Report on 1999 B757 crash at Girona finally published
Join Date: May 1999
Location: Runcorn,Cheshire,England
Posts: 195
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
At least Boeing allow you to make that decision. Once needed to use full speedbrake with cruise power enroute fron
DAR to EBB, in a 767, approx 1hour flt time, it's a great way of increasing the fuel burn to get below max landing weight. Guess in the bus you'd have been hanging around for hours in the hold..
p.s. sos about the thread creep.
DAR to EBB, in a 767, approx 1hour flt time, it's a great way of increasing the fuel burn to get below max landing weight. Guess in the bus you'd have been hanging around for hours in the hold..
p.s. sos about the thread creep.
Join Date: Dec 2000
Location: Somerset
Posts: 78
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
As a Training Captain with the airline concerned I have been following this thread with considerable interest and feel that there is just one point I can add to this fascinating discussion.
It has been my pleasure to know, fly with, and sim check both these pilots in the past and I certainly considered them to have been above average. The F/O had lowish hours and lacked experience (but then don't we all at some stage) but was enthusiastic. keen to learn, well prepared and, in short, just the sort of F/O most of us would choose to fly with given the choice.
The Captain I have been professionally acquainted with for over thirty years (from the days when he was an RAF VC10 Captain) and is one of the most highly regarded pilots I have come across in over 40 years in aviation. What frightens me most is that if it can happen this way to these two blokes, what real hope is there for the rest of us when the chips are down.
I now wait with baited breath for 411A to explain to me what a lousy trainer I have been all these years!
It has been my pleasure to know, fly with, and sim check both these pilots in the past and I certainly considered them to have been above average. The F/O had lowish hours and lacked experience (but then don't we all at some stage) but was enthusiastic. keen to learn, well prepared and, in short, just the sort of F/O most of us would choose to fly with given the choice.
The Captain I have been professionally acquainted with for over thirty years (from the days when he was an RAF VC10 Captain) and is one of the most highly regarded pilots I have come across in over 40 years in aviation. What frightens me most is that if it can happen this way to these two blokes, what real hope is there for the rest of us when the chips are down.
I now wait with baited breath for 411A to explain to me what a lousy trainer I have been all these years!
Scimitar. having done the training captain but for circa ten years, I understand how you feel.
However, my take on this is that, in terms of promotion to command, we know that even your best prospect might make a mistake since he/she is only human and the system will never be perfect. But if they do screw up, at least you can put hand on heart and say you did everything possible to ensure it would not happen.
Unlike the case where one might be tempted to let a "marginal" candidate through in which case you would never forgive yourself if anything went wrong.
In psychological terms there is a difference, of course, between one's "espoused theory" - what you SAY you would do in a specific situation and one's "theory in use" - what you ACTUALLY do when faced with the same situation. As human beings we get round this paradox by "rationalising" - "Ah well, I did it that way because....etc".
That is precisely what is happening on this thread, I venture to suggest. We are all SAYING well if it had been me I would have done so and so but you don't know what you might have ACTUALLY done until you are there!
In training we attempt to circumnavigate (no pun intended) this by actually placing pilots in the sim to see what they ACTUALLY do and then we can discuss and debrief etc and run the scenario again with, perhaps, a different outcome.
Problem is that in the "real" world we often only get one shot at it and hindsight is a great thing. All we can do when "it" happens is to try and learn from "it" to prevent future occurences. It is perhaps ironic that this accident happened to one of the most professional and safety conscious airlines in the world but as my son keeps telling me, sometime "s**t happens"!
However, my take on this is that, in terms of promotion to command, we know that even your best prospect might make a mistake since he/she is only human and the system will never be perfect. But if they do screw up, at least you can put hand on heart and say you did everything possible to ensure it would not happen.
Unlike the case where one might be tempted to let a "marginal" candidate through in which case you would never forgive yourself if anything went wrong.
In psychological terms there is a difference, of course, between one's "espoused theory" - what you SAY you would do in a specific situation and one's "theory in use" - what you ACTUALLY do when faced with the same situation. As human beings we get round this paradox by "rationalising" - "Ah well, I did it that way because....etc".
That is precisely what is happening on this thread, I venture to suggest. We are all SAYING well if it had been me I would have done so and so but you don't know what you might have ACTUALLY done until you are there!
In training we attempt to circumnavigate (no pun intended) this by actually placing pilots in the sim to see what they ACTUALLY do and then we can discuss and debrief etc and run the scenario again with, perhaps, a different outcome.
Problem is that in the "real" world we often only get one shot at it and hindsight is a great thing. All we can do when "it" happens is to try and learn from "it" to prevent future occurences. It is perhaps ironic that this accident happened to one of the most professional and safety conscious airlines in the world but as my son keeps telling me, sometime "s**t happens"!
Join Date: Oct 1999
Location: Kent UK
Posts: 10
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
Dear Scimitar we have obviously flown together and I absolutelyl agree. Good guys. Dark night, turbulence , rain, vibration, even with loads of skill, bad luck. It could happen to happen to any one of us. Just keep crossing those fingers. And if you haven't been there do please stop writing about a place you can not possibly comprehend. Those that have understand.
Join Date: Oct 2004
Location: Canada
Posts: 52
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
My Thoughts …
Boeing must improve cockpit floor design.
Boeing should build a warning into their aircraft to alert crew if the thrust is increasing whilst the speedbrake is extended.
Companies must stop applying so much pressure to captains about fuel carried … at that time letters and phone calls from management were a regular feature of life in many companies.
Company fuel policy must include sensible allowances when CBs are forecast at destination and alternates.
The flight crew should have carried a minimum of one hours extra holding fuel (about 3.3 t on the 757).
Given the actual weather at arrival in GRN the descent should not have continued below FL100 until conditions improved.
The FO should have flown the approach. This would have given the captain far greater capacity to monitor the big picture. If the VOR/DME approach had been flown accurately the aircraft might well have landed safely first time.
On the ILS approach the weather radar should have remained on and the autopilot should have been used as late as possible. The aircraft could even have autolanded!!!!
On a manual approach, once you lose visual contact near the ground, you go around … end of story.
The crew could then have diverted to Barcelona.
Everyone should stop criticising the Spanish authorities … their facilities met ICAO standards on the night. Would a UK airport have done any better given the massive CB that was sitting over the field … I personally have experienced lighting failures twice in the UK (fortunately not at the very late stage that occurred in this instance).
Finally, the excellent Flight editorial on the Gerona accident should be made compulsory reading for all aviators.
There, but for the grace of God go any of us.
Boeing must improve cockpit floor design.
Boeing should build a warning into their aircraft to alert crew if the thrust is increasing whilst the speedbrake is extended.
Companies must stop applying so much pressure to captains about fuel carried … at that time letters and phone calls from management were a regular feature of life in many companies.
Company fuel policy must include sensible allowances when CBs are forecast at destination and alternates.
The flight crew should have carried a minimum of one hours extra holding fuel (about 3.3 t on the 757).
Given the actual weather at arrival in GRN the descent should not have continued below FL100 until conditions improved.
The FO should have flown the approach. This would have given the captain far greater capacity to monitor the big picture. If the VOR/DME approach had been flown accurately the aircraft might well have landed safely first time.
On the ILS approach the weather radar should have remained on and the autopilot should have been used as late as possible. The aircraft could even have autolanded!!!!
On a manual approach, once you lose visual contact near the ground, you go around … end of story.
The crew could then have diverted to Barcelona.
Everyone should stop criticising the Spanish authorities … their facilities met ICAO standards on the night. Would a UK airport have done any better given the massive CB that was sitting over the field … I personally have experienced lighting failures twice in the UK (fortunately not at the very late stage that occurred in this instance).
Finally, the excellent Flight editorial on the Gerona accident should be made compulsory reading for all aviators.
There, but for the grace of God go any of us.
