might just be 'either journalistic or legalese'
All the foregoing notwithstanding...
You might pause to consider the fact that in this case the aircraft left the paved surface at 40kts (NTSB figures not mine by the way) so the sucker woulda stopped n'est pas? Before it went through the 'modestly' frangible blast fence and perimeter fence and on to the road - which I think you'll allow it most assuredly did?
Not my stats ICAO's Go have a moan at them
Oh and BTW just how frangible is 'modestly' is that like being a little bit pregnant? As in "whoops this modestly frangible bit of blast fence just punctured my fuel tank which appears to have slightly ignited...dang".
Whoops bit of finger trouble there should have typed 70... a million apologies but you might consider these points:
Suggest you look at the FAA requirements for airports seeking federal funding for runway upgrades including re-surfacing works.
Then you might also look at the provisions of the Lautenberg Bill which Dubya signed into law a few weeks back something about 1000ft of overrun required or EMAS (albeit not until 2015) - yep the FAA's requiremts are different from ICAOs - you only have to file a difference if you don't meet ICAO standards not if you exceed them.
Oh yes, incidentally, you might also reflect that in the ICAO Annex it talks not about the runway end but the end of the paved surface. But of course this might just be 'either journalistic or legalese'
All the foregoing notwithstanding...
You might pause to consider the fact that in this case the aircraft left the paved surface at 40kts (NTSB figures not mine by the way) so the sucker woulda stopped n'est pas? Before it went through the 'modestly' frangible blast fence and perimeter fence and on to the road - which I think you'll allow it most assuredly did?
Not my stats ICAO's Go have a moan at them
Oh and BTW just how frangible is 'modestly' is that like being a little bit pregnant? As in "whoops this modestly frangible bit of blast fence just punctured my fuel tank which appears to have slightly ignited...dang".
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arewenearlythereyet? says:
There are far too many 'pretenders' on this thread who are trying to come across as experienced with the type of operation as the carrier in this accident and then submitting their views as though they know what they are talking about when in fact all they are doing is p!ssing off those of us who are able to spot their Walter Mitty type ramblings which get in the way of reasoned debate based on experience. By raising the matter about autobrakes, Willie Mitty tries to infer that it is possible that Southwest have a policy of not using autobrakes when in fact anyone in this industry who is a B737 pilot, especially those of us who work for companies registered in the first world, know that it would be impossible to even get an AoC if someone were stupid enough to even think of implementing such a policy.
Not only do you come across as a pompous ass...based on what we now know about WN's policy on autobrakes, it appears your first sentence really applies to yourself along with a couple of others in your grandstanding post. Now the question is...are you able to admit your completely ridiculous looking mistake. It may give us some insight into your CRM capabilities.
There are far too many 'pretenders' on this thread who are trying to come across as experienced with the type of operation as the carrier in this accident and then submitting their views as though they know what they are talking about when in fact all they are doing is p!ssing off those of us who are able to spot their Walter Mitty type ramblings which get in the way of reasoned debate based on experience. By raising the matter about autobrakes, Willie Mitty tries to infer that it is possible that Southwest have a policy of not using autobrakes when in fact anyone in this industry who is a B737 pilot, especially those of us who work for companies registered in the first world, know that it would be impossible to even get an AoC if someone were stupid enough to even think of implementing such a policy.
Not only do you come across as a pompous ass...based on what we now know about WN's policy on autobrakes, it appears your first sentence really applies to yourself along with a couple of others in your grandstanding post. Now the question is...are you able to admit your completely ridiculous looking mistake. It may give us some insight into your CRM capabilities.
This NTSB update just in:
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------
The National Transportation Safety Board today released
the following update on its investigation into the accident
involving Southwest Airlines flight 1248, a Boeing 737-700 on
December 8, 2005, at Midway Airport in Chicago, Illinois. The
airplane overran runway 31C during the landing rollout.
The accident occurred about 7:14 pm central standard
time. The airplane departed the end of the runway, rolled
through a blast fence, a perimeter fence, and onto a
roadway. The airplane came to a stop after impacting two
automobiles. One automobile occupant was fatally injured
and another seriously injured. The flight was conducted
under 14 CFR Part 121 and had departed from the
Baltimore/Washington International Thurgood Marshall
Airport, Maryland.
The on-scene portion of the investigation has been
completed. Additional fact-finding, including tests and
research, will be conducted at various component
manufacturers. The Safety Board staff continues to examine
the information provided by the flight data recorder and the
cockpit voice recorder.
Operations/Human Performance
The two pilots in the cockpit were interviewed on
Saturday. Each interview took approximately three hours.
The pilots stated that everything was normal through
the point of touchdown. Approaching the airport, weather
was of concern to them, and they listened to the ATIS (the
recorded weather update) four times during the latter
portion of the flight. They stated that they agreed with
the dispatcher's assessment of the conditions for landing on
runway 31C and backed up that assessment by inputting the
numbers into the on-board laptop computer tool.
The computer confirmed that the landing would be
within the operational parameters of the airplane and
Southwest's procedures, they said. Autobrakes were set on
MAX, and they activated after a "firm" touchdown. The
flying pilot (Captain) stated that he could not get the
reverse thrust levers out of the stowed position. The first
officer, after several seconds, noticed that the thrust
reversers were not deployed and activated the reversers
without a problem. At some point, the Captain noticed that
the airplane was not decelerating normally and applied
maximum braking manually. The first officer also became
aware of the poor braking effectiveness, moved his seat
farther forward, and also applied maximum braking. They
stated that they continued to apply maximum pressure to the
brakes as the airplane went straight off the end of the
runway and came to a stop.
Interviews were conducted with a number of other
Southwest Airlines flight crews, including the crew of the
last Southwest flight to land at Midway and a subsequent
crew that diverted to St. Louis.
Airplane Performance
Preliminary calculations show that the airplane
touched down with about 4,500 feet of remaining runway and
was on the runway for about 29 seconds. Preliminary
calculations also show that, for the runway conditions and
use of brakes and thrust reverser that occurred, the
stopping distance without hitting obstructions would have
been about 5,300 feet (the actual stopping distance was
about 5,000 feet). In addition, had the airplane landing
into the wind, rather than with a tail wind, the stopping
distance for a landing would have been about 1,000 feet
less.
Documentation of aircraft performance from the scene
has been completed to the maximum extent possible. It was
not possible to observe tire marks from much of the landing
rollout due to the fact that the aircraft landed on a snow-
covered runway and snow fell on the runway immediately
following the accident.
FDR data show that autobrakes were active and provided
high brake pressure upon touchdown. Autobrakes and manual
braking continued to provide high brake pressure throughout
the landing roll.
FDR data show that thrust reversers were activated
about 18 seconds after touchdown or about 14 seconds before
contact with the blast fence. Testing and examination of
the thrust reverser systems will continue.
Investigators have obtained the laptop computer tool
used by the accident flight crew. It will be examined and
calculations of landing performance will be compared to
flight manual data.
Eleven security-type video cameras were identified on
the airport that may show imagery of the airplane rollout or
the surface of the runway and taxiway at the time of the
accident. The videos will be reviewed.
Meteorology
National Weather Service forecasters and other
personnel were interviewed. An enhanced snow band was in
the area producing localized heavy snow due to lake
enhancement. This apparently is a somewhat unusual weather
phenomenon, as the band swath was only 20 to 30 miles wide
with snow accumulations of 10 inches right over Midway
Airport.
Midway Airport weather observation equipment and
records were examined and all equipment was working normally
during the evening of the accident.
Southwest Airlines dispatchers who were associated
with the accident flight were interviewed. Prior to the
takeoff from Baltimore, when weather conditions deteriorated
and the runway switched to runway 31C, the dispatcher
determined that runway 31C was approved for landing for
flight 1248. Runway conditions, braking action, wind speed
and direction, airplane weight and mechanical condition of
the aircraft are typical factors considered in making such
decisions. The flight was contacted twice on the way to
Midway and the appropriateness of using the runway for
landing was reaffirmed during both contacts.
Official weather observations:
Approximately 20 minutes prior to the accident, the
winds were from 100 degrees at 11 knots, visibility was «
mile in moderate snow and freezing fog, the ceiling was
broken at 400 feet, and overcast at 1400 feet, temperature -
3C, dew point -5C, altimeter setting 30.06 in. Hg. Remarks -
runway 31C rvr (runway visual range) 4500 feet, snow
increment - 1 inch of new show in the last hour, 10 inches
on the ground.
Approximately 23 minutes after the accident, a special
observation revealed winds out of 160 degrees at 5 knots,
visibility ¬ mile in heavy snow, freezing fog, sky obscured
with a vertical visibility of 200 feet, temperature -4C,
dewpoint -5C. Remarks - runway 31C, rvr 3000 feet.
Toxicology
Blood and urine samples were obtained from both
pilots. The disposition of the blood samples is being
reviewed.
Structures
The aircraft has been removed from the accident site
and was transferred to a hangar at Midway Airport. The
maintenance log revealed no writeups or deferred items for
the accident flight or several previous flights.
Professional surveyors completed a survey of the
accident scene and the geography leading up to the site to
include the locations of parts shed by the aircraft after it
left the paved runway surface and the blast fence destroyed
during the accident sequence.
Powerplants
Both engines were visually examined at the accident
site. Although the first stage compressor blades of both
engines showed foreign object damage, they were all intact
and present. Wood from the blast fence and other debris was
present in both engines. A visual examination of the
turbine sections revealed no missing blades.
The 60-day engine history revealed no deferrals or
writeups. Each engine has two thrust reverser sleeves. FDR
data indicated that all four sleeves were deployed until
after the airplane left the paved runway overrun surface.
Hydraulic system B (that runs the thrust reversers) revealed
no leaks.
Systems
The Systems Group documented the switches, circuit
breakers and controls in the cockpit. The leading edge
slat, flap, and trailing edge flap extension measurements
were taken and revealed symmetrical extension of all
devices. The measurements will be compared to Boeing
documentation to determine exact extension.
Chicago Fire Department personnel were interviewed to
determine if any switch positions or other items were
altered during the rescue effort. The Fire Department Chief
stated that the only things his people did were to
disconnect the battery and turn off the crew oxygen source.
The brakes were found in good condition with adequate
wear remaining. The main landing gear tires had acceptable
tread depth and no indication of flat spots.
Air Traffic Control
The local controller, two tower controllers, and the
tower supervisor were interviewed. All controllers stated
that they saw the aircraft lights during the landing roll,
but did not see the actual touchdown.
The investigation has revealed that runway 31C was
used as the landing runway because it contained lower
landing minimums for aircraft using the ILS approach. If
runway 13C was used, the runway most aligned with the wind,
pilots would have been unable to land because of
insufficient landing minimums.
Survival Factors/Airports
All flight attendants were interviewed. They all said
that they noted a smooth landing but that the deceleration
feeling thereafter seem less than usual. They noted that
the emergency lighting came on after the airplane came to
rest, and one flight attendant opened the L1 door to begin
the evacuation. The emergency slide deployed automatically,
but its angle in relation to the ground was less than ideal.
This caused passengers to begin to pile up around the
bottom of the slide. Rescue personnel assisted people away
from the slide. The first officer deplaned after about 5
passengers and also assisted in getting people away from the
airplane.
Further factual updates will be issued when
appropriate.
-30-
NTSB Media Contact: Keith Holloway, 202-314-6100
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------
I reserve comment until I have had time to further consider the facts as they now appear.
Westhawk
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------
The National Transportation Safety Board today released
the following update on its investigation into the accident
involving Southwest Airlines flight 1248, a Boeing 737-700 on
December 8, 2005, at Midway Airport in Chicago, Illinois. The
airplane overran runway 31C during the landing rollout.
The accident occurred about 7:14 pm central standard
time. The airplane departed the end of the runway, rolled
through a blast fence, a perimeter fence, and onto a
roadway. The airplane came to a stop after impacting two
automobiles. One automobile occupant was fatally injured
and another seriously injured. The flight was conducted
under 14 CFR Part 121 and had departed from the
Baltimore/Washington International Thurgood Marshall
Airport, Maryland.
The on-scene portion of the investigation has been
completed. Additional fact-finding, including tests and
research, will be conducted at various component
manufacturers. The Safety Board staff continues to examine
the information provided by the flight data recorder and the
cockpit voice recorder.
Operations/Human Performance
The two pilots in the cockpit were interviewed on
Saturday. Each interview took approximately three hours.
The pilots stated that everything was normal through
the point of touchdown. Approaching the airport, weather
was of concern to them, and they listened to the ATIS (the
recorded weather update) four times during the latter
portion of the flight. They stated that they agreed with
the dispatcher's assessment of the conditions for landing on
runway 31C and backed up that assessment by inputting the
numbers into the on-board laptop computer tool.
The computer confirmed that the landing would be
within the operational parameters of the airplane and
Southwest's procedures, they said. Autobrakes were set on
MAX, and they activated after a "firm" touchdown. The
flying pilot (Captain) stated that he could not get the
reverse thrust levers out of the stowed position. The first
officer, after several seconds, noticed that the thrust
reversers were not deployed and activated the reversers
without a problem. At some point, the Captain noticed that
the airplane was not decelerating normally and applied
maximum braking manually. The first officer also became
aware of the poor braking effectiveness, moved his seat
farther forward, and also applied maximum braking. They
stated that they continued to apply maximum pressure to the
brakes as the airplane went straight off the end of the
runway and came to a stop.
Interviews were conducted with a number of other
Southwest Airlines flight crews, including the crew of the
last Southwest flight to land at Midway and a subsequent
crew that diverted to St. Louis.
Airplane Performance
Preliminary calculations show that the airplane
touched down with about 4,500 feet of remaining runway and
was on the runway for about 29 seconds. Preliminary
calculations also show that, for the runway conditions and
use of brakes and thrust reverser that occurred, the
stopping distance without hitting obstructions would have
been about 5,300 feet (the actual stopping distance was
about 5,000 feet). In addition, had the airplane landing
into the wind, rather than with a tail wind, the stopping
distance for a landing would have been about 1,000 feet
less.
Documentation of aircraft performance from the scene
has been completed to the maximum extent possible. It was
not possible to observe tire marks from much of the landing
rollout due to the fact that the aircraft landed on a snow-
covered runway and snow fell on the runway immediately
following the accident.
FDR data show that autobrakes were active and provided
high brake pressure upon touchdown. Autobrakes and manual
braking continued to provide high brake pressure throughout
the landing roll.
FDR data show that thrust reversers were activated
about 18 seconds after touchdown or about 14 seconds before
contact with the blast fence. Testing and examination of
the thrust reverser systems will continue.
Investigators have obtained the laptop computer tool
used by the accident flight crew. It will be examined and
calculations of landing performance will be compared to
flight manual data.
Eleven security-type video cameras were identified on
the airport that may show imagery of the airplane rollout or
the surface of the runway and taxiway at the time of the
accident. The videos will be reviewed.
Meteorology
National Weather Service forecasters and other
personnel were interviewed. An enhanced snow band was in
the area producing localized heavy snow due to lake
enhancement. This apparently is a somewhat unusual weather
phenomenon, as the band swath was only 20 to 30 miles wide
with snow accumulations of 10 inches right over Midway
Airport.
Midway Airport weather observation equipment and
records were examined and all equipment was working normally
during the evening of the accident.
Southwest Airlines dispatchers who were associated
with the accident flight were interviewed. Prior to the
takeoff from Baltimore, when weather conditions deteriorated
and the runway switched to runway 31C, the dispatcher
determined that runway 31C was approved for landing for
flight 1248. Runway conditions, braking action, wind speed
and direction, airplane weight and mechanical condition of
the aircraft are typical factors considered in making such
decisions. The flight was contacted twice on the way to
Midway and the appropriateness of using the runway for
landing was reaffirmed during both contacts.
Official weather observations:
Approximately 20 minutes prior to the accident, the
winds were from 100 degrees at 11 knots, visibility was «
mile in moderate snow and freezing fog, the ceiling was
broken at 400 feet, and overcast at 1400 feet, temperature -
3C, dew point -5C, altimeter setting 30.06 in. Hg. Remarks -
runway 31C rvr (runway visual range) 4500 feet, snow
increment - 1 inch of new show in the last hour, 10 inches
on the ground.
Approximately 23 minutes after the accident, a special
observation revealed winds out of 160 degrees at 5 knots,
visibility ¬ mile in heavy snow, freezing fog, sky obscured
with a vertical visibility of 200 feet, temperature -4C,
dewpoint -5C. Remarks - runway 31C, rvr 3000 feet.
Toxicology
Blood and urine samples were obtained from both
pilots. The disposition of the blood samples is being
reviewed.
Structures
The aircraft has been removed from the accident site
and was transferred to a hangar at Midway Airport. The
maintenance log revealed no writeups or deferred items for
the accident flight or several previous flights.
Professional surveyors completed a survey of the
accident scene and the geography leading up to the site to
include the locations of parts shed by the aircraft after it
left the paved runway surface and the blast fence destroyed
during the accident sequence.
Powerplants
Both engines were visually examined at the accident
site. Although the first stage compressor blades of both
engines showed foreign object damage, they were all intact
and present. Wood from the blast fence and other debris was
present in both engines. A visual examination of the
turbine sections revealed no missing blades.
The 60-day engine history revealed no deferrals or
writeups. Each engine has two thrust reverser sleeves. FDR
data indicated that all four sleeves were deployed until
after the airplane left the paved runway overrun surface.
Hydraulic system B (that runs the thrust reversers) revealed
no leaks.
Systems
The Systems Group documented the switches, circuit
breakers and controls in the cockpit. The leading edge
slat, flap, and trailing edge flap extension measurements
were taken and revealed symmetrical extension of all
devices. The measurements will be compared to Boeing
documentation to determine exact extension.
Chicago Fire Department personnel were interviewed to
determine if any switch positions or other items were
altered during the rescue effort. The Fire Department Chief
stated that the only things his people did were to
disconnect the battery and turn off the crew oxygen source.
The brakes were found in good condition with adequate
wear remaining. The main landing gear tires had acceptable
tread depth and no indication of flat spots.
Air Traffic Control
The local controller, two tower controllers, and the
tower supervisor were interviewed. All controllers stated
that they saw the aircraft lights during the landing roll,
but did not see the actual touchdown.
The investigation has revealed that runway 31C was
used as the landing runway because it contained lower
landing minimums for aircraft using the ILS approach. If
runway 13C was used, the runway most aligned with the wind,
pilots would have been unable to land because of
insufficient landing minimums.
Survival Factors/Airports
All flight attendants were interviewed. They all said
that they noted a smooth landing but that the deceleration
feeling thereafter seem less than usual. They noted that
the emergency lighting came on after the airplane came to
rest, and one flight attendant opened the L1 door to begin
the evacuation. The emergency slide deployed automatically,
but its angle in relation to the ground was less than ideal.
This caused passengers to begin to pile up around the
bottom of the slide. Rescue personnel assisted people away
from the slide. The first officer deplaned after about 5
passengers and also assisted in getting people away from the
airplane.
Further factual updates will be issued when
appropriate.
-30-
NTSB Media Contact: Keith Holloway, 202-314-6100
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------
I reserve comment until I have had time to further consider the facts as they now appear.
Westhawk
Join Date: Jan 2001
Location: UK
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WH - interesting post... thank you. A first read seems disrepencies as follows:
Somethings either don't add up / equal the problem 
Personally, and not pre-judging the outcome, a GIGO laptop on a Flight Deck IMHO is far less safe than a good old paper book you are used to using, you can easily see the effect of the varous factors, and have a "feel" for. In BA we now have a computer performance thing via ACARS, and I have no trust in it No "logic" - lightweight A319 on a good day from LHR's 13,000' gives a 10K V1-VR split - yet our mgmt say "believe it"...
They stated that they agreed with the dispatcher's assessment of the conditions for landing on runway 31C and backed up that assessment by inputting the numbers into the on-board laptop computer tool.
The computer confirmed that the landing would be within the operational parameters of the airplane and Southwest's procedures, they said
Preliminary calculations show that the airplane touched down with about 4,500 feet of remaining runway
Preliminary calculations also show that, for the runway conditions and use of brakes and thrust reverser that occurred, the stopping distance without hitting obstructions would have been about 5,300 feet (the actual stopping distance was about 5,000 feet). In addition, had the airplane landing into the wind, rather than with a tail wind, the stopping distance for a landing would have been about 1,000 feetless.
Personally, and not pre-judging the outcome, a GIGO laptop on a Flight Deck IMHO is far less safe than a good old paper book you are used to using, you can easily see the effect of the varous factors, and have a "feel" for. In BA we now have a computer performance thing via ACARS, and I have no trust in it
No "logic" - lightweight A319 on a good day from LHR's 13,000' gives a 10K V1-VR split - yet our mgmt say "believe it"...