"Cabin Crew of Burning Jet not trained to open doors"
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"Cabin Crew of Burning Jet not trained to open doors"
The above headline appeared in this morning's Times in relation to the AAIB's report into the Ryanair suspected engine fire at Stansted in February 2002.
Whilst the headline hardly sounds like an objective comment, the article (based on the AAIB report) still makes pretty distrurbing reading.
The two key points were that the female cabin crew found the two starboard doors too heavy to open with the slides engaged, (the doors were only then opened and the slides deployed with the assistance of other cabin crew) and as the fire was in the starboard engine and the fuselage was down wind of the fire the starboard doors should not have been deployed - indeed 6 passengers were ordered back into the plane off the starboard wing by fire crew
The AAIB found that Ryanair new entrant cabin crew were not properly trained in opening exit doors.
I would have expected the Ryanair response to be - obviously we have revised trained cabin crew training etc etc - but the comment quoted by the Times is rather different :"IF the IAA and the JAA modify existing procedures on the back of this recommendation then we will, of course, like all other airlines, implement new modifications fully." (emphasis added) Is this an appropriate response?
Two points (1) surely Ryanair should ensure that its cabin crew have practised opening the doors in a realistic deployment scenario and (2) how did the plane end up down wind of the fire, and how did the starboard doors get opened (in each case post the Manchester fire AAIB recommendations?
Whilst the headline hardly sounds like an objective comment, the article (based on the AAIB report) still makes pretty distrurbing reading.
The two key points were that the female cabin crew found the two starboard doors too heavy to open with the slides engaged, (the doors were only then opened and the slides deployed with the assistance of other cabin crew) and as the fire was in the starboard engine and the fuselage was down wind of the fire the starboard doors should not have been deployed - indeed 6 passengers were ordered back into the plane off the starboard wing by fire crew
The AAIB found that Ryanair new entrant cabin crew were not properly trained in opening exit doors.
I would have expected the Ryanair response to be - obviously we have revised trained cabin crew training etc etc - but the comment quoted by the Times is rather different :"IF the IAA and the JAA modify existing procedures on the back of this recommendation then we will, of course, like all other airlines, implement new modifications fully." (emphasis added) Is this an appropriate response?
Two points (1) surely Ryanair should ensure that its cabin crew have practised opening the doors in a realistic deployment scenario and (2) how did the plane end up down wind of the fire, and how did the starboard doors get opened (in each case post the Manchester fire AAIB recommendations?
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Thats really strange.
If the doors are armed and are attempted to open, they do so easily on power assist. So how can that be to heavy?
Also I have always found that with adrenaline you can open anything!
This does perhaps put FR's training expertise in to doubt.
If the doors are armed and are attempted to open, they do so easily on power assist. So how can that be to heavy?
Also I have always found that with adrenaline you can open anything!
This does perhaps put FR's training expertise in to doubt.
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Sammy
My recollection of the 737 series (certainly -200,-300,-400) is that there is no power assist unlike on larger aircraft.
In any case, cabin crew are required to demonstrate their ability to open the door with the power-assist inoperative.
My recollection of the 737 series (certainly -200,-300,-400) is that there is no power assist unlike on larger aircraft.
In any case, cabin crew are required to demonstrate their ability to open the door with the power-assist inoperative.
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There is no power assist on 737 doors.
When opening with girt bar engaged it does take a lot of strength - usual practice is to push the slide out with your foot as you open the door.
I'm somewhat surprised that training doesn't include firing at least one slide as the difference between that and normal door opening is quite pronounced.
When opening with girt bar engaged it does take a lot of strength - usual practice is to push the slide out with your foot as you open the door.
I'm somewhat surprised that training doesn't include firing at least one slide as the difference between that and normal door opening is quite pronounced.
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Jet II, you're forgetting one thing. The extra training would cost more money and the gob****e O'Leary (his words in a Sunday supplement about himself) likes to keep all his money for himself
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I think it would be safe to say that airlines do not practice door opening with "live slides" as a direct result of the cost involved. Furthermore, I don't believe that it is necessary to do so either, since there can be no real difference in the quality of training.
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The AAIB Report says that the AAIB had "repeatedly advised airlines of the importance of realistic door operation during evacuation training".
If this does not mean deploying a slide, then what is realistic door operation training - just opening the door???
If this does not mean deploying a slide, then what is realistic door operation training - just opening the door???
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Reputable airlines have (or have access to) door simulators, where aircraft crews (cabin and flight deck) can simulate opening doors till their hearts content. With or without power assist. They even come with the sound effect of slides blowing.
Some airlines have fusealge simulators which open into water pools to simulate a ditching whilst rocking and rolling on the (simulated) waves.
Presumably Ryan Air doesn't adhere to this JAA requirement?
Trust this helps
Some airlines have fusealge simulators which open into water pools to simulate a ditching whilst rocking and rolling on the (simulated) waves.
Presumably Ryan Air doesn't adhere to this JAA requirement?
Trust this helps
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Cabin simulator
I do not know how it is on the 737, but we on the Airbus have special cabin simulator, where you can train to open doors like in real. You simulate also the force, even unpowered, and how the slide is blown up. Of course it's not a real slide, it is attached to a blower that simulates an inflating slate.
Does anyone know of 737 cabin sims. Is it available at big carriers, who emphasize cabin training, like BA, Lufthansa, Air France etc.?
Does anyone know of 737 cabin sims. Is it available at big carriers, who emphasize cabin training, like BA, Lufthansa, Air France etc.?
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Sorry guys,
I trained on the 737 with my first airline, have been operating the buses since.
Forgot there was no power assist on the 73.
But I still stick to my last point, under adrenaline most of us can throw open anything!
I trained on the 737 with my first airline, have been operating the buses since.
Forgot there was no power assist on the 73.
But I still stick to my last point, under adrenaline most of us can throw open anything!
I have used the door simulator during the usual refresher training. When the simulator door is opened when 'Armed' you are just pushing against some velcro tapes which peel off as the door opens. Probably not very realistic as the velcro ages.
I suspect the real thing would be significantly tougher to open as experienced in this incident.
I suspect the real thing would be significantly tougher to open as experienced in this incident.
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Well quite clearly this is a disgrace and does demonstrate once again the shortcomings and serious failings of Ryanair's safety procedure. Between serious crm issues (many non-nationals whose mother tongue is not English - which is fine in itself if they actually had a grasp of the basics. Many are Eastern Europeans from countries who have recently joined the EU and hired in on cheap contracts.) and stuffing extra bods in toilets - well that's bad enough but then for cabin crew being unable to open exits well that's taking the 
The IAA needs to take action and launch an investigation into FR's training methods as well as their SOP's before something happens. It would seem to me that that day could be fast approaching as too much seems to be sacrificed for the sake of keeping bean counters like MOL happy!!
The IAA needs to take action and launch an investigation into FR's training methods as well as their SOP's before something happens. It would seem to me that that day could be fast approaching as too much seems to be sacrificed for the sake of keeping bean counters like MOL happy!!
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Legal Flyer:
If you read the AAIB report, you will note there was some degree of delay and ambiguity in communications between ground and flight deck. The was a delay in the inital 'smoke' report ( from a ground vehicle (callsign 'Ranger One'! No relation 
)) - further reports spoke only of smoke, not fire. At no time did the FD see any fire indication from the aircraft systems.
The instruction from the fire crew to evacuate was actioned at once; a subsequent 'port side only evac' call came too late, after evac was in progress.
R1
(2) how did the plane end up down wind of the fire, and how did the starboard doors get opened (in each case post the Manchester fire AAIB recommendations?
)) - further reports spoke only of smoke, not fire. At no time did the FD see any fire indication from the aircraft systems. The instruction from the fire crew to evacuate was actioned at once; a subsequent 'port side only evac' call came too late, after evac was in progress.
R1
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It's not valid to make this into a bash Ryanair thread. If the door action is different when armed than not, then all airlines should have a means of simulating the effort required. It doesn't have to be for real, but must simulate the effort, as clearly the CC were used to unarmed opening, but not armed. It's not clear whether they could have opened the doors on a second or third effort. Maybe the helpers leapt in to get them open asap, which is probably a good idea.
I think it is time that all of you Ryanair critics re-read the accident report on the BA 737 at Manchester before you start pontificating.
Passengers actually sadly died in that accident unlike the incident above.
Passengers actually sadly died in that accident unlike the incident above.
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JW 411 - I certainly did not start the thread to bash Ryanair and I had the AAIB report into Manchester well in mind, hence my second question.
The recommendations of the AAIB apply to all airlines and do raise safetry implications post Manchester - the difference at Stansted was that there was no catastrophic fire. If there had been it could have been another Manchester.
The recommendations deserve reading:-
Safety Recommendations
Safety Recommendation 2004-50
It is recommended that the Civil Aviation Authority review the instructions to Air Traffic Controllers, when they are advising an aircraft on the ground of signs of fire, to include the surface wind in their notification transmission.
Safety Recommendation 2004-51
It is recommended that the Civil Aviation Authority review the instructions to Fire Officers, when attending an aircraft fire, to ensure that they consider advising the flight crew on the best route for evacuation, as well as advising on the need to evacuate.
Safety Recommendation 2004-52
It is recommended that the Civil Aviation Authority encourages aerodrome operators to provide suitable video recording facilities at airports operating public transport flights in order to preserve best evidence in the event of an accident or incident.
Safety Recommendation 2004-53
It is recommended that the Irish Aviation Authority and JAA review the requirements for cabin crew initial and refresher training in respect of the operation of all normal and emergency exits, to ensure that crew members become, and remain, familiar with the different operating procedures, and opening characteristics, in both normal and emergency modes of operation.
The recommendations of the AAIB apply to all airlines and do raise safetry implications post Manchester - the difference at Stansted was that there was no catastrophic fire. If there had been it could have been another Manchester.
The recommendations deserve reading:-
Safety Recommendations
Safety Recommendation 2004-50
It is recommended that the Civil Aviation Authority review the instructions to Air Traffic Controllers, when they are advising an aircraft on the ground of signs of fire, to include the surface wind in their notification transmission.
Safety Recommendation 2004-51
It is recommended that the Civil Aviation Authority review the instructions to Fire Officers, when attending an aircraft fire, to ensure that they consider advising the flight crew on the best route for evacuation, as well as advising on the need to evacuate.
Safety Recommendation 2004-52
It is recommended that the Civil Aviation Authority encourages aerodrome operators to provide suitable video recording facilities at airports operating public transport flights in order to preserve best evidence in the event of an accident or incident.
Safety Recommendation 2004-53
It is recommended that the Irish Aviation Authority and JAA review the requirements for cabin crew initial and refresher training in respect of the operation of all normal and emergency exits, to ensure that crew members become, and remain, familiar with the different operating procedures, and opening characteristics, in both normal and emergency modes of operation.
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With moral amongst the flight deck community at an all time low.
Poorly trained cabin crew and a leader without leadership skills.
The holes in the swiss cheese are lining up nicely.
The AAIB have done their job well again..........has anyone seen
CAA comments on the matter ?
Poorly trained cabin crew and a leader without leadership skills.
The holes in the swiss cheese are lining up nicely.
The AAIB have done their job well again..........has anyone seen
CAA comments on the matter ?
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Legal Flyer
These recommendations (as always with hindsight) all look fine in themselves but to show how valuable they could be please consider the following:
Safety Recommendations
Safety Recommendation 2004-50
ATC including wind direction in their transmission can only be of significance if the aircraft is actually moving and then only at sufficient speed so that it could change direction to keep the fire downwind of the fuselage. On the runway the wind has already been passed once during the take off clearance. The wind around the ramp areas can be very different than the wind on the runway or the wind through the anemometer on the tower. In the worst case you could actually aggrevate the situation. If the aircraft has already stopped with the possible intention of evacuating then it is pointless.
Safety Recommendation 2004-51
In an evacuation due to fire the pax will probably be evacuating (hopefully) by the time the fire boys arrive. Once the command to evacuate is given every suitable and available door should be used. Issuing instructions along the line of "use starboard side only etc" with that order can cause possible confusion in the cabin, also restrict the number of doors and severely hamper the evacuation. The decision as to which doors to use should be taken by the person looking through the actual door not the captain who probably cannot see the fire and therefore not make that assessment. Once the evacuation is underway a call from the fire service as to not use a particular exit etc will go precisely no-where! The important thing is to start the evacuation quickly and use all suitable doors.
With all this sort of stuff it's important to try and think what it would be like to actually be the capt issuing the command and the cabin crew operating the doors. Also the sheer panic and terror of the pax climbing over each other etc. Tests and previous fire accidents suggest that you don't delay and use whatever exits you can. You do not have long!
These recommendations (as always with hindsight) all look fine in themselves but to show how valuable they could be please consider the following:
Safety Recommendations
Safety Recommendation 2004-50
ATC including wind direction in their transmission can only be of significance if the aircraft is actually moving and then only at sufficient speed so that it could change direction to keep the fire downwind of the fuselage. On the runway the wind has already been passed once during the take off clearance. The wind around the ramp areas can be very different than the wind on the runway or the wind through the anemometer on the tower. In the worst case you could actually aggrevate the situation. If the aircraft has already stopped with the possible intention of evacuating then it is pointless.
Safety Recommendation 2004-51
In an evacuation due to fire the pax will probably be evacuating (hopefully) by the time the fire boys arrive. Once the command to evacuate is given every suitable and available door should be used. Issuing instructions along the line of "use starboard side only etc" with that order can cause possible confusion in the cabin, also restrict the number of doors and severely hamper the evacuation. The decision as to which doors to use should be taken by the person looking through the actual door not the captain who probably cannot see the fire and therefore not make that assessment. Once the evacuation is underway a call from the fire service as to not use a particular exit etc will go precisely no-where! The important thing is to start the evacuation quickly and use all suitable doors.
With all this sort of stuff it's important to try and think what it would be like to actually be the capt issuing the command and the cabin crew operating the doors. Also the sheer panic and terror of the pax climbing over each other etc. Tests and previous fire accidents suggest that you don't delay and use whatever exits you can. You do not have long!
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I can't believe some of the stuff I've read here....in order to change the tone a bit i would like to add the following
WELL DONE to the crew involved. A good timely evacuation with no serious injury
WELL DONE to the the flight deck for good decision making as stated by the report
WELL DONE to the cabin crew for well organised "text book" evacuation (words of the report)
WELL DONE to the fire crew who gave good advice to the flight deck and were straight on top of the fire (smoke!!).
All a testiment to the high standards we expect from aviation
Problems occured because....
the cabin crew were slowed down by the extra force required to open a door with slide attached but still managed the job...but evacuation time was still within prescribed limits. EASY FIX by change in RYR training procedures (and other operators too!!)
Ranger one reported fire to tower and tower passed it on as SMOKE. ATC procedural error EASILY FIXED
Wind could have been reported to FD for Sit Awareness on evac....EASILY FIXED by change in ATC procedures
And of course..........make a video!!!!
Incident......report.....reaction.....!!!!
what the hell are you all rabbiting about??????
Once again well done to all involved for a great piece of proffesional work.
WELL DONE to the crew involved. A good timely evacuation with no serious injury
WELL DONE to the the flight deck for good decision making as stated by the report
WELL DONE to the cabin crew for well organised "text book" evacuation (words of the report)
WELL DONE to the fire crew who gave good advice to the flight deck and were straight on top of the fire (smoke!!).
All a testiment to the high standards we expect from aviation
Problems occured because....
the cabin crew were slowed down by the extra force required to open a door with slide attached but still managed the job...but evacuation time was still within prescribed limits. EASY FIX by change in RYR training procedures (and other operators too!!)
Ranger one reported fire to tower and tower passed it on as SMOKE. ATC procedural error EASILY FIXED
Wind could have been reported to FD for Sit Awareness on evac....EASILY FIXED by change in ATC procedures
And of course..........make a video!!!!
Incident......report.....reaction.....!!!!
what the hell are you all rabbiting about??????
Once again well done to all involved for a great piece of proffesional work.