https://www.helis.com/database/cn/16331/

I wonder if the sale is related to the incident? Must have been some ride for the passengers.

i'm betting that both the toilet and the gearbox need attention ;-)

Deleted nonsense

My understanding is no, the owner never flew in it a lot anyway. As a multi billionaire it's not about the money, he just doesn't use it any more and he is withdrawing from public life, likely because of his age (he's 84). It's been informally for sale for a while but I think we have now moved to active marketing. There are not many VIP S-92 for non Heads of State/ Royalty so what happens to it next will be interesting.

1400 hours in 14 years - and I bet a chunk of that was on the Penzance - Isles of Scilly route recently. Also, not a traditional VIP cabin as intended to ferry reasonable numbers around.

Jeopardy and Blame
 

Many of the contributors to this thread might be surprised to see a response from me, but I feel that if we are committed to making things better, and if any change for the better come is to from my bad example, then a degree of honesty and acceptance of criticism is warranted. I have not seen all the comments, but I can imagine what most of them say - and who they blame. For the avoidance of any doubt, may I set out here that I will never take umbrage or hold any personal grudge (nor will I ever seek or look to take action) against anyone who quite rightly questions and expressing shock and dismay at the apparent failings and errors highlighted in this most unfortunate - and ultimately avoidable - tale. Whatever is said and how ever it is said, I accept your right to say it.

I have seen a few comments that make reference to both the CAA and the Owner. May I state for the record, that the behaviour of both these has been exemplary and they have both set the highest standards of Just Culture and conduct. Neither of these people or organisations warrant or deserve the slightest criticism, and in fact they deserve your admiration and praise for their highest standards of conduct and empathy. I made two telephone calls within the first hour of landing. The first was to the Owner's office and the second was to the CAA to report what had happened. I will not share the details, but needlessly to say the Owner's office question was 'was this dangerous?', and my reply was that it was and it was my fault. The fact that they subsequently looked to understand the circumstances more fully rather than sacking me on the spot, is beyond belief and much to their credit - they are very rare people and deserve nothing less than your admiration. Similarly with the CAA, they accepted the information I gave them and rightly put me on notice that I may be subject to action following further investigation, but again - if you ever doubted that the CAA understands and follows Just Culture, I am an example that they do. The AAIB report paints a picture, but it is a picture of the incident - and you should all trust that the CAA make their own judgements. I was always fully ready to accept the judgement, whatever it was going to be.

I wish to also make sure everyone, who might not have a true understanding of the pressures and threats that are fundamentally part of Corporate Aviation (and you will never eliminate them, they can only be managed - it is like asking a fish not to swim in water); there was absolutely zero pressure applied by the owners in this story. Any pressure that might have been there (and there will always be pressure in any commercial aviation), it was not from them.

The reality is that no matter what your experience, and no matter how many excellent jobs or flights you have done in your past, we must all accept (or we should accept) that on any given day you will be in jeopardy of making errors in judgement and skill for as long as you sit in a cockpit. You may hope and pray that your worst day does not end up under the microscope of the AAIB, but it may - and you should never relax from watching out for the traps and pitfalls that can build quietly and silently into your otherwise 'normal day'. You all have a right to be brutally critical of my errors and mistakes, but I caution you to be careful - to fully understand any environment (and corporate aviation to off airfield landing sites at night are a very particular environment) there are many things you need to experience first hand to fully understand. It is very easy to say 'I would never' or 'that would never be me' - and I sincerely hope that it will never be you, if for no other reason than you have read this AAIB report - but there are a few things that I will tell you now: In an incident that rapidly develops into a life threatening situation, for the pilot flying (with all the other normal demands on attention in the cockpit) it cascades from normal to emergency like falling off a cliff, and the demands on your attention jump from 10 per second to a 1000 per second and if you think you will be reliably 100% of the professional pilot you are in the simulator - you are deluded. My experience, and you can disagree again, is that you will be lucky to hang onto 20% of that normally competent and good pilot - and you just hope that the remaining 20% is the skill and experience that climbs you out of the hole alive. I am not talking about the normal emergency situation, I am talking about the type of emergency situation where you know that what you do in the next 3 seconds determines the fate of you and everybody on board - and if you question whether that conscious thought actually takes place, remarkably enough, the answer is yes.

Should I have resigned? If anyone in this forum doesn't think that was my first, second and third thought - you do me an injustice. I ask you to understand that in my role I had to think about what that would have meant for the jobs and security of all the extremely valuable, professional and superb people that work in our team. I owed them my heartfelt apologies for letting them down so badly, but I also owed them every ounce of my energy and effort to make sure their jobs would be ok after it.

We have discussed this very openly and completely transparently in the team - when it first happened and when the report was published. I have no issues talking about it with anyone who genuinely wants to learn something about avoiding this again.

The microscopic examination and judgement of an AAIB investigation is never a kind or friendly experience, but it is a necessary and useful thing. You should note that there are possibly a thousand things you do in a day that are 'normal' variations on your best performance, and they will never be judged until the day there is a bad outcome; but once there is a bad outcome, everyone of them will be examined as an ;'error' or 'failing' that could or would contribute to the bad outcome - whether it did or didn't (because nobody can reliably know for sure).

I do not expect anyone to agree with whether I should still have a job, or whether I should still have a licence, but I ask you to listen to me when I advise you to never relax your attention to the subtle changes in threats in your normal day, that will build up without making a big noise or having one critical moment. I also advise you to recognise that no matter how good a pilot your are, as long as you sit in a cockpit, you are in jeopardy of making bad calls and bad judgements. Finally, my recommendation is that you listen to any first question of doubt in your mind during pre-flight planning, pause and check the cause for doubt - once your are airborne, the corridor of options can collapse around you and leave you just one door of consequence at the end remarkably quickly and possibly quicker than you can react.

I would ask you to all respect that this is not my finest moment, and my career will forever be coloured by this day in my life, but it is right and proper you should learn from it - as that is what we all owe to the future generation of pilots, learn from other's mistakes.

I understand your anger, but do not for a minute think that this matches my shame. But as an industry, hopefully, we will be better.

I do not propose to respond to any other posts on this thread - but you will have no objections from me regardless of what you feel the need to say.

Up there with the very best of posts this forum has ever seen. Thank you.

I would highly recommend everyone to have this very thought at the fore of their memory banks.

DrSM, thank you for your forthright post, I'm unable to remember when anyone, besides Dennis Kenyon, has given such a self examination in public,

Thank you Sir, and Salute.

DrSM I don’t know you but that was a very humble and honest post, thank you. Best of luck for the future….”there but for the grace of god, go I”

It is a very open and honest post - it is a shame that DrSM had to nearly crash before understanding the harsh realities of being a pilot and, that no matter how good you or others think you are, a situation can come and bite you in the arse if you are too confident in your own abilities to realise you are human.

Flying is so much more than being good on the sticks and poles - personality, attitude and self-awareness are key factors that colour the ultimate reason for every successful flight or disastrous one- Decision Making.

I have scared myself most in my career at night without doubt, mainly before the advent of NVG and anyone operating in such a regime should make huge extra allowances for human failings and err on the side of caution, no matter how clever the aircraft you are flying is.

Indeed. Thank you sir. We all need to take a lesson from you regarding humility, self-awareness and honesty, as much as safety.

https://cimg7.ibsrv.net/gimg/pprune....2f6910991a.png

I agree,
Thanks.

What an asshat.

I concur with all of that.

Appreciate fully what Crab is saying.
Not sure how else anyone expected SM to respond if going ‘public’ - it was a very thoughtful post and well conveyed. For whatever reason the crew messed-up in spades - if it was truly multi-crew rather than 2-pilot.
Some of us have been fortunate enough to receive such a kick-up-the-ar5e early in our flying career and mentally-adjusted accordingly - we are all human and therefore will make mistakes but some of us don’t make a living preaching about it so do not open ourselves to such publicity.

Quite. I reiterate my previous post.

Helonorth and Heathcliff - I really don't see why you seem to have a problem is with my post.

Is it because I said he had to have a near accident to be open and honest about human frailties?

Crab

As someone who knows the gentleman concerned, professionally, (and no i don't work for him and never have) and who has attended several of the training courses he has run at Cranfield, i can say with absolute certainty that he was well aware of "the harsh realities of being a pilot" and was more than prepared to be "open and honest about human frailties" long before the incident occurred. One of the most recurring comments arising from his presentations was regarding how open and honest he was in using case studies involving himself and his company.

This event proves that no matter who you are you can be wrong and you can get it wrong.

Should he have got it wrong? - No of course he should not (nor should any pilot) and he more than anyone will be aware of that. But we are all human and we are all subject to making errors.

What we should be doing now is reflecting on the lessons of this rather than taking cheap shots at people from the comfort of our anonymous armchairs.

You refer to the nights where you have scared yourself... I wonder how close any of those events were to becoming an incident such as this one? Perhaps closer than you would like to think or admit.

In the event that your actions on those nights were subject to the level of scrutiny and analysis that has been brought to bear here I wonder how you would come out of it looking?

I think that what people are taking exception to is your holier than thou attitude.

In that case they are reading into my post something that isn't there - why else did I allude to situations when I had learned hard lessons about my own frailties?

Your contention that he had only understood his human frailties after his own mistake is a bizarre one. There is no suggestion that this is the case, as those who have attended his course will verify.

It shouldn’t be a surprise, particularly in aviation, that people have a habit of only recognising their frailties after a near death experience. Presuming of course they are fortunate enough to survive the lesson.
Crab may be a bit crabby in his response but he is quite right. A bruised ego may just save someone’s life. Moving on..

Nowhere has it been said or even suggested that this is the case though. It's an assumption. Admittedly it is true of most of us, and indeed I count myself amid that number, but I wouldn't assume it of anyone.
It seemed a strange thing to take away from that post, that's all.

HC, I don’t know you. You don’t know me, I certainly don’t know crabcakes. I do understand being misunderstood. I seriously doubt that what was read into the comment was what was intended.
The internet is full of static and has terrible signal on a good day.

Very good point. I apologise if I have misread. And a great phrase to take away from the thread as well as everything else!

Just for clarity - I was trying to emphasise an old aviation adage - Experience is what you get just after you really needed it - ie those close calls should and hopefully do, improve us as pilots because we should learn from our own mistakes as well as those of others. I know I have and when it comes to flying, I am my own harshest critic.

Has my ego led me to make mistakes in the air? Most certainly, especially in my younger days.

I'm not taking cheap shots from an anonymous armchair, I am pointing out that Dr SM would likely never again put himself in a similar position because he did learn from it - I'm sure he was aware of how poor decision making can escalate rapidly before he had this incident but it still happened to him. He has moved on, older and wiser and to his credit not shied away from understanding the causes but discussed them openly.

That's a keeper B r, do you mind?

That certainly is a true statement, on a good day! Anyway, we need a like button for post #131.

In the interest of internet-based harmony and understanding, go forth and use liberally.. :ok:

Apologies again Crab, and amen to all that!

No worries:ok: Bell Ringer's observation re t'interweb is spot on - not the first time my posts have been construed to mean something that wasn't intended.

If this is not the first time your meaning has been misconstrued, it's possible that there's another learning opportunity here.

Yes, for everyone who uses social media :ok:

In aviation -

Any Penzance Helicopters, Sloane Helicopters, Castle Air or whoever else has operated the Scilly Isles runs when the same crew and S92 were present care to elaborate on the applicable weather minima v what actual weather the S92 was conducting approaches into Mounts Bay in, post incident clearly but also post report publication? This is a question not an assertion before anybody jumps on it.

The problem with communication is the belief that it has occurred.

I have been a regular visitor to PPRUNE as a guest for quite some time and I have been entertained and educated in equal measures over the years, but it is only today that I have actually registered to enable me to post a response to this thread which I have been reading with interest since this unfortunate incident happened.

Who cannot be moved by Dr SM’s soul searching and apparent words of wisdom to help us all learn from this unfortunate incident? I have experience of corporate aviation and I can empathise with what the good Doctor says as a pilot – especially with regards to the making a night approach to an off-airfield site – I have done more than my fair share of them and it is rarely a relaxing experience.

However, what has driven me to register and exercise the right to comment on this thread, as Dr SM has invited us to do, is that if we are going to have an open and honest discussion about this matter than we should do this in full visibility of all of the information. I know Dr SM well and he knows me, unfortunately our relationship has not been harmonious.

There is no doubt that Dr SM is a charming character, there are many that have been seduced by his silver tongue and even I have been tempted to rush out and stock up on his own unique brand of aviation inspired Snake Oil. However I feel that I must also mention that I am involved in legal proceedings with a company (over which he presides) during which I will aver that I have suffered significant financial lose for making protected disclosures around matters concerning MCC. A ‘whistleblowing’ claim as it is known.

MCC is at the heart of my legal dispute and I believe that is also at the heart of this incident. The AAIB report itself is long, technical and complex and I expect there are few of us that have the time or inclination to read it all again so perhaps I can urge you to re-read Dr SM’s recent post on this thread and consider it from a slightly different perspective.

Firstly he mentions the CAA and the owners office and heaps praise on them for their attitude towards a Just Culture (I can tell you at this point that the HR Manager for the company that Dr SM presides over had previously informed me that she had never heard of a Just Culture). I support these comments from Dr SM. He does not extend the same praise to the AAIB who have carried out a thoroughly professional and detailed report and are perhaps, the one organisation that have genuinely attempted to ensure that lessons are learnt. In the execution of this process, they have been critical of his actions and the organisational structure of the company which he oversees. He describes them as ‘painting a picture’, perhaps inviting us to believe that this was the artist impression of what happened rather than a full and detailed report on what actually happened based on hard and unequivocal data that has not the benefit if any ‘spin’ applied to the narrative?

He then takes us inside the cockpit and starts by making the broad point that to err is human. Who can deny that this is true but then he goes on to infer that we must be cautious of being too critical because of commercial pressure (of which he seems to infer that that he was a victim of such pressure even if the pressure wasn’t direct pressure) and that night off airfield landings are a particular hazard and only those who have experienced them can truly understand? Is this the equivalent of the Hollywood portrayal of the Vietnam veteran being probed about his actions who dismisses the questions with the response ‘You weren’t there man’?

He then goes on state that if we think that we, as pilots that train in the simulator, will take that training to the real world and do as we do in the simulator then we are ‘deluded’. What does this tell us about his own personal attitude to training? Can we draw anything from this as to what value he places on such training? Does he believe that TRE’s knowingly sign pilots’ licences secure in the knowledge that if they get a ‘real’ emergency they can only be expected to remember 20% of what they have been taught? Is it fair for him to assume that because his own performance was found lacking, in the same situation everybody else’s would be as well? He talks about the emergency developing as quickly as failing off a cliff. Let us remember that this was not a catastrophic gearbox failure, this was a planned approach into a site that he was very familiar with in a perfectly serviceable airframe fitted with all the bells and whistles and with the benefit of a highly experienced pilot by his side.

Dr SM seems to be asking as to be guided by him on our views and opinions as he has experienced this first-hand and we haven’t. Whilst it is true that none of us were there, wouldn’t the debate more constructive if he centred it around why he was? Surely this was never meant to be a night landing, it was planned to be a day VFR approach and the AAIB report seems to infer that the weather wasn’t even suitable for this.

The report doesn’t shy away from the fact that the dangers associated with attempting the flight were known by Dr SM prior to take–off; “We are really up against it”. I would also make the point that any decisions that were made, were made by Dr SM and Dr SM alone. My reading of the report is that the cockpit gradient was completely wrong and if I am correct in this where should the blame sit? With the F/O or the Commander? Did the F/O not attempt to air some concerns and offer alternative and safer options that fell on deaf ears? When the wheel really came off would it be true to say it that there was very little acceptance that the other half of the team may have had a view and would be able to make a valuable contribution?

It seems to me that there is a strong possibility that Dr SM was of the view that he, and he only, knew what was best. He adds drama with comments alluding to the fact that unless he did something in the next three seconds they would all perish. The counter to this is that if he had listened to the F/O he wouldn’t have been in that situation and had he allowed the F/O to take control, the F/O would have most likely calmly pressed the go-round button and engaged the autopilot to get the helicopter safely climbing away back to Birmingham to position for an ILS and avoid any endangering of life or overtorque of the aircraft. Interestingly Dr SM generally talks in the singular when discussing the incident as if the F/O wasn’t there.

Dr SM then discusses how he considered resignation. He claims that this was at the forefront of his mind and states that he did not do this to protect the jobs of others that work in the company. Let’s consider this for a second or two. The Company has been around for over 40 years and is owned by Lux Aviation and yet Dr SM seems to believe that without him at the helm the company would fail and employees would lose their jobs. What does this tell us about his ego? Would it be fair to say that during the incident it appeared that he felt that he and he alone knew what was best for the flight and now he alone knows what’s best for the company? What does this say about his view of MCC procedures?

What I can tell you is that 6 weeks after the incident I sent an email concerning a company pilot who was transferring to a MP operation within the company and required an initial MP type rating which concluded with the following paragraph “However, whilst not wanting to interfere with the way Fairoaks works, I have been puzzled by the amount of time we have spent trying to prove that an MCC Course is not required. Given that all of his previous MP experience was almost 20 years ago, my recommendation from a risk mitigation point of view, would be that he completed an MCC Course prior to doing the 10 hours MP training or we complete the combined initial MP/MCC course where he is schooled in the (company name) MP SOP’s simulating (company name) operations. This appears to be an opportunity to get things right and provide the best possible training. It is my personal view that a lot of onshore operators have made a mess of the transition to MP operations and end up paying for two pilots but not receiving the safety benefits of a well organised and well trained for MP operation with robust SOP’s and experience and training that is relevant to their operation” To the best of my knowledge the pilot concerned never completed the MCC training. This is why I have an open mind about the rumours that are circulating concerning the aircraft continuing to operate in poor weather.

Dr SM has indicated that the focus should be on making things safer (on this matter at least we whole heartedly agree). If we are to focus on this then I believe we should be looking at all of the issues that surround this subject both pre and post incident. For those of you that are interested the legal aspects of my dispute with Dr SM’s company will be decided at Bristol Employment Tribunal from the 21st to the 24th of February next year. Employment Tribunals are public which means that the press and members of the public are welcome to attend and listen to the evidence heard and the judgments delivered. Given what Dr SM has said in his post, I hope that he will stand by his words and he and his legal team will not oppose this incident being discussed under oath as I believe that MCC training is at the heart of my claim and indeed this incident. I also hope that certain documents that I have requested regarding this matter – such as the internal company report relating to this incident will be released – up until now there has been a reluctance to do this.

G-LAWX S92 Incident Discussion
 

A very thought provking responce by Dickie B and for me the following is particulary cogent.

‘’ My reading of the report is that the cockpit gradient was completely wrong and if I am correct in this where should the blame sit? With the F/O or the Commander? Did the F/O not attempt to air some concerns and offer alternative and safer options that fell on deaf ears? When the wheel really came off would it be true to say it that there was very little acceptance that the other half of the team may have had a view and would be able to make a valuable contribution

I retired from flying some years ago but during my spell as CP of a corporate S76 operation I included the following in our corporate operations manual to ensure the Pilot Monitoring (called co pilot in the old days and another captain but sat in the left seat) was fully empowerd and briefed prior to any approach.



‘’ duties, responsibilities and calls to be made by the co pilot including actions he should take in the event of failure of the handling pilot to adhere to minimum altitudes/heights, RVR’s, approach bans and descent below MDA/DA.

The form of words for the briefing should be along the lines of:

‘ In the event of descent below minimum specified Altitude/Height or continued approach below specified RVR/MDA/DA without the required visual references you are to verbally warm me by calling ‘Go Around I say again Go Around’. In the event of non immediate corrective/overshoot action by me you are to take control with the words’’ I have control’’ and take overshoot action’

It's not perfect but at least it addressed a serious issue at a critical time.

Whilst Dr SM’s contrition is laudable, I welcome the shift that the last couple of posts has brought. The previous very mild criticisms that had been made were heavily criticized by some willing to accept DrSMs humility and contrition at face value when, in detail, his post was threadbare in any examination of why the flight was executed so badly. It is all very well reaching the conclusion that you should heed your doubts whilst still on the ground, but this glosses over why, once airborne, a lack of protocols and MCC & CRM nearly resulted in a fatality with two pilots and such a capable aircraft.

The lack of procedural definition, including at which points a missed approach would be initiated and how this would be done is a glaring deficiency. And the second poorly planned approach after the first went dangerously wrong, and following an overtorque, was a stunnigly bad decision and insufficiently challenged. Honourable mention should also go to hand flying an S92 because you are a bit out of practice in deteriorating light and marginal weather conditions. That isn’t just a bad decision; it is a failure to understand that important levels of protection are being removed for the wrong reasons at the wrong time.

Was the flight dangerous? Yes, but only because the crew made a series of very poor active and passive decisions. This event did not just involve one bad decision or error of judgement; it was replete with them.

It is also not unfair or unreasonable to question why someone in DrSMs position could conduct a flight like this and there to have been so few protections to have stopped him doing so when he failed to apply long established industry standards. Were they lacking in the operation, or simply ignored because that is just stuff on paper?

Question him, then. He does offer for anyone to do so if they wish but said he would not respond further to the thread. Alternatively, if you just want to keep villifying someone on a forum where you feel anonymous, then carry on, but you will not learn anything. Which is, after all, what you are asking to do.

I'm afraid I don't see where he made the offer.