Hapag-Llloyd Airbus pilot charged...

[411A]

Have to say...

SeniorDispatcher is right on target.
Those who might criticize my earlier comments would do well to find the original thread when this incident occured.

Private pilots, flying their personal aircraft occasionally run out of fuel, due to their own ill conceived actions.

This should never EVER happen with public transport aircraft, when suitable airports have been bypassed..

PS: always listen to your First Officer....he just might save your backside....bigtime.

[SeniorDispatcher]

Some links on the subject:

http://www.luftfahrt-presse-club.de/...apaglloyd.html

http://www.flugingenieur.de/hapaglloyd.htm

http://www.findarticles.com/cf_dls/m.../article.jhtml

http://www.findarticles.com/cf_dls/m.../article.jhtml

http://www.flybernhard.de/uebersicht.htm?

http://www.flybernhard.de/hlf_a310.htm

[The Doubtful Guest]

it's funny to hear so many comments from those who have not been on site - i was.
i suggest not to condemn anybody yet. there is a judge doing this job.
company pressure seems to be a main driver for many flightcrew decisions nowadays - however, the final responsibility remains with the pic. but that's only a generic statement...

dg

[BEagle]

Irrespective of whichever performance mode has been entered into the FMS, there are still Fuel Quantity Indicators and a full fuel system page on the ECAM...... Plus the fuel flow indicators, of course.

Time equals distance over speed, multiply by burn rate and subtract from total shown - does that give us enough fuel?

Surely it can't have been that basic?

[no sig]

Excellent post Senior Dispatcher.

Tartan Giant, I don't know what happened with this flight, but I wonder if the Ops/Dispatchers re-ran the operational flight plan based on gear down/lower level performance and advised the crew of the revised figures. Had that been done I wonder if the final outcome would have been different.

[694c]

I flew the A310 in the '80's and don't have the operating manuals any more. I do however have them for the A330 and out of interest made some calculations to try to get an insight into the performance available - they are after all quite similar aircraft.

Assuming ESAD 1500nm, wind 0, ISA standard, TOW 190t, alternate distance 100nm, normal long range cruise:

Initial FL 370
M .814
IAS 265kt
TAS 467kt
EPR 1.33
FF 2720 KG/hr per engine
Trip fuel 18200kg
Flight time 3:24

Minimum fuel calculation would typically be:
Taxy 500
Trip 18200
Contingency 1000
Alternate 2500
Final reserve 2500
Total 24700kg

Same flight with landing gear down:
There is a warning on the first page of the chapter:
'Use selected speed, disregard Flight Management fuel predictions'!
Initial FL 200
Trip fuel 44800Kg
Flight time 4:48
M .52
IAS 237kt
TAS 319kt
EPR 1.37
Fuel flow 4785Kg/hr per engine

assuming optimum step climbs, after 4 hours the cruise looks like this:
FL290
IAS 196kt
TAS 308kt
EPR1.42
Fuel flow 3370Kg/hr per engine

Therefore the average fuel burn is around 8t/hr for the gear down flight .

Draw your own conclusions!

[Tartan Giant]

Hmmm

With all due respect to the Senior Dispatcher, I stand by my comment.

I am aware of the hotch-potch of what various countries define as a Dispatcher - one tends to get a feel for various views in 38 years of flying. I know this will upset you SD, but I do feel that if Dispatchers want to act as PIC, then they should give up the ground job. I know a few who have done that!

PIC then chimed in "Yeah, I'm not going to take it."

Does a surgeon hover with the scalpel whilst he listens in on a 'conference call' to ascertain which way to cut?
Too many cooks spoil the broth in my book. DODAR by all means, but there is one Commander!

no sig
I take your point; but in this case, does it really require somebody on the ground to tell you, "it's not going to work".


694c
Many thanks for taking the time and trouble to make that data available. I agree with you, "Draw your own conclusions"!

I contend, it does not need a Dispatcher (and we are talking about a flight operating in Europe) to tell that flight-deck crew, "it's not going to work"!

TG

[SeniorDispatcher]

>>>I know this will upset you SD, but I do feel that if Dispatchers want to act as PIC, then they should give up the ground job. I know a few who have done that!

Not upset at all, as the "debate" started long before either of us were around, and will probably be around for alot longer.

I do know of a couple of dispatchers that went on to become pilots, and they were also excellent ones who truly knew, better than most, about what the true role of the dispatcher was (over here, at least) and the range of resouces that we could bring to bear when a problem arose. We also actually make some some pretty good troubleshooters. (I upset a PIC earlier today when I swapped his "good" aircraft and gave him one with an inop APU, so he could take it to sunny climes while the bird with the operative APU went on a flight to "Snow City". At least I made -one- of pilots happy.

I also know one particular captain, who, after his previous airline folded, went on to a start-up operation. He had his FAA ADX ticket, and he spent the first year there dispatching (before eventually getting a flying seat and later moving into senior management). After he went back to flying, he would later tell me that he never knew what was really involved with this operational discipline until he'd actually been in the position. Yes, operational control -is- an operational discipline---we're not all unfulfilled pilot wannabes. (Admittedly, there are a few).


>>>PIC then chimed in "Yeah, I'm not going to take it."

>>>Does a surgeon hover with the scalpel whilst he listens in on a >>>'conference call' to ascertain which way to cut?

No, nor should he have to. I related that example (from experience) because the PIC involved was waffling on whether to go or not. Had his flight's dispatcher been of the "Yessir, Yessir, Captain; you always know best" mentality, he may well have taken the flight. despite the obvious grounding item. The "get-there-itis" virus isn't restricted to the GA world.


>>>Too many cooks spoil the broth in my book. DODAR by all means, but there is one Commander!

Very true, but having -no- cooks sometimes results in the pot boiling over and creating a real -mess-.

I think that one common misconception about operational control (as it's done here in the US under Part 121) is that it's management by committee. In my view, it's -not--- just as there's one PIC (Commander), there's also one dispatcher, and whatever we agree upon is the key, irrespective of other influences.

Over the years, I've had flights with partial gears, single generators (on a twin) and other abnormal situations that tend to draw manangement out of the woodwork only to become huddled behind my desk, each with their own idea of the "right" thing to do. Believe me, I've heard some pretty "Peter Pan" suggestions over the years. Even so, I've listened to their comments, and have considered some of them, but I always knew that the final decision as far as what to recomend to the PIC was with me, and nobody else.

What will be interesting (for me) to see from the Hapag Lloyd investigation is -who- was actually conversing with the aircraft (via ACARS), and presumably making the decisions as far as going to Hanover, Munich, Stuttgart, or wherever, and what level of training (aircraft systems and performance) that they possessed, and what level of responsibility they had (or didn't have). Because of my training, I know that an extended gear will suck fuel at a horrific rate, but does that management guy? Some of these guys don't know there arse from an APU. Maybe it's from watching television or movies.

Based upon all the variations in operational control around the world, it would not surprise me in the least if it were found that the "dispatcher" in this event had no other responsibilities/duties other than routine flight plan generation, and that one or more "managers" got into a debate on where to put the aircraft down. If that proves to actually be the case, that will be much more of a "too many cooks spoil the broth" example than is the one-on-one PIC/dispatcher relationship that we see here in the US.


>>>no sig
>>>I take your point; but in this case, does it really require >>>somebody on the ground to tell you, "it's not going to work".

To reiterate, in a perfect world, it really shouldn't, but then again, we all know it's not a perfect world. I've caught their mistakes, just as they've caught mine, and it's that two-way exchange between PIC and dispatcher that allows it. Why is it that CRM between PIC and F/O is such a great idea, but that CRM between the PIC and a Part 121-style dispatcher somehow isn't?

Dr. Phil Smith, at Ohio State Universtity (Columbus OH) did a studt of pilots and dispatchers a few years back. The pilots were split into two groups, as were the dispatchers. He concocted an operational scenario (quite realistic, I thought) that had an rather insidious side effect on the proposed flight.

Working by themselves, 70% of the first pilot group caught the error, while the first group of dispatchers (also working by themselves) had 80% catch the error. (BTW, I'm not inferring that dispatchers are 10% smarter than pilots, only that the difference is largely attributable to the fact that dispatchers often see operational problems much more often than an individual pilot due to the centralized nature of our offices). Dr. Smith gave the second group of pilots and dispatchers the same operational scenario, but these two groups got to converse about it one-on-one, and by golly, they caught the error 100% of the time.

Could it be that both pilots and dispatchers -each- bring something unique to the party, and that "two heads" are truly better than "one?" You can guess where I stand, although I fully understand and respect your opinion to the contrary.

Cheers...

[ATC Watcher]

Very good explanations .SD, thank you, and very informative as well on how it is done in the States. .

I was shown at the time a transcript of the ACARS "dialogue" between HF ops and the A310. If my own memory serves me well, there was nothing on it suggesting OPS pressure to divert to MUC or VIE . There was a mention of Stuttgart if I remember but all was on the suggestion tone.

I also think a copy of that transcript was put on PPruNe at one stage or another. maybe someone remembers the link.

[Avman]

An excellent reply SD. The same philosophy applies (should apply) to many other professional relationships. I believe it's called Resource Management . Unfortunately, the "I'm better than you" syndrome still dominates our society and professional lives.

[BOAC]

Good arguments on all sides ................... but it has been said many times before - inputs from the ground, being 'No 1 on the list' etc etc - until all the facts are known, we CANNOT make a judgement, except to say that until commercial a/c are controlled from the ground , there is only one person who has the ULTIMATE responsibility in law for allowing the fuel to run out before landing. All else is contributory, and there may well be blame attached there, but, refer to 'Rule 1'!

Indeed, many are the Naval Ships' Captains who have been court-martialled for events which occurred whilst they were 'not on watch'. It goes with the job.

[SeniorDispatcher]

>>>there is only one person who has the ULTIMATE responsibility in law for allowing the fuel to run out before landing. All else is contributory, and there may well be blame attached there, but, refer to 'Rule 1'!

That’s pretty much the way the US NTSB found in the 1990 Avianca 52 accident near JFK, i.e. the probable cause being the PIC’s allowing it to happen, and the lack of an operational control system as #1 in the contributing factors list, “loading and cocking the gun” that the crew would eventually “fire”.

http://amelia.db.erau.edu/reports/ntsb/aar/AAR91-04.pdf


A clarification is also in order, methinks. Lest anyone get the idea that I believe that dispatchers are infallible and can prevent all accidents. We’re certainly not, and we certainly can’t, and the same can be said for pilots, mechanics, F/As, ATC controllers, or any other human being involved with the processes involved. While numerous airline and aviation technologies have make stellar leaps over the years, we are all still the same old Mk-1 human beings with inherent fallibilities. It is the recognition and the acceptance of this, and the subsequent design of regulations, policies, and procedures (and adherence to them) that best ensure the safety of not only the flying public, but the non-flying public who live underneath the potential path of wreckage bits.

In previous training roles, I always told the newbies that it wasn’t a dispatcher’s job to fly the aircraft, per se, but to act as a troubleshooter, searching for and eradicating problems before they could bite someone in the arse. Everyone knows that accidents are almost always a result of a chain of errors, and if we can think of those chain links as individual wheels on a slot machine, operational control (properly done) can be that –last- wheel that –doesn’t- turn over.

It remains to be seen what the outcome of the HF3378 investigation will be, but it'll be interesting to watch.

Cheers...

[Frosch]

There was no pressure from 'OPS' to fly to a certain airport, since HLF-Ops does not have the man-power to take care about such incidents. The 'gear-down'-problem had been 'solved' in the flight-deck. E.g. the chief of the airbus fleet went to lunch after having a brief look on what was going on. The problem with HLF-OPS is that you don't get enough support when time-pressure is high (not the problem in this case). They are very, very lean. You're better off by telling them what's going to happen. This is not the type of 'dispatch' that some of you might be thinking of.

To the topic: Of course there have been lot's of mistakes, but none of the posts comes near the whole story. So just wait another couple of years until the austrians release their final report.

[Tartan Giant]

Gnd Ctl to Major Tom

Senior Dispatcher
Many thanks for your balanced and considerate views - and for not being upset at my suggestions!

I can see I would have readily taken kind advice from you in my flying days, and I can see you would not be averse to the PIC making the final decision.

Taking the incident we are all talking about here, I see little time for a lengthy ACARS or perhaps even a lengthy R/T exchange.

From the list of references you give SD (thank you) there is another pointer than shows the options had drawn to a rapid close.

Meanwhile, according to an official press release from the investigation team, the following aspects of the case can be confirmed:

* The pilots used only the FMC for their fuel calculations.

* The airplane's fuel gauges were functioning. Low fuel warning (about 1.3t) was 40 N.M. abeam of Zagreb (distance to Vienna at this time was about 120 N.M.)

Having taken off from the island of Crete, one does not need to be a safety-related giant to know a lot of suitable airfields (OK no Airbus repairs on site) have been passed by the time you are ABM Zagreb.

Your splendid 'post' SD mentioned,

because the PIC involved was waffling on whether to go or not.

From where I'm sitting, there's seems to have been a bit too much "waffling on" between this particular aircraft and ground; ending up running out fuel so, so, so very near VIE's runway (akin to the Kegworth disaster).

There are occasions where a drawn out debate between air and ground can be beneficial - this case unfortunately seems to prove the opposite.

Frosch has the idea,

You're better off by telling them what's going to happen.

Using that analogy - that's enough from me!

TG

[SeniorDispatcher]

>>>Many thanks for your balanced and considerate views - and for not being upset at my suggestions!

Likewise, I’m sure…


>>>I can see I would have readily taken kind advice from you in my flying days, and I can see you would not be averse to the PIC making the final decision.

That would depend upon whether I concurred with your preferred choice of action as being the safest. About 99.9999% of the time, I’d agreed with a PIC’s course of action, but every once in awhile, that .0001% situation rears its ugly head, and the PIC suggests something that is patently unsafe. It happens. Really.

As I mentioned earlier, US Part 121 (Domestic/Flag) flights are commenced via a joint-responsibility and concurrence process. Should those previously agreed upon parameters change once enroute, the party first becoming aware of the change has a duty and responsibility (per other regs) to advise the party unaware of the change(s). After both PIC and dispatcher are aware of the changes, concurrence must be re-established that it’s a safe operation.

If, during one of those rare .0001% situations, I happen to disagree with the PIC’s course of action, I cannot, of course, beam-myself into his/her cockpit, or telepathically take control of their aircraft from my office workstation. While that fact might make the issue seem like a moot point to some, our FARs here in the US leave the dispatcher far from being an afterthought in the safety equation:

Section 121.627: Continuing flight in unsafe conditions.
(a) No pilot in command may allow a flight to continue toward any airport to which it has been dispatched or released if, in the opinion of the pilot in command or dispatcher (domestic and flag operations only), the flight cannot be completed safely; unless, in the opinion of the pilot in command, there is no safer procedure. In that event, continuation toward that airport is an emergency situation as set forth in §121.557.

If you’re looking for an application, take a look at:

http://amelia.db.erau.edu/reports/ntsb/aar/AAR85-03.pdf

This was the Air Illinois HS-748 crash back in 1985. In a nutshell, the PIC (a really pro-company guy) and his trust F/O (a real whiz on the aircraft) were on the last flight of the night, and the destination was the airline’s hub, complete with crewbase and MX folks. Their aircraft had a history of generator problems, and 90 seconds after takeoff (night VMC) the generator quit. The F/O, unfortunately, disconnected the wrong CSD, and without any APU, they were now a battery-powered aircraft.

Their destination, :40 away, was night IMC with showers and embedded cells in the area. At the time of the F/O plucked the wrong CSD, the PIC told ATC that they had “a minor electrical problem” and declined the air traffic controller’s offer of a 180 degree turn to the VMC departure airport just a couple of minutes behind them. Off they went, load shedding so much that the F/A comes up front wondering why it’s so dark in the cabin, and that some pax have noticed.

The F/O is watching the amp meter like a hawk, and the needle is holding steady. About halfway to their rainy destination, the PIC says to his F/O: “Please, if you would, don’t say a thing to dispatch about this, not a %&^%* thing.” The F/O responds by saying: “Yeah, the less you tell those folks the better off you are.” Fast forwarding, their NiCad battery quits after about :30, they stall/spin, go boom, and all aboard die.

This was a Part 121 flight, and it’s clear the dispatcher (and the safety mechanism they provide) was intentionally circumvented. Had the crew advised their dispatcher at the time the failure(s) occurred and told them of their plan to run a :40 flight on a :30 battery, the disagreement between PIC and dispatcher would have triggered the emergency. As I said before, the dispatcher can’t seize control of the aircraft, but they can alert ATC than an emergency situation exists and that the aircraft needs to be issued that 180 degree turn despite any crew protests. With the proverbial “cat out of the bag” as far as ATC (and thus FAA) awareness is concerned, maybe one of the flightcrew would have snapped to.


>>>Taking the incident we are all talking about here, I see little time for a lengthy ACARS or perhaps even a lengthy R/T exchange.

Leaving the Hapag-Lloyd flight aside momentarily, unless there’s an engine fire (you can pull and turn the red handles on your own, thanks) there is usually enough time to converse with one’s dispatcher. Numerous items in the aircraft’s QRH (over here) are appropriately flagged as such, as the idea is to start discussing the situation with dispatcher more “sooner” than “later” in the flight (and perhaps in the accident sequence). Back to Hapag-Lloyd, and assuming US Part 121 regs were in place and that they were followed, a dispatcher could have been aware of the extended gear soon after departure, allowing for diversion to places a lot further south than was Vienna, if not their takeoff point. If the PIC had insisted upon continuing, the dispatcher could have initiated the declaration of an emergency independently from the crew.

In aviation, one of the things that makes for optimal flight safety is redundancy, and the mitigation (if not outright elimination) of potential single-point failures. Everyone seems to understand and accept that in the contexts of tangible mechanical stuff, but it simply amazes me at times that some have a problem applying the same risk mitigation and elimination to the intangible stuff like human factors and decisionmaking.

Cheers…

[M.Mouse]

SD your postings are reminiscent of days past here on PPRuNe, interesting and knowledgable postings by those that actually possess some knowledge!

I have always been unsure of the actual role of an FAA Dispatcher. I am a widebody captain and, frankly, the more impartial assistance I can get, in making a difficult decision, the better. I know I don't have all the answers and, funny enough, can make errors of judgement too.

Now can we return to making the more normal postings, full of abuse, innuendo and ignorant opinion?

Thank you.

[SeniorDispatcher]

Thanks for the kind words...

Part of the problem is that while some countries encourage or even require their own "dispatchers" to have a US FAA Aircraft Dispatcher certificate (issued under Part 65 of the US FARs), it's of limited use in the sense that a non-US airline is operating under their own country's rules which don't necessarily require the same US Part 121 Domestic/Flag level of operational control.

The situation is tantamount to having a law enforcement officier who has special training and certification in weapons use in one country, but when they go to work back home, the local rules of engagement don't allow them to be most optimally utilized, and the special training and certification become just words on a resume.

Lest anyone think I'm infallible, MX helped lead me to an inappropriate recomendation to a PIC the other day, and this time around the PIC was the one who said "Hey, wait a minute" and got me to look at that pesky MEL a little closer, and we didn't go. Operational control isn't about flight management by vast committees of folks, it's about a basic mechanism (2 folks) of concurrence.

[SeniorDispatcher]

For anyone interested, I found some info on dispatching in Germany...

http://www.flugdienstberater.org/Assembly03.htm

[A/P Disc]

Frosch

You claim that there was no pressure form HLF Ops to
divert to a certain airport.

I have read the ACARS messages between OPS and the
A/C and there was an intense discussion about which
airport they could just reach.

Care to comment??

[fmgc]

Once the doors are shut who is in charge of the aeroplane?

Answer: The Captain, not the company.

He ran out of fuel.

Simple verdict, doubt it will take too long to come to a guilty decision.