SQ006 Revisited
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WIND FACTOR -
Of all the reasons to cancel the flignt was the wind factor. Having a momentary legal wind report doesn't diminish the high probability of encountering a fatal wind shear until being able to accelerate to approximately 250 knots. That's quite an exposure window.
The range of wind reports with no suggestion that the wind could be expected to either stabilize or improve for hours to come should have been considered - by the whole crew.
As the evacuation showed, the aerodynamic capabilities of the aircraft, crew and their luck won't overcome the non-controllability of the excape slides in high winds.
Not mentioned also is the propensity for the downwind engines compressor stalling in high crosswinds. Remember the SFO 747 incident that nearly took off the hilltop, as well as the Gatwick 747.
There should be no doubt that the crew would now tell us that given the same situation, they would wait out the weather. They are the experts.
Of all the reasons to cancel the flignt was the wind factor. Having a momentary legal wind report doesn't diminish the high probability of encountering a fatal wind shear until being able to accelerate to approximately 250 knots. That's quite an exposure window.
The range of wind reports with no suggestion that the wind could be expected to either stabilize or improve for hours to come should have been considered - by the whole crew.
As the evacuation showed, the aerodynamic capabilities of the aircraft, crew and their luck won't overcome the non-controllability of the excape slides in high winds.
Not mentioned also is the propensity for the downwind engines compressor stalling in high crosswinds. Remember the SFO 747 incident that nearly took off the hilltop, as well as the Gatwick 747.
There should be no doubt that the crew would now tell us that given the same situation, they would wait out the weather. They are the experts.
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Rockhound,
My list of factors does not have to be in any particular order.
Since you are not in aviation, may be an expansion of the factors is in order.
An accident as I previously mentioned is pairing of several events. Think of these events as pages with holes in them. Once all the holes line up you end up with an accident.
The list was carefully thought of. Something as simple as crew rest, which is puzzling to some can play an important role.
The rest issue is not, did he get enough sleep the night before? It is how has it been in the past year? Due to SIA's fixation on crew productivity they have lost focus on the bigger picture.
It is very easy to make a very serious mistake while suffering from chronic fatigue syndrome. A great number of crewmembers have chronic fatigue (I suffered from it while at SIA on the B747-400) which is very dangerous when mixed with a B747-400. SIA fails to recognize that such a syndrome exists.
Someone asked, what would have happened to the Captain of SQ006 had he made the decision not to go?
My opinion is, he would have been called into the office to explain why such a decision while the wind was within the go envelope.
Had this happened on the A-310, B-777 or A-340, that Captain would not be promoted to the B747-400 as well as many other petty torments.
My employer has a no-go policy as well as a fatigue policy. No explanation or paper work is required. If the Captain is not comfortable, the flight is delayed.
I just cannot imagine how one could have made a go decision in such a nasty condition.
We can discuss lights and notams all day. It all again comes down to not seeing where you are going.
My list of factors does not have to be in any particular order.
Since you are not in aviation, may be an expansion of the factors is in order.
An accident as I previously mentioned is pairing of several events. Think of these events as pages with holes in them. Once all the holes line up you end up with an accident.
The list was carefully thought of. Something as simple as crew rest, which is puzzling to some can play an important role.
The rest issue is not, did he get enough sleep the night before? It is how has it been in the past year? Due to SIA's fixation on crew productivity they have lost focus on the bigger picture.
It is very easy to make a very serious mistake while suffering from chronic fatigue syndrome. A great number of crewmembers have chronic fatigue (I suffered from it while at SIA on the B747-400) which is very dangerous when mixed with a B747-400. SIA fails to recognize that such a syndrome exists.
Someone asked, what would have happened to the Captain of SQ006 had he made the decision not to go?
My opinion is, he would have been called into the office to explain why such a decision while the wind was within the go envelope.
Had this happened on the A-310, B-777 or A-340, that Captain would not be promoted to the B747-400 as well as many other petty torments.
My employer has a no-go policy as well as a fatigue policy. No explanation or paper work is required. If the Captain is not comfortable, the flight is delayed.
I just cannot imagine how one could have made a go decision in such a nasty condition.
We can discuss lights and notams all day. It all again comes down to not seeing where you are going.
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With regards the SQ6 crew rest query, I posted this back in early December.
http://www.pprune.org/ubb/NonCGI/For...ML/011351.html
Anyone noticed the amount of roster disruption since SQ6, then subsiquently the 3 man crew debacle? Way to go Gladiator!
http://www.pprune.org/ubb/NonCGI/For...ML/011351.html
Anyone noticed the amount of roster disruption since SQ6, then subsiquently the 3 man crew debacle? Way to go Gladiator!
Guest
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SKYDRIFTER and Gladiator
Spot on, it all comes down to professional command judgement.
Professional behaviour in my world says means "johnny on the spot" applying the advanced skills and experience with the authority bestowed by the enabling authority.
It of course requires that you can justify reasonable actions to your peers but they will always be conservative with any bias to perceived risk applied to the people lives with whom they are entrusted, not to massage some idiot ideologue managers ego.
If the system works otherwise, why appoint individual Captains in the first place.
The way it seems to operate in this organisation is that the Captains are in effect just senior FO's acting under the proxy command of the said ideologue sitting in an office in Singapore. It gives a whole new meaning to the title of Fleet Captain.
So until that is sorted lets call them Proxy Captains and hold the Fleet Manager responsible for ALL individual operations anywhere. If they ever had any ambitions for the opportunity to play God then here it is.
Having said all that I sincerely hope Farsides optimism and his comments to Insider107 at the beginning of this post is well founded. I too admire Insiders writing and posture.
I can speak with some authority on the "change" issues. One of the companies I am working for is nearly 100 years old and had survived that long due to an underlying technical excellence. However that had bred a form of arrogance and laziness in the management that had not recognised the express train bearing down on them whilst they were stalled on the level crossing. (In this context that express train was SQ006, it is immaterial in these terms as to who or what was responsible for SQ006, but it provides the opportunity for an orderly but wholesale rethink)
There is evidence that Qantas used QF1 so.
Worse the layers of time servers, ideologues and the sycohantic lesser abled that you accumulate over the years in these circumstances and risen through the ranks by politics rather than ability, had surrounded the leaders with a warm and fuzzy cocoon and they had gone to sleep. They were in fact now merely keeping the body warm. It was hard work, identifyng and sortng the good bits and ditching the junk. It has been three years and is as it should be a continuing work in progress.
If there were just 2 lessons to be learned from this exercise they would be.
1. It is possible that as an organisation you have been dead for some time and it is only sheer momentum that provides the illusion of continuing progress. The end in these circumstances comes very very swiftly.
2. The first and most fundamental step is to admit that this is so, communicate it directly to the staff, ask them to participate in the renewal and cut hard and deep where there is any continuing negative resistance.
Sounds like SQ have barely begun a similar process. I sincerely hope they make it.
With Insiders and Farsiders around it is possible that they can move on and become an international carrier as well respected by their peers, as by their undoubted passenger fans.
Spot on, it all comes down to professional command judgement.
Professional behaviour in my world says means "johnny on the spot" applying the advanced skills and experience with the authority bestowed by the enabling authority.
It of course requires that you can justify reasonable actions to your peers but they will always be conservative with any bias to perceived risk applied to the people lives with whom they are entrusted, not to massage some idiot ideologue managers ego.
If the system works otherwise, why appoint individual Captains in the first place.
The way it seems to operate in this organisation is that the Captains are in effect just senior FO's acting under the proxy command of the said ideologue sitting in an office in Singapore. It gives a whole new meaning to the title of Fleet Captain.
So until that is sorted lets call them Proxy Captains and hold the Fleet Manager responsible for ALL individual operations anywhere. If they ever had any ambitions for the opportunity to play God then here it is.
Having said all that I sincerely hope Farsides optimism and his comments to Insider107 at the beginning of this post is well founded. I too admire Insiders writing and posture.
I can speak with some authority on the "change" issues. One of the companies I am working for is nearly 100 years old and had survived that long due to an underlying technical excellence. However that had bred a form of arrogance and laziness in the management that had not recognised the express train bearing down on them whilst they were stalled on the level crossing. (In this context that express train was SQ006, it is immaterial in these terms as to who or what was responsible for SQ006, but it provides the opportunity for an orderly but wholesale rethink)
There is evidence that Qantas used QF1 so.
Worse the layers of time servers, ideologues and the sycohantic lesser abled that you accumulate over the years in these circumstances and risen through the ranks by politics rather than ability, had surrounded the leaders with a warm and fuzzy cocoon and they had gone to sleep. They were in fact now merely keeping the body warm. It was hard work, identifyng and sortng the good bits and ditching the junk. It has been three years and is as it should be a continuing work in progress.
If there were just 2 lessons to be learned from this exercise they would be.
1. It is possible that as an organisation you have been dead for some time and it is only sheer momentum that provides the illusion of continuing progress. The end in these circumstances comes very very swiftly.
2. The first and most fundamental step is to admit that this is so, communicate it directly to the staff, ask them to participate in the renewal and cut hard and deep where there is any continuing negative resistance.
Sounds like SQ have barely begun a similar process. I sincerely hope they make it.
With Insiders and Farsiders around it is possible that they can move on and become an international carrier as well respected by their peers, as by their undoubted passenger fans.
Guest
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15:15:50 FO OK, green lights are here.
Does this suggest that the FO is assertive or passively waiting (in fear), for the captains commands? If indeed the FO was actively involved in navigating, is it possible that he too thought that they were on the correct runway and had no reservations about taking off .... as opposed to ...realising the captain's error but was too afraid to object because he would rather die in a fireball than to receive a stern rebuke. Is it possible that, 'fear of captain / asian cockpit culture', is not a factor here?
As a precaution though, all 'Asian' FOs should be reminded that there are worse things in life than being reprimanded by a captain ... like ... dying prematurely in a fireball leaving your wife and kids to fend for themselves.
I find the current discussions about CRM a little disturbing and perplexing.
Disturbing because it would appear that there are fatigued pilots who places self interest first before the safety of his crew and passengers. Disturbing because it seems that pilots are actually weighing in their minds, whether to attempt a risky takeoff or not, based on considerations for how the chances of his promotion will be affected.
I thought pilots were supposed to be a rare breed of individuals? It would appear that they are no different from the rest of us in that sometimes personal convictions take a back seat when it comes to climbing the corporate ladder.
Perplexing because the pilot doesn't seem to realise that the promotion will come to zilch if he dies as a result of of his 'valiant' effort.
In any case how valid is it to cite CRM for risky takeoffs? Who faces more pressure from his superiors? A military field captain or a commercial airline pilot? In crimes against humanity, does the defence of 'under pressure to perform' hold water? What is the price of a few hundred lives ... including the flight crews'? A missed promotion? An 'interrogation' from the superiors? Some paperwork?
Should be a small price to pay, ........ right?
[This message has been edited by NC1701 (edited 02 March 2001).]
Does this suggest that the FO is assertive or passively waiting (in fear), for the captains commands? If indeed the FO was actively involved in navigating, is it possible that he too thought that they were on the correct runway and had no reservations about taking off .... as opposed to ...realising the captain's error but was too afraid to object because he would rather die in a fireball than to receive a stern rebuke. Is it possible that, 'fear of captain / asian cockpit culture', is not a factor here?
As a precaution though, all 'Asian' FOs should be reminded that there are worse things in life than being reprimanded by a captain ... like ... dying prematurely in a fireball leaving your wife and kids to fend for themselves.
I find the current discussions about CRM a little disturbing and perplexing.
Disturbing because it would appear that there are fatigued pilots who places self interest first before the safety of his crew and passengers. Disturbing because it seems that pilots are actually weighing in their minds, whether to attempt a risky takeoff or not, based on considerations for how the chances of his promotion will be affected.
I thought pilots were supposed to be a rare breed of individuals? It would appear that they are no different from the rest of us in that sometimes personal convictions take a back seat when it comes to climbing the corporate ladder.
Perplexing because the pilot doesn't seem to realise that the promotion will come to zilch if he dies as a result of of his 'valiant' effort.
In any case how valid is it to cite CRM for risky takeoffs? Who faces more pressure from his superiors? A military field captain or a commercial airline pilot? In crimes against humanity, does the defence of 'under pressure to perform' hold water? What is the price of a few hundred lives ... including the flight crews'? A missed promotion? An 'interrogation' from the superiors? Some paperwork?
Should be a small price to pay, ........ right?
[This message has been edited by NC1701 (edited 02 March 2001).]
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Rockhound
I have just discussed your postings of 28 Feb and 1 March with a very good friend of mine who is an ex-USMC flyer of great experience and very humble view. Having viewed these postings, at my urgent request, he has rapidly and, in my view, erroneously formed the opinion that you must either be “a civilian weenie wanabee out of his depth talking c**p, or an SQ management remf/puke, spinning misleading information to draw attention away from the main issues”. I have remonstrated with this rare display of emotion and have attempted to dissuade him of these quickly held views but, sad to say, he is adamant. Whilst I am not sure of the meaning of “remf/puke”, I certainly grasp the implication of “weenie” and am adept at filling in asterisks where required.
I have confirmed with him that, as soon as I have some “down time” and can get to a keyboard, I will produce what, whilst not being my magnum opus – I save that to a later day – will be a cogent and complete refutation of your views published to date.
Please bear with my presently hectic programme and I will post within a couple of days.
Kind regards. Insider107
I have just discussed your postings of 28 Feb and 1 March with a very good friend of mine who is an ex-USMC flyer of great experience and very humble view. Having viewed these postings, at my urgent request, he has rapidly and, in my view, erroneously formed the opinion that you must either be “a civilian weenie wanabee out of his depth talking c**p, or an SQ management remf/puke, spinning misleading information to draw attention away from the main issues”. I have remonstrated with this rare display of emotion and have attempted to dissuade him of these quickly held views but, sad to say, he is adamant. Whilst I am not sure of the meaning of “remf/puke”, I certainly grasp the implication of “weenie” and am adept at filling in asterisks where required.
I have confirmed with him that, as soon as I have some “down time” and can get to a keyboard, I will produce what, whilst not being my magnum opus – I save that to a later day – will be a cogent and complete refutation of your views published to date.
Please bear with my presently hectic programme and I will post within a couple of days.
Kind regards. Insider107
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Rockhound,
You said;
It was actually the F/O in the observer's seat who corrected the RHS F/O saying that the PVD will not be lined up until within 45 degrees of the centerline.
But why wasn't this followed up after the SQ 6 had lined up? .... Why didn't the F/O's raise this point again after the plane's heading was within 45 degrees of the centerline?
The Captain had quickly dismissed the use of the PVD as irrelevant since it was not an operational requirement although both F/O's showed at least some interest in the fact that the PVD indications were somehow not quite right.
...and the F/O's accepted the Captain's decision... without question.
I don't know, Rockhound, whether you have ever lived in Singapore, but here, you are taught from an early age to never ever question authority under any circumstances. When it comes to effective CRM, then this becomes a problem and must be addressed in the interest of air safety.
[This message has been edited by WSSS (edited 02 March 2001).]
You said;
<font face="Verdana, Arial, Helvetica" size="2">
All three were aware that the PVD indicated a discrepancy but, as I understand it, use of the PVD is not mandatory.
This brings up the matter of the article in the Taipei Times of Feb 22 (to which InitRef drew attention), which alleged (even to the point of quoting him) that Cyrano had warned Choong that the ND indicated they were out of position but was interrupted by an overbearing captain. Surely the CVR and the interview with Cyrano show this is all complete and utter garbage.
</font>
All three were aware that the PVD indicated a discrepancy but, as I understand it, use of the PVD is not mandatory.
This brings up the matter of the article in the Taipei Times of Feb 22 (to which InitRef drew attention), which alleged (even to the point of quoting him) that Cyrano had warned Choong that the ND indicated they were out of position but was interrupted by an overbearing captain. Surely the CVR and the interview with Cyrano show this is all complete and utter garbage.
</font>
But why wasn't this followed up after the SQ 6 had lined up? .... Why didn't the F/O's raise this point again after the plane's heading was within 45 degrees of the centerline?
The Captain had quickly dismissed the use of the PVD as irrelevant since it was not an operational requirement although both F/O's showed at least some interest in the fact that the PVD indications were somehow not quite right.
...and the F/O's accepted the Captain's decision... without question.
I don't know, Rockhound, whether you have ever lived in Singapore, but here, you are taught from an early age to never ever question authority under any circumstances. When it comes to effective CRM, then this becomes a problem and must be addressed in the interest of air safety.
[This message has been edited by WSSS (edited 02 March 2001).]
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Wow...am I flattered that the views of a dilettante like me on this forum are drawing a response, let alone being taken seriously! I would like to assure everyone that I tread here with great trepidation and never, in my wildest moments, truly believe that I am "Flight Deck Qualified". I repeat, I am not a pilot and you will all no doubt be happy to learn that I will never be one, as my eyesight is terrible. However, I do hope you will continue to allow me on to your flight decks for visits in-flight. (For the record, my two great dreams are to one day be allowed to sit in on (a) a takeoff in a heavy jet and (b) a Cat III autolanding in bad weather).
I would just like to respond to WSSS's and Insider's posts and then shut up (at least for a while).
WSSS,
My reference to the Taipei Times article was merely to point out that it was another example of irresponsible journalism and bore no relation to the CVR transcript in the accident report. It was not the ND that was the subject of discussion on the SQ006 flight deck but the PVD; the captain did not "cut off (the F/O) in mid-sentence"; and the captain was badly misquoted. And my reading of the CVR transcript still leads me to believe that F/O Cyrano was not overly concerned by the PVD indication. (Maybe the Appendix contains something of interest. Please, has ANYONE managed to download them?)
Insider,
Oh dear, I'm sorry to have upset your ex-Marine friend - quite unintentional, I assure you both. I may be a weenie but I'm not really a wannabe and I'm certainly not an SQ management remf/puke (but, like you, curious to find out what that is - perhaps you can email me privately). My entry under "Who?" is genuine and accurate.
I still don't see much of a parallel between the KLM Tenerife and SQ Taipei CRM but I look forward to reading your next posting.
Sorry, much too long a posting. I promise to lie low (for a while).
Rockhound
I would just like to respond to WSSS's and Insider's posts and then shut up (at least for a while).
WSSS,
My reference to the Taipei Times article was merely to point out that it was another example of irresponsible journalism and bore no relation to the CVR transcript in the accident report. It was not the ND that was the subject of discussion on the SQ006 flight deck but the PVD; the captain did not "cut off (the F/O) in mid-sentence"; and the captain was badly misquoted. And my reading of the CVR transcript still leads me to believe that F/O Cyrano was not overly concerned by the PVD indication. (Maybe the Appendix contains something of interest. Please, has ANYONE managed to download them?)
Insider,
Oh dear, I'm sorry to have upset your ex-Marine friend - quite unintentional, I assure you both. I may be a weenie but I'm not really a wannabe and I'm certainly not an SQ management remf/puke (but, like you, curious to find out what that is - perhaps you can email me privately). My entry under "Who?" is genuine and accurate.
I still don't see much of a parallel between the KLM Tenerife and SQ Taipei CRM but I look forward to reading your next posting.
Sorry, much too long a posting. I promise to lie low (for a while).
Rockhound
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Insider:
Let's not lose our composure. Rockhound is not that far off the ball (I wish I knew his trade as well as he knows ours). After all, the sound interchange of ideas is what a public forum is all about.
Having said this, I have to admit that you got the ball rolling in a most interesting flight safety issue, i.e. Is company (in this case SIA) and/or regional culture a major factor in the SQ-006 case? I understand the mindset that you discribe at the begining of this thread and the CVR proves the capt was on a rush to get going
(PVD wasn't lined up, but he could see the rwy not so bad...)
But what I don't understand is why the flight wasn't cancelled in the first place. My previous question went unanswered: What would have happened to the capt of SQ-006 had he elected not to go? Would he have been demoted/reprimanded/terminated/made his life a misery with bad rosters...what? What is it that makes you feel the management pressure so intense?
[This message has been edited by TE RANGI (edited 03 March 2001).]
[This message has been edited by TE RANGI (edited 03 March 2001).]
Let's not lose our composure. Rockhound is not that far off the ball (I wish I knew his trade as well as he knows ours). After all, the sound interchange of ideas is what a public forum is all about.
Having said this, I have to admit that you got the ball rolling in a most interesting flight safety issue, i.e. Is company (in this case SIA) and/or regional culture a major factor in the SQ-006 case? I understand the mindset that you discribe at the begining of this thread and the CVR proves the capt was on a rush to get going
(PVD wasn't lined up, but he could see the rwy not so bad...)
But what I don't understand is why the flight wasn't cancelled in the first place. My previous question went unanswered: What would have happened to the capt of SQ-006 had he elected not to go? Would he have been demoted/reprimanded/terminated/made his life a misery with bad rosters...what? What is it that makes you feel the management pressure so intense?
[This message has been edited by TE RANGI (edited 03 March 2001).]
[This message has been edited by TE RANGI (edited 03 March 2001).]
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Insider 107
I lost you here. When your marine friend came to the quick conclusion that Rockhounds postings were c**p you apparently vehemently
remonstrated with him as you thought he was erroneous. But, he stood firm and then you said, ok, I am now going to write a cogent and complete refutation on Rockhounds posts.
What happened? X-Ray vision?
Anyway, standing by for your revelations.
Back to the topic.
It seems to me that the discussion is concentrating on the SIA culture/ethnics issue, which could be a contributing factor in this accident.
What was the primary factor and, the secundary? Chain of thoughts;
Aircraft hit object. Why was object there.
How came aircraft on collision path with object. Why was object not visable for crew. And then comes the culture aspect.Why did capt. decide to leave the gate. etc. It is contributing, not primary.
[This message has been edited by AEROVISION (edited 03 March 2001).]
I lost you here. When your marine friend came to the quick conclusion that Rockhounds postings were c**p you apparently vehemently
remonstrated with him as you thought he was erroneous. But, he stood firm and then you said, ok, I am now going to write a cogent and complete refutation on Rockhounds posts.
What happened? X-Ray vision?
Anyway, standing by for your revelations.
Back to the topic.
It seems to me that the discussion is concentrating on the SIA culture/ethnics issue, which could be a contributing factor in this accident.
What was the primary factor and, the secundary? Chain of thoughts;
Aircraft hit object. Why was object there.
How came aircraft on collision path with object. Why was object not visable for crew. And then comes the culture aspect.Why did capt. decide to leave the gate. etc. It is contributing, not primary.
[This message has been edited by AEROVISION (edited 03 March 2001).]
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Only when you have been a SO and FO at SIA will you truly understand how deep the loss of face mentality runs.
As on another SIA subject doing the rounds presently, SIA keep looking in different parts of the world for FOs because the western ones disturb their cockpit enviroment. Why? because they are prepared to speak up, albiet cautiously, and question the Captain and this is not the Singaporean way.
We become very comfortable in our warm enviroments as pilots, and it takes quite a bit of effort to project forward to a catastrophic outcome. So those that say that the crew would not knowingly take-off on the wrong runway are on the wrong track. The real point here is that when there is doubt the underlings side with the captain rather than with themselves. It was the non-actioning of the doubt that caused the accident.
As on another SIA subject doing the rounds presently, SIA keep looking in different parts of the world for FOs because the western ones disturb their cockpit enviroment. Why? because they are prepared to speak up, albiet cautiously, and question the Captain and this is not the Singaporean way.
We become very comfortable in our warm enviroments as pilots, and it takes quite a bit of effort to project forward to a catastrophic outcome. So those that say that the crew would not knowingly take-off on the wrong runway are on the wrong track. The real point here is that when there is doubt the underlings side with the captain rather than with themselves. It was the non-actioning of the doubt that caused the accident.
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I’ve finally had chance to get to the keyboard, although I’m not sure when I will be able to make this posting. I’ve explained to Pprune Towers the exact nature of the circumstance that makes my present postings so sporadic - I would ask for your acceptance that the reason is genuine and overriding.
However, I had the unexpected opportunity to make my brief and hasty post of 2 March in which I revealed (in very much muted fashion) a friend’s reaction to Rockhound’s postings of 28 Feb and 1 March, which emerged earlier last week over the course of conversation at a common slip station. My view of the reaction was as stated and I did indeed argue that Rockhound could be the “genuine article” and as such, providing worthwhile debating points. Notwithstanding, following some thought, I decided to post the reaction on the twin basis that it serves us all well to realise that genuine emotion is generated by the apparent trivialisation of events which surround the SQ006 disaster – and I point out Rockhound’s trivialisation a little later - and similarly strong emotion is generated by the possibility of a “gloss over attempt” by SQ management, through the medium of phoney postings.
Te Rangi. Thanks for your note. Please be assured that my composure has been and remains completely intact. I agree entirely that Rockhound’s knowledge of our trade is laudatory (this detailed knowledge gave rise to my friend’s “wannabe” comment) and I agree absolutely with your view that “the sound interchange of ideas is what a public forum is all about”. Please see my note to Rockhound, below, most of which I roughed out a day or so before your posting. I hope also that Gladiator’s writing will demonstrate to you why the flight wasn’t cancelled in the first place and what would have happened to the captain subsequently - it is absolutely correct.
Aerostar. Thanks also for your post – contents noted. I similarly hope that my writings provide answers to your questions.
Rockhound
Thank you very much for your posting of 2 March in which you proffer your assurances that you are the “genuine article”. I certainly accept your bona fides and my American friend sends his regrets in respect of the intemperate expressions he used on first reading your postings and which expressions I subsequently relayed in my last posting. I now write in reply to these earlier postings of 28 Feb and 1 March in respect of your conclusions as to what did not cause the SQ006 disaster. May I say that as a member of the non-aviation public, you serve us all well by sparking both more debate and an increasingly forensic approach to our collective thinking. Similarly, if you had been a member of the SQ flt ops management/SQ PR department, artlessly posing as the former, then you would deserve equally to be thanked for assisting in the crystallisation of all our views and the ready articulation of them on this site. Therefore, please do not feel the need to “lie low” – you would not serve either the cause of free speech or that of aviation safety if you did so – please “keep ‘em coming” but also please heed my note at the end of this posting.
Before I move to answer your postings, may I say that the Taiwanese Aviation Safety Council Report is a “factual” report and no conclusions as to the cause of the crash are reached. We, however, are all trying to pre-empt this report and ascribe cause(s), using gleaned knowledge of the case and as much experience as we can muster. However I guess we will all have to wait for the potentially more contentious document that will be produced and available by year-end, which will state such causal conclusions and prove us individually right or wrong.
Next, I had intended writing a very detailed piece but reflection brought a realisation that I’ve already said everything in previous postings and that what I may have missed or not emphasised sufficiently, my estimable co-posters, Gladiator, Titan, Gaunty, Farside and Sia Sniffer have all filled in or emphasised. So, I will try to keep it short and rather than describe in detail, merely make reference to postings on given dates.
I hope that you will not be insulted if I say – in reverse order of your posting - that, (i) yes, you are “missing something” (ii) what has been said [albeit in a Taiwanese newspaper] is not, as you state, “complete and utter garbage” but merely the subject of unfortunate phraseology. Further, your glossy summing of “what seems to me that” is similarly in error. Allow me to elucidate.
I’m afraid that you miss the point entirely - “all three crewmembers were satisfied that they were on the correct runway” is not the case. First Officer Latif Cyrano stated that the PVD “indicated a discrepancy” and you then glibly dismiss the significance of this by saying that “but as I understand it, use of the PVD is not mandatory”. The point is that Cyrano noticed evidence to indicate that all was not well but did not pursue the point when the captain said that it did not matter – precisely because it was the captain who said it! He would, however, be harbouring his unspoken doubts on the subject, whilst events unfolded. This is a cultural issue that Gladiator and Titan have ceaselessly laboured and on which maybe I can expand later. Further, the third seat FO would similarly make no comment, following the captain’s judgement on the matter.
On the contrary, the captain appeared NOT to be “appropriately concerned with the weather”. The CVR transcript in fact demonstrated a remarkable levity amongst the crew in the face of a weather situation of the utmost gravity. If I may remind professional readers of conditions which prevailed on the night of 31 Oct 2000, by referring them to my original posting on this thread, they will be able to concur. For those non-professionals reading, please be assured that the conditions on the night were exceptional and worthy of the greatest respect by any operating crew.
I quote my first posting further:
“Apocryphal evidence indicates that the apron was flooded at the time and this would perhaps lead to the supposition that the runways may also have been in a similar condition, in light of the approaching typhoon front. Similarly the aircraft was reportedly strongly buffeted by high winds whilst still at the gate”.
I do believe that the CVR transcript bears out the crews’ appreciation of taxi conditions as the captain is heard to say words to the effect that “I’m taking it slowly as it is very slippery” – not wishing to slide off the taxiway, especially when turning onto the usually very slick runway end, rather than being “overall pretty sanguine about the conditions and was he really in such a hurry to get going”?
Next, “all three pilots agreed that conditions were within limits”. Please read:
“No overarching view of the situation would arise with this mind set, hence it would not be possible to consider that whilst technically within the cross wind limitations, prevailing gusts, low visibility, low cloud base, very heavy rain and a possibly flooded runway would lead to a take off in conditions somewhat different from the steady wind/good viz/dry runway conditions of test flying demonstrations”.
Do I really have to labour this point?
It may be worth mentioning that at this very time of the approaching typhoon front, Canadian Airlines, Eva Airways and Cathay Pacific all deemed it prudent to either cancel or place severe postponements on their flights, whilst only China Airlines – no arbiter of air safety I’m afraid, deemed the conditions suitable for continued flight operations.
Further, “all three crewmembers were well rested” is in error. The captain was one day short of his statutory rest period prior to reporting for SQ006 duty, although you could not be expected to know this (I’m surprised the ASC didn’t!) and I assume you missed my posting of a few days earlier to this effect. Further, Gladiator makes the point that SQ 744 crews have been stretched to the FTL limit of 28 day crew duty time for some time now (as are 777 crews) because of a serious pilot shortage (due to SQ’s antediluvian industrial practices/poor pay) and the cumulative effect of this heavy work pressure and constant time zone change has had and continues to have its adverse effect. Whilst on the subject, please also be assured that the present impasse over pay and conditions between ALPAS and SQ, which has been dragging on for nearly two and a half years is having an effect on most crews – yes, I know there is no evidence to suggest there was an effect on the SQ006 crew. The rancorous feeling amongst the SQ pilot body generated by a feeling of abuse and contempt of that body by the SQ management is producing the lowest morale amongst a pilot force that I have ever seen (35 years worth) and whilst I assume that long term data does not (yet) exist to provide a correlation between low morale of pilot force and susceptibility of a carrier to major accident, I think it would be a very brave man who would publicly state that no such correlation exists.
As to the actual incident as portrayed by the CVR, may I refer you again to my original posting in which I postulate the idea of there being “two thought processes which generate any flying decision made in the course of SQ operations”
1. Whatever happens, I must not take any action which will invite an admonitory/intimidatory phone call from the fleet management and which call will certainly be the culmination of a previously conducted, secret investigation involving the sustained interrogation of the FO(s) in an effort to establish inconsistency of story which could then lead to an adverse report being attached to a personal file/demotion without appeal or summary dismissal.
2. Under all circumstances, cover yourself by conducting operations absolutely within a highly legalistic interpretation of limitations and procedure without taking any overview or exercising any judgement, both of which will, necessarily, be subjective and hence open to fleet evaluation and criticism after any event.
I would suggest that perhaps a combination of the two thought processes prevailed on the night. The captain and crew were concerned with the weather and hence susceptible to the distraction that this would generate but masked this concern from each other (and perhaps themselves), in their desire to cause nil delay, with stylised SQ banter. They were however concerned to legalistically “cover themselves” and make sure that they were “within limits”. Hence mind set 2 also came into effect.
However, more ominously, if we completely disregard the above and the captain and crew indeed did not regard the prevailing weather as anything out of the ordinary, is this then not the most damning indictment possible against an SQ training philosophy that does not continually stress that operation in such adverse weather is to be treated with extreme caution, concurrent with the exercise of sound judgement? Indeed it is understood that the captain regaled his FO’s with details of an ANC take off “in far worse conditions”. Hmmm!
Unfortunately – you are again not to know this – such exercise of sound judgment is paid lip service in SQ. Crews are expected to depart and arrive on time and if not “we want to know the extremely good reason why not”. Gladiator and Titan – both experienced survivors of SQ, are entirely correct in their statements to this effect and their corollary view that such corporate stance places great psychological pressure on crews.
Similarly, their statements as to the mindset of local captains and first officers is absolutely accurate – as Titan says, however, you must have been in SQ to know exactly what this means. Therefore, I would ask you to accept as the complete truth that the Singaporean (yes I know the Straits Times said he was Malaysian) captain would never have dreamt of delaying the flight in case of sanction/adverse report from his reporting manager or even the FO (please again be assured this is perfectly possible – the system encompasses such reporting). Similarly the Singaporean FO - again you are not to know this – was fast tracked to stardom before the accident and NO WAY was he ever going to say anything which might generate even the slightest whiff of dissent that could then enter his non-accessible, secret squirrel personal file, maintained on all flight personnel. Such dissent would include demurral of the captain’s judgement to take off in the prevailing conditions. Hence the unfortunate Taiwanese press phraseology which I previously referred to, whilst inaccurately reporting that there was a heated CVR interchange between “overbearing” captain and a “subjugated” first officer on the subject, inadvertently but accurately reported the net effect on the flight of a much more muted and subtle interchange, that present day technology could only partially pick up.
Moving on, may I suggest that we are all in complete agreement that the accident happened because the crew lined up on the wrong runway and subsequently attempted a take off. The key question is then, why?
Now perhaps I understand that your suggestion as to “why” is that it was not because of any other reason than irregularities in the ground lighting system/taxiway markings (by default, the only other reason for the accident) that misled the pilots into such erroneous line up and subsequent catastrophic take off and, hence, “could have happened at any airline”. If I may say so, your leap of reasoning tritely discounts the possibility of any other cause for the accident than that this captain and crew (and by extension all captains and crews) were merely passive and uncomplaining users of a ground lighting system that hopefully may (or may not) have led them by the nose to the correct point on the airport for an intended take off, rather than them being wholly responsible, through the use of all available resources (charts, ATC instructions, internal aircraft systems, ground lighting systems, taxiway markings, familiarity with the airport, discussion between themselves, guidance by ground marshallers, common sense/airmanship) for the safe navigation of the aircraft on the ground to the correct take off position – in this case runway 05L. Such discounting, I can, however, understand as you were, hitherto, I believe, unaware of the national cultural/SQ culture dimensions affecting CRM, that my co-posters and I have now brought to your attention. I therefore maintain that the fact of their failure to line up on the correct runway, given that they are actively responsible (they most certainly were) for navigational accuracy, indicates that some distraction was present, to so prevent the correct line up on runway 05L. If we accept this, the key question then is “what was the distraction”?
My humble submission is that the extreme weather conditions, which the crew (perhaps subliminally) knew they should not have countenanced as suitable for take off, caused the fatal distraction at a time when they were grappling with a difficult ground navigation situation. If the crew had been operating in a culture/company more sympathetic to the exercise of good judgement/airmanship, they would firstly have not felt pressured to move off on schedule (please be assured that despite the “sanguine” tone of the CVR, they were) and secondly they would have felt relaxed about sensibly awaiting a weather improvement following frontal passage, when they would have been able to make a routine un-distracted take off from the correct runway. Please see my reference to the Kuching overrun accident in my first posting – If the crew (local) had held clear of the airport for 10-15 minutes before making an approach, they would have landed, un-distracted and safely, in clear weather and on a partially dry runway. They would, however, have been behind schedule on arrival – unbearable to contemplate! As it was, they landed distracted, on time, but half way down the runway in the middle of a local rain-storm and went off the end – see what we’re getting at?
To close, I’d like to make it crystal clear that I can imagine myself making catastrophic errors of the magnitude demonstrated by the SQ006 crew and I’m sure that any other thinking pilot feels the same. I’m also abundantly certain that rational pilots (of whom I count myself) will at all times strive to avoid such ghastly traps and will use, if unfettered by dogma/cultural constraints, all their experience, skill and airmanship to so avoid these traps. Hence, for these reasons of dogma/culture, I see the SQ006 trio just as much victims of circumstance as the passengers who were caught up in the fateful events of the night.
Finally, Rockhound, your less than temperate petty crowing to the effect “hey gladiator you're changing your tune. Now it's bad visibility first, SQ company culture second” is both insulting to an experienced, knowledgeable and courageous poster who is patiently attempting to give you solid facts, plus trivialising to a subject which I’m sure you will have finally noticed, professional airmen are now considering in deadly earnest.
However, I had the unexpected opportunity to make my brief and hasty post of 2 March in which I revealed (in very much muted fashion) a friend’s reaction to Rockhound’s postings of 28 Feb and 1 March, which emerged earlier last week over the course of conversation at a common slip station. My view of the reaction was as stated and I did indeed argue that Rockhound could be the “genuine article” and as such, providing worthwhile debating points. Notwithstanding, following some thought, I decided to post the reaction on the twin basis that it serves us all well to realise that genuine emotion is generated by the apparent trivialisation of events which surround the SQ006 disaster – and I point out Rockhound’s trivialisation a little later - and similarly strong emotion is generated by the possibility of a “gloss over attempt” by SQ management, through the medium of phoney postings.
Te Rangi. Thanks for your note. Please be assured that my composure has been and remains completely intact. I agree entirely that Rockhound’s knowledge of our trade is laudatory (this detailed knowledge gave rise to my friend’s “wannabe” comment) and I agree absolutely with your view that “the sound interchange of ideas is what a public forum is all about”. Please see my note to Rockhound, below, most of which I roughed out a day or so before your posting. I hope also that Gladiator’s writing will demonstrate to you why the flight wasn’t cancelled in the first place and what would have happened to the captain subsequently - it is absolutely correct.
Aerostar. Thanks also for your post – contents noted. I similarly hope that my writings provide answers to your questions.
Rockhound
Thank you very much for your posting of 2 March in which you proffer your assurances that you are the “genuine article”. I certainly accept your bona fides and my American friend sends his regrets in respect of the intemperate expressions he used on first reading your postings and which expressions I subsequently relayed in my last posting. I now write in reply to these earlier postings of 28 Feb and 1 March in respect of your conclusions as to what did not cause the SQ006 disaster. May I say that as a member of the non-aviation public, you serve us all well by sparking both more debate and an increasingly forensic approach to our collective thinking. Similarly, if you had been a member of the SQ flt ops management/SQ PR department, artlessly posing as the former, then you would deserve equally to be thanked for assisting in the crystallisation of all our views and the ready articulation of them on this site. Therefore, please do not feel the need to “lie low” – you would not serve either the cause of free speech or that of aviation safety if you did so – please “keep ‘em coming” but also please heed my note at the end of this posting.
Before I move to answer your postings, may I say that the Taiwanese Aviation Safety Council Report is a “factual” report and no conclusions as to the cause of the crash are reached. We, however, are all trying to pre-empt this report and ascribe cause(s), using gleaned knowledge of the case and as much experience as we can muster. However I guess we will all have to wait for the potentially more contentious document that will be produced and available by year-end, which will state such causal conclusions and prove us individually right or wrong.
Next, I had intended writing a very detailed piece but reflection brought a realisation that I’ve already said everything in previous postings and that what I may have missed or not emphasised sufficiently, my estimable co-posters, Gladiator, Titan, Gaunty, Farside and Sia Sniffer have all filled in or emphasised. So, I will try to keep it short and rather than describe in detail, merely make reference to postings on given dates.
I hope that you will not be insulted if I say – in reverse order of your posting - that, (i) yes, you are “missing something” (ii) what has been said [albeit in a Taiwanese newspaper] is not, as you state, “complete and utter garbage” but merely the subject of unfortunate phraseology. Further, your glossy summing of “what seems to me that” is similarly in error. Allow me to elucidate.
I’m afraid that you miss the point entirely - “all three crewmembers were satisfied that they were on the correct runway” is not the case. First Officer Latif Cyrano stated that the PVD “indicated a discrepancy” and you then glibly dismiss the significance of this by saying that “but as I understand it, use of the PVD is not mandatory”. The point is that Cyrano noticed evidence to indicate that all was not well but did not pursue the point when the captain said that it did not matter – precisely because it was the captain who said it! He would, however, be harbouring his unspoken doubts on the subject, whilst events unfolded. This is a cultural issue that Gladiator and Titan have ceaselessly laboured and on which maybe I can expand later. Further, the third seat FO would similarly make no comment, following the captain’s judgement on the matter.
On the contrary, the captain appeared NOT to be “appropriately concerned with the weather”. The CVR transcript in fact demonstrated a remarkable levity amongst the crew in the face of a weather situation of the utmost gravity. If I may remind professional readers of conditions which prevailed on the night of 31 Oct 2000, by referring them to my original posting on this thread, they will be able to concur. For those non-professionals reading, please be assured that the conditions on the night were exceptional and worthy of the greatest respect by any operating crew.
I quote my first posting further:
“Apocryphal evidence indicates that the apron was flooded at the time and this would perhaps lead to the supposition that the runways may also have been in a similar condition, in light of the approaching typhoon front. Similarly the aircraft was reportedly strongly buffeted by high winds whilst still at the gate”.
I do believe that the CVR transcript bears out the crews’ appreciation of taxi conditions as the captain is heard to say words to the effect that “I’m taking it slowly as it is very slippery” – not wishing to slide off the taxiway, especially when turning onto the usually very slick runway end, rather than being “overall pretty sanguine about the conditions and was he really in such a hurry to get going”?
Next, “all three pilots agreed that conditions were within limits”. Please read:
“No overarching view of the situation would arise with this mind set, hence it would not be possible to consider that whilst technically within the cross wind limitations, prevailing gusts, low visibility, low cloud base, very heavy rain and a possibly flooded runway would lead to a take off in conditions somewhat different from the steady wind/good viz/dry runway conditions of test flying demonstrations”.
Do I really have to labour this point?
It may be worth mentioning that at this very time of the approaching typhoon front, Canadian Airlines, Eva Airways and Cathay Pacific all deemed it prudent to either cancel or place severe postponements on their flights, whilst only China Airlines – no arbiter of air safety I’m afraid, deemed the conditions suitable for continued flight operations.
Further, “all three crewmembers were well rested” is in error. The captain was one day short of his statutory rest period prior to reporting for SQ006 duty, although you could not be expected to know this (I’m surprised the ASC didn’t!) and I assume you missed my posting of a few days earlier to this effect. Further, Gladiator makes the point that SQ 744 crews have been stretched to the FTL limit of 28 day crew duty time for some time now (as are 777 crews) because of a serious pilot shortage (due to SQ’s antediluvian industrial practices/poor pay) and the cumulative effect of this heavy work pressure and constant time zone change has had and continues to have its adverse effect. Whilst on the subject, please also be assured that the present impasse over pay and conditions between ALPAS and SQ, which has been dragging on for nearly two and a half years is having an effect on most crews – yes, I know there is no evidence to suggest there was an effect on the SQ006 crew. The rancorous feeling amongst the SQ pilot body generated by a feeling of abuse and contempt of that body by the SQ management is producing the lowest morale amongst a pilot force that I have ever seen (35 years worth) and whilst I assume that long term data does not (yet) exist to provide a correlation between low morale of pilot force and susceptibility of a carrier to major accident, I think it would be a very brave man who would publicly state that no such correlation exists.
As to the actual incident as portrayed by the CVR, may I refer you again to my original posting in which I postulate the idea of there being “two thought processes which generate any flying decision made in the course of SQ operations”
1. Whatever happens, I must not take any action which will invite an admonitory/intimidatory phone call from the fleet management and which call will certainly be the culmination of a previously conducted, secret investigation involving the sustained interrogation of the FO(s) in an effort to establish inconsistency of story which could then lead to an adverse report being attached to a personal file/demotion without appeal or summary dismissal.
2. Under all circumstances, cover yourself by conducting operations absolutely within a highly legalistic interpretation of limitations and procedure without taking any overview or exercising any judgement, both of which will, necessarily, be subjective and hence open to fleet evaluation and criticism after any event.
I would suggest that perhaps a combination of the two thought processes prevailed on the night. The captain and crew were concerned with the weather and hence susceptible to the distraction that this would generate but masked this concern from each other (and perhaps themselves), in their desire to cause nil delay, with stylised SQ banter. They were however concerned to legalistically “cover themselves” and make sure that they were “within limits”. Hence mind set 2 also came into effect.
However, more ominously, if we completely disregard the above and the captain and crew indeed did not regard the prevailing weather as anything out of the ordinary, is this then not the most damning indictment possible against an SQ training philosophy that does not continually stress that operation in such adverse weather is to be treated with extreme caution, concurrent with the exercise of sound judgement? Indeed it is understood that the captain regaled his FO’s with details of an ANC take off “in far worse conditions”. Hmmm!
Unfortunately – you are again not to know this – such exercise of sound judgment is paid lip service in SQ. Crews are expected to depart and arrive on time and if not “we want to know the extremely good reason why not”. Gladiator and Titan – both experienced survivors of SQ, are entirely correct in their statements to this effect and their corollary view that such corporate stance places great psychological pressure on crews.
Similarly, their statements as to the mindset of local captains and first officers is absolutely accurate – as Titan says, however, you must have been in SQ to know exactly what this means. Therefore, I would ask you to accept as the complete truth that the Singaporean (yes I know the Straits Times said he was Malaysian) captain would never have dreamt of delaying the flight in case of sanction/adverse report from his reporting manager or even the FO (please again be assured this is perfectly possible – the system encompasses such reporting). Similarly the Singaporean FO - again you are not to know this – was fast tracked to stardom before the accident and NO WAY was he ever going to say anything which might generate even the slightest whiff of dissent that could then enter his non-accessible, secret squirrel personal file, maintained on all flight personnel. Such dissent would include demurral of the captain’s judgement to take off in the prevailing conditions. Hence the unfortunate Taiwanese press phraseology which I previously referred to, whilst inaccurately reporting that there was a heated CVR interchange between “overbearing” captain and a “subjugated” first officer on the subject, inadvertently but accurately reported the net effect on the flight of a much more muted and subtle interchange, that present day technology could only partially pick up.
Moving on, may I suggest that we are all in complete agreement that the accident happened because the crew lined up on the wrong runway and subsequently attempted a take off. The key question is then, why?
Now perhaps I understand that your suggestion as to “why” is that it was not because of any other reason than irregularities in the ground lighting system/taxiway markings (by default, the only other reason for the accident) that misled the pilots into such erroneous line up and subsequent catastrophic take off and, hence, “could have happened at any airline”. If I may say so, your leap of reasoning tritely discounts the possibility of any other cause for the accident than that this captain and crew (and by extension all captains and crews) were merely passive and uncomplaining users of a ground lighting system that hopefully may (or may not) have led them by the nose to the correct point on the airport for an intended take off, rather than them being wholly responsible, through the use of all available resources (charts, ATC instructions, internal aircraft systems, ground lighting systems, taxiway markings, familiarity with the airport, discussion between themselves, guidance by ground marshallers, common sense/airmanship) for the safe navigation of the aircraft on the ground to the correct take off position – in this case runway 05L. Such discounting, I can, however, understand as you were, hitherto, I believe, unaware of the national cultural/SQ culture dimensions affecting CRM, that my co-posters and I have now brought to your attention. I therefore maintain that the fact of their failure to line up on the correct runway, given that they are actively responsible (they most certainly were) for navigational accuracy, indicates that some distraction was present, to so prevent the correct line up on runway 05L. If we accept this, the key question then is “what was the distraction”?
My humble submission is that the extreme weather conditions, which the crew (perhaps subliminally) knew they should not have countenanced as suitable for take off, caused the fatal distraction at a time when they were grappling with a difficult ground navigation situation. If the crew had been operating in a culture/company more sympathetic to the exercise of good judgement/airmanship, they would firstly have not felt pressured to move off on schedule (please be assured that despite the “sanguine” tone of the CVR, they were) and secondly they would have felt relaxed about sensibly awaiting a weather improvement following frontal passage, when they would have been able to make a routine un-distracted take off from the correct runway. Please see my reference to the Kuching overrun accident in my first posting – If the crew (local) had held clear of the airport for 10-15 minutes before making an approach, they would have landed, un-distracted and safely, in clear weather and on a partially dry runway. They would, however, have been behind schedule on arrival – unbearable to contemplate! As it was, they landed distracted, on time, but half way down the runway in the middle of a local rain-storm and went off the end – see what we’re getting at?
To close, I’d like to make it crystal clear that I can imagine myself making catastrophic errors of the magnitude demonstrated by the SQ006 crew and I’m sure that any other thinking pilot feels the same. I’m also abundantly certain that rational pilots (of whom I count myself) will at all times strive to avoid such ghastly traps and will use, if unfettered by dogma/cultural constraints, all their experience, skill and airmanship to so avoid these traps. Hence, for these reasons of dogma/culture, I see the SQ006 trio just as much victims of circumstance as the passengers who were caught up in the fateful events of the night.
Finally, Rockhound, your less than temperate petty crowing to the effect “hey gladiator you're changing your tune. Now it's bad visibility first, SQ company culture second” is both insulting to an experienced, knowledgeable and courageous poster who is patiently attempting to give you solid facts, plus trivialising to a subject which I’m sure you will have finally noticed, professional airmen are now considering in deadly earnest.
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I can recall that during my initial training in SIA, that the paperwork is considered of extreme importance. I remember the heavy emphasis put on departing within 3 minutes of the scheduled off chocks time. We were continually reminded that 3 minutes is OK, lah, upto 15 minutes, then the Voyage Report would only make it as far as the director of flight ops office. However, to be over 15 minutes over departure time, your flight details would be sent to the chairman's desk, for further scrutiny. Pressure to depart on time? nah lah! We can do lah.
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I’ve finally had chance to get to the keyboard, although I’m not sure when I will be able to make this posting. I’ve explained to Pprune Towers the exact nature of the circumstance that makes my present postings so sporadic - I would ask for your acceptance that the reason is genuine and overriding.
However, I had the unexpected opportunity to make my brief and hasty post of 2 March in which I revealed (in very much muted fashion) a friend’s reaction to Rockhound’s postings of 28 Feb and 1 March, which emerged earlier last week over the course of conversation at a common slip station. My view of the reaction was as stated and I did indeed argue that Rockhound could be the “genuine article” and as such, providing worthwhile debating points. Notwithstanding, following some thought, I decided to post the reaction on the twin basis that it serves us all well to realise that genuine emotion is generated by the apparent trivialisation of events which surround the SQ006 disaster – and I point out Rockhound’s trivialisation a little later - and similarly strong emotion is generated by the possibility of a “gloss over attempt” by SQ management, through the medium of phoney postings.
Te Rangi. Thanks for your note. Please be assured that my composure has been and remains completely intact. I agree entirely that Rockhound’s knowledge of our trade is laudatory (this detailed knowledge gave rise to my friend’s “wannabe” comment) and I agree absolutely with your view that “the sound interchange of ideas is what a public forum is all about”. Please see my note to Rockhound, below, most of which I roughed out a day or so before your posting. I hope also that Gladiator’s writing will demonstrate to you why the flight wasn’t cancelled in the first place and what would have happened to the captain subsequently - it is absolutely correct.
Aerostar. Thanks also for your post – contents noted. I similarly hope that my writings provide answers to your questions.
Rockhound
Thank you very much for your posting of 2 March in which you proffer your assurances that you are the “genuine article”. I certainly accept your bona fides and my American friend sends his regrets in respect of the intemperate expressions he used on first reading your postings and which expressions I subsequently relayed in my last posting. I now write in reply to these earlier postings of 28 Feb and 1 March in respect of your conclusions as to what did not cause the SQ006 disaster. May I say that as a member of the non-aviation public, you serve us all well by sparking both more debate and an increasingly forensic approach to our collective thinking. Similarly, if you had been a member of the SQ flt ops management/SQ PR department, artlessly posing as the former, then you would deserve equally to be thanked for assisting in the crystallisation of all our views and the ready articulation of them on this site. Therefore, please do not feel the need to “lie low” – you would not serve either the cause of free speech or that of aviation safety if you did so – please “keep ‘em coming” but also please heed my note at the end of this posting.
Before I move to answer your postings, may I say that the Taiwanese Aviation Safety Council Report is a “factual” report and no conclusions as to the cause of the crash are reached. We, however, are all trying to pre-empt this report and ascribe cause(s), using gleaned knowledge of the case and as much experience as we can muster. However I guess we will all have to wait for the potentially more contentious document that will be produced and available by year-end, which will state such causal conclusions and prove us individually right or wrong.
Next, I had intended writing a very detailed piece but reflection brought a realisation that I’ve already said everything in previous postings and that what I may have missed or not emphasised sufficiently, my estimable co-posters, Gladiator, Titan, Gaunty, Farside and Sia Sniffer have all filled in or emphasised. So, I will try to keep it short and rather than describe in detail, merely make reference to postings on given dates.
I hope that you will not be insulted if I say – in reverse order of your posting - that, (i) yes, you are “missing something” (ii) what has been said [albeit in a Taiwanese newspaper] is not, as you state, “complete and utter garbage” but merely the subject of unfortunate phraseology. Further, your glossy summing of “what seems to me that” is similarly in error. Allow me to elucidate.
I’m afraid that you miss the point entirely - “all three crewmembers were satisfied that they were on the correct runway” is not the case. First Officer Latif Cyrano stated that the PVD “indicated a discrepancy” and you then glibly dismiss the significance of this by saying that “but as I understand it, use of the PVD is not mandatory”. The point is that Cyrano noticed evidence to indicate that all was not well but did not pursue the point when the captain said that it did not matter – precisely because it was the captain who said it! He would, however, be harbouring his unspoken doubts on the subject, whilst events unfolded. This is a cultural issue that Gladiator and Titan have ceaselessly laboured and on which maybe I can expand later. Further, the third seat FO would similarly make no comment, following the captain’s judgement on the matter.
On the contrary, the captain appeared NOT to be “appropriately concerned with the weather”. The CVR transcript in fact demonstrated a remarkable levity amongst the crew in the face of a weather situation of the utmost gravity. If I may remind professional readers of conditions which prevailed on the night of 31 Oct 2000, by referring them to my original posting on this thread, they will be able to concur. For those non-professionals reading, please be assured that the conditions on the night were exceptional and worthy of the greatest respect by any operating crew.
I quote my first posting further:
“Apocryphal evidence indicates that the apron was flooded at the time and this would perhaps lead to the supposition that the runways may also have been in a similar condition, in light of the approaching typhoon front. Similarly the aircraft was reportedly strongly buffeted by high winds whilst still at the gate”.
I do believe that the CVR transcript bears out the crews’ appreciation of taxi conditions as the captain is heard to say words to the effect that “I’m taking it slowly as it is very slippery” – not wishing to slide off the taxiway, especially when turning onto the usually very slick runway end, rather than being “overall pretty sanguine about the conditions and was he really in such a hurry to get going”?
Next, “all three pilots agreed that conditions were within limits”. Please read:
“No overarching view of the situation would arise with this mind set, hence it would not be possible to consider that whilst technically within the cross wind limitations, prevailing gusts, low visibility, low cloud base, very heavy rain and a possibly flooded runway would lead to a take off in conditions somewhat different from the steady wind/good viz/dry runway conditions of test flying demonstrations”.
Do I really have to labour this point?
It may be worth mentioning that at this very time of the approaching typhoon front, Canadian Airlines, Eva Airways and Cathay Pacific all deemed it prudent to either cancel or place severe postponements on their flights, whilst only China Airlines – no arbiter of air safety I’m afraid, deemed the conditions suitable for continued flight operations.
Further, “all three crewmembers were well rested” is in error. The captain was one day short of his statutory rest period prior to reporting for SQ006 duty, although you could not be expected to know this (I’m surprised the ASC didn’t!) and I assume you missed my posting of a few days earlier to this effect. Further, Gladiator makes the point that SQ 744 crews have been stretched to the FTL limit of 28 day crew duty time for some time now (as are 777 crews) because of a serious pilot shortage (due to SQ’s antediluvian industrial practices/poor pay) and the cumulative effect of this heavy work pressure and constant time zone change has had and continues to have its adverse effect. Whilst on the subject, please also be assured that the present impasse over pay and conditions between ALPAS and SQ, which has been dragging on for nearly two and a half years is having an effect on most crews – yes, I know there is no evidence to suggest there was an effect on the SQ006 crew. The rancorous feeling amongst the SQ pilot body generated by a feeling of abuse and contempt of that body by the SQ management is producing the lowest morale amongst a pilot force that I have ever seen (35 years worth) and whilst I assume that long term data does not (yet) exist to provide a correlation between low morale of pilot force and susceptibility of a carrier to major accident, I think it would be a very brave man who would publicly state that no such correlation exists.
As to the actual incident as portrayed by the CVR, may I refer you again to my original posting in which I postulate the idea of there being “two thought processes which generate any flying decision made in the course of SQ operations”
1. Whatever happens, I must not take any action which will invite an admonitory/intimidatory phone call from the fleet management and which call will certainly be the culmination of a previously conducted, secret investigation involving the sustained interrogation of the FO(s) in an effort to establish inconsistency of story which could then lead to an adverse report being attached to a personal file/demotion without appeal or summary dismissal.
2. Under all circumstances, cover yourself by conducting operations absolutely within a highly legalistic interpretation of limitations and procedure without taking any overview or exercising any judgement, both of which will, necessarily, be subjective and hence open to fleet evaluation and criticism after any event.
I would suggest that perhaps a combination of the two thought processes prevailed on the night. The captain and crew were concerned with the weather and hence susceptible to the distraction that this would generate but masked this concern from each other (and perhaps themselves), in their desire to cause nil delay, with stylised SQ banter. They were however concerned to legalistically “cover themselves” and make sure that they were “within limits”. Hence mind set 2 also came into effect.
However, more ominously, if we completely disregard the above and the captain and crew indeed did not regard the prevailing weather as anything out of the ordinary, is this then not the most damning indictment possible against an SQ training philosophy that does not continually stress that operation in such adverse weather is to be treated with extreme caution, concurrent with the exercise of sound judgement? Indeed it is understood that the captain regaled his FO’s with details of an ANC take off “in far worse conditions”. Hmmm!
Unfortunately – you are again not to know this – such exercise of sound judgment is paid lip service in SQ. Crews are expected to depart and arrive on time and if not “we want to know the extremely good reason why not”. Gladiator and Titan – both experienced survivors of SQ, are entirely correct in their statements to this effect and their corollary view that such corporate stance places great psychological pressure on crews.
Similarly, their statements as to the mindset of local captains and first officers is absolutely accurate – as Titan says, however, you must have been in SQ to know exactly what this means. Therefore, I would ask you to accept as the complete truth that the Singaporean (yes I know the Straits Times said he was Malaysian) captain would never have dreamt of delaying the flight in case of sanction/adverse report from his reporting manager or even the FO (please again be assured this is perfectly possible – the system encompasses such reporting). Similarly the Singaporean FO - again you are not to know this – was fast tracked to stardom before the accident and NO WAY was he ever going to say anything which might generate even the slightest whiff of dissent that could then enter his non-accessible, secret squirrel personal file, maintained on all flight personnel. Such dissent would include demurral of the captain’s judgement to take off in the prevailing conditions. Hence the unfortunate Taiwanese press phraseology which I previously referred to, whilst inaccurately reporting that there was a heated CVR interchange between “overbearing” captain and a “subjugated” first officer on the subject, inadvertently but accurately reported the net effect on the flight of a much more muted and subtle interchange, that present day technology could only partially pick up.
Moving on, may I suggest that we are all in complete agreement that the accident happened because the crew lined up on the wrong runway and subsequently attempted a take off. The key question is then, why?
Now perhaps I understand that your suggestion as to “why” is that it was not because of any other reason than irregularities in the ground lighting system/taxiway markings (by default, the only other reason for the accident) that misled the pilots into such erroneous line up and subsequent catastrophic take off and, hence, “could have happened at any airline”. If I may say so, your leap of reasoning tritely discounts the possibility of any other cause for the accident than that this captain and crew (and by extension all captains and crews) were merely passive and uncomplaining users of a ground lighting system that hopefully may (or may not) have led them by the nose to the correct point on the airport for an intended take off, rather than them being wholly responsible, through the use of all available resources (charts, ATC instructions, internal aircraft systems, ground lighting systems, taxiway markings, familiarity with the airport, discussion between themselves, guidance by ground marshallers, common sense/airmanship) for the safe navigation of the aircraft on the ground to the correct take off position – in this case runway 05L. Such discounting, I can, however, understand as you were, hitherto, I believe, unaware of the national cultural/SQ culture dimensions affecting CRM, that my co-posters and I have now brought to your attention. I therefore maintain that the fact of their failure to line up on the correct runway, given that they are actively responsible (they most certainly were) for navigational accuracy, indicates that some distraction was present, to so prevent the correct line up on runway 05L. If we accept this, the key question then is “what was the distraction”?
My humble submission is that the extreme weather conditions, which the crew (perhaps subliminally) knew they should not have countenanced as suitable for take off, caused the fatal distraction at a time when they were grappling with a difficult ground navigation situation. If the crew had been operating in a culture/company more sympathetic to the exercise of good judgement/airmanship, they would firstly have not felt pressured to move off on schedule (please be assured that despite the “sanguine” tone of the CVR, they were) and secondly they would have felt relaxed about sensibly awaiting a weather improvement following frontal passage, when they would have been able to make a routine un-distracted take off from the correct runway. Please see my reference to the Kuching overrun accident in my first posting – If the crew (local) had held clear of the airport for 10-15 minutes before making an approach, they would have landed, un-distracted and safely, in clear weather and on a partially dry runway. They would, however, have been behind schedule on arrival – unbearable to contemplate! As it was, they landed distracted, on time, but half way down the runway in the middle of a local rain-storm and went off the end – see what we’re getting at?
To close, I’d like to make it crystal clear that I can imagine myself making catastrophic errors of the magnitude demonstrated by the SQ006 crew and I’m sure that any other thinking pilot feels the same. I’m also abundantly certain that rational pilots (of whom I count myself) will at all times strive to avoid such ghastly traps and will use, if unfettered by dogma/cultural constraints, all their experience, skill and airmanship to so avoid these traps. Hence, for these reasons of dogma/culture, I see the SQ006 trio just as much victims of circumstance as the passengers who were caught up in the fateful events of the night.
Finally, Rockhound, your less than temperate petty crowing to the effect “hey gladiator you're changing your tune. Now it's bad visibility first, SQ company culture second” is both insulting to an experienced, knowledgeable and courageous poster who is patiently attempting to give you solid facts, plus trivialising to a subject which I’m sure you will have finally noticed, professional airmen are now considering in deadly earnest.
However, I had the unexpected opportunity to make my brief and hasty post of 2 March in which I revealed (in very much muted fashion) a friend’s reaction to Rockhound’s postings of 28 Feb and 1 March, which emerged earlier last week over the course of conversation at a common slip station. My view of the reaction was as stated and I did indeed argue that Rockhound could be the “genuine article” and as such, providing worthwhile debating points. Notwithstanding, following some thought, I decided to post the reaction on the twin basis that it serves us all well to realise that genuine emotion is generated by the apparent trivialisation of events which surround the SQ006 disaster – and I point out Rockhound’s trivialisation a little later - and similarly strong emotion is generated by the possibility of a “gloss over attempt” by SQ management, through the medium of phoney postings.
Te Rangi. Thanks for your note. Please be assured that my composure has been and remains completely intact. I agree entirely that Rockhound’s knowledge of our trade is laudatory (this detailed knowledge gave rise to my friend’s “wannabe” comment) and I agree absolutely with your view that “the sound interchange of ideas is what a public forum is all about”. Please see my note to Rockhound, below, most of which I roughed out a day or so before your posting. I hope also that Gladiator’s writing will demonstrate to you why the flight wasn’t cancelled in the first place and what would have happened to the captain subsequently - it is absolutely correct.
Aerostar. Thanks also for your post – contents noted. I similarly hope that my writings provide answers to your questions.
Rockhound
Thank you very much for your posting of 2 March in which you proffer your assurances that you are the “genuine article”. I certainly accept your bona fides and my American friend sends his regrets in respect of the intemperate expressions he used on first reading your postings and which expressions I subsequently relayed in my last posting. I now write in reply to these earlier postings of 28 Feb and 1 March in respect of your conclusions as to what did not cause the SQ006 disaster. May I say that as a member of the non-aviation public, you serve us all well by sparking both more debate and an increasingly forensic approach to our collective thinking. Similarly, if you had been a member of the SQ flt ops management/SQ PR department, artlessly posing as the former, then you would deserve equally to be thanked for assisting in the crystallisation of all our views and the ready articulation of them on this site. Therefore, please do not feel the need to “lie low” – you would not serve either the cause of free speech or that of aviation safety if you did so – please “keep ‘em coming” but also please heed my note at the end of this posting.
Before I move to answer your postings, may I say that the Taiwanese Aviation Safety Council Report is a “factual” report and no conclusions as to the cause of the crash are reached. We, however, are all trying to pre-empt this report and ascribe cause(s), using gleaned knowledge of the case and as much experience as we can muster. However I guess we will all have to wait for the potentially more contentious document that will be produced and available by year-end, which will state such causal conclusions and prove us individually right or wrong.
Next, I had intended writing a very detailed piece but reflection brought a realisation that I’ve already said everything in previous postings and that what I may have missed or not emphasised sufficiently, my estimable co-posters, Gladiator, Titan, Gaunty, Farside and Sia Sniffer have all filled in or emphasised. So, I will try to keep it short and rather than describe in detail, merely make reference to postings on given dates.
I hope that you will not be insulted if I say – in reverse order of your posting - that, (i) yes, you are “missing something” (ii) what has been said [albeit in a Taiwanese newspaper] is not, as you state, “complete and utter garbage” but merely the subject of unfortunate phraseology. Further, your glossy summing of “what seems to me that” is similarly in error. Allow me to elucidate.
I’m afraid that you miss the point entirely - “all three crewmembers were satisfied that they were on the correct runway” is not the case. First Officer Latif Cyrano stated that the PVD “indicated a discrepancy” and you then glibly dismiss the significance of this by saying that “but as I understand it, use of the PVD is not mandatory”. The point is that Cyrano noticed evidence to indicate that all was not well but did not pursue the point when the captain said that it did not matter – precisely because it was the captain who said it! He would, however, be harbouring his unspoken doubts on the subject, whilst events unfolded. This is a cultural issue that Gladiator and Titan have ceaselessly laboured and on which maybe I can expand later. Further, the third seat FO would similarly make no comment, following the captain’s judgement on the matter.
On the contrary, the captain appeared NOT to be “appropriately concerned with the weather”. The CVR transcript in fact demonstrated a remarkable levity amongst the crew in the face of a weather situation of the utmost gravity. If I may remind professional readers of conditions which prevailed on the night of 31 Oct 2000, by referring them to my original posting on this thread, they will be able to concur. For those non-professionals reading, please be assured that the conditions on the night were exceptional and worthy of the greatest respect by any operating crew.
I quote my first posting further:
“Apocryphal evidence indicates that the apron was flooded at the time and this would perhaps lead to the supposition that the runways may also have been in a similar condition, in light of the approaching typhoon front. Similarly the aircraft was reportedly strongly buffeted by high winds whilst still at the gate”.
I do believe that the CVR transcript bears out the crews’ appreciation of taxi conditions as the captain is heard to say words to the effect that “I’m taking it slowly as it is very slippery” – not wishing to slide off the taxiway, especially when turning onto the usually very slick runway end, rather than being “overall pretty sanguine about the conditions and was he really in such a hurry to get going”?
Next, “all three pilots agreed that conditions were within limits”. Please read:
“No overarching view of the situation would arise with this mind set, hence it would not be possible to consider that whilst technically within the cross wind limitations, prevailing gusts, low visibility, low cloud base, very heavy rain and a possibly flooded runway would lead to a take off in conditions somewhat different from the steady wind/good viz/dry runway conditions of test flying demonstrations”.
Do I really have to labour this point?
It may be worth mentioning that at this very time of the approaching typhoon front, Canadian Airlines, Eva Airways and Cathay Pacific all deemed it prudent to either cancel or place severe postponements on their flights, whilst only China Airlines – no arbiter of air safety I’m afraid, deemed the conditions suitable for continued flight operations.
Further, “all three crewmembers were well rested” is in error. The captain was one day short of his statutory rest period prior to reporting for SQ006 duty, although you could not be expected to know this (I’m surprised the ASC didn’t!) and I assume you missed my posting of a few days earlier to this effect. Further, Gladiator makes the point that SQ 744 crews have been stretched to the FTL limit of 28 day crew duty time for some time now (as are 777 crews) because of a serious pilot shortage (due to SQ’s antediluvian industrial practices/poor pay) and the cumulative effect of this heavy work pressure and constant time zone change has had and continues to have its adverse effect. Whilst on the subject, please also be assured that the present impasse over pay and conditions between ALPAS and SQ, which has been dragging on for nearly two and a half years is having an effect on most crews – yes, I know there is no evidence to suggest there was an effect on the SQ006 crew. The rancorous feeling amongst the SQ pilot body generated by a feeling of abuse and contempt of that body by the SQ management is producing the lowest morale amongst a pilot force that I have ever seen (35 years worth) and whilst I assume that long term data does not (yet) exist to provide a correlation between low morale of pilot force and susceptibility of a carrier to major accident, I think it would be a very brave man who would publicly state that no such correlation exists.
As to the actual incident as portrayed by the CVR, may I refer you again to my original posting in which I postulate the idea of there being “two thought processes which generate any flying decision made in the course of SQ operations”
1. Whatever happens, I must not take any action which will invite an admonitory/intimidatory phone call from the fleet management and which call will certainly be the culmination of a previously conducted, secret investigation involving the sustained interrogation of the FO(s) in an effort to establish inconsistency of story which could then lead to an adverse report being attached to a personal file/demotion without appeal or summary dismissal.
2. Under all circumstances, cover yourself by conducting operations absolutely within a highly legalistic interpretation of limitations and procedure without taking any overview or exercising any judgement, both of which will, necessarily, be subjective and hence open to fleet evaluation and criticism after any event.
I would suggest that perhaps a combination of the two thought processes prevailed on the night. The captain and crew were concerned with the weather and hence susceptible to the distraction that this would generate but masked this concern from each other (and perhaps themselves), in their desire to cause nil delay, with stylised SQ banter. They were however concerned to legalistically “cover themselves” and make sure that they were “within limits”. Hence mind set 2 also came into effect.
However, more ominously, if we completely disregard the above and the captain and crew indeed did not regard the prevailing weather as anything out of the ordinary, is this then not the most damning indictment possible against an SQ training philosophy that does not continually stress that operation in such adverse weather is to be treated with extreme caution, concurrent with the exercise of sound judgement? Indeed it is understood that the captain regaled his FO’s with details of an ANC take off “in far worse conditions”. Hmmm!
Unfortunately – you are again not to know this – such exercise of sound judgment is paid lip service in SQ. Crews are expected to depart and arrive on time and if not “we want to know the extremely good reason why not”. Gladiator and Titan – both experienced survivors of SQ, are entirely correct in their statements to this effect and their corollary view that such corporate stance places great psychological pressure on crews.
Similarly, their statements as to the mindset of local captains and first officers is absolutely accurate – as Titan says, however, you must have been in SQ to know exactly what this means. Therefore, I would ask you to accept as the complete truth that the Singaporean (yes I know the Straits Times said he was Malaysian) captain would never have dreamt of delaying the flight in case of sanction/adverse report from his reporting manager or even the FO (please again be assured this is perfectly possible – the system encompasses such reporting). Similarly the Singaporean FO - again you are not to know this – was fast tracked to stardom before the accident and NO WAY was he ever going to say anything which might generate even the slightest whiff of dissent that could then enter his non-accessible, secret squirrel personal file, maintained on all flight personnel. Such dissent would include demurral of the captain’s judgement to take off in the prevailing conditions. Hence the unfortunate Taiwanese press phraseology which I previously referred to, whilst inaccurately reporting that there was a heated CVR interchange between “overbearing” captain and a “subjugated” first officer on the subject, inadvertently but accurately reported the net effect on the flight of a much more muted and subtle interchange, that present day technology could only partially pick up.
Moving on, may I suggest that we are all in complete agreement that the accident happened because the crew lined up on the wrong runway and subsequently attempted a take off. The key question is then, why?
Now perhaps I understand that your suggestion as to “why” is that it was not because of any other reason than irregularities in the ground lighting system/taxiway markings (by default, the only other reason for the accident) that misled the pilots into such erroneous line up and subsequent catastrophic take off and, hence, “could have happened at any airline”. If I may say so, your leap of reasoning tritely discounts the possibility of any other cause for the accident than that this captain and crew (and by extension all captains and crews) were merely passive and uncomplaining users of a ground lighting system that hopefully may (or may not) have led them by the nose to the correct point on the airport for an intended take off, rather than them being wholly responsible, through the use of all available resources (charts, ATC instructions, internal aircraft systems, ground lighting systems, taxiway markings, familiarity with the airport, discussion between themselves, guidance by ground marshallers, common sense/airmanship) for the safe navigation of the aircraft on the ground to the correct take off position – in this case runway 05L. Such discounting, I can, however, understand as you were, hitherto, I believe, unaware of the national cultural/SQ culture dimensions affecting CRM, that my co-posters and I have now brought to your attention. I therefore maintain that the fact of their failure to line up on the correct runway, given that they are actively responsible (they most certainly were) for navigational accuracy, indicates that some distraction was present, to so prevent the correct line up on runway 05L. If we accept this, the key question then is “what was the distraction”?
My humble submission is that the extreme weather conditions, which the crew (perhaps subliminally) knew they should not have countenanced as suitable for take off, caused the fatal distraction at a time when they were grappling with a difficult ground navigation situation. If the crew had been operating in a culture/company more sympathetic to the exercise of good judgement/airmanship, they would firstly have not felt pressured to move off on schedule (please be assured that despite the “sanguine” tone of the CVR, they were) and secondly they would have felt relaxed about sensibly awaiting a weather improvement following frontal passage, when they would have been able to make a routine un-distracted take off from the correct runway. Please see my reference to the Kuching overrun accident in my first posting – If the crew (local) had held clear of the airport for 10-15 minutes before making an approach, they would have landed, un-distracted and safely, in clear weather and on a partially dry runway. They would, however, have been behind schedule on arrival – unbearable to contemplate! As it was, they landed distracted, on time, but half way down the runway in the middle of a local rain-storm and went off the end – see what we’re getting at?
To close, I’d like to make it crystal clear that I can imagine myself making catastrophic errors of the magnitude demonstrated by the SQ006 crew and I’m sure that any other thinking pilot feels the same. I’m also abundantly certain that rational pilots (of whom I count myself) will at all times strive to avoid such ghastly traps and will use, if unfettered by dogma/cultural constraints, all their experience, skill and airmanship to so avoid these traps. Hence, for these reasons of dogma/culture, I see the SQ006 trio just as much victims of circumstance as the passengers who were caught up in the fateful events of the night.
Finally, Rockhound, your less than temperate petty crowing to the effect “hey gladiator you're changing your tune. Now it's bad visibility first, SQ company culture second” is both insulting to an experienced, knowledgeable and courageous poster who is patiently attempting to give you solid facts, plus trivialising to a subject which I’m sure you will have finally noticed, professional airmen are now considering in deadly earnest.
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All are concentrating on the culture as a reason for the accident, and blaming the decision to depart under the weather conditions as contributing. But IMHO neither was important compared to the real error, which was simply that of taking off on the wrong runway. The captain made the mistake, and the crew did not call him on it. SQ does not have the monopoly on mistakes, and neither does it have the only compliant crews.
Taking off and landing on the wrong runway is a constant danger and we all must guard against it. In this case, the airport documents show the layout clearly and there is no way a reasonable pilot would make this mistake if he took the time to study them. The taxiway does not lead to 05R; it leads to 05L. The pilot had to turn off the normal taxiway early to line up on 05R. The lights, runway markings, geometry and so on are not confusing, even in bad weather.
There has to be a different reason for the error, and if we concentrate on the distractions raised so far we will never find it out.
The weather reports were within company limits, and almost all pilots would have decided to go. It is unfair to second guess the pilots on this descision, and in fact the weather was not a factor (at least the rain and wind were not a factor, only the visibility had any effect, and that was not any worse than we see many times a month.)
And what about the reports that other pilots (CI?) saw the airplane line up and begin to takeoff on the wrong runway without saying anything to the crew concerned? Surely that deserves an answer.
Since this accident I have seen reports of at least one other landing on the wrong runway (in Europe) but it has not been the subject of debate here. Maybe it should. One airline I know about has issued a rule that the pilots are to call out the runway heading to each other when lining up as a preventive measure against the SQ accident, despite the fact that this would not have made a blind bit of difference under the conditions they had (both runways had the same heading); another example of twisted thinking.
Will we ever see truth here? I doubt it.
Taking off and landing on the wrong runway is a constant danger and we all must guard against it. In this case, the airport documents show the layout clearly and there is no way a reasonable pilot would make this mistake if he took the time to study them. The taxiway does not lead to 05R; it leads to 05L. The pilot had to turn off the normal taxiway early to line up on 05R. The lights, runway markings, geometry and so on are not confusing, even in bad weather.
There has to be a different reason for the error, and if we concentrate on the distractions raised so far we will never find it out.
The weather reports were within company limits, and almost all pilots would have decided to go. It is unfair to second guess the pilots on this descision, and in fact the weather was not a factor (at least the rain and wind were not a factor, only the visibility had any effect, and that was not any worse than we see many times a month.)
And what about the reports that other pilots (CI?) saw the airplane line up and begin to takeoff on the wrong runway without saying anything to the crew concerned? Surely that deserves an answer.
Since this accident I have seen reports of at least one other landing on the wrong runway (in Europe) but it has not been the subject of debate here. Maybe it should. One airline I know about has issued a rule that the pilots are to call out the runway heading to each other when lining up as a preventive measure against the SQ accident, despite the fact that this would not have made a blind bit of difference under the conditions they had (both runways had the same heading); another example of twisted thinking.
Will we ever see truth here? I doubt it.