MK Airlines B747 crash at Halifax
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MK Crash
According to sources in Zimbabwe Air Canada had filed an objection to the MK flight to Halifax. The objection was overruled by Civil Aviation and the flight allowed. Maintenance was one part of the objection.
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Speculation is often frowned upon as unprofessional and distasteful. However, I do not believe that is the case and agree with Avman.
Discussion about the possible causes of an accident, can increase our own awareness of how quickly things can go so horribly wrong.
If speculation makes us all the more aware in our own aviation careers, then it is a good thing.
To my friend, we will miss you terribly.
Discussion about the possible causes of an accident, can increase our own awareness of how quickly things can go so horribly wrong.
If speculation makes us all the more aware in our own aviation careers, then it is a good thing.
To my friend, we will miss you terribly.
If people don't like the speculation there's a very simple answer. Don't bother looking at thread. I suggest you look at the header at the top of this page, it says "rumour network"
I think most people on this forum are sensible enough to realise that the full facts will only be in the public domain once the report is published and until that time we will be working with rumours, speculation and hearsay.
Everyone has the right to voice there opinions on this matter and it should be left up to the reader as to whether they choose to accept the opinion or dismiss it.
"We have some real experts here" I would say that we have. We've got pilots with many years experience, Maintainers and many others involved in aviation.
I think most people on this forum are sensible enough to realise that the full facts will only be in the public domain once the report is published and until that time we will be working with rumours, speculation and hearsay.
Everyone has the right to voice there opinions on this matter and it should be left up to the reader as to whether they choose to accept the opinion or dismiss it.
"We have some real experts here" I would say that we have. We've got pilots with many years experience, Maintainers and many others involved in aviation.
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To all of you speculating about indications for the L/E flaps,AD 75-05-11 was issued to "Provide the Crew with both visual and Aural indication of the L/E flap position" this AD had to be implemented by 29 March 1975 and was issued on 25 March 1975,and as I am sure you all know any aircraft from that date HAD to have had this AD complied with,an AD is a Mandatory requirement and is NOT a "Recommendation(whereas an SB is).A further AD(79-09-03) was issued on May 10th 1979 to do a one off test of the system and this had to be carried out within 500 hrs time in service.
My background is I am a B747-100/200/300 licensed Engineer but am now involved in Aircraft technical services.
matkat
My background is I am a B747-100/200/300 licensed Engineer but am now involved in Aircraft technical services.
matkat
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747 Classic.
There are 13 Leading edge devices per wing, 10 Variable Camber and 3 Krueger Flaps. Total 26. Driven by 4 PDU's per wing.
Group A extend at Flaps 1 position and Group B extend at Flaps 5 position.
Should they not be in a Take Off Config aswell as visual indications on P2 and P4 the Aural Warning Horn will sound when No.3 Throttle is advanced.
For info the 747-400 has 28 Leading Edge devices. 1 extra per wing.
There are 13 Leading edge devices per wing, 10 Variable Camber and 3 Krueger Flaps. Total 26. Driven by 4 PDU's per wing.
Group A extend at Flaps 1 position and Group B extend at Flaps 5 position.
Should they not be in a Take Off Config aswell as visual indications on P2 and P4 the Aural Warning Horn will sound when No.3 Throttle is advanced.
For info the 747-400 has 28 Leading Edge devices. 1 extra per wing.
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My apologies for ruffling a number of feathers,, 
However a few statements on the last few pages of this thread were completely wild guesses, serving to do more harm than good. If you don't know the airplane, ask those who do.
I also apologise for the misleading statement about the LE flaps. I meant 4 groups on each wing, indicated by 16 lights on the FE pane, one green and one amber for each group, etc.
However a few statements on the last few pages of this thread were completely wild guesses, serving to do more harm than good. If you don't know the airplane, ask those who do.
I also apologise for the misleading statement about the LE flaps. I meant 4 groups on each wing, indicated by 16 lights on the FE pane, one green and one amber for each group, etc.
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as another boarder posted this is rumours&news.
so i apologize if the following is total wrong.
so may i throw in another theory:
speed indication.
what if the instruments showed a higher speed then the actual speed ?
maybe on the last 200-300 meters the crew realized this and applied full thrust to make it ?
and think about the tailstrike(s) - maybe the instruments showed vr but the actual speed was below this ?
reading all the posts about the flaps setting and the warnings when this isn't proper i would guess this accident has another cause.
another guess is the statement of the driver who pulled the 747 back "this is real heavy". maybe a problem with the gear ?
so maybe the plane accelerated slower then normal ?
don't know whether a crew would immediately realize this fact during the first 1000-1500 meters of a take off run ?
heavy as the plane and short as the runway was a difference of 5-10 km/h could be a factor ?
so i apologize if the following is total wrong.
so may i throw in another theory:
speed indication.
what if the instruments showed a higher speed then the actual speed ?
maybe on the last 200-300 meters the crew realized this and applied full thrust to make it ?
and think about the tailstrike(s) - maybe the instruments showed vr but the actual speed was below this ?
reading all the posts about the flaps setting and the warnings when this isn't proper i would guess this accident has another cause.
another guess is the statement of the driver who pulled the 747 back "this is real heavy". maybe a problem with the gear ?
so maybe the plane accelerated slower then normal ?
don't know whether a crew would immediately realize this fact during the first 1000-1500 meters of a take off run ?
heavy as the plane and short as the runway was a difference of 5-10 km/h could be a factor ?
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Data I have: From Brake Release......
@800K TOW distance to VR 8200', distance to 35 ft 9350'.
@833K TOW distance to VR 9176', distance to 35 ft 10404'.
These are 100% of balanced field length numbers not 115% as required.
@800K TOW distance to VR 8200', distance to 35 ft 9350'.
@833K TOW distance to VR 9176', distance to 35 ft 10404'.
These are 100% of balanced field length numbers not 115% as required.
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I think we can do some informed speculation based on some of the information that TSB has released to the press at this point.
TSB has reported that the tail struck the berm at the end of the runway (where it broke off), but there has been no mention whatsoever (at this point) that any of the landing gear struck the berm. So it appears that the aircraft got airborne just enough for the landing gear to clear the berm, but we know that the tail did not. The berm is located about 300 meters from the end of the runway.
The first tailstrike occurred at 250 metes before the end of the runway. Is this close to where VR should have occurred for this aircraft, at it's weight and at the field conditions that were present that night?
The other tailstrike occurred at 170 meters before the end of the runway, and appears to have continued until the aircraft finally lifted off right before the berm. This suggests to me that the pilots were trying desperately to get the aircraft airborne.
The distance between the first and second tailstrikes, may have been occupied with a sudden surprise to the pilots of a tailstrike, followed by a realization that the wheels were still on the runway, followed by a quick realization that they had to get the aircraft into the air. However, only the CVR (and perhaps the FDR) can really tell us this.
TSB has reported that the tail struck the berm at the end of the runway (where it broke off), but there has been no mention whatsoever (at this point) that any of the landing gear struck the berm. So it appears that the aircraft got airborne just enough for the landing gear to clear the berm, but we know that the tail did not. The berm is located about 300 meters from the end of the runway.
The first tailstrike occurred at 250 metes before the end of the runway. Is this close to where VR should have occurred for this aircraft, at it's weight and at the field conditions that were present that night?
The other tailstrike occurred at 170 meters before the end of the runway, and appears to have continued until the aircraft finally lifted off right before the berm. This suggests to me that the pilots were trying desperately to get the aircraft airborne.
The distance between the first and second tailstrikes, may have been occupied with a sudden surprise to the pilots of a tailstrike, followed by a realization that the wheels were still on the runway, followed by a quick realization that they had to get the aircraft into the air. However, only the CVR (and perhaps the FDR) can really tell us this.
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I might add that the fact that the pilots seemed able to lift the tail off the runway, and put it back down again after the first tailstrike, suggests that the pilots likely had normal pitch control of the airplane. Since this does not appear to be a typical "aft of CG limit" accident (seemingly normal rotation, followed by high pitch up and stall that the pilot can't control), this could all but eliminate the load shift theory.
(edited for clarity)
(edited for clarity)
Last edited by Flight Safety; 18th Oct 2004 at 15:19.
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Flight Safety: If you overrotate and hit the tail hard enough, the airplane will porpoise nose down; a subsequent "pull-up" (second overrotation) would explain the second tail strike. 
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I thought of the bounce too, but the tail dragging that occurred after the second tail strike sort of lead me away from that conclusion. But again I'm just speculating, so you could be right.
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Until proven otherwise, I'm inclined to think this MK accident crew had a fairly high degree of qualification and experience.
As a fellow pilot, don't you find it a little disappointing that some remarks in this post, regarding this accident, are a little too simplistic.
Yet, speculation seems to be good sport for some.
Improperly set speed bugs, incorrect intersection departures, incorrect configuration...pure speculation.
If we really put our collective, speculative natures and minds to work, perhaps we could come up with better and more responsible theories than some have suggested. If you really want to speculate?
My guess (...and I mean guess) is when we have an error chain to examine it will more than likely be outside the HF realm of the operating crew and lie somewhere else.
But that makes this post that much more boring, I suppose.
As a fellow pilot, don't you find it a little disappointing that some remarks in this post, regarding this accident, are a little too simplistic.
Yet, speculation seems to be good sport for some.
Improperly set speed bugs, incorrect intersection departures, incorrect configuration...pure speculation.
If we really put our collective, speculative natures and minds to work, perhaps we could come up with better and more responsible theories than some have suggested. If you really want to speculate?
My guess (...and I mean guess) is when we have an error chain to examine it will more than likely be outside the HF realm of the operating crew and lie somewhere else.
But that makes this post that much more boring, I suppose.
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Willie: Understand that not every participant on these forums and on this particular thread necessarily is or is supposed to be a pilot or one seasoned aviation accident investigator. Any participant could be anybody from anywhere. You could be reading a response authored by a plumber from Canterbury. Just imagine that.
Until the Canadian Safety Board issues its final report, one or two years from now, curious or otherwise interested people may speculate, theorize or otherwise debate the issue.
Until the Canadian Safety Board issues its final report, one or two years from now, curious or otherwise interested people may speculate, theorize or otherwise debate the issue.