"Drug found in Pilots of Jet Crash"
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Thanks for the link TG, I've just started reading it and it's very interesting.
As you've spotted before, there seem to be a lot of holes in the report indeed. I am quite susprised as I find most AAIB reports to be of very good standard. There seem to be a lot of contradictions in the facts they quoted, e.g. hours, time etc.
Cheers.
NN
As you've spotted before, there seem to be a lot of holes in the report indeed. I am quite susprised as I find most AAIB reports to be of very good standard. There seem to be a lot of contradictions in the facts they quoted, e.g. hours, time etc.
Cheers.
NN
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hello everyone.... I'm Jar ops qualifyed CRM and Human Factor instructor, and both flying with two Captains and under influence of any kind of drugs, should be REMARKED more and more during CRM sessions....a lot of other problems can happens during thr flight. The fact that 2 Capt find difficulties on their own role is very important and leads to forget F/O duties. This shouldn't happen obviously, but I find awful that all the responsibilities are strictly connected with medicines that 2 pilots dead ( so not able to defense themselves) assuned before the flight! I agree that the time should pass after taking sleeping pills or antihyistaminic is quite long, but once again I think that Pilots in general should be advised by their phisycians...and this is an argument that CRM should treat more than now (together with the fact that 2 Captains together are not really safe for fly....).
In this case other factors i.e. ice, worsened the situation and I don't find right to give all the fault to Pilots...as long as they are humans not machines!!!!!
Skunkie
In this case other factors i.e. ice, worsened the situation and I don't find right to give all the fault to Pilots...as long as they are humans not machines!!!!!
Skunkie
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Skunkie, I don't think anyone here was blaming the pilots as such. I certainly wasn't. If you saw my discussion of the effects of diphenhydramine as blaming the pilots for having ingested these substances, that was not the case. My view is that had they needed to ingest substances to assist them with sleep due to the effects of jet-lag and needing to sleep, as it was quoted to be the likely purpose of taking them in the AAIB report, it was more the problem at the organisational level than the problem that the pilots "caused" as such. By saying “organisational level”, I am talking about the regulations that permit them to work these hours, and rostering practice. I am not totally alien to the concept of sleep deprivation, fatigue inducing rosters etc and I do see that there are major problems in the current FTL.
After all, it was stated in the AAIB report that there was no warning of possible impairment on the packet - it just said to avoid mixing with alcohol. Pilots are not medical professionals and they cannot be expected to know everything about every medicine they might take (although one would hope that they would exercise common sense when taking something). If you read the report, it made safety recommendations about giving proper warnings on medicine packets etc. I got the impression that the AAIB report did deal with failure of the systems (I don't mean aircraft system here, but the whole organisational system including the lack of warning from FDA regarding the effects of the medicine, and the strange point made about "polished frost" by FAA etc).
I think it would be quite important to focus on WHY some pilots are needing to turn to pharmaceutical aid to sleeping. I would hazard a guess that in many cases, it is as a result of sleep disturbance and fatigue caused by rostering and/or circadian dysrhythmia. Often, one would find that being fatigued does not necessarily mean that one could easily get to sleep. Fatigue seems to be cited more and more as a contributory factor to accidents nowadays, and I think it is about time the authorities re-examined why fatigue-inducing patterns are still permitted despite all the evidence presented by aviation medics and psychologists that many rostering practices permissible under various FTL systems are fatigue-inducing.
Having said that, education on the effects of medicines (prescription and non-prescription) on flying, would be very beneficial. You suggested that they should be advised by their physicians. That’s all fine, but it is quite hard to see a physician about every non-prescription medicine someone would take (for instance, in the UK it can take days before one can see a GP, and it would cost some money to see one in Australia). A better plan would be for the aviation authorities to issue clearer guidelines on certain medicines that have a potential to affect alertness or other aspects of a person pertinent to flight safety. I feel this would be particularly important for non-prescription medicines as it would be harder to be guided by a physician than regarding prescription medicine.
As for the issue of two captains flying together, I guess avoiding rostering them together as much as possible, and education and awareness would be the key. At least being made aware of the potential problems would mean that they would be more alert to them and can take preventative actions. It is at times hard for companies to avoid rostering two captains together and therefore the pilots should receive at least some sort of training.
Skunkie, out of curiosity, what do you feel about this company’s practice of permitting non-commander handling pilot to fly from the left hand seat, from the CRM and human factors point of view?
It is very unfortunate that the media chose to sensationalise the findings by reporting it the way it did, but I guess that’s what they do - make things sound newsworthy.
Cheers,
NN
After all, it was stated in the AAIB report that there was no warning of possible impairment on the packet - it just said to avoid mixing with alcohol. Pilots are not medical professionals and they cannot be expected to know everything about every medicine they might take (although one would hope that they would exercise common sense when taking something). If you read the report, it made safety recommendations about giving proper warnings on medicine packets etc. I got the impression that the AAIB report did deal with failure of the systems (I don't mean aircraft system here, but the whole organisational system including the lack of warning from FDA regarding the effects of the medicine, and the strange point made about "polished frost" by FAA etc).
I think it would be quite important to focus on WHY some pilots are needing to turn to pharmaceutical aid to sleeping. I would hazard a guess that in many cases, it is as a result of sleep disturbance and fatigue caused by rostering and/or circadian dysrhythmia. Often, one would find that being fatigued does not necessarily mean that one could easily get to sleep. Fatigue seems to be cited more and more as a contributory factor to accidents nowadays, and I think it is about time the authorities re-examined why fatigue-inducing patterns are still permitted despite all the evidence presented by aviation medics and psychologists that many rostering practices permissible under various FTL systems are fatigue-inducing.
Having said that, education on the effects of medicines (prescription and non-prescription) on flying, would be very beneficial. You suggested that they should be advised by their physicians. That’s all fine, but it is quite hard to see a physician about every non-prescription medicine someone would take (for instance, in the UK it can take days before one can see a GP, and it would cost some money to see one in Australia). A better plan would be for the aviation authorities to issue clearer guidelines on certain medicines that have a potential to affect alertness or other aspects of a person pertinent to flight safety. I feel this would be particularly important for non-prescription medicines as it would be harder to be guided by a physician than regarding prescription medicine.
As for the issue of two captains flying together, I guess avoiding rostering them together as much as possible, and education and awareness would be the key. At least being made aware of the potential problems would mean that they would be more alert to them and can take preventative actions. It is at times hard for companies to avoid rostering two captains together and therefore the pilots should receive at least some sort of training.
Skunkie, out of curiosity, what do you feel about this company’s practice of permitting non-commander handling pilot to fly from the left hand seat, from the CRM and human factors point of view?
It is very unfortunate that the media chose to sensationalise the findings by reporting it the way it did, but I guess that’s what they do - make things sound newsworthy.
Cheers,
NN
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NN I perfectly agree with u! I didn't mean anyone was pointing out pilots in this thread (at least it doesn't seem to me...) but I know what can do medias emphasisying on one point of a whole accident!
I've been flying 14 years while studying pharmacology and medicine in general that's why I'm so touched by this discussion.
To answer your other question... well I simply think it is WRONG! Unfortunately many people has not the same idea! there is a deep difference between flying on right seat as an instructor or flying as First Officer, but companies (in general, and nowadays always more) seem to look only at economic questions (until something happens....)
In 1993 I was on a plane that tried two landings on an island, wind was 45 knots gusts over 60 from left side, structure limit I think about 30 knots....Captain seated on left side was flying that a/c for the 2nd time and Captain on right seat ....well I think he was simply scared like dead of the other and luckily quite experienced, but first attempt to land he did F/O work and the result was a kind of kangaroo touch down and then go ahead. Second attempt (same conditions and same runway) was a 7 crash/touch then Captain/pilot took commands and plane crashed out of runway but no injuries...it was classified as heavy landing and never revealed to authorities as we had no passengers and I was the only witness......there's a lot to say about that day, but I always remember the fact that maybe a Captain and a Pilot would have acted in another way.
another fact that let me think is the Alitalia accident in zurich in 1992...the procedure of flying on QFE instead of QNH was changed then...an was changed also another thing: pilot could take commands immediately and in case explain later (possibly on ground...) and it was forbidden to try a landing in the same place after the 2nd go ahead...3 things that I think basic and it was only 12 years ago....
Skunkie
I've been flying 14 years while studying pharmacology and medicine in general that's why I'm so touched by this discussion.
To answer your other question... well I simply think it is WRONG! Unfortunately many people has not the same idea! there is a deep difference between flying on right seat as an instructor or flying as First Officer, but companies (in general, and nowadays always more) seem to look only at economic questions (until something happens....)
In 1993 I was on a plane that tried two landings on an island, wind was 45 knots gusts over 60 from left side, structure limit I think about 30 knots....Captain seated on left side was flying that a/c for the 2nd time and Captain on right seat ....well I think he was simply scared like dead of the other and luckily quite experienced, but first attempt to land he did F/O work and the result was a kind of kangaroo touch down and then go ahead. Second attempt (same conditions and same runway) was a 7 crash/touch then Captain/pilot took commands and plane crashed out of runway but no injuries...it was classified as heavy landing and never revealed to authorities as we had no passengers and I was the only witness......there's a lot to say about that day, but I always remember the fact that maybe a Captain and a Pilot would have acted in another way.
another fact that let me think is the Alitalia accident in zurich in 1992...the procedure of flying on QFE instead of QNH was changed then...an was changed also another thing: pilot could take commands immediately and in case explain later (possibly on ground...) and it was forbidden to try a landing in the same place after the 2nd go ahead...3 things that I think basic and it was only 12 years ago....
Skunkie
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Come on guys
The amount of alcohol and trace of a `drug` used for a cold will have had no affect on their performance once the aircraft had started its take off roll. Far more likely is that it was a cold frosty the guys probably turned up got the APU cranked up, wamed the aircraft up, jackets off a quick walk roundinto that cold still bright morning, saw no ICE on the wing (they looked at) and off they went, the rest is history
I very nearly saw a BRAL J41 get caught out a couple of years back at Aberdeen, remeber when the BA computers crashed, well these guy had to sit on the ramp for about 3 hours in Feb?March? nice day CAVOK as the sun went down the temp plunged, these guys were sat there in their short sleave shirts with warm air pumped in from a ground supply, as i took my seat i could see the wings had frost on them in the apron lights. i thought they might be waiting for the pax to board before de-icing, but no they weren't aware of the frost, after the hostie did a welcome aboard i asked to let me speak to the Captain before he started his engines, as they were already late he wasn't best pleased, but he got the ground engineer(who was already hooked up) to do a check, he confirmed that the wings did now have frost on them and they had to de-ice, as lesson for them, for me and i hope for all. It might be warm when you leave the sunny south, but i gets cold bloody quickly up north, buy a jumper and always do a walk round before you go or get the ground guy to do a last check if there is any doubt
I very nearly saw a BRAL J41 get caught out a couple of years back at Aberdeen, remeber when the BA computers crashed, well these guy had to sit on the ramp for about 3 hours in Feb?March? nice day CAVOK as the sun went down the temp plunged, these guys were sat there in their short sleave shirts with warm air pumped in from a ground supply, as i took my seat i could see the wings had frost on them in the apron lights. i thought they might be waiting for the pax to board before de-icing, but no they weren't aware of the frost, after the hostie did a welcome aboard i asked to let me speak to the Captain before he started his engines, as they were already late he wasn't best pleased, but he got the ground engineer(who was already hooked up) to do a check, he confirmed that the wings did now have frost on them and they had to de-ice, as lesson for them, for me and i hope for all. It might be warm when you leave the sunny south, but i gets cold bloody quickly up north, buy a jumper and always do a walk round before you go or get the ground guy to do a last check if there is any doubt
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Kat Too,
Did you read the report? It does say they knew about the frost... It's the contributory factors to their inaction to deal with frost that is being discussed here.
Skunkie,
Thanks for sharing your story. It was very interesting to read your views on non-commander in LHS and also about the experience you had. From a simplistic point of view, I don't like the idea of frequent seat swapping anyway (slower scans unless the instrument arrangement on the LHS and RHS are the same, differences in situational awareness and in information processing, potential ergonic differences etc, as well as having a different perspective among other things) but it was even more interesting to read the actual experience you had of the danger that it contributed to (along with two captains flying together perspective).
NN
Did you read the report? It does say they knew about the frost... It's the contributory factors to their inaction to deal with frost that is being discussed here.
Skunkie,
Thanks for sharing your story. It was very interesting to read your views on non-commander in LHS and also about the experience you had. From a simplistic point of view, I don't like the idea of frequent seat swapping anyway (slower scans unless the instrument arrangement on the LHS and RHS are the same, differences in situational awareness and in information processing, potential ergonic differences etc, as well as having a different perspective among other things) but it was even more interesting to read the actual experience you had of the danger that it contributed to (along with two captains flying together perspective).
NN
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I wouldn't be too hard on the AAIB... yes the report was perhaps less complete & conclusive than we would like, but the decisions that led the crew to fly are in my view largely inexplicable. They fingered the *possible* contributing factors - fatigue, effects of drugs - I'm not sure what else the AAIB *could* have done/said.
Definitely worth waving around when issues of fatigue and FTL come up for discussion however!
I was moderately impressed with the tests they did which appeared to confirm the APU running had likely led to asymmetric icing as the proximate cause of the unrecoverable roll - that's a very nasty 'gotcha'. Does anyone know of any other accident where *asymmetric* icing was a factor?
R1
Definitely worth waving around when issues of fatigue and FTL come up for discussion however!
I was moderately impressed with the tests they did which appeared to confirm the APU running had likely led to asymmetric icing as the proximate cause of the unrecoverable roll - that's a very nasty 'gotcha'. Does anyone know of any other accident where *asymmetric* icing was a factor?
R1
