SQ006 Revisited
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SQ006 Revisited
I’m relatively new to SQ but I’ve certainly had time to absorb the subtleties of the company culture and I now await, with considerable interest, publication of the interim findings of the Taiwanese Accident Investigation Board’s examination of the SQ006 disaster, which will, I suspect, point to either one of the two local SQ mind sets as being the root cause of the accident.
SQ pilots will long be familiar but outsiders may care to note that, in general, one of two thought processes generate any flying decision made in the course of SQ operations. They are:
1. Whatever happens, I must not take any action which will invite an admonitory/intimidatory phone call from the fleet management and which call will certainly be the culmination of a previously conducted, secret investigation involving the sustained interrogation of the FO(s) in an effort to establish inconsistency of story which could then lead to an adverse report being attached to a personal file/demotion without appeal or summary dismissal.
2. Under all circumstances, cover yourself by conducting operations absolutely within a highly legalistic interpretation of limitations and procedure without taking any overview or exercising any judgement, both of which will, necessarily, be subjective and hence open to fleet evaluation and criticism after any event.
Case in point was last year’s Kuching overrun, ostensibly blamed on the recently promoted young captain, terrorized into the first mind set, when blame really rests with the breathtakingly arrogant management which some years ago severely sanctioned a training captain for very reasonably going-around at Bombay during a Second Officer’s approach to land. Needless to say, this action sent a very clear message to the airline that you had better not go-around if you knew what was good for you. Needless further to say, post Kuching, large notices now exhort pilots to go-around at the first sign of a bolting horse and all will quickly be forgotten.
However, back to Taipei on 31 Nov 2000 and, as I recall, the weather was something along the lines of:
RCTP 2000/10/31 17:00 UTC
RCTP 03042G58KT 0400 R05/0600D R06/0600D +RA SCT001 BKN003 OVC006 20/20 Q1000 WS
Apocryphal evidence indicates that the apron was flooded at the time and this would perhaps lead to the supposition that the runways may also have been in a similar condition, in light of the approaching typhoon front. Similarly the aircraft was reportedly strongly buffeted by high winds whilst still at the gate.
I hypothesize that the crew now adopted either of the two institutionalized mind sets as follows, with results that are history:
1. They realized, in light of the above, that conditions were unsuitable for a safe take off but decided, nevertheless, that a take off in the prevailing conditions was infinitely preferable to the inevitable management witch hunt that would follow any decision to delay the flight and await safer conditions. I may be alone but if I am doing something which I know to be fundamentally wrong, I feel very guilty, become very distracted and wish as soon as possible to return to a non guilty and hence non distracted state. I suspect that the three pilots may have been in this frame of mind, having became guilty with the prospect of a highly questionable take off and, in a very distracted state, rushed to distance themselves from the situation causing their guilt, by getting airborne as soon as possible and, in their haste, convinced themselves that they were on 05L rather than 05R.
2. They were perfectly relaxed about the situation, as the second mind set allowed them to ameliorate any adverse conditions by the wholly legalistic application of the manufacturer’s/operator’s limitations. In this case, cross wind was finely calculated as just within limits, visibility was verified as just above take off limits and reported wind shear after take off was taken care of by requesting the longer 05L rather than the initially offered 06. No overarching view of the situation would arise with this mind set, hence it would not be possible to consider that whilst technically within the cross wind limitations, prevailing gusts, low visibility, low cloud base, very heavy rain and a possibly flooded runway would lead to a take off in conditions somewhat different from the steady wind/good viz/dry runway conditions of test flying demonstrations. Similarly, whilst the book had been narrowly followed in that the longest runway available had been selected, to take account of wind shear, no account was taken of the many showings of manufacturers’ wind shear videos, which, as far as I remember, recommend the best way of dealing with the phenomenon is not to take off into it. The word seems to be that the FO was PF whilst CPT and third seat FO continually distracted themselves during taxi with ongoing legalistic justifications of the decision to proceed. Take off then started on 05R.
As you will note, I am not an inveterate “poster” and hope therefore that, despite the length of this missive, it will be published to provoke further discussion and, of course, contention. In particular, I would urge my local colleagues, who I regard in a wholly favourable professional light, to attempt to shake of the years of bullying perpetrated by their management and further shake off the above mind sets that this bullying has produced, and enter into positive discussion of a deeply rooted safety issue that may again embroil the carrier in further tragedy.
Finally, as I think all will realize, it is not yet possible to discuss safety or indeed any other issue with the very brittle egos in SQ management, nor is it prudent to reveal either local or ex-pat identities incase the boys from the ISA come knocking!
SQ pilots will long be familiar but outsiders may care to note that, in general, one of two thought processes generate any flying decision made in the course of SQ operations. They are:
1. Whatever happens, I must not take any action which will invite an admonitory/intimidatory phone call from the fleet management and which call will certainly be the culmination of a previously conducted, secret investigation involving the sustained interrogation of the FO(s) in an effort to establish inconsistency of story which could then lead to an adverse report being attached to a personal file/demotion without appeal or summary dismissal.
2. Under all circumstances, cover yourself by conducting operations absolutely within a highly legalistic interpretation of limitations and procedure without taking any overview or exercising any judgement, both of which will, necessarily, be subjective and hence open to fleet evaluation and criticism after any event.
Case in point was last year’s Kuching overrun, ostensibly blamed on the recently promoted young captain, terrorized into the first mind set, when blame really rests with the breathtakingly arrogant management which some years ago severely sanctioned a training captain for very reasonably going-around at Bombay during a Second Officer’s approach to land. Needless to say, this action sent a very clear message to the airline that you had better not go-around if you knew what was good for you. Needless further to say, post Kuching, large notices now exhort pilots to go-around at the first sign of a bolting horse and all will quickly be forgotten.
However, back to Taipei on 31 Nov 2000 and, as I recall, the weather was something along the lines of:
RCTP 2000/10/31 17:00 UTC
RCTP 03042G58KT 0400 R05/0600D R06/0600D +RA SCT001 BKN003 OVC006 20/20 Q1000 WS
Apocryphal evidence indicates that the apron was flooded at the time and this would perhaps lead to the supposition that the runways may also have been in a similar condition, in light of the approaching typhoon front. Similarly the aircraft was reportedly strongly buffeted by high winds whilst still at the gate.
I hypothesize that the crew now adopted either of the two institutionalized mind sets as follows, with results that are history:
1. They realized, in light of the above, that conditions were unsuitable for a safe take off but decided, nevertheless, that a take off in the prevailing conditions was infinitely preferable to the inevitable management witch hunt that would follow any decision to delay the flight and await safer conditions. I may be alone but if I am doing something which I know to be fundamentally wrong, I feel very guilty, become very distracted and wish as soon as possible to return to a non guilty and hence non distracted state. I suspect that the three pilots may have been in this frame of mind, having became guilty with the prospect of a highly questionable take off and, in a very distracted state, rushed to distance themselves from the situation causing their guilt, by getting airborne as soon as possible and, in their haste, convinced themselves that they were on 05L rather than 05R.
2. They were perfectly relaxed about the situation, as the second mind set allowed them to ameliorate any adverse conditions by the wholly legalistic application of the manufacturer’s/operator’s limitations. In this case, cross wind was finely calculated as just within limits, visibility was verified as just above take off limits and reported wind shear after take off was taken care of by requesting the longer 05L rather than the initially offered 06. No overarching view of the situation would arise with this mind set, hence it would not be possible to consider that whilst technically within the cross wind limitations, prevailing gusts, low visibility, low cloud base, very heavy rain and a possibly flooded runway would lead to a take off in conditions somewhat different from the steady wind/good viz/dry runway conditions of test flying demonstrations. Similarly, whilst the book had been narrowly followed in that the longest runway available had been selected, to take account of wind shear, no account was taken of the many showings of manufacturers’ wind shear videos, which, as far as I remember, recommend the best way of dealing with the phenomenon is not to take off into it. The word seems to be that the FO was PF whilst CPT and third seat FO continually distracted themselves during taxi with ongoing legalistic justifications of the decision to proceed. Take off then started on 05R.
As you will note, I am not an inveterate “poster” and hope therefore that, despite the length of this missive, it will be published to provoke further discussion and, of course, contention. In particular, I would urge my local colleagues, who I regard in a wholly favourable professional light, to attempt to shake of the years of bullying perpetrated by their management and further shake off the above mind sets that this bullying has produced, and enter into positive discussion of a deeply rooted safety issue that may again embroil the carrier in further tragedy.
Finally, as I think all will realize, it is not yet possible to discuss safety or indeed any other issue with the very brittle egos in SQ management, nor is it prudent to reveal either local or ex-pat identities incase the boys from the ISA come knocking!
Guest
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Insider 107, you state that you are relatively new to SQ, but reading your excellent article proves that you are a quick learner and sharp observer. I am an optimist and I believe that things are changing all over the world , even here in Singapore. I agree with your assesment of the management culture we have here in Singapore but I beleive that someone with your obvious auditable talents can put this talent to good use in SQ. This is the time that the higher and newly reqruited management ( higher than the 4th floor) will be very interested in your views, as long as you follow them up with positive ideas. I am sure that you not only have the talent to clearly see the problems you might also have some suggestions to tackle them. There are new ways in SQ to do this (OSIG might be one of them) and I wouldn't be too concerned about the midnight knock on your door, again I could be totally wrong, but as I said before I am an optimist.
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Insider 107
I think your missive is the first post in this forum which describes in detail the thoughts a lot of us had on this matter for the last few months. Well done.
Now for your hypothesis, para.2 and especially the last sentence.
Did you have acces to the FULL transcript of the CVR read out, or, did you actually hear
the full read out, or, did you speak to one of the pilots after his return to SIN, or, is your thesis a reflection of a situation you found yourself in, one dark and stormy night.?
The truth on how and when the crew came to their deliberations and conclusions could indeed lie in the 30 minutes time span before take off. We all read the last three minutes of the tape transcript and i wonder why the
remaining 27 minutes not have been disclosed.
If you did read the full transcript, please email me on how and when.
As for Farside's suggestion, yes, but do your groundwork first. Caution is advised.
I think your missive is the first post in this forum which describes in detail the thoughts a lot of us had on this matter for the last few months. Well done.
Now for your hypothesis, para.2 and especially the last sentence.
Did you have acces to the FULL transcript of the CVR read out, or, did you actually hear
the full read out, or, did you speak to one of the pilots after his return to SIN, or, is your thesis a reflection of a situation you found yourself in, one dark and stormy night.?
The truth on how and when the crew came to their deliberations and conclusions could indeed lie in the 30 minutes time span before take off. We all read the last three minutes of the tape transcript and i wonder why the
remaining 27 minutes not have been disclosed.
If you did read the full transcript, please email me on how and when.
As for Farside's suggestion, yes, but do your groundwork first. Caution is advised.
Guest
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We will have the possibillity to talk to the SQ 6 crew tommorrow when the union is organising a dinner with the members and the crew. ( members themselves) It could be a very interesting evening with a lot of good information and fact finding. It also could be a polite waste of time where the crew is instucted not to disclose any details as long as the investigation is running. I for one believe the last will be the case but I hope that we can learn a few things to stop the flow of rumours. It will take an awfull lot of energy and bravoury to change some attitudes here with management, but given the time it could be done. There are some conflicting stories out here on the actual configuration during take-off and if the PVD was selected on or not. Also what was on and what wasn't on the Flight Recorder is guess work with the line pilots. One thing is for sure: If the PVD is selected on ( Both PVD on on EICAS ) and you are not within 40 degrees of the RWY hdg and within one dot of ILS localisor of the active rwy ( 05L) the PVD indicator on the glareshield will be off, not turning, and not lighted. In other words no indication. This in itself could have been a trigger for the crew , but again we are just guessing. (hope I spelled that correct)
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Farside
Thank you for your post. Yes I agree that there is a slight sniff of change in the air in Singapore, attributable, I think, to the characteristically mercurial intelligence at the very pinnacle of the republic’s power structure. Transmitting an entirely correctly formulated revised philosophy downwards, however, to more pedestrian intelligences or to those who’s noses are firmly in the trough, of course, will prove problematical. Notwithstanding, as SQ is merely a microsm of the republic, I do believe that our newly acquired, similarly mercurial higher management will be able to make headway but only after the full removal of the present tired, discredited but extended subordinate incumbent plus team and the blocking of a conceited arrogance that masquerades as an heir apparent. Meanwhile, extreme caution is the watchword.
Aerovision
Thank you also for your post. No I do not have access to the transcript – my original post was based on my analysis of the published facts (I am merely one of scores who have made a similar analysis and come to the same conclusion), information gleaned from this website, yes, my own experience of past events but, most importantly, information passed on by my FO colleagues, who all seem to be well and truly in the loop and able to cogently fill in the 27 minute CVR gap, the contents of which we await with bated breath. These self same FO’s seem to me, to a man, to be of the highest caliber, superbly educated, disciplined and at the start of their careers (before becoming fire-blackened and cynical), keen and well motivated. Why then does SQ squander this “human capital” with their disgustingly poor treatment of this group, when, according to the highest in the land, they should be nurturing it as part of the future asset base of the nation? Perhaps the new higher management may like to consider harnessing some of this talent hiding under his nose – a move that will prove potently catalytic in an organisation increasingly and urgently requiring fresh thinking.
Sunny
Thank you for yours. Yes the PVI allegedly was on but I didn’t want to discuss it as the subject corresponds with some potentially pivotal CVR dialogue.
Gladiator
Thanks for your support. Good luck.
Thank you for your post. Yes I agree that there is a slight sniff of change in the air in Singapore, attributable, I think, to the characteristically mercurial intelligence at the very pinnacle of the republic’s power structure. Transmitting an entirely correctly formulated revised philosophy downwards, however, to more pedestrian intelligences or to those who’s noses are firmly in the trough, of course, will prove problematical. Notwithstanding, as SQ is merely a microsm of the republic, I do believe that our newly acquired, similarly mercurial higher management will be able to make headway but only after the full removal of the present tired, discredited but extended subordinate incumbent plus team and the blocking of a conceited arrogance that masquerades as an heir apparent. Meanwhile, extreme caution is the watchword.
Aerovision
Thank you also for your post. No I do not have access to the transcript – my original post was based on my analysis of the published facts (I am merely one of scores who have made a similar analysis and come to the same conclusion), information gleaned from this website, yes, my own experience of past events but, most importantly, information passed on by my FO colleagues, who all seem to be well and truly in the loop and able to cogently fill in the 27 minute CVR gap, the contents of which we await with bated breath. These self same FO’s seem to me, to a man, to be of the highest caliber, superbly educated, disciplined and at the start of their careers (before becoming fire-blackened and cynical), keen and well motivated. Why then does SQ squander this “human capital” with their disgustingly poor treatment of this group, when, according to the highest in the land, they should be nurturing it as part of the future asset base of the nation? Perhaps the new higher management may like to consider harnessing some of this talent hiding under his nose – a move that will prove potently catalytic in an organisation increasingly and urgently requiring fresh thinking.
Sunny
Thank you for yours. Yes the PVI allegedly was on but I didn’t want to discuss it as the subject corresponds with some potentially pivotal CVR dialogue.
Gladiator
Thanks for your support. Good luck.
Guest
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Pillow we here in flytown call that time difference, or different time zone's, or to make it even simpler: when Insider is behind the computer at 8 in the morning before starting the rest of the day our friend the Gladiator is finishing a days work at the end of the same day , also behind the computer. Not so difficult you see and you are right just coincidental!!
Guest
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Insider107 -
Appreciate the update; good summary. Looking forward to knowing more. We can't change history, but we're fools not to learn productive lessons from it.
The fallacy in the crosswind limitation is the 30 knot limit on the escape slides.
In the USA, the argument is made that the crosswind data is an information provision of "demonstrated' performance, as opposed to a hard limitation. The joke is in the FAR 25 Certifications standards, which compel the specification of limitations.
I'm not privileged to know the extent of the trend, but many American airlines neither issue nor adequately teach regulations - contrary to the FARs. Thus, an SQ-006 is in waiting on the American end.
While American airline pilots resent the European & Japanese discounting of our ATP standards, there's a damn good reason for it. We need to change that.
Posts such as yours illuminate core facts and the changes needed; thanks.
Appreciate the update; good summary. Looking forward to knowing more. We can't change history, but we're fools not to learn productive lessons from it.
The fallacy in the crosswind limitation is the 30 knot limit on the escape slides.
In the USA, the argument is made that the crosswind data is an information provision of "demonstrated' performance, as opposed to a hard limitation. The joke is in the FAR 25 Certifications standards, which compel the specification of limitations.
I'm not privileged to know the extent of the trend, but many American airlines neither issue nor adequately teach regulations - contrary to the FARs. Thus, an SQ-006 is in waiting on the American end.
While American airline pilots resent the European & Japanese discounting of our ATP standards, there's a damn good reason for it. We need to change that.
Posts such as yours illuminate core facts and the changes needed; thanks.
Guest
Posts: n/a
Pillow -
I have a distinct hunch that you've already forgotten more than I'll ever know know.
In 'flytown,' 8 minutes difference is the same in Australia London or ALaska - the last I checked. Must be cooincidence. I don't know how your comment stirred any debate.
I have a distinct hunch that you've already forgotten more than I'll ever know know.
In 'flytown,' 8 minutes difference is the same in Australia London or ALaska - the last I checked. Must be cooincidence. I don't know how your comment stirred any debate.
Guest
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Does anybody in Singapore know what went on in the last meeting with the union members and the crew of SQ 6. Was it a lot of Makan Kechil or was it realy substantial with some rumour killers. ( Did they have the PVD selected on yes or no!!) That is the place to find out when you can straight foreward ask the question.