Hapag-Llloyd Airbus pilot charged...
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>>>I have read the ACARS messages between OPS and the
A/C and there was an intense discussion about which
airport they could just reach.
Pesonally, I'm still curious as to who the specific players were on the ground, and whom (manager, or HLF dispatcher devoid of Part 121 style capabilities) was actually exchanging ACARS messages with the aircraft.
Do you have any kind of transcript of yje ACARS exchanges that you can post. The only one I've seen is an excerpted one that was in an article, previously linked in this thread.
Cheers....
A/C and there was an intense discussion about which
airport they could just reach.
Pesonally, I'm still curious as to who the specific players were on the ground, and whom (manager, or HLF dispatcher devoid of Part 121 style capabilities) was actually exchanging ACARS messages with the aircraft.
Do you have any kind of transcript of yje ACARS exchanges that you can post. The only one I've seen is an excerpted one that was in an article, previously linked in this thread.
Cheers....
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SD. In europe the despatcher helps out with the load and balance and has no influence whatsoever on MEL issues etc. Certainly he cannot - and does not make any contribution whatsoever after the doors close!¬
I'm sure you do a great job, and I don't mean to be rude, - but I'm astonished that you have such a high view of your contribution!
I'm sure you do a great job, and I don't mean to be rude, - but I'm astonished that you have such a high view of your contribution!
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The fact that you guys are arguing about this is embarassing, not alone the fact that the Captains actions are an embarrassment to all of us and our profession. What extenuating circumstances would make a guy fly and airplane off profile half way across Europe.
What the hell is the "captain" doing even talking to management about where to take a malfuncioning airplane. If there's a system problem that serious you simply return to the departure airport. Discuss it with maintenance, if you have that luxury, confirm the gear down situation is ok for landing, and land. Simple.
Great CRM also. Thought, with all the stiff reguations in the JAA concerning CRM, lack of CRM in the cockpit, was a non problem. So much for the "pipe smokers" telling us all what we need. CRM can't "fix" a stupid Captain. Re-evaluating CRM profiles needs to be addressed. It wasn't a case of weak CRM - there flat out wasn't any CRM.
The "airline suits" run on cash registers. Show them a procedural manual and they would eat it. Management probably suggested later that he should have flown a 3 mile final instead of a 6 mile final.
Numerous airlines are run by idiots and it looks like they are winning.
Airmanship gentlemen, is what our job is all about.
The captain's actions were idiotic, as the results prove.
What the hell is the "captain" doing even talking to management about where to take a malfuncioning airplane. If there's a system problem that serious you simply return to the departure airport. Discuss it with maintenance, if you have that luxury, confirm the gear down situation is ok for landing, and land. Simple.
Great CRM also. Thought, with all the stiff reguations in the JAA concerning CRM, lack of CRM in the cockpit, was a non problem. So much for the "pipe smokers" telling us all what we need. CRM can't "fix" a stupid Captain. Re-evaluating CRM profiles needs to be addressed. It wasn't a case of weak CRM - there flat out wasn't any CRM.
The "airline suits" run on cash registers. Show them a procedural manual and they would eat it. Management probably suggested later that he should have flown a 3 mile final instead of a 6 mile final.
Numerous airlines are run by idiots and it looks like they are winning.
Airmanship gentlemen, is what our job is all about.
The captain's actions were idiotic, as the results prove.
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Airmanship gentlemen, is what our job is all about. - couldn't agree more.
BUT
I'm saddened but not surprised by the incident/accident.
This is because - in 10 years of flying
(i) In the four airlines I have been at although I've worked with some amazingly capable and lovely blokes I've come across a large number of pompous, self righteous, arrogant Captains.
(ii) I've personally witnessed employers ( of all types and colours) put a great deal of pressure on crews to do things the crews wouldn't normally do. For example charter companies ( Air 2000 / Monarch / JMC / Airtours type... expecting that extra sector from a crew when they are totally shaged after a night flight " you will go into discretion".
For example our largest uk airline who I'm told , astonishingly runs league tables to put pressure on crews to take plog fuel and no more unless they have a very good reason.
(iii) I have witnessed many times the type of pilot who is acomplete "wizz" on the FMGC - he thinks he's fast ( he is!) .. he has an unshakable self belief in his knowledge of the systems ( got 100% in the exam) .. like the HL Captain looking at the fuel prediction page ( see earlier posting) if it says xxx on the display he believes it .
(iv) I can picture now (sitting at my pc) at least 10 Captains who would ignore an F/O's protestations.
This accident sums up the state of aviation today I'm sorry to say .
BUT
I'm saddened but not surprised by the incident/accident.
This is because - in 10 years of flying
(i) In the four airlines I have been at although I've worked with some amazingly capable and lovely blokes I've come across a large number of pompous, self righteous, arrogant Captains.
(ii) I've personally witnessed employers ( of all types and colours) put a great deal of pressure on crews to do things the crews wouldn't normally do. For example charter companies ( Air 2000 / Monarch / JMC / Airtours type... expecting that extra sector from a crew when they are totally shaged after a night flight " you will go into discretion".
For example our largest uk airline who I'm told , astonishingly runs league tables to put pressure on crews to take plog fuel and no more unless they have a very good reason.
(iii) I have witnessed many times the type of pilot who is acomplete "wizz" on the FMGC - he thinks he's fast ( he is!) .. he has an unshakable self belief in his knowledge of the systems ( got 100% in the exam) .. like the HL Captain looking at the fuel prediction page ( see earlier posting) if it says xxx on the display he believes it .
(iv) I can picture now (sitting at my pc) at least 10 Captains who would ignore an F/O's protestations.
This accident sums up the state of aviation today I'm sorry to say .
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>>>SD. In europe the despatcher helps out with the load and balance and has no influence whatsoever on MEL issues etc. Certainly he cannot - and does not make any contribution whatsoever after the doors close!¬
Yes, I'm aware of the various regulatory schemes on that side of the pond and elsewhere that artificially limit the dispatcher's duties to preflight stuff. Over here, that's the "initiating" phase of operational control (US FAR 1.1), but our regs also cover the operation of the flight itself, as well as the termination of the flight when it becomes warranted, so a dispatcher's contribution (here) certainly -can- make a contribution to flight safety.
>>>I'm sure you do a great job, and I don't mean to be rude, - but I'm astonished that you have such a high view of your contribution!
Perhaps you misunderstand. I'm just a normal, fallible human dispatcher, working with fallible human pilots, fallible human mechanics, fallible human ATCOs, and fallible (sometimes highly so) human management types. Given the basic potential failings of the typical human being, the more robust an operational control system is as far as checks and balances, the less likely you are to have a "single point" failure.
I don't mean to be rude either, and you'll pardon the blasphemy of my saying this, but I catch pilots in errors all the time, just as they catch me. Ditto for MX and the other folks. The point isn't to keep score as to who makes the most/least mistakes, or who is better/worse than someone else, but to provide diversification in the error detection and prevention process, and to keep the error(s) from becoming links in an accident chain.
Look at some of the accidents that were previously mentioned--the accidents where operational control is circumvented (Air Illinois 710), ignored (Valujet 558), or non-existent because of the regulatory scheme (Avianca 52). All of these could have been avoided. Many more situations quietly are, and you'll never hear about most of them. As I said before, I know of two potential fuel-starvation situations, and that dispatcher intervention kept from occurring.
Cheers.
>>>The fact that you guys are arguing about this is embarassing,
With all due respect, sir, I think what's truly embarassing are the widespread misconceptions outside the US regarding what operational control is, and isn't.
It's not about erosion of PIC authority, it's about supplementing it and backstopping it during potentially critical decisionmaking events, when a little error can go a long way...
It's not about creating "pressure" to continue, it's about -preventing- that pressure from even being transmitted to you via phone or radio. (If I had a dollar for every time I've argued with certain mechanics and/or manangement types concerning a MEL item or proposed course of action, I'd be rich.) Over here, the vast majority of these types of situations are resolved by the dispatcher before the PIC even arrives planeside, and the dispatcher's efforts are largely transparent to the crews. Yes, =some- dispatcher's do err and create versus eradicate "pressure", and they are just as unprofessional as some of the other folks that have been mentioned.that do the same thing. Overall, our system works...
Whether it's "pressure" from someone other than the PIC, or self-induced "pressure" by the PIC themself to do something unsound, the Part 121 regulatory structure here allows the dispatcher to be in a position to say "nyet" to an unsafe operation, and take appropriate action if that unsafe operational is attempted.
If an operational control system is properly supported (via training and management support, as well as enabling regulatory authorities, the dispatcher -can- be your ally, and -not- an adversary as many folks seemed to be defaulted to believing.
Yes, I'm aware of the various regulatory schemes on that side of the pond and elsewhere that artificially limit the dispatcher's duties to preflight stuff. Over here, that's the "initiating" phase of operational control (US FAR 1.1), but our regs also cover the operation of the flight itself, as well as the termination of the flight when it becomes warranted, so a dispatcher's contribution (here) certainly -can- make a contribution to flight safety.
>>>I'm sure you do a great job, and I don't mean to be rude, - but I'm astonished that you have such a high view of your contribution!
Perhaps you misunderstand. I'm just a normal, fallible human dispatcher, working with fallible human pilots, fallible human mechanics, fallible human ATCOs, and fallible (sometimes highly so) human management types. Given the basic potential failings of the typical human being, the more robust an operational control system is as far as checks and balances, the less likely you are to have a "single point" failure.
I don't mean to be rude either, and you'll pardon the blasphemy of my saying this, but I catch pilots in errors all the time, just as they catch me. Ditto for MX and the other folks. The point isn't to keep score as to who makes the most/least mistakes, or who is better/worse than someone else, but to provide diversification in the error detection and prevention process, and to keep the error(s) from becoming links in an accident chain.
Look at some of the accidents that were previously mentioned--the accidents where operational control is circumvented (Air Illinois 710), ignored (Valujet 558), or non-existent because of the regulatory scheme (Avianca 52). All of these could have been avoided. Many more situations quietly are, and you'll never hear about most of them. As I said before, I know of two potential fuel-starvation situations, and that dispatcher intervention kept from occurring.
Cheers.
>>>The fact that you guys are arguing about this is embarassing,
With all due respect, sir, I think what's truly embarassing are the widespread misconceptions outside the US regarding what operational control is, and isn't.
It's not about erosion of PIC authority, it's about supplementing it and backstopping it during potentially critical decisionmaking events, when a little error can go a long way...
It's not about creating "pressure" to continue, it's about -preventing- that pressure from even being transmitted to you via phone or radio. (If I had a dollar for every time I've argued with certain mechanics and/or manangement types concerning a MEL item or proposed course of action, I'd be rich.) Over here, the vast majority of these types of situations are resolved by the dispatcher before the PIC even arrives planeside, and the dispatcher's efforts are largely transparent to the crews. Yes, =some- dispatcher's do err and create versus eradicate "pressure", and they are just as unprofessional as some of the other folks that have been mentioned.that do the same thing. Overall, our system works...
Whether it's "pressure" from someone other than the PIC, or self-induced "pressure" by the PIC themself to do something unsound, the Part 121 regulatory structure here allows the dispatcher to be in a position to say "nyet" to an unsafe operation, and take appropriate action if that unsafe operational is attempted.
If an operational control system is properly supported (via training and management support, as well as enabling regulatory authorities, the dispatcher -can- be your ally, and -not- an adversary as many folks seemed to be defaulted to believing.
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Perhaps the use of the term Ramp Dispatcher versus Flight Dispatcher ( or commonly in Europe- Operations Officer/Flight Planners or Briefers) will help here.
Shuttleworth, in the US the Flight Dispatcher holds the same 'written' licence qualification as the ATPL (it the same exam)and is subject to type qualifcation and recurrent training, therefore contributes, within the FAR121 system, a great deal to the pre-flight planning and en-route monitoring of the flight- as a licenced individual with that background they are in a position to offer considerable support to a crew in flight.
Shuttleworth, in the US the Flight Dispatcher holds the same 'written' licence qualification as the ATPL (it the same exam)and is subject to type qualifcation and recurrent training, therefore contributes, within the FAR121 system, a great deal to the pre-flight planning and en-route monitoring of the flight- as a licenced individual with that background they are in a position to offer considerable support to a crew in flight.
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Wait a minute... Is this the same "Shuttleworth" that just said a couple of messages back that "Certainly he [the dispatcher] cannot - and does not make any contribution whatsoever after the doors close!"?
>>>(i) In the four airlines I have been at although I've worked with some amazingly capable and lovely blokes I've come across a large number of pompous, self righteous, arrogant Captains.
Me too, and it's these latter group that are the most spring-loaded towards making some bad decisions.
>>>(ii) I've personally witnessed employers ( of all types and colours) put a great deal of pressure on crews to do things the crews wouldn't normally do.
As I said previously, adding pressure (versus eradicating it) is unacceptable and unprofessional, and a big factor in that is an airline's corporate culture. Exactly how far manangement can manipulate that corporate culture to induce "pressure" is also affected by the regulatory structure in place. The more that regulatory structure -isn't- in place, the further some management's can "push."
>>>For example our largest uk airline who I'm told , astonishingly runs league tables to put pressure on crews to take plog fuel and no more unless they have a very good reason.
I have a really simple personal policy on fuel. If a PIC wants more than I've planned (per company policies, etc.), and he's not asking for 2x or 3x of what I'm asking, he gets it. I may query him about what he's seeing that I'm not, but I don't get anal-retentive or ego-sensitive about fuel. Period.
>>>(iii) I have witnessed many times the type of pilot who is acomplete "wizz" on the FMGC - he thinks he's fast ( he is!) .. he has an unshakable self belief in his knowledge of the systems ( got 100% in the exam) .. like the HL Captain looking at the fuel prediction page ( see earlier posting) if it says xxx on the display he believes it .
The F/O on the Air Illinois 710 accident I previously mentioned was another example of this. Such a whiz on the aircraft, but fixated on the amp meter looking for signs of discharge trens when it was a NiCad (and not a lead-acid) battery. Back to basic human fallibility again...
>>>(iv) I can picture now (sitting at my pc) at least 10 Captains who would ignore an F/O's protestations.
...and had those 10 pulled that stuff over here, 10 dispatchers would have been in a position to invoke 121.627(a) (and thus 121,557) and get the emergency ball rolling.
>>>This [Hapag-lloyd] accident sums up the state of aviation today I'm sorry to say .
Pity that it doesn't have to be that way...
>>>(i) In the four airlines I have been at although I've worked with some amazingly capable and lovely blokes I've come across a large number of pompous, self righteous, arrogant Captains.
Me too, and it's these latter group that are the most spring-loaded towards making some bad decisions.
>>>(ii) I've personally witnessed employers ( of all types and colours) put a great deal of pressure on crews to do things the crews wouldn't normally do.
As I said previously, adding pressure (versus eradicating it) is unacceptable and unprofessional, and a big factor in that is an airline's corporate culture. Exactly how far manangement can manipulate that corporate culture to induce "pressure" is also affected by the regulatory structure in place. The more that regulatory structure -isn't- in place, the further some management's can "push."
>>>For example our largest uk airline who I'm told , astonishingly runs league tables to put pressure on crews to take plog fuel and no more unless they have a very good reason.
I have a really simple personal policy on fuel. If a PIC wants more than I've planned (per company policies, etc.), and he's not asking for 2x or 3x of what I'm asking, he gets it. I may query him about what he's seeing that I'm not, but I don't get anal-retentive or ego-sensitive about fuel. Period.
>>>(iii) I have witnessed many times the type of pilot who is acomplete "wizz" on the FMGC - he thinks he's fast ( he is!) .. he has an unshakable self belief in his knowledge of the systems ( got 100% in the exam) .. like the HL Captain looking at the fuel prediction page ( see earlier posting) if it says xxx on the display he believes it .
The F/O on the Air Illinois 710 accident I previously mentioned was another example of this. Such a whiz on the aircraft, but fixated on the amp meter looking for signs of discharge trens when it was a NiCad (and not a lead-acid) battery. Back to basic human fallibility again...
>>>(iv) I can picture now (sitting at my pc) at least 10 Captains who would ignore an F/O's protestations.
...and had those 10 pulled that stuff over here, 10 dispatchers would have been in a position to invoke 121.627(a) (and thus 121,557) and get the emergency ball rolling.
>>>This [Hapag-lloyd] accident sums up the state of aviation today I'm sorry to say .
Pity that it doesn't have to be that way...
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Senior Despatcher:
I've got about five ACARS messages. I don't want to
put them in the public domain but what I can tell you is
that is is from "HLF Ops". I've got no idea who the
actual person was. It was a very interesting discussion though
because HLF keeps asking which airport he can reach.
The a/c responds first with airfields in central Germany and
than later during the flight they give alternate airfields
much more south. So they very well new that something
was wrong fuel wise!
One point is interesting though. The captain was
Austrian not German. So he must have known Vienna Airport
pretty well. I am very intersted to read in the final report
if a case of "get there itis" was involved. Well just have to wait
and see.
Rgds.
I've got about five ACARS messages. I don't want to
put them in the public domain but what I can tell you is
that is is from "HLF Ops". I've got no idea who the
actual person was. It was a very interesting discussion though
because HLF keeps asking which airport he can reach.
The a/c responds first with airfields in central Germany and
than later during the flight they give alternate airfields
much more south. So they very well new that something
was wrong fuel wise!
One point is interesting though. The captain was
Austrian not German. So he must have known Vienna Airport
pretty well. I am very intersted to read in the final report
if a case of "get there itis" was involved. Well just have to wait
and see.
Rgds.
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Thanks for the info. That sounds like about the same number As I saw in that article, but I'm sure the full accounting will be in the final report, whenever it comes out...
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SeniorDispatcher.
Your post about dispatchers is something I'm well aware of having worked for US 121 Air Carriers most of my career. The past 7 years I've worked in and around Europe. My current employer, a wannabe JAA member, uses "dispatchers" in O.C.C. When I first joined the company, I thought they were "dispatchers". In the US they would be Flight Followers, just as JAR operators don't use dispatch. Charter Captains "out here" fly alone being supplied with OFP and WX. and unless SelCal or company frequencies are available, make "all" the decisions while airbourne.
Under 121 this case of incompetence would never had happened as the dispatcher requried under 121 would have been seriously envolved.
The JAA needs to reorganize their definition of dispatch and get additional operational people in the loop with the pilots. Its ludicrous that the Captain was discussing issues with only maintenance and management.
Under 121 the chance of both a wacked out pilot and a wached out dispatcher working the same flight like the one we are discussing, would be pretty improbable.
I would also like to add that I am not against discussing this incident, but it does bother me that people are trying to justify the actions envolved. Must be a lack of understanding or experience.
Your post about dispatchers is something I'm well aware of having worked for US 121 Air Carriers most of my career. The past 7 years I've worked in and around Europe. My current employer, a wannabe JAA member, uses "dispatchers" in O.C.C. When I first joined the company, I thought they were "dispatchers". In the US they would be Flight Followers, just as JAR operators don't use dispatch. Charter Captains "out here" fly alone being supplied with OFP and WX. and unless SelCal or company frequencies are available, make "all" the decisions while airbourne.
Under 121 this case of incompetence would never had happened as the dispatcher requried under 121 would have been seriously envolved.
The JAA needs to reorganize their definition of dispatch and get additional operational people in the loop with the pilots. Its ludicrous that the Captain was discussing issues with only maintenance and management.
Under 121 the chance of both a wacked out pilot and a wached out dispatcher working the same flight like the one we are discussing, would be pretty improbable.
I would also like to add that I am not against discussing this incident, but it does bother me that people are trying to justify the actions envolved. Must be a lack of understanding or experience.
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411a's comments,although harsh,are not unjustified.There are a plethora of airports between Greece and Germany,and I'm afraid this was a case of very poor judgement.Coordination with company should have been the last thing on this guy's mind.The pilot of a British Midland B737 that crashed at Kegworth also saw fit to devote precious time calling company when he should have been devoting his full attention to the unfolding events.
Give me a pilot who knows that airmanship and company considerations sometimes diverge and who knows which canoe to paddle when the divergence becomes clear.Remember,SOP's have never saved lives.Only airmanship.
Give me a pilot who knows that airmanship and company considerations sometimes diverge and who knows which canoe to paddle when the divergence becomes clear.Remember,SOP's have never saved lives.Only airmanship.
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Rananim
Most would agree that good airmanship is fundemental as is the prioritisation of tasks and decsion making. No one would suggest a crew with an immediate problem should be wasting time with calls to the Company. However, where time permits, to have engineering and flight dispatch/operations support hopefully, offers the crew more assistance than distraction.
In the case of the FAR121 dispatch system, if might be seen as another crew member (operating to operational regulations and law) based on the ground, not a 'Company Man' trying to influence a Commanders decision for economic or commercial reasons. It's the very reason FAA Dispatchers are licenced to the same technical levels as aircrew.
Most would agree that good airmanship is fundemental as is the prioritisation of tasks and decsion making. No one would suggest a crew with an immediate problem should be wasting time with calls to the Company. However, where time permits, to have engineering and flight dispatch/operations support hopefully, offers the crew more assistance than distraction.
In the case of the FAR121 dispatch system, if might be seen as another crew member (operating to operational regulations and law) based on the ground, not a 'Company Man' trying to influence a Commanders decision for economic or commercial reasons. It's the very reason FAA Dispatchers are licenced to the same technical levels as aircrew.
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Just to get some things right, the mentioned company is sometimes trying to influence the PIC`s decission. BUT it never tries to actually make that decission. The PIC does. I have been working for that company for quite a time in both seats and never got a call why I did this or that. There are black sheeps in every company and its only a question of having "a" problem with the wrong guy being involved.
PS HLF made quite an effort to strengthen the position of the F/O to avoid things like this happening again.
PS HLF made quite an effort to strengthen the position of the F/O to avoid things like this happening again.
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SeniorDispatcher,
I work as a Dispatcher (talking running the turnround a/c side doing loadsheets etc type) in the UK and would love to see the US way of doing things adopted. It would be benificial from a safety point of view, and the extra cash from having an official license would be nice too !!
There are too many f/deck crews in Europe who have little or no respect for the Dispatcher and what they do and merely think we are just wannabe's or glorified jetbridge drivers, and because of the lack of formal training we get I can see why.
You are only required to do just 2 weeks training in what that particular airline/handling agent wants you to know and another couple of weeks shadowing on the job and off you go !!.
In my last job we spent a majority of the 2 weeks purely on manual loadsheets and that was only for narrowbody a/c, but when I moved to my current job, for a widebody operator we only got 1 day on manual loadsheets - even that was split 1/2 day on weight and 1/2 next day on trim !!!. That wasn't such a problem for me, but for the poor girls and guys who had never even seen one before it wasn't nearly enough, I pity them if they ever had to do one for real !!.
Some of the flight crew at my airline don't even realise we actually work for the same company - they have that little interest in what we do, they think we are just handling agent staff.
I have offered numerous f/deck crews the chance to come and see what we really do when they are shouting at us or saying how incompetent the dispatch department is, but not one of them has ever bothered to take up that offer.
We actually had a flight crew in our office last week (not their choice I might add) when the snow hit and they were amazed by what actually went on when they saw it and what problems we face everyday from the airport authorities/handling agents etc etc. At least that is 2 crew members who now understand more about why things happen the way they do and thats 2 that will be a little more understanding instead of shouting at us over the r/t next time they are holding for 20 mins for a stand at the busiest time of day.
As part of our job function as a dispatcher we need to know something about the job roles of everyone we deal with, from cleaners to captains so we know what problems they are up against. It would be nice if it worked the other way too.
I just wish that JAA would change the rules to adopt the FAA way of doing things, but we'll have flown to the moon and back again before that ever happens.
Straying from the thread now so I'll shut up.........
I work as a Dispatcher (talking running the turnround a/c side doing loadsheets etc type) in the UK and would love to see the US way of doing things adopted. It would be benificial from a safety point of view, and the extra cash from having an official license would be nice too !!
There are too many f/deck crews in Europe who have little or no respect for the Dispatcher and what they do and merely think we are just wannabe's or glorified jetbridge drivers, and because of the lack of formal training we get I can see why.
You are only required to do just 2 weeks training in what that particular airline/handling agent wants you to know and another couple of weeks shadowing on the job and off you go !!.
In my last job we spent a majority of the 2 weeks purely on manual loadsheets and that was only for narrowbody a/c, but when I moved to my current job, for a widebody operator we only got 1 day on manual loadsheets - even that was split 1/2 day on weight and 1/2 next day on trim !!!. That wasn't such a problem for me, but for the poor girls and guys who had never even seen one before it wasn't nearly enough, I pity them if they ever had to do one for real !!.
Some of the flight crew at my airline don't even realise we actually work for the same company - they have that little interest in what we do, they think we are just handling agent staff.
I have offered numerous f/deck crews the chance to come and see what we really do when they are shouting at us or saying how incompetent the dispatch department is, but not one of them has ever bothered to take up that offer.
We actually had a flight crew in our office last week (not their choice I might add) when the snow hit and they were amazed by what actually went on when they saw it and what problems we face everyday from the airport authorities/handling agents etc etc. At least that is 2 crew members who now understand more about why things happen the way they do and thats 2 that will be a little more understanding instead of shouting at us over the r/t next time they are holding for 20 mins for a stand at the busiest time of day.
As part of our job function as a dispatcher we need to know something about the job roles of everyone we deal with, from cleaners to captains so we know what problems they are up against. It would be nice if it worked the other way too.
I just wish that JAA would change the rules to adopt the FAA way of doing things, but we'll have flown to the moon and back again before that ever happens.
Straying from the thread now so I'll shut up.........
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Given that operational control has received attention as a result of other accidents outside the USA proper like the Air Ontario F-28 at Dryden (resulting in changes in Canadian regs) and the USAF T-43/B737 in Croatia (resulting in USAF changes at Scott AFB, where they now have FAA-licensed dispatchers), I suspect that operational control will be a prominent factor once the final report on Hapag-Lloyd eventually comes out. There is simply too much evidence to support operational control's overall contribution to flight (and public) safety, despite the objections of some, most of whom have zero understanding of what operational control truly is, and what it isn't.
Time will tell.
Time will tell.
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Senior dispatcher, as a fellow dispatcher one cannot fail to be impressed by your rhetoric in relation to Vienna issue as well as the implications of part 121 dispatch.
In the instance of the Vienna incident, effective liason was established with operations,however ops were advised that the aircraft would be continuing to MUC gear down.There was no commercial pressure to get the aircraft to a main base as a spare a310 and crew were available to cover the rotations where necessary. No amount of operational intervention can fly an aircraft,to blame lack of operational input for the vienna incident is ludicrous particularly as operations are reliant upon what the pilot chooses to tell them in the first place.
You also refer to the background work carried out within operations that goes largely unnoticed by the pilot workforce,this maybe the case, but by the same token whilst you are sitting in your cosy office that same pilot workforce may be dealing with all manner of horrors that are unnoticed by us,e.g bad weather operations,unruly pax, fatigue etc.
Whilst I applaud your defence of our profession, I would also recommend to you that operations provide decision making support once the aircraft is airborne if required by the crew,but should not take direct responsibilty for the operation of that aircraft, this lies squarely at the feet of the commander, the reason being that he is the man on the spot best placed to make a decision in a live situation.
ND Hapag Lloyd Operations/TUI GP OPS
In the instance of the Vienna incident, effective liason was established with operations,however ops were advised that the aircraft would be continuing to MUC gear down.There was no commercial pressure to get the aircraft to a main base as a spare a310 and crew were available to cover the rotations where necessary. No amount of operational intervention can fly an aircraft,to blame lack of operational input for the vienna incident is ludicrous particularly as operations are reliant upon what the pilot chooses to tell them in the first place.
You also refer to the background work carried out within operations that goes largely unnoticed by the pilot workforce,this maybe the case, but by the same token whilst you are sitting in your cosy office that same pilot workforce may be dealing with all manner of horrors that are unnoticed by us,e.g bad weather operations,unruly pax, fatigue etc.
Whilst I applaud your defence of our profession, I would also recommend to you that operations provide decision making support once the aircraft is airborne if required by the crew,but should not take direct responsibilty for the operation of that aircraft, this lies squarely at the feet of the commander, the reason being that he is the man on the spot best placed to make a decision in a live situation.
ND Hapag Lloyd Operations/TUI GP OPS
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this lies squarely at the feet of the commander, the reason being that he is the man on the spot best placed to make a decision in a live situation.
Had this particular flight have operated under FAR121 as SD has commented the question would hopefully have been asked "Why do you think you can make MUC when the flight planning system and my calculations says your going to be short?". From there if a resolution could not have been reached the dispatcher would have had the authority and could have taken action to have the aircraft land.
When the Commander made the decision to continue to MUC did anyone question it, did anyone run a gear down plan and pass any predicted fuel burns, and was any flight planning assistance offered by HL ops?
With the greatest of respect on this occassion it is quite obvious that the statement "this lies squarely at the feet of the commander, the reason being that he is the man on the spot best placed to make a decision in a live situation" is incorrect.
Now whilst I hope as SD and others on this forum have said this inquirey may lead to a fundamental review of Operations Control in Europe I think we are all big enough and ugly enough to realise FAR121 style dispatch is not going to be the outcome.
I wait for the results with interest.
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>>>to realise FAR121 style dispatch is not going to be the outcome.
Probably not. It'll probably take the death of a member of a royal family, a politician, or a pop music star...
>>>No amount of operational intervention can fly an aircraft,
No, it can't. As I've said previously, a dispatcher (anywhere) can't teleport themselves from the office to the cockpit and wrestle control away from an errant PIC. A dispatcher -can- however take independent steps to declare an emergency when a PIC's action is likely to become a single-point failure.
>>>to blame lack of operational input for the vienna incident is ludicrous particularly as operations are reliant upon what the pilot chooses to tell them in the first place.
I don't believe I've ever blamed "operational input" as a possible cause, but I have mentioned "operational control" as a likely factor, and they are two different things. Rather than rehash all that here, please feel free to see US FAR 1.1, or previous posts for exactly what "operational control" is. As far as being hostage as to only the info that a PIC wants to tell you, sure it happens sometimes, but because of our level of training here (the ADX is 98% common to the ATP), we usually are able to see through the smokescreeen. Via ACARS, dispatchers here can get a fuel query answered truthfully, and are sufficiently trained to know that extended flight with gear down eats fuel, a PIC's assertions that "they can make it" aside.
>>>I would also recommend to you that operations provide decision making support once the aircraft is airborne if required by the crew,but should not take direct responsibilty for the operation of that aircraft, this lies squarely at the feet of the commander, the reason being that he is the man on the spot best placed to make a decision in a live situation.
I can appreciate that you'd not like to see any kind of situation that could potentially result in a dispatcher there sharing the same legal fun as 3378's PIC is now enjoying, but it has to be noted that joint responsibility as practiced here can resolve these kinds of operational situations LONG before the event gets to a courtroom. You may think "the commander is the man on the spot best placed to make a decision in a live situation" but the accidents that I've mentioned previously, as well as 3378, don't always bear this out.
Probably not. It'll probably take the death of a member of a royal family, a politician, or a pop music star...
>>>No amount of operational intervention can fly an aircraft,
No, it can't. As I've said previously, a dispatcher (anywhere) can't teleport themselves from the office to the cockpit and wrestle control away from an errant PIC. A dispatcher -can- however take independent steps to declare an emergency when a PIC's action is likely to become a single-point failure.
>>>to blame lack of operational input for the vienna incident is ludicrous particularly as operations are reliant upon what the pilot chooses to tell them in the first place.
I don't believe I've ever blamed "operational input" as a possible cause, but I have mentioned "operational control" as a likely factor, and they are two different things. Rather than rehash all that here, please feel free to see US FAR 1.1, or previous posts for exactly what "operational control" is. As far as being hostage as to only the info that a PIC wants to tell you, sure it happens sometimes, but because of our level of training here (the ADX is 98% common to the ATP), we usually are able to see through the smokescreeen. Via ACARS, dispatchers here can get a fuel query answered truthfully, and are sufficiently trained to know that extended flight with gear down eats fuel, a PIC's assertions that "they can make it" aside.
>>>I would also recommend to you that operations provide decision making support once the aircraft is airborne if required by the crew,but should not take direct responsibilty for the operation of that aircraft, this lies squarely at the feet of the commander, the reason being that he is the man on the spot best placed to make a decision in a live situation.
I can appreciate that you'd not like to see any kind of situation that could potentially result in a dispatcher there sharing the same legal fun as 3378's PIC is now enjoying, but it has to be noted that joint responsibility as practiced here can resolve these kinds of operational situations LONG before the event gets to a courtroom. You may think "the commander is the man on the spot best placed to make a decision in a live situation" but the accidents that I've mentioned previously, as well as 3378, don't always bear this out.