Unofficial SOP’s
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Harry again
That is one completely unfounded statement! The basic mathematical formula for Power is Mass x Acceleration over Time and Distance (P = M x A/T). In determining Power, clearly the use of the Speed Formula (Speed=Distance/Time) and the Acceleration Formula (Acceleration=Change in Velocity/Time) are paramount. THRUST, on the other hand, is a FORCE. Force=Mass x Acceleration. It therefore stands to reason that, in aviation terms, thrust is generated through the application of power, and no batteries or generators are required.
Now stick that in your SOP!
Rider, power is electrical; thrust comes from engines
Now stick that in your SOP!
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Interesting subject....for me Budgie69 sumed it up in His/Her 1st Para.
Doesn't matter to much (provided it's safe)what we do so long as we all do it the same, eitherway the job gets done( Flying before you say it!!) OK maybe some systems are more efficient than others,Imagine flying a fleet with Hundreds of People all doing the job differently. SOP's evolve through Environmental, Regulatory, Cultural needs, Manufactures recommendations, Experience (hard knock's) and other factors, until we operate in a Homogeneous World I believe it is probably better to "taylor" each Operators SOP's to suit their needs.
Regardless, SOP's are a tool designed to enhance safety.
I tend to think to much (SOP) talking is a case of "less is more" particuarly in the critical phase of flight, One can "switch off" particuarly if you are flying multi-sector days in/with trying conditions/people. the Altimeter thing sounds like a throw back from the "Black & White dial Boy's"
Agreed nothing "gets my Goat" more than Instructors teaching and grading "Technique" as SOP. The same goes for poorly written Memo's/reports/SOP's etc, this has long been an indication that Pilots are not Academics, infact at times they are barely literate, (myself included!)The Maint log is usually testimony to this. Anyway m2cw...
"Select Flaps two zero or to zero???"
Doesn't matter to much (provided it's safe)what we do so long as we all do it the same, eitherway the job gets done( Flying before you say it!!) OK maybe some systems are more efficient than others,Imagine flying a fleet with Hundreds of People all doing the job differently. SOP's evolve through Environmental, Regulatory, Cultural needs, Manufactures recommendations, Experience (hard knock's) and other factors, until we operate in a Homogeneous World I believe it is probably better to "taylor" each Operators SOP's to suit their needs.
Regardless, SOP's are a tool designed to enhance safety.
I tend to think to much (SOP) talking is a case of "less is more" particuarly in the critical phase of flight, One can "switch off" particuarly if you are flying multi-sector days in/with trying conditions/people. the Altimeter thing sounds like a throw back from the "Black & White dial Boy's"
Agreed nothing "gets my Goat" more than Instructors teaching and grading "Technique" as SOP. The same goes for poorly written Memo's/reports/SOP's etc, this has long been an indication that Pilots are not Academics, infact at times they are barely literate, (myself included!)The Maint log is usually testimony to this. Anyway m2cw...
"Select Flaps two zero or to zero???"
quidquid excusatio prandium pro
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“Whilst, for example, US operators insist upon qualifying their First Officers to a lower standard than their commanders, I accept that their SOPs might best reflect this. However, when the manufacturer writes SOPs to provide for an under-competent First Officer, and these are blindly adopted by operators elsewhere who qualify both flight deck crew members to the same standard, then the SOPs are effectively 'dumbing down' the operation.”
Perhaps, Harry darling, you might provide us an example or two of “dumbed-down” US operator SOP’s, or a recent accident/incident attributed to “under-competent” FO’s. And while you’re at, make sure to lower your nose once in a while, tends to prevent collisions with things like lamp posts and telephone poles.
Perhaps, Harry darling, you might provide us an example or two of “dumbed-down” US operator SOP’s, or a recent accident/incident attributed to “under-competent” FO’s. And while you’re at, make sure to lower your nose once in a while, tends to prevent collisions with things like lamp posts and telephone poles.
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OK, ok, yes, yes, 126.9...
I know all about power etc, the point I was making is that for the purpose of discussion on the flight deck, 'power' should relate to electrical issues, 'thrust' to engine ones. It is by achieving simple and effective definitions such as this that effective flight deck communication may be achieved. Too often, use of ambiguous terminology plays a part in creating confusion and incidents. This is true in the ATC world too - agood parallel being the sector numbers in use at LACC, which lack the immediate clarity of the sector names used at LATCC.
I know all about power etc, the point I was making is that for the purpose of discussion on the flight deck, 'power' should relate to electrical issues, 'thrust' to engine ones. It is by achieving simple and effective definitions such as this that effective flight deck communication may be achieved. Too often, use of ambiguous terminology plays a part in creating confusion and incidents. This is true in the ATC world too - agood parallel being the sector numbers in use at LACC, which lack the immediate clarity of the sector names used at LATCC.
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Well done Harry again!!! Thanks for making that decision on behalf of a 100 year old industry!!! 
Boy, am I glad that you came along and rescued me (and others) after 20 years in aviation not knowing that my (and aviation's) use of the terminology Power and Thrust were that confusing.
One small piece of advice though: If your going to make a completely unfounded and blatantly ignorant statement such as the first one above, try not to defend it later with precursors such as "SHOULD relate to..." or by redefining well established, clearly understood and completely unambiguous terms such as POWER or THRUST.
Boy, am I glad that you came along and rescued me (and others) after 20 years in aviation not knowing that my (and aviation's) use of the terminology Power and Thrust were that confusing.One small piece of advice though: If your going to make a completely unfounded and blatantly ignorant statement such as the first one above, try not to defend it later with precursors such as "SHOULD relate to..." or by redefining well established, clearly understood and completely unambiguous terms such as POWER or THRUST.
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126.9, I offerthe following for your consideration...
If I call and say 'mayday etc we have lost thrust' you will grasp what I mean quite rapidly...
If call and say 'mayday etc we have lost power' you will have to seek clarification... Have they lost power (electrical), or thrust?
So, my point is made. Yes, the industry is 100 years old, but it's nowhere near perfect. I fly often enough with FOs who speak English only as a second language. Perhaps some clarity of terminology might assist our operation...
...and you would be well advised to adopt a more conciliatory tone in this forum. Some of us have been there and got the T-shirt regarding 1000s of jet hours, management experience, academic qualifications, etc. A little mutual respect would go a long way.
Finally, 'power and thrust'... 'completely unambiguous'... You jest!
If I call and say 'mayday etc we have lost thrust' you will grasp what I mean quite rapidly...
If call and say 'mayday etc we have lost power' you will have to seek clarification... Have they lost power (electrical), or thrust?
So, my point is made. Yes, the industry is 100 years old, but it's nowhere near perfect. I fly often enough with FOs who speak English only as a second language. Perhaps some clarity of terminology might assist our operation...
...and you would be well advised to adopt a more conciliatory tone in this forum. Some of us have been there and got the T-shirt regarding 1000s of jet hours, management experience, academic qualifications, etc. A little mutual respect would go a long way.
Finally, 'power and thrust'... 'completely unambiguous'... You jest!
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>>“Whilst, for example, US operators insist upon qualifying their First Officers to a lower standard than their commanders, I accept that their SOPs might best reflect this. <<
Well, I've flown with Brits and Americans and have a couple of expat British style ATPL's and a U.S. ATP.
Americans are far less concerned about ego and standing on ceremony in the air, some of this is cultural, a lot of it is from recent CRM philosophy.
Brits are obsessed with detail stuff like R/T procedures (you can see the endless stream of threads on the subject here). Americans figure that if you say it loud enough and long enough, they'll eventually get the message. We can't call out flight levels below 180 correctly for love or money. We're more concerned about how much time off we have and how much money we make. Our respective pay rates and R/T procedures continue to reflect these differences in emphasis.
Procedurally, we Americans like to keep things as simple and foolproof as possible. In the British system, the more extra callouts (like every 5000 feet of altitude) and busy work involved, the better the SOP's. Similar differences are found in the licensing systems (and fee structures).
In the British system, a high checkride failure rate means the standards are high, in the U.S. system it means the training is lousy.
I'm told the British love of procedural complexity in aviation comes from the sailing days when things were made intentionally difficult so the enlisted men couldn't mutiny and run the ship themselves.
Well, I've flown with Brits and Americans and have a couple of expat British style ATPL's and a U.S. ATP.
Americans are far less concerned about ego and standing on ceremony in the air, some of this is cultural, a lot of it is from recent CRM philosophy.
Brits are obsessed with detail stuff like R/T procedures (you can see the endless stream of threads on the subject here). Americans figure that if you say it loud enough and long enough, they'll eventually get the message. We can't call out flight levels below 180 correctly for love or money. We're more concerned about how much time off we have and how much money we make. Our respective pay rates and R/T procedures continue to reflect these differences in emphasis.
Procedurally, we Americans like to keep things as simple and foolproof as possible. In the British system, the more extra callouts (like every 5000 feet of altitude) and busy work involved, the better the SOP's. Similar differences are found in the licensing systems (and fee structures).
In the British system, a high checkride failure rate means the standards are high, in the U.S. system it means the training is lousy.
I'm told the British love of procedural complexity in aviation comes from the sailing days when things were made intentionally difficult so the enlisted men couldn't mutiny and run the ship themselves.
Psychophysiological entity
As one of the merry band that started raising a digit signifying that there was one thousand to go, I have little to offer apart from anecdotal recollections. But one is a gem.
Strolling back to my DC3 at Sumbrough, a training captain, cagoules a colleague to tell the story of his 10,000 error. The captain of one of the most famous incidents in the world, was being checked out on the fleet, having been canned from a good job flying a Viscount with nnnnnnn nnnnnnnn airways.
It seems he was in the hold, at X-teen thousand feet when he encountered a five-bar gate and a ( Seemingly smooth) meadow. Happily, it was quite the most benign crash. But the punch line came when he said... Sic. " And do you know old boy, when we went back to look at the crash sight, it was EXACTLY in the correct position in the hold." The story goes on to say how the little green 10k light at the top right of the altimeter, was named after him.
Strolling back to my DC3 at Sumbrough, a training captain, cagoules a colleague to tell the story of his 10,000 error. The captain of one of the most famous incidents in the world, was being checked out on the fleet, having been canned from a good job flying a Viscount with nnnnnnn nnnnnnnn airways.
It seems he was in the hold, at X-teen thousand feet when he encountered a five-bar gate and a ( Seemingly smooth) meadow. Happily, it was quite the most benign crash. But the punch line came when he said... Sic. " And do you know old boy, when we went back to look at the crash sight, it was EXACTLY in the correct position in the hold." The story goes on to say how the little green 10k light at the top right of the altimeter, was named after him.
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Harry again
I offer the following: should you lose engine power and wish to declare an emergency, then use the standard phraseology and terminology, which suggests that you state Engine Failure as the cause of your predicament. Certainly on the airplanes that I fly, even an EPR shortfall is concerned an engine failure.
Furthermore, should you be absolutely hell-bent on the use of either "power" or "thrust," either word, preceeded by the word "engine" would suffice...? So yes; when any of the above terms are used intelligently, they are completely unambiguous!
I too have flown with people who's first language is not English. This particular statement, to me, implies multi-lingualism. That in itself, implies a level of intelligence somewhat above average. I personally (as a tri-lingual person) would hesitate to assume that English terminology is as ambiguous or confusing as you make it seem. Simple education in the correct use of the present terms is all that is required, as opposed to redefining the meanings of power or thrust.
Mutual respect on the other hand is something quite different. In my opinion it comes not from T-Shirts purchased nor thousands of jet hours, (which I too have done and forgotten about) but rather it is earned throughout a lifetime of reliable consistency.
With regards to my unconciliatory tone: I do sincerely apologise!
Furthermore, should you be absolutely hell-bent on the use of either "power" or "thrust," either word, preceeded by the word "engine" would suffice...? So yes; when any of the above terms are used intelligently, they are completely unambiguous!
I too have flown with people who's first language is not English. This particular statement, to me, implies multi-lingualism. That in itself, implies a level of intelligence somewhat above average. I personally (as a tri-lingual person) would hesitate to assume that English terminology is as ambiguous or confusing as you make it seem. Simple education in the correct use of the present terms is all that is required, as opposed to redefining the meanings of power or thrust.
Mutual respect on the other hand is something quite different. In my opinion it comes not from T-Shirts purchased nor thousands of jet hours, (which I too have done and forgotten about) but rather it is earned throughout a lifetime of reliable consistency.
With regards to my unconciliatory tone: I do sincerely apologise!
I'm from a different industry, but I think there are parallels. We design large and complex oil and gas plants. During the design process we spend literally thousands of hours developing the safety case for the facility, and thousands more hours documenting the design. We then develop procedures that describe how the facility is intended to be operated. The safety case is embedded in the design, and the design reflects the safety case.
However hard we try, I have never seen a documentation set for a complex plant which accurately captured in an assimilatable form all the underlying thinking of the designers. We tell the operator how we expect him to react in a given set of circumstances, and try to make his decision process as simple and intuitive as possible. To keep it simple, we do not try to explain in detail why it is the way it is: the reason you need hundreds of specialists to design the thing in the first place is that one person cannot understand all of it.
It never ceases to amaze me that the operators of the plants we design are quite happy to tinker with the immaculate conception almost on a whim. The more 'sophisticated' the operator, the more likely this is to happen. In my experience, he will invest roughly two orders of magnitude less effort in changing the operating procedures than we spent in developing them. Either he is very smart, or we are very dumb.
I would suggest if you buy a commercial jet from someone like Boeing or Airbus, there has to be an underlying assumption that they know more about how it is intended to work than you do. Rewriting the SOPs is then both high risk and arrogant: if the SOPs are wrong, make it safer for everyone by making your case for change to the manufacturer. If you change them on your own, ultimately, the law of unintended consequences will catch you out, and something, maybe people, will break or get broken.
However hard we try, I have never seen a documentation set for a complex plant which accurately captured in an assimilatable form all the underlying thinking of the designers. We tell the operator how we expect him to react in a given set of circumstances, and try to make his decision process as simple and intuitive as possible. To keep it simple, we do not try to explain in detail why it is the way it is: the reason you need hundreds of specialists to design the thing in the first place is that one person cannot understand all of it.
It never ceases to amaze me that the operators of the plants we design are quite happy to tinker with the immaculate conception almost on a whim. The more 'sophisticated' the operator, the more likely this is to happen. In my experience, he will invest roughly two orders of magnitude less effort in changing the operating procedures than we spent in developing them. Either he is very smart, or we are very dumb.
I would suggest if you buy a commercial jet from someone like Boeing or Airbus, there has to be an underlying assumption that they know more about how it is intended to work than you do. Rewriting the SOPs is then both high risk and arrogant: if the SOPs are wrong, make it safer for everyone by making your case for change to the manufacturer. If you change them on your own, ultimately, the law of unintended consequences will catch you out, and something, maybe people, will break or get broken.
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“...and you would be well advised to adopt a more conciliatory tone in this forum”
A little advice you should perhaps take to heart yourself, Harry.
“mayday etc we have lost thrust”
“'mayday etc we have lost power'”
The above stinks of ‘under-competent’. You may be in aviation Harry, but you are certainly not a professional pilot, please see 126.9’s post for proper phraseology.
A little advice you should perhaps take to heart yourself, Harry.
“mayday etc we have lost thrust”
“'mayday etc we have lost power'”
The above stinks of ‘under-competent’. You may be in aviation Harry, but you are certainly not a professional pilot, please see 126.9’s post for proper phraseology.
I am a figment of my own imagination
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One of the things which never failed to fascinate me as a young F/O in a large fleet was the number of different ways there were of doing essentialy the same job. Most if not all the Captains of were war time veterans, few had much co-pilot time. They were a bunch of interesting but generaly conflicting ideas. One cherry picked what seemed to work well and avoided other more bizarre practices. It was a rough and ready method of operating but extremely interesting. SOP's is definitely the way to go but we managed reasonably well without and I was priviliged to have observed then many different techniques of getting from A to B... oh, and the absolute assurance with which each felt as they did so, that their way was the 'right' way!
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SLF3,
Unofficial SOP’s have more to do with technique, that is, the different ways an aircraft can be flown to achieve the same end. There are at least three ways to perform a crosswind landing, for example, but only two of them I know that work well for the tires. Some companies mandate one or the other in their ops manuals, I prefer to leave it to the discretion of the operating pilot.
The agenda some posters here seem to have, that being the deliberate disregard of manufacturer directives (they only built the thing, they don’t fly it), is something you rightly object to. In the case of your complex power plant, I don’t really know how many of your procedures are open to interpretation, but I would guess not many. In the operation of large aircraft, we follow the strictest of manufacturer-generated guidelines, all of our emergency and abnormal procedures are standardized, sequentially itemized in our checklists, and cross-checked by both pilots (ideally) in the performance thereof. It is not the only way to fly, but it is far and away the safest and most lawyer-free.
Anyone on these pages who tells you different is talking sh@t.
Unofficial SOP’s have more to do with technique, that is, the different ways an aircraft can be flown to achieve the same end. There are at least three ways to perform a crosswind landing, for example, but only two of them I know that work well for the tires. Some companies mandate one or the other in their ops manuals, I prefer to leave it to the discretion of the operating pilot.
The agenda some posters here seem to have, that being the deliberate disregard of manufacturer directives (they only built the thing, they don’t fly it), is something you rightly object to. In the case of your complex power plant, I don’t really know how many of your procedures are open to interpretation, but I would guess not many. In the operation of large aircraft, we follow the strictest of manufacturer-generated guidelines, all of our emergency and abnormal procedures are standardized, sequentially itemized in our checklists, and cross-checked by both pilots (ideally) in the performance thereof. It is not the only way to fly, but it is far and away the safest and most lawyer-free.
Anyone on these pages who tells you different is talking sh@t.
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Anyone on these pages who tells you different is talking sh@t.
As I recall there are a number of items over the years not covered by manufacturers checklists. 737 pitch-up roll-off, 747 ground-air switch position in error. In both these cases operators changed drills before Boeing got their act together. I'm sure there are lots more which only goes to show some items only show up after prolonged operations.
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Exactly, 126.9, interesting how some individuals in certain companies are able to exert undue influence, and have their personal opinions written into the flying manuals.
BusyB, point taken. I think, though, you refer more to ‘teething’ problems associated with newly introduced aircraft than any negligence and/or obvious oversight on the part of the manufacturer. In the various and many minutiae of the flying game, things are bound to pop up occasionally.
BusyB, point taken. I think, though, you refer more to ‘teething’ problems associated with newly introduced aircraft than any negligence and/or obvious oversight on the part of the manufacturer. In the various and many minutiae of the flying game, things are bound to pop up occasionally.
As far as the ground air switch goes Boeing didn't change the checklists until 1990, when was the 1st 747. As for the 737, when BA had their PU/RO Boeing then admitted 9 previous incidents they hadn't warned BA of!
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Are there any operators that don’t write their own SOPs and just use the manufacturer's manuals as is or with minimum of alterations and additional information as needed to comply with JAR OPS?
Last edited by 80/20; 29th Feb 2004 at 19:13.
