Pinnacle Airlines aircraft incident
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What is the relight envelope for this plane - some engines won't start until you are down in twenties or lower at a particular speed envelope? The implication is if you lose both and follow Flight Manual/QRH guidance - you may have to sit on your hands for a few minutes while the plane gets down to a directed altitude and airspeed.
Also - does this plane have an electronic checklist - eg like the Airbus ECAM system that will automatically bring up relevant engine failure/relight checklist etc.
Also - does this plane have an electronic checklist - eg like the Airbus ECAM system that will automatically bring up relevant engine failure/relight checklist etc.
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There is no electronic reference manual, this is directly from the QRH
DOUBLE ENGINE FAILURE EMER 1-5 REV55 Jul 13/01
1 CONT IGNITION................ON
if engines continue to run down
2 THRUST LEVERS (BOTH).........SHUTOFF
3 ADG manual deploy handle...PULL
when ADG power is est
4 STAB TRIM CH 2............ENGAGE
5 target airspeed..............ESTABLISH
FLT LEVEL TARGET AIRSPEED
ABOVE 340 0.7 MACH
BELOW 340 240 KIAS
maintain airspeed until ready to restart engines
6 APU (BELOW 30,000 FT)..................START
7 APU GEN (if APU avail).......................ON
check/ reset barometric altimeter setting, altitude preselector, V-speeds and speed bug settings after ADG deployment or APU generator switching
windmilling relight possible (requires airspeed of not less than 300 KIAS)
YES
(from 21,000 feet and below)
8 Relight using windmilling procedure
(see page EMERG 1-6).......................ACOMPLISH
Maintain 240 KIAS until ready to initiate windmill start
NO
(from 13,000 feet and below)
8 Relight using APU Bleed Air Procedure
(see page EMERG 1-8).......................ACOMPLISH
Maintain between 190 KIAS(23,000 kg - 51,000 lb) and 170 KIAS(16,000 kg - 36,000 lb)
DOUBLE ENGINE FAILURE EMER 1-5 REV55 Jul 13/01
1 CONT IGNITION................ON
if engines continue to run down
2 THRUST LEVERS (BOTH).........SHUTOFF
3 ADG manual deploy handle...PULL
when ADG power is est
4 STAB TRIM CH 2............ENGAGE
5 target airspeed..............ESTABLISH
FLT LEVEL TARGET AIRSPEED
ABOVE 340 0.7 MACH
BELOW 340 240 KIAS
maintain airspeed until ready to restart engines
6 APU (BELOW 30,000 FT)..................START
7 APU GEN (if APU avail).......................ON
check/ reset barometric altimeter setting, altitude preselector, V-speeds and speed bug settings after ADG deployment or APU generator switching
windmilling relight possible (requires airspeed of not less than 300 KIAS)
YES
(from 21,000 feet and below)
8 Relight using windmilling procedure
(see page EMERG 1-6).......................ACOMPLISH
Maintain 240 KIAS until ready to initiate windmill start
NO
(from 13,000 feet and below)
8 Relight using APU Bleed Air Procedure
(see page EMERG 1-8).......................ACOMPLISH
Maintain between 190 KIAS(23,000 kg - 51,000 lb) and 170 KIAS(16,000 kg - 36,000 lb)
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update
Second NTSB Update On The Pinnacle Airlines Crash
Aircraft Apparently Entered Stall At 41,000 Feet
The National Transportation Safety Board Wednesday released the following
update on its investigation of the October 14, 2004 crash of Pinnacle
Airlines flight 3701 in a residential area in Jefferson City (MO). The two
crewmembers, who were the only occupants on board, were killed, and impact
forces and a postcrash fire destroyed the airplane. There were no injuries
on the ground. The on-scene portion of the investigation finished on October
20, 2004.
The two GE CF34-3B1 engines were shipped to a General Electric Aircraft
Engine facility in Lynn, Massachusetts for detailed examination. The
examination found that the cores of both engines were free to rotate and
there was no indication of any pre-existing problems that would have led to
the accident.
The flight data recorder (FDR) data indicate that while the airplane was at
41,000 feet, the stick shaker and stick pusher activated several times
before the airplane entered an aerodynamic stall. Almost simultaneously,
both engines shut down. The air-driven generator was automatically deployed
and supplied the backup alternating current power to the airplane.
According to the emergency checklist for a dual engine failure, there are
two ways to restart or relight the engines. One option is to use a windmill
restart, which requires at least 300 knots indicated airspeed and the core
of the engine to be either 12 percent rpm above 15,000 feet or 9 percent rpm
below 15,000 feet. The FDR data show that the computed airspeed did not get
above 300 knots and that there was no measured rotation of the engine core.
The second option is to use auxiliary power unit (APU) bleed air, which has
to be accomplished at 13,000 feet or below. The target best glide speed
depends on the weight of the aircraft and is either 190 knots indicated
airspeed or 170 knots indicated airspeed. The FDR data indicate that the APU
was on after the aerodynamic stall and that the airspeed was sufficient for
an APU start. The FDR and CVR indicated that the flight crew tried to start
the engines several times but were unsuccessful.
The operations group is still conducting interviews and developing the
72-hour history for the flight crew. The operations group has scheduled
interviews with the Federal Aviation Administration principal operations
inspector and several managers for the operator. The systems, powerplants,
and aircraft performance will visit the airplane manufacturer.
FMI: www.ntsb.gov
Aircraft Apparently Entered Stall At 41,000 Feet
The National Transportation Safety Board Wednesday released the following
update on its investigation of the October 14, 2004 crash of Pinnacle
Airlines flight 3701 in a residential area in Jefferson City (MO). The two
crewmembers, who were the only occupants on board, were killed, and impact
forces and a postcrash fire destroyed the airplane. There were no injuries
on the ground. The on-scene portion of the investigation finished on October
20, 2004.
The two GE CF34-3B1 engines were shipped to a General Electric Aircraft
Engine facility in Lynn, Massachusetts for detailed examination. The
examination found that the cores of both engines were free to rotate and
there was no indication of any pre-existing problems that would have led to
the accident.
The flight data recorder (FDR) data indicate that while the airplane was at
41,000 feet, the stick shaker and stick pusher activated several times
before the airplane entered an aerodynamic stall. Almost simultaneously,
both engines shut down. The air-driven generator was automatically deployed
and supplied the backup alternating current power to the airplane.
According to the emergency checklist for a dual engine failure, there are
two ways to restart or relight the engines. One option is to use a windmill
restart, which requires at least 300 knots indicated airspeed and the core
of the engine to be either 12 percent rpm above 15,000 feet or 9 percent rpm
below 15,000 feet. The FDR data show that the computed airspeed did not get
above 300 knots and that there was no measured rotation of the engine core.
The second option is to use auxiliary power unit (APU) bleed air, which has
to be accomplished at 13,000 feet or below. The target best glide speed
depends on the weight of the aircraft and is either 190 knots indicated
airspeed or 170 knots indicated airspeed. The FDR data indicate that the APU
was on after the aerodynamic stall and that the airspeed was sufficient for
an APU start. The FDR and CVR indicated that the flight crew tried to start
the engines several times but were unsuccessful.
The operations group is still conducting interviews and developing the
72-hour history for the flight crew. The operations group has scheduled
interviews with the Federal Aviation Administration principal operations
inspector and several managers for the operator. The systems, powerplants,
and aircraft performance will visit the airplane manufacturer.
FMI: www.ntsb.gov
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Hmmm, well if the previous is factual, perhaps the junior jet guys need a bit of training about high altitude aerodynamics, and especially cruise buffet onset.
Why am I not surprised....
In years gone past, these are some of the same problems faced by pilots of 707's and DC8's.
I would have hoped that these earlier incidents would be well known...guess not.
Why am I not surprised....
In years gone past, these are some of the same problems faced by pilots of 707's and DC8's.
I would have hoped that these earlier incidents would be well known...guess not.
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If I understand him right, 411A reckons that the pilots were either negligent in allowing a high (or low) speed upset or ignorant of the possibility of such an event. Therefore they are directly attributable for the incident, which apparently occurred with an associated engine(s) failure.
Bit patronising and arrogant of him to be so presumptuous I think - or else he knows exactly what happened.
You weren't there, you don't know why the engines failed or why the aircraft was upset, so have a bit of humility, get off the guy's backs and leave it to the NTSB.
There for the grace of God - (possibly, possibly not) - go you.
Bit patronising and arrogant of him to be so presumptuous I think - or else he knows exactly what happened.
You weren't there, you don't know why the engines failed or why the aircraft was upset, so have a bit of humility, get off the guy's backs and leave it to the NTSB.
There for the grace of God - (possibly, possibly not) - go you.
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I partly agree with 411A on this issue. Some regional airlines' training is very basic in certain subjects to say the least. Looking back at my CAA ground school days regarding this issue, I don't recall anything about high- altitude aerodynamics either.
7 7 7 7
7 7 7 7
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Forgetting the basics....
Yes, gashcan, I am surprised that the junior jet guys have not learned lessons long ago forgotten.
Lets be clear...the aerodynamics of swept wing jet aircraft have not changed all that much, since the old days.
Oh yes, they have all the fancy equipment up front (glass...well designed FMS etc...) but the fact remains that they do not, have all that much difference.
Ignore the basics...crash and burn.
DP Davies said it all in 'Handling The Big Jets' and if you ignore the very basic facts about high altitude flying in these aircraft, you will fail in your attempts at success.
Find an old copy...and learn.
To those that don't (or cannot bother), are prone to making the very same mistakes learned so long ago.
Captain Davies has been gone for a year...very sad for the younger guys.
From Comet to Concorde...he was the best.
Lets be clear...the aerodynamics of swept wing jet aircraft have not changed all that much, since the old days.
Oh yes, they have all the fancy equipment up front (glass...well designed FMS etc...) but the fact remains that they do not, have all that much difference.
Ignore the basics...crash and burn.
DP Davies said it all in 'Handling The Big Jets' and if you ignore the very basic facts about high altitude flying in these aircraft, you will fail in your attempts at success.
Find an old copy...and learn.
To those that don't (or cannot bother), are prone to making the very same mistakes learned so long ago.
Captain Davies has been gone for a year...very sad for the younger guys.
From Comet to Concorde...he was the best.
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Stall at Dead mans' corner. The plane didn't tumble out of the sky though because the crew made relight attempts. I'd say they regained control soon after the initial event because it seems they made re-light attempts 'on the way down'. If I was in a stall/spin, I'd rather get the attitude sorted before thinking about relight. I still think this incident became fatal (RIP) at low level.
[edited to say i am a non-crj200 pilot]
[edited to say i am a non-crj200 pilot]
Johnny: It is safe to say that all transport-category aircraft have wing and engine anti-ice, plus continuous engine ignition. On a pure jet (turbo/fan-) it consists of heated ducts for the wing leading edge and usually the horizontal tail leading edges, along with electrically-heated pitot-stall, ram air temp. and other probe equipment, plus the windshields, of course.
This is my symbol for winter flying-cold and frozen evil (if those guys don't de-ice the runways
, when they are supposed to).
Don't laugh-it happens, and planes slide off, even when they touch down in the right zone and on speed, with little crosswind and no tailwind . A guy in my upgrade class years ago turned off the runway just fine and he said "I got no brakes!" . The local yokels (Michigan or Wisconsin) had not sprayed the turn-off areas by the active runway. Thanks to the Check Airman slamming both engines reverse levers wayyyy back into max reverse, they barely stayed on the concrete ( using EPR, not torque). Instead, the engine inspections created quite a delay for the outbound folks 
. Maybe 90+people...
Woops, wrong topic-I guess no lessons can be learned if wrong topic.
This is my symbol for winter flying-cold and frozen evil (if those guys don't de-ice the runways, when they are supposed to). Don't laugh-it happens, and planes slide off, even when they touch down in the right zone and on speed, with little crosswind and no tailwind .
A guy in my upgrade class years ago turned off the runway just fine and he said "I got no brakes!" . The local yokels (Michigan or Wisconsin) had not sprayed the turn-off areas by the active runway. Thanks to the Check Airman slamming both engines reverse levers wayyyy back into max reverse, they barely stayed on the concrete ( using EPR, not torque). Instead, the engine inspections created quite a delay for the outbound folks . Maybe 90+people...Woops, wrong topic-I guess no lessons can be learned if wrong topic.
Last edited by Ignition Override; 16th Nov 2004 at 06:01.
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Just speculating....
...if this aircraft was at roughly 37,000 lb for Takeoff in LIT, then a M0.74 cruise at FL410 ISA was marginally possible.
...IF it was ISA+10 at 41, at roughly 37,000 lb for Takeoff, then a M0.74 cruise at FL410 was NOT possible. (according to the charts)
The crew surely would have participated in a real 'struggle' to climb to 41 during the last couple of thousand feet with all relevant and obvious indications. If SPD mode (CLB .70) was used to milk the last bit of climb out of the aircraft then it would have probably NOT accelerated once level due to CRZ thrust limit's inability to overcome the drag in the thin air and accelerate back to .74. On top of that, they might also have been very, very close to the Vls (stall). At this point it must have been very obvious to the Capt. it was time to descend.
On top of that, ISA+10 at altitude would cause a 2% increase in fuel burn and off optimum by 4 thousand feet would have introduced a further 7% increase in burn. Almost a 10% increase in forecast burn.
I'm wondering why a climb above optimum was even considered outside of any enroute weather? At -57 C, what possibly could have been their reason?
...if this aircraft was at roughly 37,000 lb for Takeoff in LIT, then a M0.74 cruise at FL410 ISA was marginally possible.
...IF it was ISA+10 at 41, at roughly 37,000 lb for Takeoff, then a M0.74 cruise at FL410 was NOT possible. (according to the charts)
The crew surely would have participated in a real 'struggle' to climb to 41 during the last couple of thousand feet with all relevant and obvious indications. If SPD mode (CLB .70) was used to milk the last bit of climb out of the aircraft then it would have probably NOT accelerated once level due to CRZ thrust limit's inability to overcome the drag in the thin air and accelerate back to .74. On top of that, they might also have been very, very close to the Vls (stall). At this point it must have been very obvious to the Capt. it was time to descend.
On top of that, ISA+10 at altitude would cause a 2% increase in fuel burn and off optimum by 4 thousand feet would have introduced a further 7% increase in burn. Almost a 10% increase in forecast burn.
I'm wondering why a climb above optimum was even considered outside of any enroute weather? At -57 C, what possibly could have been their reason?
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Thanks Ignition, realize now it was a silly question. Have been getting up too early the last week (4:00 am, and I'm on days off!) and the combination of coffee and quiet in the house led my fingers to propel my brain to places it shouldn't have gone.
Mr Willie Everlearn (Betty Wohnt...) your posting doesn't explain the engine failures though. Or did I miss something?
Struggling up to altitude and then deciding to go down is one thing, but losing both engines wasn't part of the agreement.
Over...
JD
Looking at the engine start options, if they wanted a windmilling start the QRH says 240 KIAS until ready then 300 KIAS for the start. Bit of a pickle really as best glide speed might make you glide further (TS 236 to Azores) but the increased was speed needed for windmilling.
I Imagine it cooled off and fogged up until the APU is relit ( below 30,000 from the QRH) and supplying heated air. So a glide of 11,000 feet is commenced at night, waiting for the APU start altitude. Once that's done, its another glide to wait for FL210 to commence the windmilling start. If that doesn't work (imagine the descent rate at 300 knots!), its time to try the APU bleed assissted relight, at 13000 feet.
How does this scenario play out in the simulator, or have I got the sequence of actions messed up? Looks pretty challenging, given the low speed handling characteristics as posted above, and the sense of panic that would be just bubbling inside of both pilots...
JD
Mr Willie Everlearn (Betty Wohnt...) your posting doesn't explain the engine failures though. Or did I miss something?
Struggling up to altitude and then deciding to go down is one thing, but losing both engines wasn't part of the agreement.
Over...
JD
Looking at the engine start options, if they wanted a windmilling start the QRH says 240 KIAS until ready then 300 KIAS for the start. Bit of a pickle really as best glide speed might make you glide further (TS 236 to Azores) but the increased was speed needed for windmilling.
I Imagine it cooled off and fogged up until the APU is relit ( below 30,000 from the QRH) and supplying heated air. So a glide of 11,000 feet is commenced at night, waiting for the APU start altitude. Once that's done, its another glide to wait for FL210 to commence the windmilling start. If that doesn't work (imagine the descent rate at 300 knots!), its time to try the APU bleed assissted relight, at 13000 feet.
How does this scenario play out in the simulator, or have I got the sequence of actions messed up? Looks pretty challenging, given the low speed handling characteristics as posted above, and the sense of panic that would be just bubbling inside of both pilots...
JD
Last edited by jonny dangerous; 16th Nov 2004 at 13:17.
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Here is a different slant to what might have occured in this thread. Run this in Google, http://forums.flightinfo.com/showthread.php?t=42858
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Golden Rivet thanks for the thread link. Very unfortunate to see some of the ideas floating around the industry in terms of climb capability and techniques to get there...
JD
JD